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Classical Series

THE MENO OF PLATO

THE

MENO OF PLATO

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND EXCURSUSES

BY

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ΘΗΣΕΥΣ

ὦ πόλλ' ἁμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην,
τί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε
καὶ πάντα μηχανᾶσθε κἀξευρίσκετε,
ἓν δ' οὐκ ἐπίστασθ' οὐδ' ἐθηράσασθέ πω,
φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς;

ΙΠΠΟΛΥΤΟΣ

δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας, ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖν
τοὺς μὴ φρονοῦντας δυνατός ἐστ' ἀναγκάσαι.

EURIPIDES.

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PREFACE

THIS book might possibly have been better if less time had been spent over it. Worked at with interruptions during a period of more than twelve years it is at last, I fear, something of a farrago. I have done my best to put myself on a level with the times in regard to the study of Plato; but I cannot pretend to have assimilated all the results of foreign scholarship; at the same time silence with regard to a work must not always be taken as implying ignorance of it. I have found Fritzsche's recension of Stallbaum an admirable sub-structure for work on the dialogue. But it is to scholars of my own country that I have to express the greatest obligations. The number of references to the work of Dr. W. H. Thompson, Professor Campbell, R. D. Archer-Hind and J. Adam, will show how much I have derived from them. Above all I cannot

over-estimate my debt to Dr. Henry Jackson as a great pioneer in true methods of investigation in Ancient Philosophy. If I had ventured to dedicate this work to any one, it is certainly his name that I should have wished to prefix to it.

My sincere thanks are due to my friend H. Rackham, Classical Tutor of Christ's College, Cambridge, for looking through the proof-sheets, and offering many useful suggestions.

The greater part of the work I have done alone, and I have not availed myself of the counsel of friends so fully as doubtless I might have done with profit. One who attempts to interpret Plato may fairly ask to be judged in the spirit of the words: *πάντα ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν, ὅστις καὶ ὁτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πράγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιὼν διαπονεῖται.*

EWHURST, *September* 21, 1900.

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. In the history of Greek philosophy we may recognize three main stages. The earliest of these may be called the Poetical. Early speculation was aroused by Wonder; it was but to a small extent self-critical, and there was occasionally present in its expounders—as is likely to be the case with those conscious of some superiority among primitive peoples—a vein of charlatanry. Even its literary form was in some cases (as with Parmenides and Empedocles) poetical; when it was clothed in prose, this sometimes had a prophetic tinge, as in the 'dark sayings' of Heraclitus.

This was the childhood of philosophy. Then came the time of adolescence, the period of questioning. Among the influences that led in the new phase we recognize as distinctly the most important the figure of Socrates. But that we must not assign to Socrates the undivided responsibility for the transition, is obvious enough. If we knew more about *Zeno of Elea* we should probably see more clearly than we do how important was the part he played. As it is, Grote (1 96) is certainly right in naming him with Socrates

as the great agencies in bringing about the transition to the second, or Dialectic, stage of Philosophy. (Cp. the phrases from Aristotle's *Metaph.* which Grote there quotes: A. VI 7 = 987 b 32 οἱ γὰρ πρότερον διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον, M. IV 4 = 1078 b 25 διαλεκτικὴ γὰρ ἰσχὺς οὐ τότ' ἦν. Diog. L. IX 25 quotes Aristotle as saying that Zeno was 'the discoverer of dialectic.' As to the term διαλεκτική he says it was introduced by Plato, III 24.)

The third stage is the Expository. A thinker having succeeded in framing a system that satisfies him, assuming the attitude of a teacher propounds it in a consecutive treatise. This stage really commences with its greatest representative, Aristotle. But the surpassing interest of Plato lies in the fact that in him we have the bridge from the second stage to the third. Beginning as critic and investigator, he ends as an expositor.

§ 2. The form of Plato's compositions—the dialogue—is the natural outcome of his place in the history of philosophy (Zeller p. 153 foll.; Grote I 239 foll.). One great characteristic of it is its elasticity. It ranges from a vivid reflexion of Socratic converse, with constant inquiry and criticism, chiefly in the earlier dialogues, to a thin, though not altogether purposeless, veil of consecutive exposition in the later. Plato was not indeed the inventor of this form: Diog. L. III 47, 8 says that some attribute the introduction of it to Zeno of Elea; but that Aristotle awards it to a certain Alexamenus, of whom we know nothing. He sensibly adds, however, δοκεῖ δέ μοι Πλάτων, ἀκριβώσας τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ τοῦ κάλλους

οὕτω τῆς εὑρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. Contrast the spiteful denial of Plato's priority in Ath. XI 505 C.

There are obviously two forms in which a dialogue may be written. Either the words uttered may be set down, the several speakers being merely indicated; or the whole dialogue may be reported by one of the interlocutors, or some one present. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. The method of reporting involves the wearisome repetition 'said I' and 'said he,' which induced Plato to abandon it in the *Theaetetus* (see 143 C). On the other hand the direct method precluded to a Greek anything like 'stage-directions' or comment. This no doubt was the consideration that led Plato to prefer the other in the *Republic*. But for this we should not have known, for instance, that at 350 D Thrasymachus blushed. Nowhere do we get the ἦθος of Socrates impressed upon us more strongly than in the dialogues where, as in the *Republic* and *Protagoras*, he reports his own conversations (see Zeller, 109, 110).

The *Meno*, in which the accessory furniture is very simple, is written in the direct form. Consequently we do not know, and can only conjecture, at what point Anytus joins the party (see on **89 E** 34). On the other hand much adroitness is shown by the way in which the actual words of the speakers illustrate the circumstances of the dialogue. For instance, Socrates' first answer serves as an introduction to the person Meno.

§ 3. The persons of the dialogue are four, Socrates, Meno, Anytus and the Slave.

The personality of Socrates is brought before us

remarkably vividly. We have indications of his irony (**71 C** 19 *οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων*, **96 D** 22 *κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος*), his unfailing good temper and courtesy (**79 A** 5 *εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με*, **86 D** 10 *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον κτἑ.*, **95 A** 5 *ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ, οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων κτἑ.*), his erotic tendencies (**76 C** 15): Meno's simile of the *νάρκη* **80 A** not only strongly brings before us the effect of Socrates' discourse, but gives us a glimpse of Socrates' personal appearance.

§ 4. Meno is a Thessalian, young, rich, and well-born. At the time when the *Meno* was written Thessaly was looked upon as semi-barbarous. 'The abundance of corn and cattle from the neighbouring plains sustained in these cities a numerous population, and above all a proud and disorderly noblesse, whose manners bore much resemblance to those of the heroic times. They were violent in their behaviour, eager in armed feud, but unaccustomed to political discussion or compromise; faithless as to obligations, yet at the same time generous in their hospitalities, and much given to the enjoyments of the table' (Grote *Hist. of Greece* Part II. ch. 3, cp. Liv. xxxiv. 51). It is to Thessaly that Crito, in the dialogue called after him, 45 c, proposes to smuggle away Socrates out of prison. Subsequently (53 D foll.) the Laws, in their imaginary speech, tell Socrates to what a disorderly place he will go if he accepts the invitation—*ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία*—and how the gentlemen there, far from being shocked at his breaking

prison, will laugh at the story of his undignified escape. Compare Xen. *Mem.* I ii 24 *καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένῳ συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαχθέντε, Κριτίας μὲν φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις.*

Some ten years after the probable date of the composition of the *Meno* Thessaly assumed a prominence in Grecian affairs such as it had never enjoyed before. It was in the year 374 B.C. that Polydamas of Pharsalus came to Sparta asking help against Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly. Under Jason there was a brief chance that Thessaly might play in regard to Greece a part similar to that played later by Macedon under Philip. But at the time of Meno's assumed visit to Athens — about 402 B.C. — there was no thought of this. As late as 382 B.C. the Spartans passed through Thessaly on their way against Olynthus without let or hindrance. Meno in Athens is something like a Russian prince in Paris during the eighteenth century.

A short disquisition on the life of Meno, by Gedike, is prefixed to Buttmann's edition. Fritzsche in his prolegomena, pp. 24 foll., has given a very thorough treatment of the subject. Meno's father's name was Alexidemus (**76 E** 47). His town was probably Pharsalus, the town of Polydamas, the most luxurious town in Thessaly according to Theopompus (see on **70 B** 7). Diog. L. II 50 calls Meno *Φαρσάλιος*, whereas Diodorus XIV 19 calls him *Λαρισαῖος*. It is hard to see what can have made Diogenes call him a

'Pharsalian' except a true tradition; on the other hand Diodorus may easily have been led into his statement by a careless inference from 70 B 7. On this Fritzsche well remarks 'immo potius cum Socrates dicat οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται (Larisaei), verisimilius est Menonem ipsum *non* fuisse Larisaeum.' (The fact that Λαρισαίου in our text there is probably spurious, makes no difference, as it is otherwise known that Aristippus was a Larisaean.)

It is probable then that our Meno belonged to the same family as the Meno of Pharsalus, who in the year 476 B.C. when Cimon was besieging Eion aided him with twelve talents and 300 horsemen, his own retainers. For this the Athenians granted him the citizenship, as we read in Demosthenes *Aristocr.* (23) 199. (The author of the compilation περὶ συντάξεως († Dem. (13) 23) diminishes these statements; Meno found 200 horsemen and only got ἀτέλεια.) Thucydides (II 22) names 'Meno of Pharsalus' as one of the leaders of a body of Thessalian cavalry who came to assist the Athenians κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν συμμαχικόν in the first year of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.). The distance of time makes it improbable that these two Menos were identical (though Westermann on Dem. *Aristocr.* l.c. thinks they were); but they may well have been related.

The name Meno was not uncommon at Athens. Plutarch *Per.* 31 tells us of a statuary Meno who accused Phidias; and *Alc.* 22. 5 of a Meno, father of the priestess Theano. These two may be identical. Meno is the name of the archon of 473 B.C. There was also a Meno who was sent as general to the

Hellespont in 361 B.C. (Dem. *Polycl.* (50) 12) and again to Euboea in 357 B.C. (*CIA.* II 64, Hicks 104). Xenophon *Hell.* V iv 55 mentions a Meno of Thespiae. Lastly, there is another important Meno of Pharsalus who took a prominent part in the Lamian War (Plut. *Phoc.* 25) and was, through his daughter Phthia, the grandfather of Pyrrhus of Epirus.

There is no reason for thinking that the Meno of our dialogue enjoyed the Athenian franchise. He was united by hereditary ties of hospitality to Anytus (see on **90 B** 2). He was also the πατρικὸς ξένος of the Persian king (**78 D** 28, where see note).

Meno is represented by Plato as young, though no longer *very* young (**76 B** 11). He has had a good education; he knows the poets, Simonides (?) **77 B** 12, and Theognis (**95 D**), something of the physics of Empedocles, and something of geometry. His great teacher and light has been Gorgias of Leontini, the rhetorician, who spent the last years of his long life in Thessaly. Thus he may be regarded as a product of fashionable or 'sophistic' education, but with everything to learn in dialectics; even the grasping of a general definition is at first quite beyond him.

Meno is chiefly known for the part he took in the expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes. It was owing to his favour with Aristippus that he obtained a command over a division of the Greek mercenaries: παρὰ Ἀριστίππῳ ἔτι ὡραῖος ὢν στρατηγεῖν διεπράξατο τῶν ξένων (Xen. *Anab.* II.vi 28). We may think, if we please, that it was this business that obliged him to return home, and curtailed his stay at Athens (**76 E**, see also on **76 B** 11). Meno did not start from Sardis

with the force of Cyrus, but joined it with his contingent at Colossae (Xen. *Anab.* I ii 6). Xenophon makes no secret of his hatred of Meno (cp. Diog. L. II 50). This may have arisen from a rivalry between Meno and Xenophon's friend and hero, Clearchus. He accuses Meno of dishonourably overreaching his colleagues at the time when Cyrus was debating with his officers about crossing the Euphrates. Meno urged his own men to anticipate the decision by crossing: so, if it was decided to cross, they would have the credit of setting the example; if it was decided not to cross and they had to retreat again, Cyrus would in future give them the preference as having shown themselves the most zealous in his service. 'Such breach of communion and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Meno' (Grote *Hist.* ch. 69).

Not long afterwards at a place called Charmande a *fracas* occurred between the troops of Meno and those of Clearchus. The outbreak was only quelled by the personal intervention of Cyrus (Xen. *Anab.* I v 10 foll.). At the battle of Cunaxa Clearchus commanded the right, Meno the left, wing of the Greeks. This means that under Cyrus Clearchus had the first command, Meno the second. This is hardly consistent with the words of Ctesias (*Persica* 58) who says that Clearchus and Meno ἀεὶ διάφοροι ἀλλήλοις ἐτύγχανον διότι τῷ μὲν Κλεάρχῳ ἅπαντα ὁ Κῦρος συνεβούλευε, τοῦ δὲ Μένωνος λόγος οὐδεὶς ἦν. Meno was also connected by a tie of friendship with Ariaeus, the

commander of Cyrus' Asiatic troops, and after the death of Cyrus in the battle Meno was sent at his own desire among the embassy to Ariaeus to offer him the crown (ibid. II i 5). When the rest of the embassy returned, Meno remained with Ariaeus (II ii 1). Ariaeus had declined the crown and seemed to be playing false with the Greeks. So Meno incurred the suspicion of Clearchus; (II v 28) *ὑπώπτευε δὲ εἶναι τὸν διαβάλλοντα Μένωνα, εἰδὼς αὐτὸν καὶ συγγεγενημένον Τισσαφέρνει μετ' Ἀριαίου καὶ στασιάζοντα αὐτῷ* (i.e. Κλεάρχῳ) *καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα ὅπως τὸ στράτευμα ἅπαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν λαβὼν φίλος ἦ Τισσαφέρνει.* Subsequently Meno, like the other generals, went for a colloquy to the tent of Tissaphernes; and was there seized. At this point there is a discrepancy in the accounts, which are practically two, that of Xenophon and that of Ctesias. The story of Ctesias is preserved in Photius' summary of his *Persica*, and on it is largely based the account in Plutarch's *Artaxerxes*, and in Diodorus. That the Greek generals, including Meno, were seized and sent to the King at Babylon, all agree. Xenophon (II vi 29) says of Meno *ἀποθνῃσκόντων δὲ τῶν συστρατηγῶν ὅτι ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ βασιλέα σὺν Κύρῳ, ταὐτὰ πεποιηκὼς οὐκ ἀπέθανε, μετὰ δὲ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων θάνατον στρατηγῶν τιμωρηθεὶς ὑπὸ βασιλέως ἀπέθανεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ Κλέαρχος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλάς, ὅσπερ τάχιστος θάνατος δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ζῶν αἰκισθεὶς ἐνιαυτὸν ὡς πονηρὸς λέγεται τῆς τελευτῆς τυχεῖν.* But Ctesias (*Persica* 60, cp. Plut. *Art.* 18, Diod. XIV 27) says that it was by Meno's agency that the other generals were entrapped into the tent of Tissaphernes and that

for this service Meno was released. (Diodorus says Τισσαφέρνης δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς δήσας ἀπέστειλε πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀνεῖλε, Μένωνα δὲ μόνον ἀφῆκεν· ἐδόκει γὰρ μόνος οὗτος στασιάζων πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους προδώσειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, where the word προδώσειν, if sound, would seem to indicate that *future* services were expected of Meno.) It is noteworthy that Meno's enemy Xenophon says nothing about any treachery of Meno towards the other generals, though he gloats over his miserable death. Of course it is quite possible that Meno was treacherous to his comrades and yet was punished at the Persian court. Grote (*Hist.* ch. 70) thinks he did betray them, or took credit for doing so, and perished through the agency of Parysatis, ever ready to take vengeance on any who had wronged her darling son Cyrus, or his friends.

§ 5. Xenophon in giving the characters of the slain generals reserves Meno for the last, and paints him in very dark colours. His greed of gain was undisguised; and to increase his gains he was greedy of rule and honour. He truckled to the powerful to secure a screen for his acts of injustice. Perjury and falsehood he regarded as the quickest way to the consummation of his desires; simplicity and truth were mere folly. He loved no one; with him professions of friendship were but the signal of an attack. He treated no foe with scorn; but always assumed a scornful air in talking with allies. To attack the guarded possessions of enemies was too much trouble; the defenceless possessions of friends he made his prey. He gloried in treachery, falsehood and mockery of

friends, as much as others in piety, truth and justice. He thought the best tie of discipline for soldiers was a partnership in crime. He considered himself as having conferred a boon if he associated with any one without ruining him. All this, says Xenophon, is notorious; as to still darker stories about him there may be some untruth (*Anab.* II vi 21–28).

Is the portrait that we get in Plato inconsistent with this? Jowett (*Meno* Introd. p. 265) says 'The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded,[1] as he is also silent about the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades.' Again, p. 266, he speaks of Plato as 'regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his dialogue as in the case of Meno and Critias': cp. p. 268. This seems to me to go too far.

There is no real inconsistency between Plato's picture and that of Xenophon. Athenaeus is stupidly wrong when he says (505 B) that Plato ἐγκώμια αὐτοῦ (scil. Μένωνος) διεξέρχεται, as a counterblast, forsooth, to Xenophon, who had vilified him; and (506 B) that Plato disparages the great men of Athens, Μένωνα δ' ἐπαινεῖ τὸν τοὺς Ἕλληνας προδόντα. It is quite clear, at least to one who reads between the lines, that Plato regards Meno as by no means an exemplary person. His arrogance (ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὦ Μένων κτέ. **76 A**), self-esteem (καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ

[1] Jowett here falls into an error, perhaps based on Athenaeus XI 505 A. Xenophon does *not* impute this treachery to Meno.

εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν **80 B**), vanity (*γιγνώσκω οὖ ἕνεκά με ἤγκασας κτέ.* **80 C**), want of self-control (*ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἦς* **86 D**) are clearly indicated.[1] The charges are made quite good-humouredly, it is true, but they are perfectly serious. Perhaps we may add that at **74 A** Meno omits *ὁσιότης* from the list of virtues, and remark the parenthesis **81 B** *δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον κτέ.*, the intention of which becomes much more obvious if it is intended for Meno's personal benefit. In Meno's favour it may be said that he is always deferential to Socrates, and he respects conventions (**78 D** 33).

Plato was, of course, not indifferent to common morality. The bad behaviour of some of his pupils no doubt gave occasion to some of his enemies to assert that he was. (Cp. Ath. 508 D *ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ τυραννικοί τινες καὶ διάβολοι γενόμενοι.* Much of Athenaeus' material is derived from Theopompus, a pupil of Plato's rival, Isocrates.) But Meno's character was not Plato's subject. He may have been a bad man—that was a matter of comparative indifference; he certainly was a bad *pupil*—that is a point of cardinal importance. Compare Meno with the types of the *good* pupil—with Glaucon and Adimantus, with Simmias and Cebes, and above all with Theaetetus, and it is seen how appropriately he is selected as the respondent in a dialogue that is meant to show that a partial and premature attack on the fortress of the Nature of Virtue must be fruitless.

[1] See too the note on the text of **72 A** 20.

§ 6. *Anytus* is the well-known accuser of Socrates. This should be placed beyond doubt by his parting threat at **94 E** ; besides the hint at **99 E** τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα and the concluding words of the whole dialogue ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις. Moreover the name Anthemion, as in our dialogue, is given to the father of Socrates' accuser in the scholium on *Apol.* 18 B, presently quoted. The same name is given by Plutarch in two places to the father of an Anytus of whom he tells a story about his infatuation for Alcibiades (*Alc.* 4. 5 ; *Amat.* § 27 p. 762 D ; cp. Satyrus in Ath. XII 534 E, Zeller *Socr.* p. 172 note) ; so also it is given in two places to the father of the Anytus of whom the story goes that he was the first to bribe judges (Plut. *Coriol.* 14. 4 ; Diod. XIII 64 ; cp. Arist. Ἀθ. Πολ. ch. 27 and see on **95 A** 5). True or false, both these stories must refer to the same man, the personage in the *Meno* and the accuser of Socrates. There may be more doubt about the Anytus who is said (Plut. *de malign. Herod.* § 6 p. 862 B) to have proposed a vote of ten talents to Herodotus, where the father's name is not given. Some information as to Anytus will be found in the notes on **90 B** 46 and **95 A** 5, and this I proceed to supplement, referring among modern works to Grote *Hist.* ch. 68 ; Zeller *Socrates* pp. 162, 172–74 ; Riddell *Apology* Introd. pp. ii–iv ; Fr. Introd. 29, 30.

The scholium on Plato *Apol.* 18 B begins οὗτος ὁ Ἄνυτος Ἀνθεμίωνος ἦν υἱός, Ἀθηναῖος γένος, Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐραστής, πλούσιος ἐκ βυρσοδεψικῆς. He was a prominent democrat in the time of the Peloponnesian

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War; in 404 B.C. he was exiled by the Thirty (Xen. *Hell.* II iii 42, 44), and in the next year he aided Thrasybulus to expel them and restore the democracy. 'Anytus was a man of strong political convictions: he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom' (Riddell Introd. p. xxviii, cp. Isocr. 18. 23 *Θρασύβουλος καὶ Ἄνυτος μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δ' ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων*). Anytus however appears not to have been an *extreme* democrat; the Aristotelian *Ἀθ. Πολ.* ch. 34 names him as a member of the 'middle party' of which Theramenes was the head.

When we read of a man *πλούσιος ἐκ βυρσοδεψικῆς*, who is at the same time (with whatever qualifications) a democrat, our thoughts naturally turn to Cleon. Because Socrates and the democrats were both attacked by Aristophanes, we are apt to suppose that they were in the same camp. But in the case of Anytus this is clearly not the case. The key of Anytus' character is his conversation. 'Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true philosopher' (Jowett *Meno*, Introd. p. 266). At the time of Socrates' trial (399 B.C.) it was the oligarchs who were the innovators; democracy was the established constitution. Though it was little more than a century old, if reckoned from Clisthenes, and much less if reckoned from Ephialtes and Pericles, prescription had won for it veneration. This found its expression in the watchword *ἡ πάτριος πολιτεία*, which certainly meant democracy of some kind, though how strong or how diluted might be a matter of individual taste.

In the *Apology* 23 E Socrates represents each of his three accusers as taking up the cudgels against him to avenge the insults to his own class; Meletus for the poets, Lycon for the orators, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. But there is reason to think that Anytus had further some private grounds for his animosity. We may well disregard the stories of his jealousy of Socrates in regard to Alcibiades; but there is a fairly well authenticated story that would assign to Anytus a motive against Socrates, which, though private, was but a particular instance of a public grievance. One of the commonest accusations against the new teaching, whether of Socrates or the 'sophists,' was its interference between parent and son (see on **92 A** 3). Just such a case of interference had Anytus to resent from Socrates.[1] In Xenophon's *Apologia Socratis* (which is not, like Plato's, a speech supposed to be addressed by Socrates to his judges) we read §§ 29 foll. how Socrates, seeing Anytus passing, observes that Anytus is much puffed up at having got him condemned because he said Anytus ought not to bring up his son to his own trade. Socrates has met the son and formed a high opinion of his abilities; his mind, he told Anytus, will want a larger scope than leather-dealing affords, and if he does not get it he will fall into bad habits. So it turned out; the son took to drinking, and Anytus even after his death was in ill repute owing to his bad training of his son. We know nothing certain of the end of Anytus; on which matter, as Fritzsche says,

[1] See J. S. Mill *Dissertations* iii. 310.

'*neque inter se congruentia neque omnino probabilia memoriae produntur.*' Later writers indulge in various stories of the Nemesis that overtook him. Diog. L. (II 43) says that of Socrates' accusers the Athenians exiled some, and put Meletus to death; that the men of Heraclea ejected Anytus on the very day on which he arrived there; (VI 9) that Antisthenes was the reputed author of the decree condemning Anytus to exile and Meletus to death. Diodorus XIV 37 says that the accusers of Socrates were put to death without trial (ἄκριτοι); Plut. *de invidia* 6 p. 558 A says they were subjected to so rigorous a 'boycott' that they hanged themselves. (See Zeller *Socr.* 202.) We may probably assume that Anytus was dead at the time when the *Meno* was written.

Meno and Anytus supplement one another. They are products of the two forces which Plato, standing as it were between two fires, was continually combating, the false teachers on the one hand, the philistines (μισολόγοι) on the other (Fritzsche Intr. p. 19 note 8).

§ 7. As to the Slave, Fritzsche says *quamquam de servuli aetate nihil injicitur, tamen quanto provectiorem sumis aetate, tantum demis loco venustatis.* He is not a character, but an abstraction, a typical blank mind.

§ 8. The assumed date of the dialogue depends on two considerations. Firstly, Meno is no longer very young, and he was still comparatively young when he started on the expedition of Cyrus (see § 4). This makes it difficult to interpose a long time between the dialogue and the expedition. Secondly, the nearer the time of the dialogue is placed to that of Socrates' trial, the more point there is in Anytus'

threat at **94 E**. We may then assign the year 402 B.C. as probable. There is at least one anachronism in the dialogue, the mention of Ismenias at **90 A**.

§ 9. The genuineness of the *Meno* was assailed by those two '*qui non ita multos Platonis libros de supplicio exemerunt, Ast et Schaarschmidt*' (Fritzsche). But that was in unregenerate days. Ueberweg at one time doubted its genuineness, but ended by believing in it. The *Meno* can in fact say with not many degrees less right than the *Phaedo*

εἴ με Πλάτων οὐ γράψε, δύω ἐγένοντο Πλάτωνες·
Σωκρατικῶν ὀάρων ἄνθεα πάντα φέρω.
(*Anth. Pal.* IX 358.)

'In the *Menon* more that is characteristic of Plato is brought together in a smaller space than in any other dialogue; if the *Phaedon* and the *Gorgias* are noble statues, the *Menon* is a gem' (J. S. Mill *Dissertations* III 350). And Mr. Walter Pater in his *Plato and Platonism*, p. 52, does justice to 'that most characteristic dialogue, the *Meno*.'

Besides internal evidence, the *Meno* is protected by an unmistakeable reference in the *Phaedo* 72 E (see on **81 E** 12), and a probable one in the *Republic* 506 C to *Meno* **97 B**, to say nothing of other possibilities. Aristotle twice cites the *Meno* by name; *Anal. pr.* II 21. 7 = 67 a 21 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι λόγος, ὅτι ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις (**81 D**) and *Anal. post.* I 1. 7 = 71 a 29 referring to the ἀπόρημα at **80 D** 1 (where see the note). It is true that Aristotle does not mention Plato as the author; but in similar style he cites the *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Gorgias* and *Hippias*

Minor. Further, though the *Meno* is not named, there is a probable reference to it in Arist. *Pol.* I xiii, for which see on **71 E** 7.

§ 10. Hardly any dialogue of Plato is so clear-cut and simple in its construction as the *Meno*. The argument falls into five divisions, which correspond pretty nearly to the five scenes of which the dialogue consists.

The first scene (**70 A**–**80 D** cc. i–xiii) is between Meno and Socrates. Meno assails Socrates with the stock question 'Can Virtue be taught?' Socrates characteristically retorts by asking for a definition of Virtue, which Meno fails to give.

The second division extends from **80 D** to **86 C** (cc. xiv–xxi). The speakers are Socrates, Meno and the Slave. Meno, sore with his failure, and perhaps hoping to shelve the inquiry as to the definition of Virtue to which Socrates invites him, propounds a sceptical quibble that would imply the impossibility of a genesis of Knowledge, and consequently the futility of inquiry. Socrates by an experiment with the Slave shows that Knowledge is subject to a genesis, that its raw material is Opinion, and that we owe our power of recovering it to Reminiscence from a previous state of Existence.

The third scene, between Socrates and Meno, extends from **86 C** to **90 B** (cc. xxii–xxvi). Meno's objection being thus overthrown he is again invited to the inquiry 'What is Virtue?' But Meno, who no doubt regards that question as merely academic and uninteresting, would much rather attack the practical question 'Is Virtue teachable?' Socrates will meet

him half-way. They must approach the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' from a *hypothesis* as to what Virtue is. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teachable, and if not, not. But will this hypothesis stand? Yes, theoretically; for Virtue, like everything good and beneficial, may be ultimately reduced to Knowledge or Wisdom. But on the practical side a difficulty remains. Where are the teachers?

At this point Anytus, as a man of experience, is invited into the discussion, and in the fourth scene (**90 B–95 A**, cc. xxvii–xxxiv) he and Socrates are the interlocutors. Socrates begins by ironically assuming that just as for teaching in a special art we should go to a professional teacher, so for ἀρετή we should go to the Expert Teachers—the sophists. This excites Anytus' disgust. But when, like his colleague Meletus in the *Apology* (24 E), he says that any good citizen is capable of instilling Virtue, he is soon faced with a number of conspicuous instances of failure.

Anytus having departed in dudgeon, the final scene (**95 A–100 B**, cc. xxxv–xlii) is left to Socrates and Meno. This paradox about Virtue is not confined to one place or time: he who has it for the most part cannot impart it: he who professes to impart it for the most part does not possess it. The only solution is that Virtue, as we see it in the world, is not the product of Knowledge, but of something like Knowledge, that is, of half-knowledge or Opinion. Opinion may simulate the results of Knowledge; but the possessor of it has not the root of the matter in him, his hold on Virtue is precarious, and not communicable. Perhaps some day there may arise a man or men

whose Virtue is rooted in Knowledge, and then we shall see great things. But we shall get no satisfactory result till we attack the problem What Virtue *is*.

§ 11. As to Meno's inquiry, Jowett (*Meno* Intr. p. 262) says 'No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times.' This is hardly the place for considering why the inquiry has been superseded in modern times, if indeed this be the case. But at the end of the fifth century B.C. certain phenomena forced the matter on the consideration of the Greeks, not as a mere academic problem, but as an urgent practical question. These phenomena were mainly two. In the first place there was the obvious fact that parents failed to influence their children. Great fathers sometimes had feeble sons, good fathers vicious sons, wise fathers silly sons. With regard to the ordinary arts there did appear to be a certain power of communication; but as to the inner quality ἀρετή, that vaguely-apprehended something that made one man count for more than another, the best wishes of parents and trainers seemed almost powerless.

Just at this time arose a class of men who did profess to fill the gap that home-training obviously left—the sophists. Were they public benefactors or were they frauds? Many of the young men said the former; most of the old men said the latter. If the sophists were unsuccessful, it might either be because they were attempting something in itself impossible, or because they were attempting a possible task in the wrong way. Thus the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' was one to interest everybody.[1]

[1] The two divisions of Socrates' argument in the *Protagoras*

§ 12. What place does the *Meno* take in the order of Plato's writings? In regard to any Platonic dialogue this is at once the most important and the most difficult question that we have to answer. It results from the place of Plato in the history of philosophy that it is precisely the *development* of his views that forms the chief point of interest in them.

To Grote the question of the order of the Platonic writings seemed an unprofitable maze (see for instance his note at II 16, about the *Meno*; and II 120 on the question whether the *Protagoras* or the *Gorgias* is prior). The dialogues he regarded as pictures in a kaleidoscope, each fascinating in itself but quite discontinuous from anything before or after. I wish to speak with the utmost veneration of the work of Grote. The 'provocative shock' he gave to the study of Plato is something almost comparable in its kind with the work of Socrates. We stand on his shoulders, and how much we are thereby raised we have not to-day full means of judging. Before he wrote, all Plato's works were supposed to be parts of a finished and co-ordinated system. Inconsistencies were either ignored, or got rid of by the simple surgery of lopping off the offending dialogue from the Platonic canon. But since Grote cleared the air, much has been done, largely by British scholars, to bring the comprehension of Plato nearer than it has ever been before. Though with regard to the order of the dialogues we shall

319 A foll. (cp. on **93 B** 17, **94 E** 14) correspond, in inverse order, with the above-mentioned two sides from which the question was presented. So also do the two divisions of Socrates' discussion with Anytus.

always have to speak ὡς οὐκ εἰδότες ἀλλὰ ὡς εἰκάζοντες, we must not listen to the ἀργὸς λόγος that any attempt on the problem is futile. Olympiodorus at the end of his life of Plato tells how Plato on his death-bed dreamed that he was a swan pursued in vain by ἰξευταί; which Simmias explained to be the interpreters who should in vain endeavour to catch his thoughts. If the bird is not yet in our hands we may at any rate claim that we have closed in round it and are now able to watch its movements at closer quarters.

One great assistance to a better view of Plato's work is that it has come to be increasingly recognized that we must regard Plato not merely as a transcendental philosopher, but as a man living amongst men, with human preferences and antipathies, and undergoing human vicissitudes. The old spirit in regard to Plato finds fine expression in the words of Goethe (Ueberweg § 39, Grote 1 201) 'Plato's relation to the world is that of a superior spirit whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It is not so much his concern to become acquainted with it —for the world and its nature are things which he presupposes (*schon voraussetzt*) — as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with him, and of which it stands in so great need.' It was his strong desire to get at Plato *the man* that made Grote cling so strongly to the authenticity of the Platonic Epistles, as 'the only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in his own person' (Grote 1 219, cp. 216 note). We have had to give up the notion that in the Epistles we have a self-revelation of Plato; though we may still gather from them some statements as to

his life, of various degrees of trustworthiness. It is hard that the very time that has shown us the importance of understanding Plato's career should also have shown us how very slender are our materials for constructing it. The fact is that the tradition is not only scanty but corrupt, and appears to have been corrupted at a very early time. Diog. L. III 2 gives the name of Plato's nephew Speusippus, among others, as an authority for a miraculous story about Plato's birth.

§ 13. According to the most probable date of Plato's birth, the year 427 B.C., he was 28 years of age when in 399 B.C. his master Socrates was put to death. He had thus passed what has been for many great men the blossoming period of the mind. And yet his work was not begun. I think Grote's arguments (I 196 foll.) ought to be conclusive that Plato published no dialogues before the death of Socrates. Nor is it fatal to their cogency that the genuineness of the Platonic Epistles, on which Grote relied, must be given up. For the conception of the Socrates of the dialogues a certain mythical atmosphere is required, which readily gathered at no long interval after his death, but which would have been as impossible during his life-time as the appearance of his ghost.

We must beware then of expecting to find, or of thinking we detect, marks of 'juvenility' in any work of Plato. Yet it must be remembered that precocity was rare in Greek literary genius. Aristophanes is of course an instance, though his precocity has been exaggerated. We may be almost certain that Plato originally intended himself for public life, and that it was circumstances that forced him into

philosophy. For an Athenian in Plato's position to take up philosophy as a career in the fifth century would seem quite derogatory, and there was indeed no precedent for it. It was as if the eldest son of a peer should come out as a professional violinist.

For public life he had indeed one disadvantage from the start: ἰσχνόφωνος ἦν says Diog. L. (III 5 cp. Grote I 118). But the execution of Socrates decided the matter; it was the first great turning-point in his life. The signs of the times seemed to show that it was unsafe for Socrates' pupils to remain at Athens: Plato with others withdrew to Megara and thence made travels. During the next years of his life we may suppose the chief influences affecting his mind to have been, firstly, a strong antipathy to the democracy, with a feeling that he himself as far as politics were concerned could but bide his time: secondly, a strong desire to make himself the interpreter of his Master, and to present to his countrymen his Master's thoughts more or less recast by his own mind.

During this period he was, as to politics, in the position of a statesman whose party is 'out'; as to philosophy he was still an amateur; that is, he held no professional position. When he returned to Athens we do not know; the extent of his travels at this time has probably been much exaggerated and we need not suppose his absence to have extended over more than two or three years.[1] The dialogues that

[1] Cp. Grote I 121; Karsten *de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis* pp. 164 foll.; Ueberweg-Heinze p. 142. Zeller p. 17 says 'there is great probability, and even some external evidence,

belong to this period it is most reasonable to suppose were written at Athens. His antagonists, as far as there are any, are the old (in most cases dead) antagonists of Socrates. The dialogues that compose this, the 'Socratic,' series are the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Hippias major*, *Hippias minor*, *Io* and *Euthyphro*. (I lay no stress on the order, and I regard both the *Alcibiades* dialogues as spurious.) During the later years of this period were probably written two other dialogues, the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*, though these rather belong to the next group of works.

Meanwhile a change was coming over the scene. Pupils of Socrates, Euclides at Megara, Antisthenes at Athens, had set up as heads of philosophic schools; Isocrates was winning a great position as an educator in rhetoric. The thought must have pressed itself more and more strongly on Plato that he should emulate them and finally cast in his lot with philosophy. It was not without a struggle that he gave up politics: *τὸ πρῶτον πολλῆς μεστὸν ὄντα ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινά*, says the author of the seventh

that long before this journey' (of 388 B.C.) 'Plato had settled in Athens, and there worked as teacher and author; even granting that at this period his instructions were confined to a select few.'

Dr. Thompson *Gorgias* Introd. p. xvi note derides the 'fabulous extent and duration assigned to Plato's travels'; Plato's return 'according to more than one witness must have taken place about four years after the death of Socrates, that is to say about 395 B.C.' Corinth is one of the places where, according to Aristoxenus in Diog. L. III 8, Plato bore arms for his country. Probably this was at the battle of 394 B.C.

letter, using words which Plato certainly *might* have applied to himself (cp. Diog. L. III 23: after Plato's *third* return from Sicily πολιτείας μὲν οὐχ ἥψατο, καίτοι πολιτικὸς ὢν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν).

This brings us to what may be considered the second important moment in Plato's life; his first journey to Sicily and his starting as Principal of the Academy in Athens. The seventh letter (324 A) says that Plato first went to Syracuse σχεδὸν ἔτη τετταράκοντα γεγονώς—that is about 387 B.C. The date of the opening of the Academy by Plato is given as 387 or 386 B.C. (Ueb.-Heinze p. 138). Lists of the σχολάρχαι or Heads were preserved, and these lists were embodied in διαδοχαί published by later authors, of whom the earliest appears to have been Sotion, a Peripatetic who lived at the beginning of the second century B.C. (Ueb.-Heinze 26, 255; R. & P. 4 a).

There is a good deal of doubt and discrepancy about this journey of Plato's as well as about his travels after Socrates' death. I think we may draw one conclusion about it with a fair amount of certainty, namely that its object was not political. It is true that the seventh letter (326 B foll.) does attribute to Plato political objects even in his *first* journey to Sicily; but what could he expect to effect during the tyranny of the elder Dionysius? Olympiodorus in his life says that he went to Italy on this occasion to see the Pythagoreans, especially Archytas of Tarentum, and to Sicily θεασόμενος τοὺς κρατῆρας τοῦ πυρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἴτνῃ. The descriptions in *Phaedo* 111 E, 113 B, make it reasonable to suppose that Plato did take some interest in volcanic phenomena. To the same

effect Diog. L. III 18: *τρὶς δὲ πέπλευκεν εἰς Σικελίαν· πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ θέαν τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν κρατήρων, ὅτε καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους τύραννος ὢν ἠνάγκασεν ὥστε συμμῖξαι αὐτῷ.* Then comes the story how he quarreled with Dionysius, who dismissed him abruptly; and how he was sold into slavery, but ransomed by Anniceris of Cyrene and so reached Athens in safety again (Grote I 121, Zeller p. 24). The story of the selling into slavery has been doubted by many. If the incident occurred, it certainly made little impression on Plato's mind; no sign of an allusion to it can be traced anywhere in his writings; even the seventh letter is silent about it. Perhaps its chief importance is the tradition that Anniceris, refusing to accept the sum he had paid for Plato, which his friends wished to refund, bought with it for Plato's use the garden in the Academy. This serves to connect this voyage of Plato with the commencement of his school.[1]

Among the travels of Plato after Socrates' death Diogenes (III 6) includes a journey to *Italy* to visit the Pythagoreans Philolaus and Eurytus. Neither he nor any one else says anything about a visit to *Sicily* at this time, so that we may safely assume that Plato's visit to the island in 388 B.C. was—as Diogenes III 18 says—his first. But it is quite possible that Diogenes is wrong about an earlier visit to *Italy*, and that his visit in 388 B.C. was his first to that country

[1] Diog. L. III 8 says that the original form of the name *Ακαδημία* was *ἑκαδημία*—in which there lurks perhaps a fanciful etymology from *ἑκὰς δήμου*. (But he there makes Plato teach in the Academy after his *first* return to Athens.)

also. This is rather more probable as Diogenes interpolates this alleged earlier journey to Italy between Cyrene and Egypt. It is surely more probable that Plato in his first tour confined his travels to Africa, leaving the West for a future time.[1] The matter is not of great importance; but his sojourn with the Italian Pythagoreans in 388 B.C. becomes more important if it appears that this was his first personal interview with them. Not that by any means we need conclude that Plato was ignorant of Pythagoreanism before this; see Zeller p. 20, who in a note gives the stories about the purchase of Pythagorean *books* by Plato. But whatever these stories may be worth, no one who considers Plato's temperament will doubt that the cosmic imagery which was the glory of Pythagoreanism would receive new vividness in Plato's mind by intercourse with the leading spirits of that sect.

I conceive that Plato's travels in his fortieth year were directly connected with his resolution to start a school; whether it were that before beginning he wished to supplement his knowledge and experience in certain particular directions, or that being about to tie himself to Athens more closely, he wished to enjoy a spell of freedom while it was still open to him.

With regard to the *Gorgias*, both Cope (Intr. p. lxxiv) and Dr. Thompson (Intr. p. xvi) place it in the interval between Plato's return to Athens after his first travels, and his first Sicilian journey. They both recognize in it a certain buoyancy and comic spirit that imply that the writer was comparatively young. This

[1] To this view Zeller seems to incline: p. 16 note, and p. 19.

is combined with sternness and even bitterness on certain points. Plato, when he wrote the *Gorgias*, was disgusted with politics, but he was not disgusted with life. Dr. Thompson inclines to the conjecture that the *Gorgias* was the first work, or one of the first, written by Plato after his first return to Athens. To this the chief objection I have to offer is that sufficient time is not thus allowed for the earlier dialogues, all written (I believe) after Socrates' death. It seems to me much more probable that the *Gorgias* was the *last* dialogue written before Plato's departure on his travels to Italy and Sicily with a fixed resolve as to his future career. He bids good-bye to Athens—for a time; and good-bye—probably for ever—to politics. For this last step it is the Ἀπολογία Πλάτωνος.

To make clear Plato's procedure and attitude when he returned again to Athens, I cannot do better than borrow the words of the article 'Sophists' in the *Encyc. Brit.* p. 268 b (by 'H. J.'), only premising that I am inclined to refer the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* to a time when Plato was in intention, though not yet in fact, Head of the Academy. 'It may be imagined further that when Plato established himself at the Academy, his first care was to draw up a scheme of education, including arithmetic, geometry (plane and solid), astronomy, harmonics and dialectic, and that it was not until he had arranged for the carrying out of this programme that he devoted himself to the special functions of professor of philosophy. However this may be, we find among his writings,—intermediate, as it would seem, between the Socratic conversations of his first period, and the metaphysical disquisitions

of a later time—a series of dialogues, which, however varied their ostensible subjects, agree in having a direct bearing upon education. Thus the *Protagoras* brings the educational theory of Protagoras and the sophists of culture face to face with the educational theory of Socrates, so as to expose the limitations of both; the *Gorgias* deals with the moral aspect of the teaching of the forensic rhetorician Gorgias and the political rhetorician Isocrates; and the intellectual aspect of their respective theories of education is handled in the *Phaedrus*; the *Meno* on the one hand exhibits the strength and the weakness of the teaching of Socrates, and on the other brings into view the makeshift methods of those who, despising systematic teaching, regard the practical politician as the true educator; the *Euthydemus* has for its subject the eristical method; finally, having in these dialogues characterized the current theories of education, Plato proceeds in the *Republic* to develop an original scheme.'

Side by side with this should be put the summary which the same author has appended to the last of his papers on 'Plato's Later Theory of Ideas,' namely that on the *Politicus*, in *J.P.* xv 302 foll.

'In short, I think we may distinguish four stages or periods of Plato's literary career, and designate them as:

(1) Socratic, of which the *Euthyphro* is typical;

(2) educational—including the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, the *Euthydemus*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedo*;

(3) philosophical—including the *Philebus*, the

Parmenides, the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, the *Timaeus*;

(4) political—including the *Laws*.'

(The list does not contain all the dialogues.)

It may be observed that in group (1) the persons criticized are mainly antagonists of Socrates; in group (2) they are Plato's rivals, but often also Socrates himself; in group (3) they are Plato's rivals, Socrates, and also Plato himself at an earlier stage. In the last stage of all, the *Laws*, Plato returns in a manner *à ses premiers amours*, politics. It is out of the question for him now to take an active part in Athenian affairs; but he so far returns to 'practical' politics as to consider in the *Laws* the best amendments on existing institutions. Plato's second and third journeys to Sicily, the second in 367 B.C. when he was sixty years old, the third later, were undertaken in the vain hope of putting his political theories in practice.

§ 14. We are immediately concerned with the second or 'educational' group of dialogues, to which the *Meno* belongs. We may assume that Plato after he became Head of the Academy at once began to prepare for writing his great educational work, the *Republic*, and that he would not allow more time than he could help to elapse between the starting of the Academy and its publication.

Of the other dialogues of this group there are considerable grounds for placing the *Phaedo* later than the *Republic* (see H. Jackson in *J.P.* xv 303). The rest are all earlier than the *Republic*, and more or less intended to lead up to it. Assuming then that

the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* were written before the first journey to Sicily, we have to fit in the *Phaedrus*, *Euthydemus* and *Meno* between Plato's return to Athens and the publication of the *Republic*. The *Menexenus* and the fragmentary *Clitophon* also belong to this time (see Grote III pp. 8, 25). (The *Symposium* is reserved for subsequent consideration.)

As to the date of the *Republic*, almost the only reference to external events that we have to guide us is the mention of Ismenias of Thebes (*Rep.* I 336 A). In the note on **90 A** 40 I have given reasons for thinking that this passage was written not long before Ismenias' death, which took place probably towards the *end* of 382 B.C.[1] We may then conjecturally assign to 381, or the earlier part of 382 B.C., the publication of bk. I of the *Republic*. Probably some further portion was published with it; but the question in what instalments the work was presented cannot be discussed here.

Can we go any farther, and, assuming that the *Phaedrus*, *Meno* and *Euthydemus* were all written

[1] As to Plato's practice in regard to naming his contemporaries, see Dr. Thompson in *J.P.* VIII 307 note (cp. XI 2 note): 'This reticence, of which it is not difficult to divine the motives, is most carefully practised in the case of the living celebrities who claimed like himself to be disciples of Socrates, such as Euclides, Aristippus and Antisthenes. A cursory reader of Plato has no idea that such men existed as the heads of rival sects with which the Platonists of the Academy were engaged in perpetual controversy. On the other hand Plato never scruples to name the dead, nor perhaps those living personages with whom he stood in no relation of common pursuits or common friendships, e.g. Lysias, Gorgias, etc.'

between 387 and 382 B.C., ascertain the order in which they came? Here our conclusions can only be tentative. Perhaps the best method will be to take all the educational dialogues in order, and briefly consider their relations to the *Meno*.

§ 15. The *Protagoras*. The main subject of the *Protagoras* is the same as that of the *Meno* 'Is Virtue teachable?' It brings out the looseness of popular views of Virtue, and the futility of attempting the position from the side that naturally presented itself —the practical side—before mastering the metaphysical key to it, the nature of Virtue. 'The issue of our conversation' says Socrates 'renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in everything rather than knowledge:—on which supposition it would hardly be teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up; and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation—first, what Virtue is, next, whether it is teachable or not' (Grote II 69; cp. Fr. Intr. p. 14).

The expectation here raised is to some extent fulfilled in the *Meno*. Not that the *Meno* is by any means final; but certain important steps forward are made. There are, to begin with, some attempts at actually defining Virtue. These attempts though abortive serve to illustrate the nature of the problem.

The fourth section of the dialogue—the dialogue with Anytus (cc. xxvii–xxxiv)—goes largely over ground already traversed in the *Protagoras* (see § 11 above). But in the *Protagoras* the question whether after all there is an ἐπιστήμη ἀρετῆς is not faced[1]; nor is there any trace of the doctrine of δόξα, by which a solution is offered of the paradox that although Virtue is of the nature of Knowledge, yet the possessors of Virtue are for the most part unable to impart it, nor of the allied topic of 'demotic virtue' (see on **100 A** 6).

There is much ground for supposing that of the 'Educational' dialogues the *Protagoras* is the earliest. The argument is almost purely Socratic. In particular there is the well-known identification of the Pleasant and the Good. Virtue is represented in the *Protagoras* as a calculus of Pleasures. From this outcome of Socratic teaching, which was developed by Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, Plato shortly afterwards strongly separated himself, and he criticizes it in the *Gorgias*. (See Grote II 60, 78, 119 foll.; J. & A. M. Adam's Introd. to *Prot.* pp. xxix foll.)

§ 16. The *Gorgias*. The main point of advance in the *Gorgias* is the strong assertion of the intrinsic difference between Pleasure and Good (Zeller p. 121). It is true that as Grote says (II 105) 'Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it: we learn only that Good is a mental perfection, Evil a mental taint, answering to

[1] 'Plato Menone hanc quaestionem, num veritatis omnino cognitio sit, primum tractavit, qua in Protagora supersederat' Hermann *Gesch. u. Syst.* I 483 (quoted by Fr.).

indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this circumstance, that they have no reference either to pleasure or pain.' But we could hardly expect from Plato at this stage a full and complete utterance on a point about which he perhaps never more than half satisfied himself.

The comparative slenderness of the metaphysical basis in the *Gorgias*, and the simplicity of the mythical materials (Exc. VI p. 289), point to a comparatively early date for its composition. As I have already said (§ 13) I should place it as the last dialogue written before Plato's first Sicilian journey. The Pythagorean passage 492 E foll. furnishes no argument against this view.

Another argument for placing the *Gorgias* before the *Meno* is the fact that the term δόξα, later so closely connected by Plato with the province of rhetoric, is in the *Gorgias* conspicuous by its absence (see Exc. VII pp. 299, 300).

Further, the summary treatment of Gorgias' position and of the relations of rhetoric to sophistry in the *Meno* implies the thorough discussion of these points in the *Gorgias*. See on **95 C** 23.

It is also just possible that in *Meno* **71 C** the reference to Socrates' meeting with Gorgias may be a covert allusion to the earlier dialogue (cp. Exc. V p. 282).

§ 17. The *Phaedrus* I believe to have been written by Plato soon after his return from his first Sicilian journey, and to have been his first publication as Head of the Academy.[1] I lay some stress in regard

[1] This was the view taken by C. F. Hermann and others. Grote I 178, 561, etc., Zeller p. 104 note.

to this on the tradition that the *Phaedrus* was the earliest of *all* Plato's compositions.[1] The tradition is preserved by Diog. L. III 38 λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον, by Olympiodorus in his life of Plato ch. 3 (Teubner text VI p. 192) ὅτι δὲ τοὺς διθυράμβους ὁ Πλάτων ἤσκητο δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου, τοῦ διαλόγου πάνυ πνέοντος τοῦ διθυραμβώδους χαρακτῆρος, ἅτε τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦτον πρῶτον γράψαντος διάλογον, ὡς λέγεται, and lastly in the Προλεγόμενα τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας (Teubner text VI p. 217). The reasons assigned for giving the first place to the *Phaedrus* are different in each of these works and in each case somewhat frivolous; but perhaps the very inadequacy of the grounds alleged points to some real fact at the back of the tradition. If in the Academic records account was only taken of the writings of the Head in his official position, then the earlier writings of Plato would be ignored, and the *Phaedrus* would be set down as his first utterance.

In the *Phaedrus* the additional territory that Plato has added to his domain of thought is wide and diversified. I think most of these accessions may be connected with the new facts of his life, namely (1) his westward journey, (2) his professional position. The results of the first have two aspects, which are however closely connected. Plato's new intercourse with leading Pythagoreans I believe to have been in the first place the main source from which he drew the mass of mythical material with which is associated his teaching on Transmigration and Immortality (Exc.

[1] This view was taken by Schleiermacher: Grote I 172, etc., Zeller pp. 129 foll.

VII p. 296). Further, I believe that from the same source fell the spark that kindled into life Plato's first theory of Ideas. From an early time Plato felt that to the Universal attached a Reality that did not belong to the particulars. Perhaps the passage most clearly showing this is *Euthyphro* 6 D *ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια* (cp. 5 D). 'Similar passages, in which the expressions which were afterwards used in connexion with the theory of ideas occur in speaking of the Socratic *λόγοι*, are far from rare in the Socratic dialogue' (J. Adam *Euthyphro*, Introd. p. xxviii: see also on **73 D** 5, cp. Zeller p. 120 note). But what sort of independent existence of the Ideas was conceivable? Surely the Other World to which the Soul departed after its commerce with earth was the natural home for those Existences that were then the objects of its cognition. It is true that in the *Phaedrus* we are not very explicitly told what the Realities are on which the Soul gazes; only that it sees the very Justice, the very Temperance, the very Knowledge, *οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ' ᾗ ἐστί που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὖσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν.* But that corresponding to every General Name there is an independently-existing Idea Plato probably first expressly said, or at least wrote, in *Rep.* X 596 A *εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν* (see H. Jackson in *J.P.* X 254 foll.). But it was in the *Phaedrus* that the Universals were 'hypostatized' and the Ideal Theory developed. Possibly we have a hint of this in

the words (247 c) that no poet has yet hymned the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος. But the separate existence of the Ideas could only be described by borrowing the language of Sense (see on **72 C** 2); indeed the mind refused to grasp them except as a kind of sensible.[1] And thus the Ideas in receiving 'a local habitation and a name' received their death-blow; the Ideal Man, existing apart from particular men, was after all but One More, so that a new Idea was needed embodying the common qualities he had with the rest (Grote II 271).

The new aspects in the *Phaedrus* that may be connected with Plato's new position consists in its polemical character. In the earlier dialogues there is very little polemic against living individuals. Plato is still a free-lance among philosophers; his sympathies and antipathies to other teachers are determined mainly by loyalty to Socrates, and are very little personal. It is absurd to suppose that the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* are attacks on the distinguished men whose names they bear. In the *Gorgias* there is, it is true, earnest denunciation of popular Statecraft and of oratory as her handmaiden.

[1] 'The Platonic Ideas are nothing more' (than 'first efforts'); 'but of all theories that have arisen in ingenious minds from an imperfect conception of the processes of abstraction and generalization, they are surely among the most plausible as well as beautiful' J. S. Mill *Dissertations* III 348. [The sequel shows admirably how the Ideal theory was arrived at.] Cp. J. Adam in *C.R.* XII 222: 'The doctrine of transcendent self-existent Ideas is a creation of the poet Plato, and has a permanent poetical if not philosophical value. It is the most powerful stimulus to the artistic imagination which Philosophy has ever supplied' (see Exc. VI p. 296).

In the *Phaedrus* the point of view is greatly changed. There is an attack upon Lysias—who is *δεινότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν* (228 A) and therefore selected for the purpose—but the attack upon him is not because he teaches rhetoric, but because he teaches it in the wrong way. There are in the *Phaedrus* references to the view of rhetoric taken in the *Gorgias*, and something amounting to a recantation of it (see 260 D foll. *ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ 'γαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν λόγων τέχνην ;*). Rhetoric is introduced speaking in her own defence; without me, she says, however much a man may know the Truth, the Art of Persuasion will not be his. Yes, she may be answered, but there is just the question; *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή*. Again 269 B *οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὁρίσασθαι τί ποτ' ἐστι ῥητορικὴ κτέ*. 'This reads like a good-humoured apology for past severities' observes Dr. Thompson, Introd. p. iv. The 'faulty classification' is the analogy drawn in the *Gorgias* between Rhetoric and Confectionery. Presently this is repudiated, and for it is substituted an analogy between Rhetoric and Medicine (270 B). Pericles, who in the *Gorgias* is involved with other statesmen in a common censure, is here praised because his oratory was founded on a basis of scientific knowledge. A large part of the *Phaedrus* (from 259 onwards) is an attempt to construct a true or philosophic Rhetoric. This is to be founded firstly on Dialectic, that is, on proper methods of Collection and Division (265 D foll.,

cp. 273 D foll.); secondly on Psychology, just as Medicine depends on a proper knowledge of the body. (For Plato's new conception of a Rhetoric see Dr. Thompson's Introd. pp. xvi–xviii). When Plato wrote the *Phaedrus* he held that there was room for an Art of Expression, and possibly even intended to fit it into the curriculum of his Academy.

All this tends to show that the *Phaedrus* is later than the *Gorgias*; at the same time the westward journey furnishes the sort of interval necessary to explain the transit from the old point of view to the new. A further question may be put: was not the new view the direct outcome of a visit to the birth-land of Greek Rhetoric, the home of Corax and Tisias? To this I can only say that I know of no one living in Sicily at the time, who is likely to have impressed Plato in this direction; and I think his new position in Athens may have been alone the determining cause; but other speculations are not excluded.

It is in the *Phaedrus* that we find the first reference to Plato's rival at Athens, Isocrates (278 E foll.). The reference is friendly, and perhaps shows that Plato then really hoped to find in the 'philosophic' rhetoric Isocrates professed to furnish, an article superior to that supplied elsewhere.[1] If this be so, the spirit of professional rivalry embittered in the

[1] An approximation to Isocrates in the *Phaedrus* is noticeable in the tendency towards the Isocratean principle of avoiding hiatus. This appears especially in the dialogue portions: the proportion being less than half what is found in the *Symposium* and the *Republic* (Blass *Att. Bered.* II 426). For the early friendship of Plato and Isocrates see Diog. L. III 8.

following years the good relations with which they started. In the *Euthydemus* there is a distinct note of antagonism (Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* pp. 179 foll.) and a still stronger one in the *Republic*, if we are to recognize in the picture (495 E) of 'the bald-headed tinker, who, having made some money, goes to the bath and washes himself, puts on a wedding garment, and proposes to marry his master's daughter, now that she is poor and desolate,' Isocrates with his patronage of poor forlorn Philosophy (Teichmüller *Literarische Fehden* pp. 103–105, 1881, cp. H. Jackson *Proc. of the Cambridge Philol. Society* 1882, pp. 13 and 41). Plato is rarely so acrimonious as this.[1]

The date here assumed for the composition of the *Phaedrus*—say 386 B.C.—is merely part of a hypothesis which must stand or fall according as it is found to fit or not to fit the view of Plato's career which increased enlightenment shall show to be a reasonable one. Dr. Thompson (Introd. pp. xix, xx) argues against the view of C. F. Hermann that I have here adopted, and would place it later. So would Mr. J. B. Bury (*J.P.* xv 83 foll.). On the other hand Zeller p. 134 (see the other passages there referred to, and the note on p. 399) argues for a comparatively early

[1] See Jebb *Attic Orators* Introd. p. cxx 'Nothing more distinguishes Plato from later satirists of like keenness than his manner of hinting the redeeming points of the person under dissection; and whenever Gorgias comes in—whether in the dialogue that bears his name or elsewhere—it may be discerned (I venture to think) that Plato's purpose was to bring out an aspect of the man—that aspect which he considered most important—but that he allowed, and was writing for those who knew, that there was another side to the picture.'

date of the *Phaedrus*. It must be allowed that on the view here taken the amount of new material in the *Phaedrus* is very large, and these advances cannot all be connected with the external circumstances above considered. I will mention three: the tripartite division of the Soul; the method of *συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις*, and the recognition of two distinct grades below the *φιλόσοφος* corresponding respectively with the *φιλότιμος* and the *φιλοχρήματος* (see Exc. VI p. 295). In the *Phaedo* the *φιλοσώματος* is recognized as another stage below these three.

§ 18. The next dialogue to be considered is the *Euthydemus*. Both it and the *Meno* I regard as preceding the *Republic*; but which of the two is prior is extremely hard to say. On the whole I think it probable that the *Meno* is later. The topic of the ascendency of *φρόνησις* is treated elaborately in the *Euthydemus*, more succinctly in the *Meno*. See on **88 A 7**. On the other hand, the great question of the *Meno* receives summary treatment in the *Euthydemus* (282 c) *εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σοφία διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἄσκεπτον καὶ οὔπω διωμολογημένον ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί. Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, διδακτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἡσθεὶς εἶπον· Η καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, καὶ εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ σοφία.* (The shifting of the subject of the question from *ἀρετή* to *σοφία* is not important.) It seems to me that we have here not so much a reference back to a previous discussion, as a shelving of the question at present for convenience.

Plato had moreover already treated the question 'Is Virtue teachable?' in the *Protagoras*. (For views as to the date of the *Euthydemus* see Grote I 561 note; II 243 note, where Grote agrees with Ueberweg that the *Euthydemus* is later than the *Phaedrus*: Zeller p. 84 note, p. 119, and p. 126 note 80, where it is argued that the Ideal theory is implied in the *Euthydemus*.)

§ 19. If the views just put forward be accepted, the *Meno* may be regarded as the immediate prelude to the *Republic*. Some corroboration is to be found in the close analogy between the end of the *Meno* and the end of Book I of the *Republic*. In both Socrates is dissatisfied; he has been led off on side issues from the pursuit of the main problem. 'I have not been well entertained,' he tells Thrasymachus, 'but that was my own fault and not yours: for as your gourmands seize upon every new dish as it goes round, and taste its contents before they have had a reasonable enjoyment of its predecessor, so I seem to myself to have left the question we were at first examining, concerning the real nature of Justice, before we had found out the answer to it . . . so that at present the result of our conversation is that I know nothing: for while I do not know what Justice is, I am little likely to know whether it is in fact a virtue or not, or whether its owner is happy or unhappy' (Davies' and Vaughan's translation).

The transference of the subject of investigation from Virtue in the *Meno* to Justice in the *Republic* is characteristic. In the *Republic* we have an important development of the Socratic doctrine that Virtue is One. The cardinal virtues are now regarded as

'broken lights' of the One Virtue, and the grounds on which their difference depends are examined. This analysis finds no place in the *Meno*, nor in Book I of the *Republic* (Zeller, pp. 451 foll.).

The treatment of δόξα in the *Republic* carries on that in the *Meno*: in *Rep.* 506 C we have what looks like a verbal reference to *Meno* **97 A**. Further, *Meno* **89 B** contemplates an Ideal State, such as the *Republic*, at **99 A** we get a glimpse of the notion that the Man is the microcosm of the State, and at **100 A** we have a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in *Rep.* vii.

§ 20. The next dialogues to be considered in relation to the *Meno* are the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo*. Both of these I regard as later than the *Republic*, and *a fortiori* later than the *Meno*. In spite of their great difference they have this in common, that both present an idealized picture of Socrates more full and vivid than any to be found elsewhere (cp. Grote II 227); also that Plato rises in them to what is absolutely his highest point of poetical beauty, both in imagination and in diction. One strong reason for thinking them later than the *Republic* is that in assigning the *Phaedrus*, *Euthydemus* and *Meno* (with the *Menexenus* and *Clitophon*) to the years 386–383 B.C.—during all which time Plato must have been working at his *chef d'œuvre*—we are sufficiently filling up his time. In the case of the *Symposium* there is nothing that may not have been subsequent to the *Republic*, whereas in the *Phaedo* there are things we may almost say must have been so (cp. p. xxxix and presently p. liv).

The main point of contact between the *Meno* and

the *Symposium* is in the development of the doctrine of δόξα contained in the latter. It is possible that at 202 A (quoted on **97 B** 17) we have a reference not merely to the doctrine of the *Meno* but the actual treatise.[1] Whereas in the *Phaedrus* Eros is a god, the son of Aphrodite, in the *Symposium* he is relegated to the sphere of intermediary powers, and is not a god but a δαίμων. Thus he is brought nearer to men (Grote II 216).

The *Phaedo* is connected with the *Meno* by the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. The *Meno* is unmistakeably referred to, and its doctrine receives a further development (see on **81 D** 12 and § 9 above).

§ 21. A question may be raised as to the development of the doctrine of Immortality in Plato. In five of the dialogues that have now been considered this doctrine appears. These dialogues come, on the hypothesis adopted, in the order, *Phaedrus*, *Meno*, *Republic*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*. Is this order consistent with a probable view of the development of Plato's views on this subject? The main difficulty is the position of the *Symposium*. Whereas in the *Phaedrus*, the *Meno*, and the *Republic* we have proofs offered of the immortality of the soul (though that in the *Meno* is a partial and abbreviated one, in which the argument and myth of the *Phaedrus* is probably presumed), in

[1] Grote (II 232, note) points out that the *Symposium* must have been written between 385 B.C.—the date of the διοίκισις of Mantinea—and 370 B.C. when it was re-established. Zeller p. 133 couples it with the *Phaedo* as belonging 'to a time when the philosophy of Plato, and also his artistic power, had reached full maturity.' 'Teichmüller has shown that the *Phaedo* is later than the *Symposium*': see *C.R.* X 41.

the *Symposium* only a 'metaphorical immortality' is asserted: 'the soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation—by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and feelings—by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others' (Grote II 223).

In the *Phaedo* the question is faced with all the solemnity and earnestness of which Plato is capable. It is the sort of work that one might expect from a man who had just gone through a serious illness or a great trouble. I believe that Archer-Hind is quite right in upholding (*Phaedo* Intr. p. 21 foll.) that Plato did in the *Phaedo* maintain 'the immortality of particular souls as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul.' Not but that it is possible to exaggerate the importance attached by Plato to individual immortality (see on **86 A** 8).

The explanation is probably this. Plato did offer in the *Phaedrus* a very general proof of the immortality of soul (245 C). Some few years later he offered in the *Republic* another proof (Bk. X 608 D–611 A). This proof is different from that in the *Phaedrus*, to which, so far as I can see, no allusion is made. In the *Phaedo* again there is neither resumption of, nor reference to, the arguments of the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*. It would seem that Plato after writing the *Republic* became conscious that his arguments, so far at least as personal immortality is concerned, were unsatisfactory. It is strange, at any rate, that the only

reference in the *Phaedo* to any previous treatment of the subject should be to the half-demonstration in the *Meno*. After writing the *Symposium*, circumstances, we know not what, brought Plato round to renew his assault on the great problem. The result remains in the *Phaedo* as his final achievement in this direction.

§ 22. I will not enter on the difficult question of the date of the *Theaetetus*. On arriving at this dialogue we leave the stage of the 'educational' dialogues, and enter on the 'philosophic.'[1] The *Theaetetus* must be later than the *Meno*, containing, as it does, an important development of the doctrine of δόξα. At the same time it contains in matters of detail some curious parallels to the *Meno*.

(1) The story of Theaetetus' attempts to define Knowledge is very like that of Meno's attempts to define Virtue (see on **71 E** 1).

(2) There is a kinship between the mathematical passage at *Theaet.* 147 D foll. and the problem the solution of which Socrates elicits from the slave. In the *Theaetetus*, it is upon surds and square numbers that Theodorus has been lecturing, and he stops at the number 16. Now it is *sixteen feet* that the figure in the *Meno* **83 C** contains.

(3) The contrast between Theaetetus and Meno is pointed. Meno is fair in body, but not in mind; Theaetetus is just the reverse. Meno is exactly

[1] Zeller, I think, is certainly wrong (pp. 125 sqq.) in grouping the *Theaetetus* with the *Gorgias*, *Meno* and *Euthydemus*. For the hypothesis that the *Theaetetus* as we have it is an enlarged edition of an earlier work, see H. Jackson in *J.P.* XIII 244 note; Archer-Hind *Timaeus* Intr. p. 21, note.

described in *Theaet.* 150 E foll. (cp. 177 B). Theaetetus *wonders* but is not disconcerted.

(4) The simile of the νάρκη, applied by Meno to Socrates, is paralleled by that of the μαία, applied by Socrates to himself.

(5) The allusion to χρῶμα and the theory of vision in 153 D and 156 may be set beside *Meno* 76.

(6) The reference to ἐριστική 154 D, 164, 165, is just in the spirit of the *Meno.*

(7) The departure of Socrates at the end of the *Theaetetus* εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν is balanced by Anytus' threat in the *Meno.*

§ 23. Thus the dialogues form a series, each linked to others before and after. When we have a promise of an intended work we may presume that the contents of the intended work were to some extent in the author's mind at the time of his making the promise, though his views would shape and develop themselves in the process of execution. So Plato had much of the *Republic* in his head when he wrote the *Meno.*

We shall not be more than a year or so out if we assign the *Meno* to 384 B.C. At that time Plato was forty-three years of age and Socrates had been dead for fifteen years.[1] I proceed on the assumption that

[1] Schleiermacher thought that the *Meno* was written thirteen years after the death of Socrates. See his views, Grote II 16 note. While dissenting on some points I find it rather remarkable that in so many I coincide with a writer who has pursued his investigations on such very different principles. Rudolf Hirzel (*Rhein. Mus.* XLII 249) suggests that the *Meno* (especially the Anytus episode) was called forth by the publication of the κατηγορία Σωκράτους by the sophist Polycrates. This was a feigned speech, put into the mouth of Anytus, which led to

the works which, after Plato's second return to Athens, preceded the *Republic*, he produced because he saw some special reason for doing so. In the *Phaedrus* he sets forth his new view of intellectual concepts, and puts himself right as to the function of Rhetoric; the *Euthydemus* has for its chief object the depressing of his professional rivals Antisthenes and Isocrates; the writing of the *Meno* may have been forced upon him by impatient and impertinent people who pressed him for an answer on the question of the day: 'Can you teach Virtue? What do you profess?' The *Meno* is thus rather satirical than polemical. It is a continuation of the discussion with Protagoras, though it is not with Protagoras that the discussion is continued. For the rôle of respondent in the new discussion Plato found no one so suitable as the spoiled and arrogant young Thessalian, who, it was recorded, had once met Socrates. That Meno is a pupil of Gorgias is a mere accident. The *Meno* is in no sense an attack on Gorgias. 'Let us leave him out of the question,' says Socrates (**71 D**), 'as after all he is not here': and the explanation of Gorgias' position, that he teaches not Virtue, but the Art of Speaking, is received without a word of comment.

§ 24. It has come to be recognized of late years that an important aid to the determination of the order of Plato's works may be afforded by investigation

the later belief that it was the speech Anytus used at the trial (cp. Isocr. *Bus.* § 5; Diog. L. II 38; Them. *Or.* 23, p. 296 c; Quint. II 174). Hirzel's case as to the *Meno* is weak, and I cannot believe that the purpose of that dialogue is a defence of Socrates.

of points of style—points mostly so minute as to represent half-unconscious habits of the author's mind, and therefore likely to furnish a trustworthy clue to what we may call its 'stratification.' Opinions differ a good deal as to the degree of importance to be attached to this evidence. Still it is true to say that in 'Stylometry' has been found an occasionally useful adjunct to the old method of 'Hylometry' (if we may so call it).

It is as confirmatory evidence with regard to the main groups of Plato's writings that Stylometry is of most service. On the evidence of style alone it might be asserted that the *Meno* belongs to a different period from the *Philebus*. But it affords but little help as to the order of dialogues within one group; it does not help us to discover whether the *Meno* or the *Euthydemus* is prior.

All discussions of the order of Plato's writings based upon style (and to a less extent those based on other considerations) depend on the assumption that Plato after once issuing a work left it unaltered. May we assume this? A certain passage in Dionysius of Halicarnassus would make the assumption appear entirely unwarranted. Plato continued up to his eightieth year, he tells us, *τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων* (*de compos. verborum* ch. xxv p. 208; see Jebb *Att. Or.* Intr. p. lxxiv, R. & P. 243). Then follows the story about the tablet which, they say, was found after his death, with the first words of the *Republic*—*κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος*—arranged in several different orders.

We may well accept the view, which Dionysius is here supporting, of Plato's industry and fastidiousness in his literary work, and yet believe that Plato for the most part after publishing a dialogue regarded that edition as final. There was certainly no such general revision of his works as would have reduced them all to the level of one style, that of his later years. Conspicuous differences of style among the dialogues are obvious. With regard to subject matter the same is clear: there are abundant instances of inconsistency, development and self-criticism. I think, too, that Plato's mind was too active to allow him to spend any large amount of time in 'touching-up and titivating' published works, to say nothing of the inconvenience of having different editions in circulation at the same time.

The truth about the story appears to be this. Plato lived during a period when Attic prose was undergoing a great revolution. Beginning with a natural order, in which words were set down in the arrangement their mere sense would dictate, with little or no attention to euphonious combination, Attic writers ended with a style in which the arrangement of words was almost as severely conditioned as in verse; and this in regard to two things mainly, the collision of vowel sounds and rhythm. Plato was not a leader in this movement; it proceeded from the orators. But Plato had an exquisite ear for prose rhythm, and he could not be deaf to the effects the innovators produced. Moreover he was an experimenter in style. In the *Phaedrus* the influence of Isocrates is traceable; the *Menexenus* is an attempt to rival Lysias; in the

Symposium there is a succession of parodies of leading stylists. As time went on he elaborated more and more the order of words, and in particular became more and more sparing of hiatus.

We notice in Plato a growing tendency to fall in with the new taste in prose; but this tendency is broken by occasional experiments. This is a disturbing element that must always be taken into account when applying the stylometric method to Plato. Many writers indeed are liable to get a particular phrase or trick of style running in their head, an affection that disappears as unaccountably as it came. Such a trick we have in the use of εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα eight times in the *Charmides* (see on **80 D** 4).

§ 25. The verdict of Stylometry as regards the *Meno* fortunately agrees pretty well with that which would be given on other grounds. It is marked as not belonging to the later dialogues by the comparative indifference to *hiatus* (see on **77 A** 5, **98 C** 13) and the general simplicity of the order of words (see on **89 E** 26).

Prof. Lewis Campbell in *C.R.* III 28 gives a review of an important essay in the new method of 'quantitative criticism'; namely Constantin Ritter's *Die Echtheit und Chronologie der platonischen Schriften* (Stuttgardt 1888). Prof. Campbell had himself done most important work in this direction in his General Introduction to the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* (1867). Among foreign scholars W. Dittenberger led the way in 1881 by publishing in *Hermes* XVI pp. 321–345 his *Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge*. 'Having learned that the particle

μήν, for example, was rarely or never used by the earlier Attic prose-writers, he read through Plato with this in view, and found that the familiar formula τί μήν; was entirely absent from about two-thirds of the whole number of the generally acknowledged dialogues, and that in about half γε μήν was nowhere to be found, while on the other hand in the remaining works more than a hundred instances of τί μήν; and about sixty of γε μήν appeared.' (Neither τί μήν; nor γε μήν are found in the *Meno*, but ἀλλὰ μήν and καὶ μήν both occur.) 'The line of investigation thus marked out by Dittenberger has since been pursued by many scholars, of whom M. Schanz is much the most significant name. His paper in *Hermes* XXI pp. 439–459' (*zur Entwickelung des platonischen Stils*, 1886) 'has given fresh importance to this whole inquiry. The number of test-formulae has rapidly grown, and the many paths of observation successively opened show a remarkable amount of convergence.'

Among small immaterial points in which it is thought that the workings of half-conscious habit may be traced, a very large number of facts are furnished by the *formulae of answer*. Ritter after investigating these says that in the *Meno* out of 182 instances of answer-formulae, 42, or 23 per cent, take the form ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε or δοκεῖ μοι. This form is characteristic of the 'first group' (including *Phaedo* and *Symposium*); is less common in the 'second group' (*Rep.*, *Phaedr.*, *Theaet.*, and perhaps *Parm.*), and is rare in the last group (*Soph.*, *Polit.*, *Phil.*, *Tim.*, *Crit.*, *Laws*). I quote some results at which he arrives in regard to the *Meno* and six other dialogues.

	Prot.	*Euthyd.*	*Gorg.*	*Meno*	*Rep.*	*Philebus*	*Laws*
δῆλον ὅτι . . .	15	11	15	12	47	8	16
δῆλον ὡς . . .	0	0	0	0	2	5	14
σχεδόν τι (or separated)	3	2	2	1	12	0	2
σχεδόν . . .	0	0	3	0	7	14	122
ὡς ἔλεγον impf.	4	7	19	5	43	4	6
ὡς εἶπον aor. .	0	0	1	0	7	5	24
πότερον before vowels	18	13	13	4	27	21	36
πότερον before conson.	8	15	16	8	17	0	4
πότερα before conson.	0	2	1	0	3	6	7
πότερα or πότερ' before vowels	1	0	0	0	1	1 (50D)	1
ὥσπερ . . .	68	30	69	21	212	9	24
καθάπερ . .	0	1	1	0	6	27	148
μῶν	2	3	0 (rare in early dialogues)	3	3	10	29
δέ γε	3	6	25	12	67	27	31
forms of answer	50	107	336	182	1260	314	568
ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε, δοκεῖ μοι, etc.	3	19	49	42	69	3	
=%	6	17	15	23	5½	1	
ἀληθῆ λέγεις .	6	3	5	4	9	2	7
ἀληθῆ . . .	0	0	0	0	29	2	4
ἀληθῆ, ἀλ. λέγεις, ὀρθῶς λ.	6	3	5	5	48	6	22
ἀληθέστατα, etc., superl.	0	0	0	0	40	22	36

	Prot.	*Euthyd.*	*Gorg.*	*Meno*	*Rep.*	*Philebus*	*Laws*
Repetition of words from questions	5	22	28	16	218	35	34
with γὰρ οὖν .	0	0	1	0	22	12	10
,, γάρ. . .	0	1	5	2	55	0	2
,, δῆτα . .	0	5	8	7	11	1	1
πάνυ γε . . .	3	20	48	27	40	9	4
πάνυ μὲν οὖν .	3	3	7	5	64	21	49

These figures show in a general way a kinship between the *Meno* and the group *Protagoras*, *Euthyd.*, *Gorgias* and *Republic*; from which the *Philebus* is removed and the *Laws* yet more removed. Some of the other results at which he arrives, however, diverge considerably from the views adopted in the present work.

Ritter argues that for determining the order of the dialogues language is the only test: doctrinal content, allusions from one work to another, historical references, are all illusory or insufficient.

The stylometric method has been disparaged by Ferdinand Horn (*Platonstudien*, Vienna, 1893)[1]; also by Zeller in the 4th (German) edition of his *History of Ancient Philosophy* and in two papers.

But the writer who has been most prominent in recent years in regard to this kind of research is W. Lutoslavski. A paper of his was read before the

[1] In an Appendix (pp. 343–358) he gives an analysis and criticism of the *Meno*, which he believes to have been written later than the *Protagoras*, but earlier than the *Gorgias*.

Oxford Philological Society on 21st May, 1897, of which a review is given in *C.R.* XI 284: 'Great numbers of stylistical peculiarities are required for correct inferences. C. Ritter investigated only forty peculiarities of style, and many other inquirers have drawn inferences from a single occurrence of a single peculiarity. The chronological conclusions drawn by Lutoslavski are based on the comparison of five hundred peculiarities representing fifty-eight thousand observations made by various investigators.' His method has been, assuming that the latest work of all is the *Laws*, to group in order of their approximation to this the other 'late' dialogues, *Soph.*, *Polit.*, *Phil.*, and *Timaeus*. Then these dialogues, with the *Laws*, are taken as the standard of comparison for the remaining works.

So far as the earlier dialogues are concerned, his conclusions are as follows:—

(1) *Gorgias* is later than *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, and all Socratic dialogues.

(2) *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo* form a group later than the *Gorgias*, and were written probably in the order here mentioned.

(3) *Republic* Bks. II–X were written in a few years, and are later than the *Phaedo*. The composition of this work was not interrupted by other labours; only Bk. I is very much earlier, probably written between *Gorgias* and *Cratylus*.

(4) *Phaedrus* was written about 379 B.C. and after the *Republic*.

In 1897 Lutoslavski's main work *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* was published in English.

A careful and elaborate review of it, by J. Adam, appears in *C.R.* XII 218 foll. The work falls into two parts; the first 'stylometric' (of which a part of the results have just been given), the second dealing with the contents and teaching of the dialogues. The reviewer has some excellent observations on the limitations of the method of Stylometry. Lutoslavski says the method of his book is 'a result of the author's previous study of natural sciences and mathematics.' He has applied the methods there appropriate too rigidly to the workings of a human mind.

Editions of the Meno

Platonis dialogi IV Meno, Crito, Alcibiades uterque cum adnotatione critica et exegetica. Curavit Ph. Buttmannus (Ed. IV 1822, Ed. V 1830). This work was based on the work of F. E. Biester, who published an edition of these four dialogues in the year 1780, in accordance with a decree of Frederick the Great, issued in the previous year, to promote the better editing of Latin and Greek works for the use of schools, and the publishing of German translations of the same.

Vier platonische Gespräche, Menon, Kriton, der erste und zweite Alkibiades, Deutsch mit Anmerkungen etc., by F. Ullrich (Ed. II 1821). This was based on a translation by F. Gedike issued in 1780 as part of the scheme referred to above.

Stallbaum published an edition of the *Meno* in 1827, and again in 1836 as part of his complete edition of Plato's works. On this is based, but with great additions and improvements, the work of R. Fritzsche (Leipzig 1885).

The *Meno of Plato,* with Introduction and Notes, by St. George Stock, M.A., Pembroke College, Oxford (Clarendon Press 1891). [This I believe is the only edition with English notes hitherto published.]

Explanation of some References

'Grote' = *Plato and the other companions of Socrates*, by George Grote, F.R.S. (Ed. II 1867). (When Grote's *History of Greece* is indicated it is referred to specifically. Unfortunately the paging differs so much in the different editions that it has only been possible to refer to the chapters.)

'Zeller' = *Plato and the Older Academy*, translated with the Author's sanction from the German of Dr. Eduard Zeller by Sarah Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin, M.A. (new ed. 1888). (When translations of other parts of Zeller's work are referred to, they are specially indicated. In the case of the vol. on Socrates, reference is made to the 3rd ed. 1885.)

'Kühner' = *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* von Dr. Raphael Kühner. Reference has unavoidably been made to the *second* edition (1870) by sections (§) and paragraphs. The numbering of the sections corresponds generally with that of the new (revised) edition.

'Jelf' = Jelf's *Greek Grammar* (3rd ed. 1861).

'Riddell' = *Digest of Idioms*, forming Appendix B to the edition of the *Apology* of Plato with Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. James Riddell, M.A. (Clarendon Press 1867).

'Goodwin *M. T.*' (or 'Goodwin') = *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*, by Dr. W. W. Goodwin (enlarged edition 1897).

'F.E.T.' = *A Syntax of Attic Greek*, by F. E. Thompson, M.A. 1883.

'*C.R.*' = *Classical Review*.

'*J.P.*' = *Journal of Philology*.

'R. & P.' = Ritter and Preller *Historia philosophiae, etc.* ed. 7, 1888.

'Ueb.-Heinze' = Ueberweg *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Phil.* ed. 8, 1894, re-edited by Heinze.

'*J.H.S.*' = *Journal of the Hellenic Society*.

'Fr.' = Fritzsche's edition (mentioned above).

'Sch.' = M. Schanz's edition of the text.

)(= distinguished from.

A mark † is affixed to the name of any work that is regarded as spurious.

The old Latin translation of Plato by Ficinus was published in 1532 (and the following years) and that by Cornarius at Basel in 1561.

Dramatic date about 407 B.C.
Date of composition 383

ΜΕΝΩΝ

ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς [πειραστικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ, ΑΝΥΤΟΣ

I. Ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδα- St. II.
κτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ p. 70
οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παρα-
γίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ;

ΣΩ. Ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐ-
δόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο
ἐφ' ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, B
καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου
Ἀριστίππου πολῖται [Λαρισαίου]. τούτου δὲ
ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν
πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε
τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρί-
στιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ
τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγα-
λοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ
εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν C
ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅ τι ἄν τις

βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος.
ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περι-
71 ἑστηκεν· ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, 20
καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρ' ὑμᾶς
οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως
ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται
καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός
τις εἶναι [ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ' ὅτῳ 25
τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι]· ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτου
δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὡς
οὐδὲ αὐτό, ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετή,
τυγχάνω εἰδώς.

B II. Ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω·
συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος,
καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ
ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς
ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τί <ἐστιν> εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι 5
οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ
παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς
εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ
τἀναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι;

C ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, 10
ἀληθῶς οὐδ' ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

ΣΩ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι
οὐδ' ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

ΜΕΝ. Τί δέ; Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε 15
ἐνθάδε ἦν;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε.

ΜΕΝ. Εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι;

ΣΩ. Οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε
οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πῶς μοι τότε
ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδεν, καὶ σὺ ἃ D
ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν· ἀνάμνησον οὖν με, πῶς ἔλεγεν.
εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δή που σοὶ
ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ
ἄπεστιν· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί
φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα
εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς
σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ
πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι.

ΙΙΙ. ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, E
εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν,
ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι
τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς
μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ
αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ
βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν,
ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε
τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ
ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ
ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει,
ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμ- 72
πολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν
ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν
πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον
ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὡσαύτως δέ, οἶμαι,
ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

ΣΩ. Πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων. ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· ἆρα τούτῳ φὴς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς;

MEN. Τοῦτ' ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἦ μέλιτταί εἰσιν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα· τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων, ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι· τί τοῦτο φὴς εἶναι; εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

IV. ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀρετή· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅ τι λέγω;

MEN. Δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας

καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάν περ ὑγίεια ᾖ, ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ; E

ΜΕΝ. Ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς; ἐάν περ ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάν τε ἐν γυναικί· ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάν τε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάν τε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάν τε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάν τε ἐν ἀνδρί; 73

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὁμοῖον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα. B

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄν περ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοικήσουσιν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.

MEN. Φαίνονται.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο ;

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι ;

MEN. Ναί.

C ΣΩ. Πάντες ἄρ' ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοί εἰσιν· τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται.

MEN. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

V. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστιν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ' ἐκείνου.

MEN. Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ' εἶναι
D τῶν ἀνθρώπων ; εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ' ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἷόν τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων ;

MEN. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε σκόπει· ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τ' εἶναι· οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή ;

ΜΕΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις ; E

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε, ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα.

ΜΕΝ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς.

ΣΩ. Τίνας ταύτας ; εἰπέ· οἷον καὶ ἐγὼ σοὶ 74
εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις· καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

ΜΕΝ. Ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν· πολλὰς αὖ ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδή· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.

VI. ΜΕΝ. Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, B
ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἷός τ' ὦ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γάρ που ὅτι οὑτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο, ὃ νυν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστιν σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων ; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυ-

λότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι ; εἶπες δήπου ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστιν σχήματα ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες ἄν ;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὅ τι ἔστιν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ χρῶμά τι ; εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα ;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

D ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅ τι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, τί ἔστιν τοῦτο, ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα

E καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις ;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

VII. ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο, οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστιν τὸ σχῆμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅ τι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅ τι λέγεις· ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη· τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.

ΜΕΝ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ. B

ΣΩ. Βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Προθυμητέον τοίνυν· ἄξιον γάρ.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρῶμαί σοι εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστιν σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχει αὐτὸ εἶναι·

ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων
C τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ
ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην
εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΜΕΝ. Ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν
λόγον, ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν
τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ
περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;

VIII. ΣΩ. Τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε· καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν
σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν
ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται·
D εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον
καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ
φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ
δὴ πραότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρί-
νεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ
μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνων
ὧν ἂν προομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτῶν. πειράσομαι
E δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. λέγε γάρ μοι·
τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ
ἔσχατον· πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω· ἴσως δ'
ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο· ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που
καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι· τὸ
τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ
λέγεις.

76 ΣΩ. Τί δ'; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ
στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων, σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμα· ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

IX. ΜΕΝ. Τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὦ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν, ὅ τί B ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ' εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.

ΣΩ. Καὶν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν.

ΜΕΝ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες, ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ὦσιν. καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ C ἴσως κατέγνωκας, ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν. χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις;

ΜΕΝ. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;

ΜΕΝ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορ- 25
ροαὶ πορεύονται ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνί-
D οις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. 30

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος, ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. 35

ΜΕΝ. Ἀριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται· καὶ ἅμα, οἶμαι, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς
E εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνήν, ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα 40
πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος. 45

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, βελτίων· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ' 50
εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης.

77 ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.

Χ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπο-

λείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι, ὅ τι ἔστιν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντας τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή. τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρ' ἐμοῦ εἴληφας. B

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, C ὥριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις ; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ ;

D ΜΕΝ. Γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο ;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ ;

ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.

ΣΩ. Ἢ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακά, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν

E κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, [οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά,] ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων, ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά· ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὔ ;

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον, ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπ' αὐτῶν ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

78 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ' ὅσον βλάπτονται ;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας ;

ΜΕΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι ;

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώ- B κρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.

XI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι ;

ΜΕΝ. Εἶπον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων ;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά. C

ΜΕΝ. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΣΩ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τ' εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον ;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἄλλ' ἅττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

D ΣΩ. Εἶεν· χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὸ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ κακίαν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι,

E ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται,

79 ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δ' ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

XII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με;

ΜΕΝ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθ' ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι, ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν B οἷόν τ' εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν, ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων.

ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἔστιν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ C εἰρηκὼς ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; [τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν.] ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ' οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅ τι ἔστιν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

D ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ' ἐγώ σοι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅ τι ἔστιν οἵου διὰ τῶν ταύτης
E μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις· ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

XIII. ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου;

ΜΕΝ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν
80 καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι
B πεποιηκέναι [ναρκᾶν]. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ

τι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδ' ὅ τι ἔστιν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ' ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ' ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης.

ΣΩ. Πανοῦργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπάτησάς με.

ΜΕΝ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με ἤκασας. C

ΜΕΝ. Τίνος δὴ οἴει ;

ΣΩ. Ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι. λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γάρ, οἶμαι, τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν D περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὃ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ἤδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἅψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὁμοῖος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅ τί ποτε ἔστιν.

XIV. ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅ τι ἔστιν ; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος

ζητήσεις ; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσει ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ἤδησθα ;

E ΣΩ. Μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον †κατάγεις,† ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδεν οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν ; οὔτε γὰρ ἄν γε ὃ οἶδεν ζητοῖ· οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως· οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅ τι ζητήσει.

81 MEN. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

MEN. Ἔχεις λέγειν ὅπῃ ;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα—

MEN. Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.

MEN. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες ;

ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρί-

B ζονται λόγον οἵοις τ' εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσι, ταυτί ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ σκόπει, εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὃ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε· δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον·

οἷσι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἄλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτει

ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν,
ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ C
35 τε μέγιστοι
ἄνδρες ἀΰξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.

XV. Ἄτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ
5 περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, D καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν
10 ἄνθρωποι, τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν
15 καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε δὲ ἐργαστικούς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς ποιεῖ· ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ E σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ΜΕΝ. Ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις
20 τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι ὡς οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι πανοῦργος εἶ· καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε 82
25 διδάξαι, ὃς οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλ'

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ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγων.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ἀλλ' εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκα. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν
B σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὁντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.

ΣΩ. Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής.

ΣΩ. Πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ὁπότερ' ἄν σοι φαίνηται, εἰ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρ' ἐμοῦ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ προσέξω.

XVI. ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

C ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ αὕτη δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἑνὸς ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἄλλο τι ἢ δὶς δυοῖν γίγνεται ; D

ΠΑΙ. Γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα δὶς γίγνεται ποδῶν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δύο δὶς πόδες ; λογισάμενος εἰπέ.

ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν γένοιτ' ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἕτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν ;

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώ.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται ἑκείνου ἡ γραμμὴ ἑκάστη ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ E τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν· τί δὲ ἡ ἑκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου ;

ΠΑΙ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶ πάντα ; καὶ νῦν οὗτος οἴεται εἰδέναι, ὁποία ἐστὶν ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γενήσεται· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οἶδεν οὖν ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οἴεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

XVII. ΣΩ. Θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι. σὺ δέ μοι λέγε· ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῂς τὸ διπλάσιον
83 χωρίον γίγνεσθαι; τοιόνδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω ὥσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν· ἀλλὰ ὅρα, εἴ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι.

ΠΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, ἂν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης δή, φῄς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον, ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

B ΣΩ. Ἀναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. ἄλλο τι ἡ τουτὶ ἂν εἴη ὃ φῂς τὸ ὀκτώπουν εἶναι;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ταυτὶ τέτταρα, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσον οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

ΠΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστιν τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον ;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ C διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα. οὐχί ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὀκτώπουν δ' ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς ; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον ;

ΠΑΙ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησὶ τουτί ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ ἥμισυ ;

ΠΑΙ. <Ναί.>

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύ- D της γραμμῆς, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἢ τοσησδί ; ἢ οὔ ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου. καί μοι λέγε· οὐχ ἥδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν ἦν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωριου γραμμὴν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος.

ΠΑΙ. Δεῖ.

E ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῂς αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ΠΑΙ. Τρίποδα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ᾖ, τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως δύο μὲν οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῄς.

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν ᾖ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται;

ΠΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐννέα.

ΣΩ. Ἔδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώ- πουν χωρίον γίγνεται.

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς· καὶ εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ
84 δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὗ ἐστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤδει μὲν οὔ, ἦ τις ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμή, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὖν ᾤετό γ' αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ

θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν· νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἤδη, καὶ ὥσπερ B οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδ' οἴεται εἰδέναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ ἤδει;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει· νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ C ῥᾳδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις ᾤετ' ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν μήκει.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οἴει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὄνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας;

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅ D τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος· φύλαττε δὲ ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα.

XIX. Λέγε γάρ μοι σύ· οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστι χωρίον ; μανθάνεις ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τουτὶ ἴσον ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἑκατέρῳ τούτων ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθ' ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα χωρία τάδε ;

E ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίγνεται ;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἔδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας
85 εἰς γωνίαν τείνουσα, τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἴσαι, περιέχουσαι τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον ;

ΠΑΙ. Γίγνονται.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή· πηλίκον τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἥμισυ ἑκάστου ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέτμηκεν ἐντός; ἢ οὔ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν;

ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρα.

ΣΩ. Πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε;

ΠΑΙ. Δύο.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν;

ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσια.

ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται; B

ΠΑΙ. Ὀκτώπουν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς;

ΠΑΙ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ τετράποδος;

ΠΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί· ὥστ' εἰ ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XX. ΣΩ. Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων; ἔστιν ἥντινα δόξαν οὐχ αὑτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο; C

ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἤδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὗται αἱ δόξαι· ἢ οὔ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε ;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.

D ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει, ἤτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων· εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε
E τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ δεδίδαχέν τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν ; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαχεν ; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ τέθραπται.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ' οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν.

ΣΩ. Ἔχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται.

XXI. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει; 86

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅτ' οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὅν τ' ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὂν ἂν μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρ' οὐ τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρή, ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος, ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι; B

ΜΕΝ. Εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι δ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν, ἃ μή τις οἶδεν, βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα, ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα,

C μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.

MEN. Καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXII. ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν, ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή;

MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι,
D πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἔστιν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι· τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν;
E ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι, ποιόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅ τι ἔστιν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν
87 εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι οὔπω οἶδα

εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μέν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε· εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον, οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ, οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα παθεῖν· ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν B κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή.

XXIII. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅ τί ἐστιν οὔθ' ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποιόν τί ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν; πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ; ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν; διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα· ἀλλ' ἆρα διδακτόν; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, C ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δ' οὔ.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέ-

ψασθαι, πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.

D ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τιν' αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀρετῇ γ' ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων.

XXIV. ΣΩ. Σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

88 ΣΩ. Ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν· ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φῂς ἢ οὕτως;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει ; ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε. B

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή, τούτων ἆττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ ; οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἷον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία· <πάντα> μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά ; C

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δ' εἰς τοὐναντίον ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν

ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφελιμόν γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν' εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XXV. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα, ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά, οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δ' ἡ ἄφρων;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον· φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι;

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί.

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδ' ἦν· εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXVI. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγονται, ἆρα μαθήσει;

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως νὴ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει μὲν ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ ἀρετή;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ

ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα· ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν, εἴ τινες εἶεν αὐτῆς διδάσκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ καὶ τούτων μάλιστα, οὓς ἂν οἴωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδοῖμεν· Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μέν ἐστι πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλὴς ἀνήρ· ἔπειτα τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει· αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτ' εἰσὶν εἴτε μή, καὶ οἵτινες.

XXVII. Σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἄνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τίνες ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι. ὧδε δὲ σκέψαι· εἰ βουλοίμεθα Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἆρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς C ἰατρούς;

ΑΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα γενέσθαι, ἆρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους;

ΑΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;

ΑΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὧδε δή μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι· ἆρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι D παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῖμεν ἄν, τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἰέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν;

ΑΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι E βουλομένους αὐλητήν τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις δέ τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν [ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν

παρὰ τούτων] οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι μήτ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητὴς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν ὃν ἂν πέμπωμεν. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι ;

ΑΝ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός.

91 XXVIII. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετ' ἐμοῦ κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτουΐ Μένωνος. οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρός με, ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὑτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως
B ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν . . . σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιμεν. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους ;

ΑΝ. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σύ, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς
C οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

ΑΝ. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων, μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων.

XXIX. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε; οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιουμένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅ τι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσιν; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι D πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτως περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν· καίτοι τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξακούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας E μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη· οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα· καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὶ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται· καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμ- 92
πολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λελη-θέναι καὶ ἑαυτούς; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώ-

σωμεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;

XXX. ΑΝ. Πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων· τούτων δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ
B τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῶσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφ- 5
ικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἠδίκηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ; 10

ΑΝ. Οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Ἄπειρος ἄρ' εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν;

C ΑΝ. Καὶ εἴην γε. 15

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει <ἐν> ἑαυτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἶης;

ΑΝ. Ῥᾳδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἵ εἰσιν, εἴτ' οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμὶ εἴτε μή. 20

ΣΩ. Μάντις εἶ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε· ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐζήτουμεν τίνες εἰσίν, παρ' οὓς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχ-
D θηρὸς γένοιτο· οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει, 25 ἔστων οἱ σοφισταί· ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργέτησον, φράσας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ

πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτ' ἂν ἄξιος λόγου.

ΑΝ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φῄς· καὶ ἴσως τὶ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν E τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων· εἰπὲ ὄνομα ὅτου βούλει.

ΑΝ. Τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι ; ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάν περ ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι.

XXXI. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ' οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἷοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα, ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον ; 93

ΑΝ. Καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσι σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες ;

ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς ; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὤν· οὐκ εἰ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδ' εἰ γεγόνασιν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλ' εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι B σκοποῦμεν. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ

ἦσαν, ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν ἄλλῳ παρ' ἄλλου· τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων.

XXXII. Ὧδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ
C λόγου· Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, κἀκεῖνον εἶναι;

ΑΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', οἶει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ; ἢ οἶει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ
D καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν ὑὸν ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν; ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν, ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο. ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;

ΑΝ. Ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ υἱέος αὐτοῦ ᾐτιάσατ' ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν.

E ΑΝ. Ἴσως οὐκ ἄν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἅπερ ὁ

πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ πρεσβυτέρου ;

ΑΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ υἱὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή ;

ΑΝ. Ἴσως μὰ Δί' οὔ.

XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὗτος μὲν δή σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι· ἄλλον δὲ δὴ σκεψώμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου· ἢ τοῦτον οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι ;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαίδευσεν, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὁτουοῦν πεποιηκέναι ; τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγένονας καὶ ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Περικλέα, οὗτος μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἶσθ' ὅτι δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον ;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σύ, ἱππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τἆλλα ἐπαίδευσεν, ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, οὐδενὸς χείρους· ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι ; δοκῶ μέν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτόν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οἴῃ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι

ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψεν, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων· τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ· οὗτοι δέ που ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, ἀκοῇ.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὑτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαι, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ἂν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.

ΑΝ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷόν ἐστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ· οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν· καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴεται

γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων. ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ, οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς B διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὔ.

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή ; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι C ἀρετῆς ;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.

D ΣΩ. Οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοι τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθ' ὅτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγει ;

MEN. Ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν ;

XXXVI. ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις οὗ λέγει

καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἵζε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν
E συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει ;

MEN. Φαίνεταί γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,

εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,

λέγει πως ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον

οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ

οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
96 πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τἀναντία λέγει ;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλὰ
B οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι,

οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

XXXVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί; C

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ὡμολογήκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμ- D μεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ

ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἐνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους
E ποιήσει· λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν
ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως, ὅτι
οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως 30
καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον
γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

XXXVIII. ΣΩ. Ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς
ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν
97 τοῦτό γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι· ἦ γάρ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς 5
ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που
καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν
μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὁμοῖοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς 10
ὡμολογηκόσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς δὴ [ὀρθῶς] λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. <εἴ> τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν
εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ
ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο; 15

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

B ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων, ἥτις
ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ' ἐπιστάμενος,
οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. 20

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕως γ' ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ
περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων

ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐδὲν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι C φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

ΜΕΝ. Τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ' οὔ.

XXXIX. ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ <ἂν> ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται· ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅ τι δή ποτε D πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι' ὅ τι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν δι' ὅ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γ' εἰπέ.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν· ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστιν παρ' ὑμῖν.

ΜΕΝ. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

E MEN. Τί οὖν δή;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ παραμένει· δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον· πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν
98 δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, <ὦ> [Μένων] ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.

MEN. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί.

B XL. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων· ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, <οὐ> πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην, ἓν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.

MEN. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη ;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον C οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι' ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, [οὔτ' ἐπίκτητα]—ἢ D δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

E ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον ;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

99 ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται· ᾧ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως.

XLI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή ;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

B ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ

τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὗς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν· διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσιν, ἅτε οὐ δι' ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται, ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι C τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσιν καὶ λέγουσι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε, οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς D ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

E ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.

XLII. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ
100 νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν, οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ εὐθὺς τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.

B ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς παραγίγνεται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπι-
C χειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή. νῦν δ' ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πραότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις.

COMMENTARY

Chapters I, II (**70 A–71 D**). MENO. *Can Virtue be taught?* SOCRATES. *I do not even know what Virtue is, much less whether it can be taught. What is more, I never met any one who did know what Virtue is.* MENO. *Have you never met Gorgias?* SOCRATES. *Yes, but I do not clearly remember what he said. Try and tell me yourself.*

The first division of the dialogue extends to the end of chap. xiii. (**80 D**). The speakers are Meno and Socrates. Meno attempts to frame a definition of Virtue, and confesses himself beaten.

1. **ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή**: for the philosophical import of this **70 A**
question see Introd. § 11. It had already been made the main subject of the dialogue *Protagoras*, at the end of which (361 A B) it appears that Socrates, in arguing that Virtue is *ἐπιστήμη*, has been implicitly arguing that Virtue may be taught, though explicitly this is the position he has denied. The converse paradox turns out to be the position of Protagoras. He, as his profession demanded, asserted that Virtue was teachable; but by denying that Virtue was Knowledge, he has implicitly contradicted himself. In the *Euthydemus* (282 B C) the question occurs again, though here *σοφία* is substituted for *ἀρετή*. Socrates says *εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ* Κλεινία, *ἡ σοφία διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*. Cleinias eagerly accepts the former alternative; Socrates applauds him, saying *εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ σοφία*. Cp. also *Clitophon* 407 B. (This dialogue, if genuine, as it probably is, must be regarded as an introduction to the *Republic*, left for some reason unfinished. As the *Meno* is also in a manner introductory to the *Republic*, correspondencies between the *Clitophon* and the *Meno* are worth noting.) In *Clit.* l.c. we read *τῶν δ'*

ὑέων ἀμελεῖτε, καὶ οὔτε διδασκάλους αὐτοῖς εὑρίσκετε τῆς δικαιοσύνης, εἴπερ μαθητόν· εἰ δὲ μελετητόν τε καὶ ἀσκητόν, οἵτινες ἐξασκήσουσι καὶ ἐκμελετήσουσιν ἱκανῶς. In the spurious dialogue *περὶ ἀρετῆς* (Teubner text vol. VI pp. 86–91), which consists of little more than excerpts from the *Meno*, Socrates opens with the question *Ἆρα διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται ἄνδρες, ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ;* Xen. *Symp.* ii 6 exhibits it as a theme of debate in a genteel assembly: *καὶ ὁ μέν τις αὐτῶν εἶπε, Ποῦ οὖν εὑρήσεις τούτου* [sc. *τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας*] *διδάσκαλον; ὁ δέ τις ὡς οὐδὲ διδακτὸν τοῦτο εἴη, ἕτερος δέ τις ὡς εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν.* The problem is referred to by Aristotle *NE.* I x (ix) 1 *ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν* [sc. *ἡ ἀρετὴ*] *ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίγνεται.* It is probable (especially from the use of the words *ἀσκητόν* and *θείαν μοῖραν*) that there is here a definite reference to the *Meno*. Cp. ibid. X ix 6 *γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μήποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύῃ, ἀλλὰ δέῃ προδιείργασθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν.* Antisthenes the Cynic, as a follower of Socrates, *διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετήν* (Diog. L. VI 10). On the other hand, Isocrates does not believe in any *τέχνη* to make men virtuous; *Antidosis* (15) 274, cp. *in Soph.* (13) 21. 'Quaestio tota antiquitate non desita est disceptari': Fr. Prol. p. 12 note 6, who refers to Diog. L. II 121, 122 for tracts on the subject by Crito and Simo, pupils of Socrates. Cp. the words quoted from the *μέγας λόγος* of Protagoras (Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 471 note) *φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται.*

2. **ἀσκητόν**, 'quod exercitatione comparatur' Ast. The word appears to occur in this sense only here and in *Clit.* l.c., Arist. *NE.* l.c. and Xenophon *Mem.* I ii 23 *πάντα ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι*—the only places in which the word is used by Plato, Xenophon, or Aristotle. The word is used by other writers in physical senses related to physical meanings of *ἀσκέω*. *ἀσκέω* 'I work up' or 'elaborate' may be used intransitively (Plato *Rep.* 389 c etc. 'I go into training'), or with an acc. of the *result produced*, or with one of the *material worked upon*, or with both (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII vi 10 *ἀσκεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς σὺν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πολεμικά*). The sense of *ἀσκητός* in the passage before us is related to *ἀσκέω* with an acc. of the result produced. The other sense quoted by L. & S., of *persons* ('practised in'), is related to *ἀσκέω* with an acc. of the subject worked upon; but Plut. *Lyc.* 30. 2 *ἀνδρὸς ἀσκητοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ* is perhaps to be

referred to *ἀσκητήν* rather than *ἀσκητός*. The words *ἀσκητής, ἄσκησις, ἀσκητικός* we find applied first to the pursuit of some profession or art (specially gymnastics), next to the discipline of some philosophical school, and lastly, in Christian theology to the 'ascetic' life.

Practice is here distinguished from Knowledge as an avenue to Virtue. In Plato it is represented as conferring an inferior kind of Virtue: *Phaedo* 82 B *δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν . . ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ.* In *Rep.* 619 C an evil fate awaits one who has trusted too much to this, *ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα.* Socrates drew no such sharp distinction; and the Cynics when they spoke of 'learning virtue' 'understood moral exercise rather than intellectual research' (Zeller *Socr.* p. 313). Cp. Xen. *Mem.* I ii 19 23 (referred to above), also the fragment of Critias (Bergk *F. L. G.*[4] II p. 282) *ἐκ μελετῆς πλείους ἢ φύσεως ἀγαθοί.* Note that the alternative *ἀσκητόν* does not meet us again in this dialogue.

In *ἀσκητός*, used as it is here, the suffix *-τος* has the sense of the Latin termination *-bilis*; 'attainable' rather than 'attained. A large number of Greek verbal adjectives in *-τος* have this sense, e.g. in this dialogue *διδακτόν* (often), *μαθητόν, ἀναμνηστόν* (**87 B**), *παραδοτόν* and *παραληπτόν* (**93 B**), *ποιητόν* and *ἔνθετον* in Theognis quoted **95 E**, *μελετητόν* and *ἐθιστόν*, in Plato *Clitophon* and Aristotle *NE.* quoted above; further, *γνωστόν, νοητόν, αἰσθητόν, καταληπτόν* (*comprehensibile* Cicero *Ac.* I 41); likewise *κτητόν, τρωτόν* and many others (Kühner § 332. 6). This sense arises simply from a tendency to ignore the difference between the actual and the possible. This difference in the case of *negative* verbals amounts to very little, and it is to negative adjectives that this use of the corresponding Latin forms in *-tus* is mainly confined, e.g. *invictus, immensus*; but not entirely, e.g. *conspectus* (Forbiger *ad Verg. Georg.* I 206). Riddell takes a different view, § 88.

4. **ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ** anticipates the result (*θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*) actually arrived at (**99 E**).

5. **Θετταλοί**: for the omission of the article see *Phaedo* 57 A and Archer-Hind there: 'the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers.'

7. **ἐφ' ἱππικῇ**: Thessalian horses and horsemanship were **B** a commonplace with writers from Homer downward, *Il.* 2. 202, Hdt. VII 196. Plato *Hipp. maj.* 284 A *ὁ οὖν κάλλιστ' ἐπιστάμενος ἱππικὴν παραδιδόναι ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μάλιστα τιμῷτο καὶ πλεῖστα χρήματα λαμβάνοι; Laws* 625 A, Xen. *Hell.* IV iii 9 (Fr.); also Athen. VII 278 E *ὑποτιθέμενος αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν Πυθίαν ζητεῖν*

ἵππον Θεσσαλικόν, Λακεδαιμονίην τε γυναῖκα,
ἄνδρας δ' οἳ πίνουσιν ὕδωρ καλῆς Ἀρεθούσης.

Cp. *Polit.* 264 C, Isocr. *Antid.* (15) 298. Alexander's Bucephalas came from Thessaly (Plut. *Alex.* 6). The coins of Thessalian towns often show a horse; see P. Gardner *Types of Greek Coins*, plate VII figs. 3 and 40 (Larisa); fig. 6 (Pharsalus).

καὶ πλούτῳ: Isocrates *Antidosis* (15) 155 says that when Gorgias, who made more money than any other sophist, went to Thessaly, the Thessalians were the wealthiest of the Greeks. For their luxury and hospitality cp. Theopompus apud Athenaeum XII p. 527 A (he gives the palm for luxury to the Pharsalians). Again, Theopompus (apud Athenaeum VI 260 B) says that Philip of Macedon won over the Thessalians by boon companionship. Xen. *Hell.* VI i 3 says of Polydamas of Pharsalus *ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον*. Cp. on **74 A** 30.

9. **Ἀριστίππου**: see Introd. § 4. 'Aristippus, Gorgiae fautor, non confundendus ille cum Aristippo Cyrenaico Socratis discipulo, dynastes erat Larisaeus ex gente Aleudarum, quam rei equestris studiosissimum fuisse testatur Athen. XII 534 B *ἱπποτροφῶν καὶ ἡνιοχῶν τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἱππικώτερος*. Huic Cyrus quattuor milia conducticiorum et sex mensum aera militaria dedit ad coercendam popularium seditionem. Xen. *An.* I i 10' (Fr.). See also Xen. *An.* II vi 28. Besides Aristippus and Meno, another leader in the expedition of Cyrus was a pupil of Gorgias, Proxenus the Boeotian, Xen. *An.* II vi 16.

πολῖται, 'fellow-citizens.' So often with a genitive or a possessive pronoun; *Prot.* 339 E *ὦ Πρόδικε, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης*, 315 C, *Laws* 629 A, 630 A etc. The word *συμπολίτης* is condemned, Rutherford *New Phrynichus* p. 255. Latin usage is similar: *ἐμὸς πολίτης*, *meus civis*, 'my fellow-citizen'; *ἐμὸς φυλέτης*, *meus tribulis*, 'my fellow-tribesman'; *ἐμὸς δημότης*, *meus popularis*, 'my fellow-demesman.' Cf. below **71 B** 2 *συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις*.

10. **Γοργίας**: see on **76 C** 22, **95 C** 23. For Gorgias' life in Thessaly see Cicero *Orator* § 176, Quint. III i 8. He is said to have lived to the age of 109.

11. **ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ**, 'persons who run after him for his wisdom.' Cp. *Prot.* 317 C: Protagoras appeared to boast *ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἶμεν*: *Euthyd.* 276 D *οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν*: *Phaedr.* 257 B. For the transference of amatory phrases to spiritual aspirations see Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* App. I (especially pp. 152 3), and App. III. This is most characteristic of Plato; see especially *Symp.* 184 C sqq.

Olympiodorus in his life of Plato, near the end (Teubner text vol. VI p. 194), says of Plato himself *πολλοὺς ἐραστὰς αὑτοῦ καταστήσας*. The contrast between *ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ* and *ὁ σὸς ἐραστής* is intentional. For *ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ* cp. *Rep.* 600 D (Protagoras and Prodicus) *ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι*, *Hipp. maj.* 300 D *ἀνδρὶ πλεῖστον ἀργύριον εἰργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ*, also 281 C ; *Symp.* 206 C ; *Theaet.* 161 C ; *Hipp. min.* 372 B ; Xen. *Mem.* IV ii 1, 3 ; Isocr. 13. 2 ; 15. 111 etc.

Ἀλευαδῶν : these were the oligarchic caste at Larisa. Similar power was wielded by the Scopadae at Crannon, Hdt. VI 127 (Holm *History of Greece* (E.T.) I p. 224). The vacillating policy of the Thessalians is to be accounted for to a great extent by hostility between the common people and the *δυναστεῖαι*. Hdt. VII 172, Thuc. IV 78. See Whibley *Greek Oligarchies* p. 117 note 3.

14. **ἀφόβως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι** : this was the profession Gorgias made himself ; *Gorg.* 447 E *Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἀπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ ;* ΓΟΡ. *Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.* His pupil Polus is not less confident, ib. 462 A. Cp. Cic. *fin.* II § 1, *de orat.* I § 103, Quint. II 21, 21, XII 11, 21 (Gedike).

16. **παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν** : infinitives like *ἐρωτᾶν*—epexe- C
getical, supplementary, prolate, or whatever else they may be called—illustrate the dative origin of the Greek infinitive. 'I give myself up for questioning.' The dative is one of *purpose* or 'work contemplated.' See *Gorg.* 456 B *οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ*, 475 D (see Dr. Thompson's note), 480 C, *Prot.* 348 A (in all which places *παρέχειν* is intransitive), *Phaedr.* 228 E *ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται*, and especially *Apol.* 33 B, where Socrates is contrasting his procedure with that of Gorgias, *ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν*. Also Xen. *Mem.* I ii 54, *Anab.* VI vi 18. Cp. *Gorg.* 497 B (*ὑπόσχες*). [Riddell § 230 brings these instances under 'Binary Structure,' certain idioms which 'are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one' (ib. § 204). But the infinitive hardly amounts to a separate clause.]

For the dative origin of the infinitive see Goodwin *Moods and Tenses* § 742. The grammarians (Kühner § 473. 7, Jelf § 669. 2, Goodwin *MT.* § 770, F. E. Thompson § 146, Hadley § 951, Krüger 55. 3. 20, 21) distinguish instances where the infinitive appears as a *necessary* completion of the sense of a

verb (e.g. a verb of command) from the looser use with verbs and adjectives, as here, where the infinitive appears to add something *extra* to the sense. But the two classes are separated by no firm line.

The *active* (or middle) infinitive after *παρέχω* and the like is by far commoner than the passive. Cp. *Phaedo* 102 D *τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον*, where Madvig translates *ὑπερέχειν* 'superandam,' *ὑπερέχον* 'superantem.' So in Latin tradit *diffundere* ventis; and we say 'a sight to remember,' 'a house to let.' Logically the passive infinitive would be equally possible. Whether the active or passive view be taken will depend on the presence or absence in the context of a prominent noun that may be taken as a subject to the notion of the infinitive. If there is such a noun, the active construction is preferred in Greek. Such a noun is often provided, as here, by a dependent dative. Gorgias lends himself *τῷ βουλομένῳ* for *him* to *ask*. In the exceptional place *Charm.* 157 B *ὃς ἂν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν παράσχῃ τῇ ἐπῳδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι*, the dative *ἐπῳδῇ* is not a person and cannot well be conceived as a subject; hence the passive construction is preferred. So Kühner, who also (§ 473. Anm. 4), quotes Isocr. 12. 156 *ποιήσομαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λεχθησομένων ἀκοῦσαι μὲν ἴσως τισὶν ἀηδῆ, ῥηθῆναι δ' οὐκ ἀσύμφορον*, where the passive *ῥηθῆναι* can be seen to be necessary, the active being impossible unless a subject were expressed with it.

17. **τῷ βουλομένῳ**: see on **90 D** 21.

18. **οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ**: this is a case of *inverse attraction*. Hadley § 1003, Riddell § 199. See **71 A** 23, **74 D** 32; also on **96 C** 7.

71 A 20. **ὥσπερ**, 'as it were.' This use of *ὥσπερ*, standing out of construction, is common in Plato: **87 A** 26, *Phaedr.* 260 E *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων λόγων*, 270 D, *Phaedo* 77 C, 88 D, *Crat.* 384 C etc. (see Ast); also in Aristophanes: *Clouds* 1276 *τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ὥσπερ σεσεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖς*, *Wasps* 395, 713, *Peace* 234.

22. **εἰ γοῦν**, 'I only know that if.'

25. **ἀρετὴν γοῦν**: *ἀρετήν* is not strictly object to *εἰδέναι*, but is put by 'prolepsis' (Hadley § 878) or 'antiptosis' (F.E.Thompson § 330) for *ἀρετή* as subject to *διδακτόν*. This idiom, perpetually occurring in Greek, and frequent in this dialogue (e.g. **71 B** 6 *ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει ὅστις ἐστίν*), is brought by Riddell § 226 under the general head of 'Binary Structure.'

26. **τοσούτου δέω**: see App. on the text.

27. **εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν :** see on **86 D** 12.

28. **ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ . . ἀρετή** : i.e. the real essence or nature of Virtue. This dialogue, the main purpose of which is not metaphysical but ethical, leaves the question open how Plato here regards the 'essence' of Virtue, whether as a mere logical concept, or as having a substantial separate existence. In other words, the *Meno* contains nothing explicitly showing that when it was written the theory of Ideas (of the *Phaedrus* and *Republic*) was full-blown in Plato's mind. But there is nothing to indicate that it was not, and the theory of Ideas is really implicitly involved in the theory of *ἀνάμνησις*. See on **81 D** 12.

CHAPTER II

2. **συμπένομαι** occurs nowhere else. Where *σύν* is com- **B**
pounded with an intransitive verb, the preposition naturally qualifies the subject; e.g. the present phrase = *ἐγὼ σὺν τοῖς πολίταις πένομαι*. But where *σύν* is compounded with a transitive verb, the preposition generally affects the *object*, such constructions as *συνεξαιρεῖ αὐτοῖς Σελλασίαν* (Xen. *Hell.* VII iv 12) being less common. Cp. **80 D** 40. See Jowett on Thuc. VIII 46 (*συγκαταδουλοῦν*) and Jebb on Soph. *Ajax* 229 and 361.

3. **εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς,** 'eadem structura verbi *εἰδέναι* **85 C** 10, **92 C** (add **80 D** 37), *ἐπίστασθαι* **85 D** 18' (Fr.). Cp. **72 A** 14, **B** 22. See on **90 B** 47.

4. **ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τί <ἐστιν> εἰδείην ;** We have here a very pronounced distinction between the essential and non-essential attributes of a thing. The 'Definition' or *λόγος* of a class-name, as presented in this dialogue, is no longer the definition obtained by a simple comparison of a number of particulars. It is one which consists in referring a class to a higher genus and then marking the specific difference (*definitio per genus et differentiam*). The attributes forming the Essence or Species of a thing may thus be divided into those contained in the Genus and those contained in the Difference. The doctrine of the Predicables, as developed by the school of Aristotle, recognised besides 'Essential' attributes others that were classed either as Property (Proprium) or as Accident. The distinction generally drawn between these was that a Property was deducible from the essential attributes, an Accident not so. In the present instance *ὁποῖόν τι* represents Property rather than Accident; for the attribute *διδακτόν* turns out to be one deducible from the Essence of Virtue. See, for the Predicables, Jevons's *Elementary Lessons in Logic* pp.

98 foll., Bain's *Logic* I 73. See also Mill's *Logic* bk. I ch. vi §§ 1, 2 with ch. vii §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, for a criticism of the doctrine: where it is shown that in the more elastic view which modern Logic takes of the General Notion, the distinction between essential and non-essential attributes tends to disappear.

The phraseology *τί* and *ὁποῖόν τι* to express the distinction between Essence and non-essential attribute is repeated at **86 E** 17, **87 B** 2. See Zeller *Plato* p. 200 note 79. It appears in the *Gorgias* 448 E. Polus has been asked what the art of Gorgias *is*. He replies by a eulogy of it. Socrates says he has not answered the question.

ΠΩΛ. *Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;*

ΣΩ. *Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἤτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.*

ΠΩΛ. *Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;*

ΣΩ. *Καὶ μάλα· ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἠρώτα ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς* (cp. 462 C foll. where the question is answered).

See also *Philebus* 37 C 'Opinion (*δόξα*), besides being Opinion *per se*, may be further qualified as true or false *καὶ ἐγένετ' οὐ μόνον δόξα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα*. We must further consider' says Socrates 'whether, while Opinion is subject to qualification, Pleasure and Pain are not' (*εἰ καὶ τὰ μέν* [sc. *δόξαι*] *ἐστι ποῖ' ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ ἐστι, ποίω τινε δ' οὐ γίγνεσθον*). Socrates proceeds *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποίω τινε. πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ κτέ.*

Something similar may be seen in *Symp.* 201 D foll. 'I must explain' says Socrates "*τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, καὶ ποῖός τις, ἔπειτα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ.*" The three points are dealt with successively: (1) 202 E foll. *Ἔρως* is a *δαίμων*, the son of *Πενία* and *Πόρος*; (2) 203 C foll. he is poor, and not tender or beautiful, as people think; (3) 206 B foll. his *ἔργον* is described.

But the terminology is not fixed or technical. *ποῖος*, or *ποιός*, often implies an added attribute, whereby a smaller class is carved out of a larger. In this sense it will correspond with Difference (in the language of the Predicables). Thus *Gorg.* 453 C, 454 A, 463 C *ὁποῖον μόριον*, *Euthyphro* 12 D *ποῖον μέρος*, *Laches* 194 D E. See especially *Rep.* 438 B–E 'If A be relative to B, then A qualified by some differentia will be relative to B qualified by a corresponding differentia (*ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιοῦ τινός ἐστιν κτέ.*). If knowledge is related to an object, a particular kind of knowledge will be related to a particular kind of object (*ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιοῦ τινὸς καὶ τινός*).' So *Charmides* 159 A *ὅ τι ἐστιν*

καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη, though we cannot be sure here that a formal definition per Genus et Differentiam is expected. Cp. **87 B** 4 εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, and (more loosely) *Euthyphro* 5 C ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῂς εἶναι. So Aristotle *NE.* II vi 1 ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις: *Rhet.* I ii 7 τί δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, etc. [At *Theaet.* 152 D the difference of τι and ὁποιονοῦν τι seems to be that between a Concrete term and a Quality.]

A word is needed on the curious antithesis ὅν and ποῖόν τι in †*Ep.* vii 342 E and 343 B. For an account of the passage see Grote (I pp. 224–5), who believes in the genuineness of the letter, and Karsten (*de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis* pp. 182 foll. and 197) who does not. The antithesis here, as Grote says, is between the *quid* or Essence (of the class) which we are searching for, and the *quale* or Accidents (seemingly of the particulars) which we are not searching for: δυοῖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινός, οὐ τὸ ποιόν τι, τὸ δὲ τί ζητούσης εἰδέναι τῆς ψυχῆς κτέ. [An attack on the genuineness of the seventh epistle should be now superfluous. See *C. R.* XIV, especially p. 337 *b* foll. It is hard to believe Plato to have been guilty of the sentence from which the above words are quoted, with its horrible accumulation of participles, almost defying disentanglement of subject and object. Many will find additional evidence of spuriousness in the fact that a document professing to be written late in Plato's life recognizes Ideas not merely of κύκλος but περὶ σώματος ἅπαντος σκευαστοῦ τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότος πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων (342 D). See on **72 B** 21.]

The distinction between Essence and Non-essential is otherwise expressed in the *Euthyphro*, 11 A namely by the antithesis οὐσία and πάθος (see J. Adam's Introduction p. xx, and below on **72 B** 22). In *Hipp. maj.* 300 E foll. we have the pairs εἶναι and πεπονθέναι, οὐσία and πάθος, though the ground of the antithesis is not dwelt on. In Plato we see philosophic terminology in the making, but the process of crystallization is not complete.

For the thought cp. **86 D**. That Metaphysic, a knowledge of Being, should come before Practice and lie at the root of it, is the text on which is based much of the *Republic*. See also *Laches* 190 A B εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ὀτῳοῦν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;

6. **ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει ὅστις ἐστίν**: the difference in the mode of existence of the *individual* Meno on the one hand and the *class* Virtue on the other is not here for Plato's purpose important. There are many passages

in Plato in which he illustrates the definition of a class by the definition (or identification) of an individual, such as is afforded by a postal address or legal description. In the *Theaetetus* 208 C foll., where λόγος is treated as a knowledge of differences (*σημεῖον ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν*), the two examples taken for illustration are both individuals, namely the Sun, which is defined as *λαμπρότατον τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν*, and next Theaetetus himself, 209 A–C. In *Symp.* 201 D the first question raised and answered about Ἔρως is *τίς ἐστι ;* In *Gorg.* 453 C we have a question about the definition of an individual which in its form recalls some of the questions about class-definition in this dialogue (**72 B** 22) *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἶ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων ;* Again compare *Phaedo* 102 C *τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι* with *τῷ μελίττας εἶναι* at **72 B** 26. Cp. on **97 A** 13. See Whately's *Logic* II. v. § 6. For *ὅστις ἔστιν* see on **92 C** 18.

8. **εἴτε καὶ γενναῖος . . εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία** : *καί* accentuates the word that follows it, in the general sense 'even.' Riddell *Digest* § 132. It is here put with *γενναῖος* as that marks the climax of the three alternatives enumerated. It is put with *τἀναντία* as that marks the more emphatic alternative ; more emphatic because more surprising. Cp. *Tim.* 21 B *εἴτε δὴ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ τότε εἴτε καὶ χάριν τινὰ τῷ Κριτίᾳ φέρων.* Ast, under *εἴτε*, supplies other instances. For *καί* emphasizing one member of a contrast see *Clit.* 406 A *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπήνουν σε, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπῄνουν*, 410 E *τὰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ σε, τὰ δέ τι καὶ ψέγω. Crat.* 440 D *ἴσως μὲν οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ* ('*after all*') *οὔ.* See notes on **C** 12 *καὶ οἵκαδε*, also on **D 26** *ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν* : **75 A** 11, **79 D** 35, and **84 D** 32. Kühner § 541. Anm. 2.

C 10. **ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδ' οἶσθα . . ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἀπαγγέλλωμεν ;** the uses of ἀλλά in the two instances will be felt to be different. Sentences of similar form, but not interrogative, occur **76 E** 47 *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, βελτίων, Euthyphro* 3 C *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἰέναι, Theaet.* 146 B *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἤρξω μὴ ἀφίεσο Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.* Cp. **74 D** 30 *ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλὰ κτέ.* The first and second uses in each of these places are respectively typical of two uses of ἀλλά, namely :

(*α*) To effect a transition to a fresh subject, often with a special appeal to the person addressed. This use occurs in statements, commands (*Symp.* 199 C *ἀλλὰ παρίημι, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα*), and questions (as here). In this use the matter with which ἀλλά is contrasted, is *not definitely expressed.*

(*β*) To introduce the second half of a statement which supplements the first half by either affirming something opposed to

what has been denied, or denying something opposed to what has been affirmed. Here the matter with which ἀλλά is contrasted is *definitely expressed*. Thus we have—

(1) οὐ Θεαίτητός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Θεόδωρος.
(2) Θεόδωρός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ Θεαίτητος.

In these cases the real antithesis between the two halves of the sentence is slight. Where the sentence consists of a statement followed by the denial of its opposite, the antithesis sinks to nil; and even where this is not so clear, the first half is very little 'limited' by the second: we have rather the same fact viewed in two different aspects. In (1) we should either translate ἀλλά 'but'; or we should leave it untranslated: 'it is not Theaetetus, it is Theodorus.' In (2) we should translate ἀλλ' οὐ 'and not' rather than 'but not'; or again we might leave ἀλλά untranslated. In sentences of this form ἀλλ' οὐ may be replaced by καὶ οὐ, οὐδέ (in verse), and (for emphasis) the simple οὐ (Soph. *OC.* 1368 αἴδ' ἄνδρες, οὐ γυναῖκες, not uncommon in orators, Dem. *de Cor.* (18) 89, *Aristocr.* (23) 25). Instances of sentences of forms (1) and (2) occur perpetually; see the opening of this dialogue, then **72 C** 33, **73 B** 46 (which in a continuous sentence would be οὐκ ἀκόλαστοι ἀγαθοὶ ἂν γένοιντο, ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι), **84 D** 35, **85 D** 20 (which = οὐ διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντός τινος), **89 B** 32, *Rep.* 354 A B οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γ' εἰστίαμαι· δι' ἐμαυτὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διά σε· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι κτέ.

[Where both clauses are affirmative, or both negative, the adversative force is stronger. The first half has then a concessive force, the latter a limiting. The former may be strengthened with μέν (Xen. *Cyr.* VII i 16 τὰ μὲν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλάγια λυπεῖ με), the latter with ὅμως (*Euthyphro* 3 C οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα, ἀλλ' ὅμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν).]

But we have this 'complementary' use (cp. Riddell § 249) of ἀλλά not merely in statements, but also in commands (illustrated above) and in questions; thus

(3) ἆρ' (οὐ Θεαίτητός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Θεόδωρος);
(4) ἆρα (Θεόδωρός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ Θεαίτητος);

The brackets here show that the interrogative refers to the sentence as a whole. In (3) οὐ does not go with ἆρα, which would make the first part an affirmative question. The whole is one neutral question. This is the form of the place before us. It may be granted that the two halves of the question here are not precise counterparts, but the transition is slight. ἀλλά is '*and*.' 'Do you really not know, Socrates, and are we to carry this report of you even to Thessaly?' Cp.

78 D 30, **79 C** 30, *Phaedo* 58 c ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων ; *Symp.* 205 B etc.

(4) may be illustrated by *Rep.* 344 E ἢ σμικρὸν οἴει ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγήν ; *Rep.* 366 B τίς μηχανὴ (τὸν τοιοῦτον) δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα ; Here too ἀλλά is '*and*' rather than 'but.'

See Kühner § 535. 2, 3.

[The use of δέ for ἀλλά in such constructions is characteristic of the *Laws* (Riddell § 161 A). Cp. † *Ep.* vii 343 B quoted on **71 B** 4.]

12. **καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν**, 'do you wish this repute of you to be carried *even* to Thessaly ?'—where it would of course spoil Socrates' reputation and chance of success. The verb is treated as one of motion, hence οἴκαδε. Hesiod has (*O. et D.* 611) *πάντας ἀπόδρεπε οἴκαδε βότρυς.*

The confusion between expressions of rest and motion is very easy ; cp. our 'where' for 'whither,' and (conversely) ποῖ 'whither ?' originally locative. *Phaedo* 57 A Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε.

The plural is used because Meno is speaking for himself and his party.

13. **μὴ μόνον γε . . ἀλλά** : from the use of ἀλλά following a negative clause to which it gives the affirmative counterpart (see note on line 10) arise a number of phrases in which the preceding negative clause is elliptical (Riddell § 158) :

(α) οὐκ ἀλλά **85 C** 3, **88 A** 9, *Prot.* 313 D, *Rep.* 475 E, *Euthyd.* 277 B, *Soph.* 263 D, *Phaedr.* 236 D ΣΩ. μηδαμῶς τοίνυν εἴπῃς. ΦΑΙ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω, etc., Dem. *Phil.* I § 27. μὴ ἀλλά **75 B** 13. μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλά **74 D** 30, οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλά *Rep.* 475 E, *Theaet.* 201 B, etc. ; μηδαμῶς ἀλλά *Gorg.* 497 B, etc. Riddell § 250.

(β) οὐ γὰρ ἀλλά *Euthyd.* 286 C, 305 E, Aristoph. *Frogs* 58, 498, Eur. *Bacch.* 785. Riddell § 156.

(γ) οὐχ ὅτι . . ἀλλά Xen. *Mem.* II ix 8. Perhaps never in Plato : at *Symp.* 179 B the reading is doubtful. μὴ ὅτι . . ἀλλά often in Plato, *Apol.* 40 D μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινα ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα : *Ep.* vii 329 E. Riddell § 154.

(δ) οὐχ ὅπως . . ἀλλά **96 A** 22 etc. μὴ ὅπως . . ἀλλά Xen. *Cyr.* I iii 10. Riddell § 152.

(ε) οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλά *Phaedo* 107 B. μὴ μόνον γε ἀλλά (that is, μὴ ταῦτα μόνον ἀπάγγελλε ἀλλά) here, *Euthyphro* 6 C. Riddell §§ 151, 157.

(ζ) οὐ μὴν ἀλλά *Gorg.* 449 C etc.

(η) οὐ μέντοι ἀλλά **86 C** 4, *Phaedo* 62 B (twice), *Symp.* 173 B. Riddell § 155.

(θ) *μή τι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλά Hipp. maj.* 297 E. (*εἰ μή τι, ἀλλά* **86 E** 18 is different.)

(ι) *οὐ (μή, οὐδέν, μηδέν) ἀλλ' ἤ,* **76 B** 13, **84 D** 32. Riddell § 148.

(κ) *οὔπω γ'· ἀλλά Phaedr.* 260 B.

14. **ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ**: the personal use of *δοκεῖν* is far more common in Plato than the impersonal. *Apol.* 36 A *Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα.* So the 2nd person *ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς* **80 A** 6. See Sidgwick on 'Personalisation,' *Class. Rev.* III 148, Hadley § 944, F. E. T. p. 159.

15. **Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες**: Gorgias first visited Athens in 427 B.C. at the head of an embassy sent from his town Leontini in Sicily to ask aid against Syracuse. In the dialogue *Gorgias* there are passages (as the beginning, where Gorgias is clearly a new attraction, and 503 C *Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα*) which look as if Plato meant to refer the dramatic date of the dialogue to Gorgias' visit of 427 B.C. Some later historical allusions suggest that Plato may have intended a later dramatic date, perhaps a subsequent visit of Gorgias. Anachronisms are, however, a feature very natural in fictitious dialogue, where the author is constantly tempted to introduce relevant matter within his own knowledge (see on **90 A** 40). At any rate the dramatic date of the *Gorgias* is earlier than that of the *Meno*. It is not necessary to suppose a reference here to the dialogue *Gorgias*; but I am strongly disposed to think there is one. I have given reasons (Introd. §§ 13, 16) for believing that the *Gorgias* was written before the *Meno*.

18. **εἶτα**: as it were 'after all this,' *cum admiratione.* **79 A** 5, *Apol.* 28 B, and often.

19. **οὐ πάνυ**: this phrase means originally, as we should expect, 'not altogether,' and is a *weak* negative. So Plato uses it perpetually, as here, 'I have not the best of memories,' **77 D** 41, **86 B** 23, etc. Where it has the force of a *strong* negative (as **73 D** 11, **98 B** 3, etc.), this is due to 'litotes,' the irony whereby the point of some truth is increased by understatement. English colloquialisms will supply many parallels: '*rather!*' (strong affirmation), 'not *much*' (strong negative). Cp. Munro on Lucr. III 361, Riddell § 139, Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 457 E; also *Apol.* 19 A, *Theaet.* 150 C *εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, Rep.* 419 A *μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν.* The point was cleared up by Cope, Translation of Plato's *Gorgias* App. C. The strongest instance of pathetic irony is Soph. *O. C.* 144, where Oedipus speaks of himself as *οὐ πάνυ μοίρας εὐδαι-*

μονίσαι πρώτης—the only instance of the phrase in tragedy. Cp. *οὐ σφόδρα Phaedo* 100 A.

οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων : in these words, and the similar passage *Prot.* 334 C D *ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος κτέ.*, Plato has no doubt preserved a trick of the historic Socrates for inveigling his interlocutor into the wiles of his *elenchus*. It is all the more noticeable because the Greeks attached great importance to a good memory, as was natural with people who depended so little on writing. Plato himself makes it an essential requisite for the philosopher, *Rep.* 486 C D, *Gorg.* 466 A. At **88 A** 17 *μνήμη* stands in the list of the virtues. In Aristoph. *Clouds* 482 foll. Strepsiades' memory is tested, and in 629 he is taunted as *ἐπιλήσμων*. The 'short memory' of the Spartans (Hdt. III 46) had, like that of Socrates, its diplomatic object.

D 26. **ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν** : the absent authority and the speechless book are on the same level of uselessness for the purpose of debate. Cp. *Phaedrus* 274 B–276 B (Grote II 239 and 256 foll.). In the same way consecutive oratory is unsatisfactory ; *Prot.* 329 A (if you ask a point of Pericles or any orator he will make you a speech) *εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσι οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι*, ib. 347 E (rational beings need not resort to citations from poets for topics of conversation) *οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φασὶν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν οἱ δ' ἕτερα.* Add *Hipp. min.* 365 D, quoted below. Plato's disparagement of writing, which diminished with advancing years, was grossly exaggerated by the writers of the second and seventh epistles (312 D foll., 341 B foll.), who for their own purposes tried to make out that the true Platonic teaching was an esoteric mystery only communicated orally. Grote, who accepts the epistles as genuine, overstates Plato's position (I pp. 221 foll.) ; for a juster view see Zeller p. 89 note ; see also on **77 B** 12.

ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν, 'since, after all, he is not here' ; see on **71 B** 8. Cp. the similar passage *Hipp. min.* 365 D *τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον τοίνυν ἐάσωμεν ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν.*

27. **σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς . . τί φῄς** : Riddell § 309 'Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.' Cp. **78 C** 19, **86 D** 8.

28. **εἶπον** : the 2nd sing. 1st aor. imperat. *εἶπον* (so accentuated, not *εἰπόν*, see Buttmann, Excursus I) is rare in good

Attic, never occurring in tragedy. In the two instances in which it occurs in Attic prose, here and Xen. *Mem.* III vi 3 *πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφη, μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλ' εἶπον ἡμῖν*, it is used in a solemn adjuration, probably for its heavier sound. See App. on the text.

καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς: it is a strong note of Platonic dialectic, borrowed from Socrates, that a man's intellectual powers ought to be freely at the service of his fellows for the discovery of truth. All vulgar *φθόνος* is out of place among philosophers, as it is in the circle of the gods (*Phaedr.* 247 A, *Tim.* 29 E). The writer of the seventh epistle takes up the note, 344 B *ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσι καὶ ἀποκρίσεσι χρωμένων*. See on **91 B** 14.

29. **ψεῦσμα**: a rare word, nowhere else in Plato.

ἐψευσμένος ὦ: the middle and passive tenses of this verb afford a curious study in the Greek voices. *ψεύδομαι* (the moral connotation of which is much feebler than the English 'lie,' see e.g. *Rep.* 338 B) means either (middle?) 'I speak wrongly,' 'I utter a lie,' or (passive?) 'I am wrong.' In the former case it is opposed to *ἀληθεύειν* (*Hipp. min.* 366 E foll., *Euthyd.* 284 A, *Crat.* 431 B). In the latter it is opposed to *τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν* (*Theaet.* 194 C). Sometimes the 'middle' is used transitively, Xen. *Hell.* III i 25 *ψεύδεταί σε οὗτος*. Perhaps there is no instance in Plato of the *present* middle used transitively; but we have the aor. in *Laws* 921 A *τὴν τιμὴν τῶν ἔργων ὀφειλέτω ὧν ἂν τὸν ἐκδόντα ψεύσηται* 'of which he has *cheated the person* who gave the contract.' Cp. *Rep.* 331 B *τὸ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι*, where *τινα* is object. On the other hand it seems difficult to find the present *ψεύδομαι* in any author as a distinct *passive* with an expressed agent (*ψεύδομαι ὑπό τινος*).

The meanings of *ἔψευσμαι* exactly follow the meanings of *ψεύδομαι*—namely, 'I have uttered a lie' (middle), 'I harbour a lie or error' = *ἀμαθής εἰμι* (passive). But it would be hard to find an instance either of *ἔψευσμαι* transitive, or on the other hand of *ἔψευσμαι* distinctly passive with agent expressed. It is not clear here whether the meaning is 'have made a wrong statement' or 'have been deceived.' Such was the temper of the Greek mind, or such the freakish development of the Greek verb, that they expressed by the same form 'I am under a delusion' and 'I deceive (perhaps wilfully) another.' And so we get the extraordinary juggle in *Rep.* II 382 A–C, where it is argued that gods cannot deceive, because to deceive must imply the harbouring of error: *τῇ ψυχῇ ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο*: cp. ibid. 535 E.

ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς . . ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκώς, 'if it turns out

that you and Gorgias know, *though* I said etc.' (parataxis). Kühner § 518. 6 draws a distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' or 'rhetorical' parataxis. The former is the primitive simplicity of language, before the mechanism of the subordinate clause has developed; the latter is a conscious retention or revival of the primitive form for special effect. He admits that no firm line can be drawn between the two classes. Cases like the present he would consider 'artificial' (§ 518. 9). Cp. Dem. *de Cor.* (18) 160 *αἰσχρόν ἐστιν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τοὺς πόνους, ὑμεῖς δὲ μηδὲ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνέξεσθε.*

Chapters III, IV (**71 D-73 C**). MENO. *There are all kinds of Virtue, suitable to different persons and circumstances.* SOCRATES. *But there must be something in common that makes all these actions Virtue. I want to get at that.* MENO. *I do not see that Virtue is in all cases one and the same—as, for instance, Health is.* SOCRATES. *But it is by possession of the same qualities that persons exhibit Virtue in all cases.* MENO. *Yes.*

E 1. **ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν**: Meno at first naturally does not realise the difficulty of the task, and speaks with the confidence of ignorance: so presently *οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν*, where the word *ἀπορία* is ominous. Meno's first answer shows that as yet he does not grasp the notion of logical definition at all. His later attempts are more or less definitions in form, though faulty. For the present, instead of giving the contents of the notion, he gives an enumeration of instances. His answer refers to the *extension* of the term rather than its *intension*.

In many of Plato's dialogues where a definition is proposed, the first stage is devoted to exemplifying and clearing up this difficulty (Fr. Introd. p. 21 note 6).

(1) *Hipp. maj.* 286 E What is Beauty? (*τὸ καλόν*). Hippias, quite as confident as Meno in his mastery of the subject, gives in succession three answers, each of which is shown to be a mere exemplification of Beauty, not a general definition at all. Afterwards Socrates suggests (professedly at second-hand) three definitions, which are so far definitions that 'they keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification' (Grote I 379). But they each fail to satisfy the examination to which Socrates subjects them.

(2) *Euthyphro* 5 C What is Piety? *Euthyphro.* To do as I am now doing: to prosecute guilty people, even if the culprit

is your father. *Socrates* (6 D). That is not an answer: other things are holy too. Euthyphro's next answer (*τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές*) is a definition in form, though unsatisfactory. Grote I 317, 8.

(3) *Laches* 191 D What is Courage? *Laches*. There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, is a courageous man (Grote I 473). *Socrates*. 'But sometimes he that fights and runs away—like the Scythian horseman—is courageous. Yours is no definition.' Socrates then gives a sample definition of Swiftness. Laches then gives a definition of Courage, expressed in general terms; but it turns out too large. Subsequently Nikias proposes a definition which, though on strictly Socratic lines, still leaves some difficulties unsolved. See on **88 B** 23.

(4) Lastly, in the *Theaetetus*, Socr. asks What is Knowledge? (146 C). *Theaetetus*. Geometry and the other things that Theodorus teaches; and again, shoemaking and practical arts. *Socrates*. *γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἓν αἰτηθεὶς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἁπλοῦ*. Socrates then gives a model definition of Clay (*γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα*) 147 D, after which Theaetetus shows that he at any rate grasps what is meant by a class-notion. Grote II 320.

This list of dialogues might be increased. The language in the various passages deserves careful comparison. Plato laboured hard to bring out the point, then a new one, for the elucidation of which little apparatus of philosophic terms was yet provided.

2. **εἰ βούλει**: this phrase (also *εἰ βούλεται, εἰ βούλεσθε* etc.) is used in various elliptic constructions (Ullrich on **71 D** 23). We may distinguish according as there is, or is not, an expressed apodosis. In the first two sentences of Meno's speech we may fairly say there is an apodosis: *εἰ βούλει (με εἰπεῖν) ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον (εἰπεῖν) κτέ. εἰ δὲ βούλει (με εἰπεῖν) γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν κτέ.* In the later instance *εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου*, the words *ἐλευθέρου* and *δούλου* are no doubt each the relic of an apodosis, but it has practically disappeared, and *εἰ μὲν βούλει, εἰ δὲ βούλει* are little more than *εἴτε . . εἴτε*.

The protasis in all these cases is incomplete, there being no infinitive dependent on *βούλει*. At *Symp.* 177 B we have a complete protasis: *εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, (οὐ δεινὸν) Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην συγγράφειν;*

Above at **71 D** 23 we have an instance with a real apodosis.

In the following instances we have *εἰ δὲ βούλει* (or the like)

without *εἰ μὲν βούλει* preceding, the meaning being 'or again': **94 B** 11, *Prot.* 320 A, *Hipp. maj.* 282 C, *Theaet.* 196 E, *Crat.* 392 A, *Phaedr.* 230 C. In these cases there is a verbal clause succeeding, but it is not a real apodosis. Similar is **73 E** 19 *οἷον, εἰ βούλει . . εἴποιμ' ἄν.* In the following there is no verb succeeding: *Symp.* 220 D *εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μαχαῖς* 'again, take his conduct in battle,' ib. 209 D, *Hipp. maj.* 301 A, *Rep.* 425 D, *Laches* 188 C, *Theaet.* 183 A. In the last two places the meaning is 'or rather.'

Where *εἰ μὲν βούλει* or *εἰ μὲν βούλεται* precedes, *βούλει* or *βούλεται* after *εἰ δέ* is commonly omitted (Riddell § 253). *Symp.* 212 C *τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἔρωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι· εἰ δέ, ὅ τι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε, Euthyd.* 285 C *εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἐψέτω, εἰ δ', ὅ τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιείτω, Laws* 688 B, *Crat.* 407 D, † *Alc.* i 114 B. Riddell compares the case of *εἰ δέ* without a verb in Homer. This is due in Homer to the original interjectional force of *εἰ*. In the cases before us there is a distinct ellipsis, and they should hardly be regarded as cases of survival. Note that in *Symp.* 212 C and *Euthyd.* 285 C, the relative clauses introduced by *ὅ τι* take the place of *βούλει* and *βούλεται* respectively, and would make the insertion of these words awkward. We find a fuller construction *Gorg.* 472 A B *ἐὰν βούλῃ . . ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ . . ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ: Rep.* 432 A *εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύϊ, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν κτέ.* Cp. also *Prot.* 342 A. See Appendix on the text, **72 A** 12.

ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν: the *ἀρετὴ ἀνδρός* here set forth is the vulgar notion of civic excellence. See on **91 A** 4. *ἀρετή* came to mean anything that conduced to pre-eminence, anything by which one could show one's self 'the better man,' even the miserable art of quibbling taught by Euthydemus and his friend, *Euthyd.* 273 D. When Thuc. (VIII 68) says Antiphon was *ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς δεύτερος*, this need not be read as a testimony to moral character.

4. **τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς**: this is the usual pre-Christian standard. *ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλήσιόν σου, καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου. ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, Ev. Matth.* v 43, 44.

The view is often given by Plato as the current one, but never by him accepted. See *Rep.* 332 A B, criticised 334 B foll., *Clit.* 410 A, *Crito* 49 B (where see J. Adam's note). The teaching of the *Gorgias*, *κρεῖττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν* is directed against it. Whether Socrates took the same enlightened view is more doubtful. Bernays *Phokion und seine neueren Beurtheiler* pp. 46 foll. argues that Socrates acquiesced in the current view. J. Adam (note on *Crito* l.c. and Introd. p. xii) replies to his

arguments, I think successfully. But what he says of Socrates is also true of Plato; where Plato impugns the current doctrine it is not from an altruistic standpoint, but from a self-regarding one, the welfare and dignity of the agent's own soul (Grote II 82 and 123, J. S. Mill *Diss.* III 342 foll., Zeller 182 and 454).

It must be said in defence of the popular view that if it preaches the duty of revenge it also rates very highly the obligations of friendship. Even Callicles (*Gorg.* 473 B) represents as part of the misery of the man without power in the state, that he not merely cannot take his own part, but that he cannot do a good turn for a friend.

7. **γυναικὸς ἀρετήν**: this also is the conventional view. One of the strongest practical results of the Socratic-Platonic theory that Virtue is One, is the ignoring of any distinction in the special excellence or moral function of the sexes. See *Rep.* 451 foll., Zeller p. 448, *Socr.* p. 121. Xenophon, *Symp.* ii 9, appears to report the Socratic view; but adheres to the popular view, *Oec.* vii §§ 22-27. Antisthenes said *ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή*: Diog. L. VI § 12. Aristotle, as we might expect, is on the side of 'common sense': *Pol.* I 13 *ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς· ὑποληπτέον δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον . . ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης . . πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετὰς ὥσπερ Γοργίας.*

The fact that Meno is here 'enumerating' virtues makes it highly probable that Aristotle is referring to the present passage, and attributing the views Meno here expresses to his master. Whether Aristotle had access to any deliverance of Gorgias himself on the subject is very doubtful (Dr. Thompson *Gorgias* p. 181, Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 472).

Fr. well points out that the use of *ἀρετή* = 'special excellence or function' naturally led the way to such a recognition of various forms of Virtue. This use of *ἀρετή* is prominent in Plato himself. *Rep.* 353 B foll. *οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; κτέ.*, ib. 601 D *οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστί, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ᾖ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός;* Cp. Arist. *NE.* II vi 2. See the words translated below.

14. **καθ' ἑκάστην κτλ.**, 'for corresponding to our several occupations and ages in regard to each of our functions there is for each of us a Virtue; and in like manner, I think, Socrates, a Vice.' **72 A**

The style of Meno's answer is verbose and bombastic; but it is hard to detect in it any traits that can be set down distinctly as 'Gorgianisms.' See on **76 E** 43: Blass *Attische Beredsamkeit* I 58 foll. Agathon's speech in the *Symposium* (194 foll.) is full of Gorgianisms; cp. 198 C. See too Xen. *Symp.* ii 26, Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 492. When the rhetorician Hermogenes censures 'Polus and Gorgias *and Menon*' (Dr. Thompson's *Gorgias* p. 175) for their pompous and pretentious way of writing, he probably bases his criticism of Meno on slender grounds, as there is no reason to believe that the real Meno left any literary relics.

18. **πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ κτλ.**: cp. the ironical congratulation to Theaetetus 146 D (quoted on **71 E** 1).

19. **σμῆνος ἀρετῶν**: the word *σμῆνος* is frequently used metaphorically, *Crat.* 401 E *σμῆνος σοφίας*, *Rep.* 574 D *ἡδονῶν σμῆνος*, Aristoph. *Clouds* 297 *σμῆνος ἀοιδῆς*. Cp. *Rep.* 450 B *ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε*. Plutarch *Virt. Mor.* 2 borrows hence the expression *σμῆνος ἀρετῶν* to ridicule Chrysippus' long list of virtues. (Zeller *Stoics* p. 244 note 1.) A similar expression, 'a mob of virtues,' was applied to Aristotle's list by Schleiermacher (Whewell *Additional Lectures on Moral Philosophy* p. 18).

B 21. **κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα**, 'apropos of this metaphor of the hive.' Many uses of *κατά* with acc. come from the notion of *following down* (we say 'following *up*') a suggestion. Hdt. VII 142 *οἱ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τὸν φραγμὸν συνεβάλλοντο τοῦτο τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος εἶναι* 'following up the notion of the stockade,' Aristoph. *Clouds* 534 *νῦν οἶν Ἡλέκτραν κατ' ἐκείνην ἦδ' ἡ κωμῳδία ζητοῦσ' ἦλθ'*, *Theaet.* 179 E (the Herakliteans) *ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται* 'are in the state of instability appropriate to their writings,' *Rep.* 576 C *ὃ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότητι*. Cp. **76 C** 19, 23.

The mention of the hive suggests to Socrates the *bee* as a subject for definition. It is clear that Plato devoted much attention to zoological and botanical classification. We have elaborate examples of the former, *Soph.* 220 A B, *Politicus* 261 B –267 C, especially 266 E. It is true that these classifications stand apart from the main subject of these dialogues; but it would be a mistake to deny them intrinsic importance. Aristotle seriously criticises Plato's zoology (*Part. An.* I chaps. ii and iii, especially I ii §§ 2, 3, I iii §§ 12, 13). See W. H. T. in *JP.* vol. VIII p. 294; also p. 315, where he quotes the satire of the comic poet Epicrates on the proceedings of the Academy, who are represented as occupied in determining the genus and species of a pumpkin. See also H. Jackson in *JP.* vol. XIII pp. 38, 243, and Archer-Hind, *Timaeus* Introd. pp.

31-35, *JP.* vol. XXIV p. 52, who show that in Plato's later view the only Ideas are those corresponding to the Natural Kinds; mainly, that is, those of plants and animals. At the time when he wrote the *Meno* Plato had not arrived at this stage; but as suggestive problems in classification the species of plants and animals must have interested him at an early stage. These species furnish the chief instances of Natural Kinds, as they were called by Mill, that is, Kinds separated from others that stand near them not by a known limited number of differences, but by an unlimited number—as, for instance, the differences between a bee and a wasp. The selection of the most suitable differences on which to ground a system of classification is the problem botanists and zoologists have to face. (See Mill *Logic* I vii § 4, IV vi § 4, IV vii §§ 2, 4; Bain *Logic* vol. I p. 63; Jevons *Elem. Lessons* p. 294.)

22. **εἴ μου ἐρομένου κτλ.**: the protasis is really triple, but one member of it appears in a participial form (*μου ἐρομένου*). This becomes clear by comparing the sentence with two analogous ones at **74 B** and **C**.

	72 B	**74 B**	**74 C**
(*α*)	*μου ἐρομένου*	*εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο*	*εἰ ἀνήρετο*
(*β*)	*εἰ ἔλεγες*	*εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες*	*εἰπόντος σου*
(*γ*)	*εἴ σε ἠρόμην*	*εἴ σοι εἶπεν*	*καὶ (εἰ) ὑπέλαβεν*

The variety is characteristic of Plato.

Sentences with a *double* protasis, especially as here in summarising a supposed dialogue, are frequent in Plato.

Hipp. maj. 289 C *εἴ σε ἠρόμην—εἴ μοι ἀπεκρίνω—ὀρθῶς ἂν ἀπεκέκρισο.*

Prot. 311 B C *εἰ ἐπενόεις—εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο—τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω:* (bis).

Gorg. 453 C *εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν—εἴ μοι εἶπες—οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην;*

Theaet. 147 A *εἴ τις ἔροιτο—εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα—οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν;*

† *Theages* 123 B *εἰ ἐπεθύμεις—καὶ ἐγώ σε ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν—τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;*

In *Euthyphro* 10 E we have a double protasis, but the second is bifurcated, each half having a separate apodosis.

In *Clit.* 408 E we have an elaborate sentence with a triple protasis, *εἴ τις ἡμᾶς προὔτρεπε—καὶ ἔπειτα ὠνείδιζε—εἰ δ' ἐπανηρόμεθα—εἶπεν ἄν.* In all these instances the protases are separate and co-ordinate; in translation they might be linked together by 'and.' A more elaborate form occurs *Phaedo* 67 E *εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται κτέ.* Kühner § 578. 9, Goodwin *MT.* § 510.

'Hic et in proximis mirum in modum alternant imperfecta cum aoristis,' *ἔλεγες, ἀπεκρίνω, ἠρόμην, ἀπεκρίνω* **72 B**, *εἶπον,*

εἶχες **73 D**, *ἦρχον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα* **86 D**. Heind. *ad Gorg.* 447 E *εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιοῦργος, ἀπεκρίνατο ἄν*, 514 D *κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα ὅπου ἄν*, omnia tamen in verbis hisce loquendi, respondendi, inquirendi' (Buttmann). Heind. refers *inter alia* to *Prot.* 311 E (quoted above). Fr. notes **74 C D**, *Euthyphro* 12 D *εἰ ἠρώτας εἶπον ἄν;* add **99 E** 3, *Gorg.* 453 C, *Ion* 540 D *εἰ ἐτύγχανες ἱππικὸς ὢν ἔγνως ἄν*, *Symp.* 199 D *εἰ ἠρώτων εἶπες ἄν*, *Prot.* 313 A *εἰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν ἔδει τῳ—πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω—καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις*: Goodwin *MT.* § 414, Hadley 875. 6. In many of these cases the ground of difference in the tenses comes out clearly: thus *ἠρώτων* refers to a process of questioning, *ἠρόμην* to a single question (see App. on text, **72 C** 4). But certain aorists and certain imperfects seem to be favoured, *Theaet.* 144 E *πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθα;*

μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν: see Exc. I.

26. **τῷ μελίττας εἶναι**, 'in their essential nature as bees,' i.e. *τῇ μελιττῶν οὐσίᾳ*. *Hipp. maj.* 292 D *τὸ καλὸν αὐτό, ὃ παντὶ ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι*, 299 D *ἆρ' οὖν ἡδὺ ἡδέος ὁτιοῦν ὁτουοῦν διαφέρει τούτῳ τῷ ἡδὺ εἶναι; Lysis* 217 B *σῶμά που κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν*, *Phaedo* 102 C *οὐ γὰρ Σιμμίαν (Σωκράτους) ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει* (see on **71 B** 6), **72 E** 22 *πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι*, **73 A** 26.

30. **ᾗ μέλιτται εἰσίν**: this somewhat more technical expression is substituted for *τῷ μελίττας εἶναι* above. Cp. *Parm.* 145 E *ᾗ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ᾗ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ*. The use becomes stereotyped in Aristotle, and is represented by the scholastic *qua*.

C 36. **ἔγωγε**: Plato spares us Meno's attempt at defining a bee. It would be interesting to see what Plato's own would have been.

CHAPTER IV

1. **κἂν εἰ . . εἰσιν . . ἔχουσιν**: in this construction the *ἄν* originally belonged to the apodosis. It has got drawn forward and attached to *καί*, mainly owing to the desire to mark the conditional character of the sentence at the start, but perhaps partly from the wish to avoid the hiatus *καὶ εἰ*.

The origin of the idiom is seen by comparing such a sentence as **75 C** 25 *ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις*, which might have been written *ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν εἴ μοι οὕτως ἀρετὴν εἴποις*,

ἀγαπῴην. But the *ἄν* has become '*consopitum*,' and is used often where there is no apodosis that admits of *ἄν*, as here, *Soph.* 267 D (*προσείπωμεν*), *Rep.* 477 A (*ἔχομεν*), 579 D *ἔστιν ἄρα, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ* (cp. 473 A), *Prot.* 328 A *κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει . . ἀγαπητόν*, *Symp.* 185 C *κἂν εἴ τις ἐξαπατηθείη ὅμως καλὴ ἡ ἀπατή*, † *Theages* 121 A, 130 D. In some cases there is neither an apodosis corresponding to *ἄν* nor a verb with *εἰ*: the words *ἄν* and *εἰ* then are the relics of a vanished apodosis and protasis, and are almost otiose, *κἂν εἰ* being little more than *καί* 'even,' *Soph.* 247 E *κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ*, *Polit.* 308 C *εἴ τις πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν . . κἂν εἰ τὸ φαυλότατον, συνίστησιν*. In cases where *ἄν* retains its force, and the apodosis contains a suitable finite verb, Plato generally repeats *ἄν*: *Soph.* 256 B *κἂν εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν . . οὐδὲν ἂν ἄτοπον ἦν*, *Gorg.* 514 D quoted on **B** 22, *Phaedo* 72 C *κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξ. γεγονὸς εἴη*: cp. *Prot.* 318 B, 353 D, *Menex.* 236 C *ὥστε κἂν ὀλίγου, εἴ με κελεύοις ἀποδύντα ὀρχήσασθαι, χαρισαίμην ἄν* (where, however, Sch. brackets the last two words). [But where the apodosis is an inf. or ptcp. Plato usually does not repeat *ἄν*: *Rep.* 408 A, 473 A, 612 C: *Phaedo* 71 B: *Phil.* 58 C.]

In most of the above cases *καί* goes with *εἰ*, in the sense 'even,' the sentence being concessive (see on **98 D** 35).

On *κἂν εἰ* see Kühner § 398. 4, Riddell § 255, Goodwin *MT.* § 195, F. E. T. § 190, Buttmann note here and on Dem. *Mid.* § 51, Heindorf on *Soph.* 247 E, Jebb on Soph. *El.* 1483, *Aj.* 1078, Cope on Aristot. *Rhet.* I i 5. The account of *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ* is analogous to that of *κἂν εἰ*.

2. **ἕν γέ τι εἶδος**: here we have another word which Plato moulded to philosophical usage. The meanings before Plato are (1) 'form,' 'physical appearance,' and (2) 'sort,' 'kind' (see L. & S.). The former meaning is frequent in Plato, e.g. **80 A** 9, *Rep.* 402 D *ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει*, *Symp.* 210 B *εἰ δεῖ διώκειν τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν* (so Hug, I think rightly, but there may be a play on two senses of *εἶδος*). The second meaning differs but little from one of the philosophical meanings in Plato; you can hardly separate *παιγνιέων τὰ εἴδεα* (Hdt. I 94) from *Rep.* 363 E *ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων*, 424 C *εἶδος καινὸν μουσικῆς* (cp. *τρόπον ᾠδῆς νέον* just above). See *CR.* XII 223.

The philosophical meanings of *εἶδος* in Plato we may thus distinguish:

A. (metaphysical): the Form which makes a given Class what it is, whether by infusing its being into it (Participation), or by serving as an exemplar (Imitation). *Phaedo* 102 B *ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν*, *Rep.* 597 A (*ὁ*

κλινοποιός) *οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δή φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά, Parm.* 129 A–135 C, especially 132.

[In the passages hitherto quoted some definite metaphysical theory or other is implied as to the relation of the *εἴδος* to the particulars. Of the following places in earlier dialogues, as of this place (and **D, E** presently) in the *Meno*, this can hardly be said: *Euthyphro* 6 D *ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν, ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια* (cp. 5 D and see on **72 B** 22 above), *Hipp. maj.* 289 D *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος.* At *Ion*y. 503 E the meaning is 'visible form'; but not without suggestion of a mental type to be realised: (the true orator) *οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός τι· ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος . ., ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται.*]

B. (logical) (*α*) a *genus* contrasted with a smaller species, or with particulars, *Theaet.* 178 A *εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτῴη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν,* 148 D *ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες.*

(*β*) a *species* contrasted with a larger genus, *Symp.* 205 B *ἀφελόντες γὰρ τοῦ ἐρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιτιθέντες ὄνομα, ἔρωτα. Rep.* 357 C, *Polit.* 258 E, 263 B, etc.

[There is also a periphrastic use, *Rep.* 389 B *ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει* 'by way of medicine' (see L. & S.), with which cp. *Hipp. maj.* 297 B *ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέᾳ εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Laws* 918 E *ἐν μητρὸς καὶ τροφοῦ σχήματι.* So *ἐν μέρει τινος* (L. & S. IV 3), *ἐν ἀνδρὸς λόγῳ* Hdt. III 120.]

Whether there is any consistent distinction in Plato's usage of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* has been debated. Zeller (notes pp. 207 and 238) denies any such difference, and I think he is right. On the other hand see Campbell *Theaet.* App. C, and L. & S. s.v. *ἰδέα*. But *εἶδος* has in Plato all the meanings of *ἰδέα*. The history of the two words is precisely similar. *ἰδέα* had before Plato the same two meanings as *εἶδος*, 'physical appearance' and 'sort.' Both words occur in *Hipp. maj.*, *εἶδος* in a philosophical sense, *ἰδέα* only in the phrase *ἐν πατρὸς ἰδέᾳ* (289 D and 297 B quoted above). Both occur in *Euthyphro* in a philosophical sense, *ἰδέα* 5 D, *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* 6 D. On the latter passage J. Adam says '*εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are here practically synonymous: the only difference is that *εἶδος* views the thing in question more as to its content, *ἰδέα* more as to its form.' Cp. Fr. Introd. to *Euthyphro* p. 150 note 6. On *Phaedo* 103 E Archer-Hind observes, 'In fact *μορφή*, *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are in the present passage interchangeable words.' In *Rep.* 596 there is little change of meaning between *εἶδος* at A and *ἰδέα* (thrice) at B. 'We assign one *εἶδος* to each class of particulars: and so there are

ἰδέαι of the bed and of the table, which the *δημιουργὸς* copies.' The key of the Ideal Theory (of the *Rep.*) is the representation of Intellectual processes by metaphors drawn from the world of Sense. Perhaps associations of Sense adhere rather more strongly to *ἰδέα* than to *εἶδος*. In *Parm.* 132 A I can distinguish no difference of meaning: *Οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι*, nor ib. C *Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν;* *Ναί. Εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;* Cp. 135 A. Again cp. *Phaedr.* 249 B *δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸντ' αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον* with 265 D *εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα*: also *Polit.* 258 C, 262 B.

ἰδέα nowhere occurs in the *Meno*. Diog. L. III 64 says of Plato *πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ὀνόμασιν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σημαινομένου χρῆται· τὴν οὖν ἰδέαν καὶ εἶδος ὀνομάζει καὶ γένος καὶ παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἴτιον.* Plato saw that the formation of philosophic habits of thought must precede the fixing of a philosophical nomenclature: *Theaet.* 184 C *τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, κτέ., Polit.* 261 E *κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως*: *Rep.* 533 D *ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.* Hostility to the word-catching methods of Eristic contributed to this feeling in him. See Campbell General Introd. to *Soph.* and *Polit.* p. xxiv, who, after quoting from Cope's Pref. to his Translation of the *Gorgias* (p. xi): 'one of the most striking peculiarities of Plato's philosophical writings is the almost entire absence of any scientific terminology,' shows that in the later dialogues, from the *Theaetetus* onwards, the tendency to technicalities considerably increases.

3. **εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντα**: cp. *Euthyphro* 6 E *ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ . . φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι*: *Gorg.* 503 E (quoted above); *Rep.* 501 B etc.

4. **που**, *opinor*, **74 B** 6, **75 E** 14, **89 B** 27, 28, **97 B** 6. Cp. **75 C** 29 (Fr.).

8. **τὸ ἐρωτώμενον**, 'the point of your present inquiry'; **D** not *τὸ ἐρωτηθέν*, because he is not referring exclusively to Socrates' last question.

9. **οὕτω δοκεῖ . . ἄλλη μέν**: there is a seeming anacoluthon here, *δοκεῖ* giving the impression of an impersonal use, whereas

a subject is subsequently supplied. Fr. quotes *Rep.* 334 B τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη (where the transition is rather stronger, as τοῦτο gives the impression of being subject to δοκεῖ), *Apol.* 25 B (see Stallbaum) ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι where δοκοῦσι has to be substituted for δοκεῖ in the second clause. See on **71 C** 14 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

E 20. **τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει**, 'by something generically the same.' Plato leads up to this by the phrases **C** 2 ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, **D** 14 ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, and for it he substitutes at **73 C** 51 τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ. Cp. *Euthyphr.* 6 D (quoted, Intr. p. xlv).

21. **τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω**, 'by the words "the same" I mean this.' λέγω = 'I mean' generally has two accusatives: *Gorg.* 489 D (twice), 491 A, etc.

22. **πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι**: cp. πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι just below. The attraction into the nom. is quite regular in Greek. *Prot.* 341 A διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι. Cp. Roby *Latin Grammar* II p. xxiii. See on **72 B** 26.

73 A 29. **τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὁμοῖον**, 'hoc non jam simile'; the same sense would be given by τοῦτ' ἤδη ἀνόμοιον 'hoc jam dissimile.' Cp. *Soph.* 247 B τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται: *Gorg.* 503 A Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς: **99 A** 2. See on **83 D** 52.

31. **ἔλεγες**: 'ubi verba dicendi vel sentiendi (ἐδόκει **89 C** 8) ad superiora referuntur imperfectum usu venit. Ita νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον **74 B** 7, **76 E** 49, **78 B** 1, ἀπεβάλλομεν **79 D** 36, ἐλέγομεν **87 B** 8, **88 D** 2, **99 D** 28, ὡμολογοῦμεν **97 A** 7' (Fr.). But see Intr. p. lxii. (ἐποίει at **88 D** 5 is somewhat different.)

35. **σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως**: these are the two virtues that constitute ordinary civil virtue. *Phaedo* 82 B τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην (see Archer-Hind's note and his App. I), *Symp.* 209 A πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακοσμήσεις, ἣ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη (see Hug's note); at *Prot.* 325 A τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι is added. Zeller pp. 449 foll. Xenophon represents Justice and Temperance as the common ground of the sexes, *Oec.* vii 27.

B 42. '**ἄρα** in conclusionibus **73 C** 51, **78 A** 62, **82 D** 22, **83 C D E** al., aliter ad **80 E** 8, **81 D** 12, **97 C** 33' (Fr.): also **91 C** 2. See on **80 E** 8.

46. **μῶν** is rare in the early dialogues: see the table quoted from Constantin Ritter, Intr. p. lxii. It occurs thrice in the *Meno*; here, **84 B** 14 and **93 A** 11.

49. **ἀλλὰ σώφρονες**: the ἀλλά is 'complemental': see on **71 C** 10.

55. **εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν**: see Exc. II. **C**

Chapter V (**73 C**-**74 A**). MENO. *Virtue is the power to rule.* SOCRATES. *But this does not suit the case of all men—slaves and children, for instance. Moreover, to make rule virtuous it must be exercised with certain characteristics—Justice, for instance. These characteristics are several species of Virtue. We have not got Virtue as a Whole yet.*

Meno's second definition has at least the semblance of unity. But how has he arrived at it? He has simply taken out of the 'swarm' of Virtues above the one that fills the largest place in his mind, the *ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή*, and ignored all the rest. Socrates shows, first, that the definition is much too narrow; next, that no progress is made so long as we still regard the term Virtue in its Extension. If we take a class of external acts, as those of a virtuous Ruler, we find they are virtuous because they manifest various qualities, Justice for instance. As these qualities are many, Virtue again, from a new point of view, appears as plural.

With Socrates' criticism here must be carefully compared that which he makes on the third definition subsequently, **77 B** foll. Meno's ready assent that Rule must be Just to be virtuous, is parallel with his similar assent about Acquisition at **78 D** 33.

5. **κατὰ πάντων**: it is worth while to notice the different **D** prepositional and other phrases used by Plato to denote the relation of the Universal to the Particulars, during the period of his philosophy while he either had framed no metaphysical theory of this relation, or still regarded the Idea as 'immanent in the particulars' and not, as in his later stage, merely as an exemplar. (See H. Jackson in *JP.* vol. X pp. 295–6, XI p. 297, Archer-Hind *Phaedo* Intr. pp. 34, 35.)

κατὰ πάντων here: **74 B** 2, **88 E** 13; cp. **76 A** 23, etc.

διὰ πάντων **74 A** 35: *Laches* 192 B *εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινούμεθα. Soph.* 240 A *τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων, ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι, φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἓν ὄν.*

ἐπὶ πᾶσι **75 A** 6: *Soph.* 240 A (just quoted), *Theaet.* 185 C *τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις, Symp.* 210 B *τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος.* The metaphor implied in the use of the preposition *ἐπί* to express this relation, and the difficulties

involved in it, are brought out in *Parm.* 131 B ἡδέως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἓν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον: cp. 132 C. See *JP.* XI pp. 289–291.

ἐν πᾶσι: *Lach.* 191 E πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν, τί ὂν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταὐτόν ἐστιν.

Lastly, at **74 D** 34 the Universal κατέχει the Particulars. Cp. *Phaedo* 104 D; see also note on **73 E** 17.

The references to the *Sophistes* come from a portion of that dialogue where the 'Sophist' is made to assume the mantle of Socrates himself, and to ask for a definition in language which, as H. Jackson has shown (*JP.* XIV pp. 189, 190), 'is the very echo of that of the *Meno*.'

7. **ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε**, 'yes, that is just what I *am* seeking for.' For ἀλλὰ μήν . . γε used in repeating with emphasis a word from a previous speaker cp. *Euthyphro* 6 E εἰ οὕτω βούλει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε, 'yes, that is just what I *do* wish,' *Lach.* 193 C εἴπερ οἴοιτό γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαί γε, and 192 C (quoted above). (Cp. *Gorg.* 466 B εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέν δὴ λέγω γε.) Other uses of the combination occur **74 E** 43, **77 A** 1, **98 E** 47, cp. 41.

10. **ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι**, 'do you think the ruler would be a slave *then*?'

11. **οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ**: see on **71 C** 19.

12. **οὐ γὰρ εἰκός**, 'I should rather think *not*.'

ὦ ἄριστε implies no estimate of the character of the person addressed, any more than does 'my *dear* sir' (used in expostulation) or 'my good fellow' (used with contempt). See Campbell *Theaetetus* App. D. Cp. Carlyle *Sartor* bk. i ch. 3 'but I, *mein Werther*, sit above it all; I am alone with the stars'; and Sheridan's *Rivals*, where Fag profoundly observes that 'one always says "honest" to one's inferiors.' Cp. **92 C** 16 ὦ δαιμόνιε.

13. **προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε**: cp. *Rep.* 369 D.

E 17. **ἡ ἀρετή τις**; so σχῆμα and σχῆμά τι presently express respectively the Universal and the Particular. A similar relation is expressed by τὸ καλόν and καλόν in *Hipp. maj.* 287 D.

19. **εἰ βούλει**: see on **71 E** 2.

21. **οὕτως ἁπλῶς**, 'just simply,' without qualification. Ast s.v. ἁπλῶς quotes many examples, either word preceding indifferently. *Prot.* 351 C etc.

74 A 29. **καὶ σὺ οὖν**: οὖν resumes εἰπέ in the line above. For οὖν

resumptive see *Apol.* 28 D, *Symp.* 201 D, *Euthyd.* 285 B. '*Velut ipse dicerem . . . si juberes, ita tu quoque dic.*'

30. Meno here gives the four 'cardinal' virtues ; but shows that this is no philosophical classification by adding μεγαλοπρέπεια ('*pars civilis virtutis quam intellegebat Meno*' Fr.), καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι. The Thessalian Admetus is markedly μεγαλοπρεπής (Eur. *Alc.* 858 : cp. on **70 A** 7). Perhaps it is also characteristic of Meno that he leaves out ὁσιότης, which Socrates introduces at **78 D** 30.

It may be noted that μεγαλοπρέπεια, though not standing on the same footing as δικαιοσύνη, is mentioned as one of the qualities of the true philosopher, *Rep.* 486 A. His character is summed up at 487 A ; he must be μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης. Cp. on **88 A** 16 and **91 A** 4, 8. Cp. Ar. *Rhet.* I vi 9=1362 b 13, I ix 5, 12=1366 b 2, 18 ; *N.E.* II vii 6 and IV ii.

Chapters VI–IX (**74 A–77 A**). *Socrates helps Meno by giving sample definitions—first, two of Figure, the former of which is rejected as involving terms with which the respondent has not assured himself that the other is familiar. After the second and scientific definition of Figure, Socrates gives in addition a definition of Colour, hailed with acclamation by Meno, but less scientific because it rests on a hypothesis not universally admitted.*

6. εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο κτέ. : see on **72 B** 22. The triple protasis is expressed by thrice-repeated εἰ a rare combination. The change of mood (ἀνέροιτο, εἶπες) is a change from a vague future supposition (Goodwin *MT.* § 455) to a present unreal supposition. It is important to notice that the unreal supposition, though expressed by aorists, is *present*, not past. For the change of mood, cp. **90 B** 5 ἂν πέμποιμεν, followed by **C** 16 ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, †*Theages* 125 B-D where the main problem is put in the optative (εἰ ἔροιτο . . τί ἂν φαίη ;), the intervening illustrations in the aor. indic. (εἰ ἠρόμεθα . . τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνατο ;): see Kühner § 576 Anm. 9, Goodwin *MT.* § 414. Cp. εἴ σε ἠρόμην **72 B** 24. See also **76 E** 49. **B**

As to the present passage, Kühner § 577. 9 says that the first member, εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο, is really protasis to the second, εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες, the third member, εἴ σοι εἶπεν, being the real protasis to εἶπες δήπου ἄν. 'If in a certain case you would answer so-and-so, to a further question you would answer so-and-so.' Goodwin (*MT.* § 510), on the other hand, appears to

regard the first member as 'the leading condition, to which the rest of the sentence (including the other conditions) is the conclusion.' 'If any one should ask you "What is Figure?" you would—under certain further conditions—make such and such an answer.' Grammatically the three protases are co-ordinate, and might conceivably be so translated: 'suppose—and suppose—and suppose—what then?'

7. **ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον**: for the impf. see on **73 A** 31.

C 19. **εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο κτέ.**: see on **72 B** 22.

D 29. **εἰ οὖν . . μετῆει**: the complex protasis is in this instance interrupted. It is resumed at **E** 2, *εἰ οὖν . . εἶπες*, and the apodosis finally comes at **75 A** 5 *ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε* (Struve, quoted by Fr.).

30. **ἔλεγεν ὅτι**: for *ὅτι* redundant in introducing a quotation see **75 A** 4, **C** 3, **87 A** 25, *Prot.* 356 A, *Rep.* 453 B etc., and Riddell §§ 279, 280.

ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλά: *ἀλλά* transitional followed by *ἀλλά* complemental. See on **71 C** 10 and 13, *Prot.* 318 B (Heind.). The ellipsis with *μὴ οὕτως* in these places is *λέγε* or the like. In *Hipp. maj.* 299 D *μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ . . ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὐτῷ τούτῳ διαφέρει* we must understand *σκόπει* or the like with both members.

33. **καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις**: it is obvious to us that one class may contain under it two things not merely different but opposite. The subject has been approached in the *Protagoras* c. xix (330 E foll.). It is asked 'How can Virtue be One, and yet the parts of Virtue (*μόρια ἀρετῆς*) different from each other?' Protagoras, in setting forth his view, says that opposites have a common point (331 D), *τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπῃ προσέοικε, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις.* Cp. *Phil.* 12 E *καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι κατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτ' οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τό γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τὸ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὂν τυγχάνει· καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι κατὰ ταὐτόν κτέ.* In *Phaedo* 104 A B it appears that *ἀριθμός* comprises the opposites *ἄρτιον* and *περιττόν*.

The passage above quoted from the *Philebus* opens up other kindred matters, about which see H. Jackson's paper in *JP.* x pp. 263 foll. In the *Philebus* we are confronted by the old difficulty of seeing how a thing can be at once One and Many. How can One thing (e.g. Pleasure) *be* Many things (e.g. good and bad)? (This was one source from which sprang Antisthenes' denial of the possibility of predication.) Philebus cannot see how Pleasure can be of different *kinds*. They may have

different or opposite *origins*, but in as far as they are *Pleasure*, they must be One and the same (12 D *εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὗταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη;*). Socrates shows that the paradox that a thing is both One and Many appears under several aspects. He (*Philebus* 14 C foll.) recognises identification of *ἕν* and *πολλά* in three distinct senses: (1) the identification of the One particular and its Many *qualities*, (2) the identification of the One particular and its Many *parts*, (3) the identification of the One idea and its Many particulars. In the sequel the article proceeds to show that between the earlier dialogues and the *Philebus* the interest has shifted from the first two problems to the last. The first problem is really that of Classification, which fills so large a space in the *Meno* and kindred dialogues; for each of the Many qualities is a Class notion. But in the *Philebus* the first two problems are accounted trivial and uninteresting (*δεδημευμένα*, 'played out,' 14 D); though in *Rep.* 523 A–526 B they are made the bases of a dialectical course. [So at *Phil.* 13 E Socrates says he would be a poor creature if he were not equal to seeing that one class may embrace not only dissimilars but opposites: *πολλαί τε αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα ἄξιος ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι, κτέ.*] 'Similarly in the *Phaedo* 102 B–103 A the first identification is discussed—in regard to the tallness and shortness simultaneously discoverable in Simmias—at a length for which Socrates thinks it necessary to make a sort of apology 102 D, while the simultaneous appearance of *αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος* and *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος*, of the separately existent idea and the same idea distributed among its particulars—a case of the third identification of *ἕν* and *πολλά*—is assumed without a word of explanation' (note on p. 264). 'If again we turn to *Meno* 73 C sqq. we remark at once a similarity and a dissimilarity to *Phil.* 12 D sqq. Meno's inability to regard Virtue as a *ἕν*, and Protarchus' inability to regard Pleasure as a *πολλά*, have a common origin, and Socrates in his answer to Meno takes the same sort of line, and employs the same examples (*σχήματα* and *χρώματα*), as in his answer to Protarchus. On the other hand there is nothing in the *Meno* to correspond to *Phil.* 14 B–15 C. The ontological difficulty insisted upon in the latter has not in the former made its appearance.' The *Meno* contents itself with the attempt to grasp the General Notion; in the *Philebus* that stage is passed; but the problem remains, '*how* does the Idea enter into the Particulars?'

καὶ ταῦτα καί, 'and that too though,' L. & S. *οὗτος* C IX 2.

34. **κατέχει**: see on **73 D** 5.

35. **ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις κτλ.**, 'which you call Figure, allowing the name Figure both to curved and straight.' This is hardly an instance of the ordinary transition from the relative to the demonstrative construction. This transition mostly occurs where the relative if repeated in the second clause would be in a different case. Where the relative would be in the *same* case, it is naturally understood in the second clause. But even under these circumstances the transition to the demonstrative sometimes occurs (Kühner § 561. 1), Xen. *An.* III iii 16 Ῥοδίους, *ὧν τοὺς πολλοὺς φασιν ἐπίστασθαι σφενδονᾶν καὶ τὸ βέλος αὐτῶν καὶ διπλάσιον φέρεσθαι τῶν Περσικῶν σφενδονῶν*. In the present place it looks at first sight as if Plato might have left out the second *σχῆμα*, writing *ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ*. But there would then have been the danger that his reader, instead of supplying *ὅ* in the second clause as predicate, might take *εἶναι* in the sense 'exist.' Cp. **77 E** 44 *ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά*, **93 D** 17 *ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο, καὶ ἐποίησε σοφὸν ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο*: *Theaet.* 192 A *ὃ μέν τις οἶδε . . αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή*. See on **90 E** 32.

E 39. **ἆρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς**, 'am I to understand that when you speak thus you mean that curved is no more curved than it is straight, or that straight is no more straight than it is curved?' Dr. Jowett's translation (2nd ed.), by twice giving 'any more' instead of 'no more,' makes nonsense of this passage.

CHAPTER VII

1. **τοῦτο** is followed by *τὸ σχῆμα* epexegetically. Riddell § 214.

75 A 4. **εἶπες ὅτι**: see on **74 D** 30.

οὐδὲ μανθάνω—οὐδὲ οἶδα: *οὐδέ . . οὐδέ* are never (in Attic Greek) correlated ('*neither . . nor*'); when they occur they mean '*not even . . nor yet*,' Hadley § 1005. Cp. *Lysis* 210 C *νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατὴρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ καθ' ὅσον ἂν ᾖ ἄχρηστος*, *Rep.* 391 C, Xen. *An.* III i 27 *σύ γε οὐδὲ ὁρῶν γινώσκεις οὐδὲ ἀκούων μέμνησαι*, *ne* videns *quidem* cernis, *neque* audiens meministi (Kühner § 537. 2). Cp. **92 B** 11.

7. **ἐπὶ τούτοις**, 'on these terms': note the difference from the neighbouring uses of *ἐπί* with the dative, and see on **90 D** 20.

But the use before us has grown out of the local use, *ἐπὶ τούτοις* being simply 'on this basis,' 'on this understanding.'

11. **ἵνα καὶ γένηται**: see on **71 B** 8. This intensive *καί* is not uncommon in final clauses. *Luch.* 194 A *καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει καρτερήσωμεν ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ*: *Rep.* 346 A *μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν*: *Lys.* 204 B, *Gorg.* 467 C, *Apol.* 22 A B, *Theaet.* 163 C, *Soph.* 250 A etc.

13. **μή**: deprecatory. Riddell § 136, *Gorg.* 497 B *μηδαμῶς,* **B** *ὦ* K., *ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα.* See on **71 C** 13, and cp. **74 D** 30.

14. **βούλει χαρίσωμαι;** cp. **76 C** 19, **86 C** 1. Goodwin *MT.* § 287. He quotes *Rep.* 372 E *εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει* to show that in Attic Greek the subjunctive was felt as dependent upon the part of *βούλομαι*, not as independent. (See on the other hand Kühner § 394. 5.)

24. **χρώματι ἑπόμενον**: Colour is an attribute of matter much less constant, much more dependent on the state of the percipient, than is Form. Form is ranked by Locke among the 'primary' qualities of matter, Colour among the 'secondary' —a distinction which goes back to Democritus. (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 231; Sir Wm. Hamilton, 'Reid's Works,' Note D, and index 'Qualities.') We have then here the fallacy of defining *ignotum per ignotius* (Jevons *Elem. Lessons* pp. 110 and 114). The juxtaposition of *σχῆμα* and *χρῶμα* is very frequent in Plato; see *Phil.* 12 E, quoted on **74 D** 33, and many places quoted by Ast s.v. *χρῶμα.*

25. **κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην**: cp. on **72 C** 1. Here the usual **C** hyperbaton of *ἄν* is avoided. But another is introduced, for *οὕτως* really belongs to *εἴποις.*

29. **που**, 'if I understand'; a variety of the usual sense of *που* (*opinor*), in which 'it is added when with some hesitation we repeat the words of another' (Buttmann *Index*). Fr. quotes **79 D** 36, **94 C** 26 for the same sense.

30. **εἶεν**: '*συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα* Tim. lex,' Fr. Cp. †*Alc.* i 106 A *εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅ τι μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενόημαι κτέ.* See J. Adam on *Prot.* 311 C, 357 A.

32. **ἀποκεκρίσθαι**: this tense is used as deponent and as passive by Plato with about equal frequency: passive, as here, *Gorg.* 453 D, where see Heindorf.

CHAPTER VIII

2. **ἐριστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν** : see Excursus V and on **83 D** 50. Cp. *Theaet.* 154 D.

3. **ὅτι** : see on **74 D** 30.

D 4. **λαμβάνειν λόγον**, 'to examine the statement.' The phrase in this sense occurs *Rep.* 337 E, *Soph.* 246 C etc. ; and in the same sense *δέχεσθαι λόγον*, *Prot.* 336 C, *Rep.* 531 E. It is opposed to *διδόναι λόγον*, 'to stand an examination,' **81 B** 23, *Prot.* 336 C, *Rep.* 531 E (*ὑπέχειν*, *παρέχειν λόγον*, *Prot.* 338 D, *Rep.* 344 D). The phrases express the respective positions of the 'opposer' and 'maintainer' of a thesis. The metaphor is probably taken from an audit of accounts ; cp. *Laws* 774 B *ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιούτου λόγον ὑπεχέτω*. The phrases *λαμβάνειν* and *διδόναι δίκην* furnish fairly close parallels. We have also the phrase *λόγον ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι* (*Soph.* 230 A, often in Hdt.) 'to give an account to one's self,' or sometimes 'to reconcile something with one's conscience.' But *λαμβάνειν λόγον* has another sense in Plato, not connected with personal debate, viz. 'to grasp the *λόγος* or true definition of something.' *Rep.* 402 A, *Theaet.* 148 D *περὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν*. Corresponding with this we have a second sense of the phrase *διδόναι λόγον* 'to *furnish* such a definition,' *Phaedo* 76 B (see Archer-Hind), 78 D, *Rep.* 534 B *ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας ; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ δοῦναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν ;* cp. *Gorg.* 501 A (the Art *ἰατρικὴ*) *τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι*. Stallb. and others at the present place translate *λαμβάνειν λόγον* 'loquentis partes suscipere.' This view is rightly opposed by Fr. It is true that *δοῦναι λόγον* in Xen. *Hell.* V ii 20 does mean 'to give opportunity for speech,' but *λόγον* in these combinations in Plato always means more than 'speech.' At *Phil.* 11 A C *δέχεσθαι λόγον* means 'to undertake a thesis committed to one.'

6. **βούλοιντο** : the mention of the present conversers (*ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ*) naturally introduces a transition to the plural.

7. **διαλεκτικώτερον** : it is characteristic of the *διαλεκτικός* to be able *διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν λόγον* (in both the Platonic senses), *Rep.* 531 E, 534 B (quoted above) ; cp. *Crat.* 390 C, *Phaedr.* 266 B. See Grote I 267, Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 75 D.

On the procedure here recommended see Xen. *Mem.* IV vi 15 *ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός (ὁ Σωκράτης) τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου* :

R. & P. 194 B, Zeller p. 201, Aristot. *An. Pr.* II 16 1 = 64 b 36 *ὅταν τὸ μὴ δι' αὑτοῦ γνωστὸν δι' αὑτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῇ δεικνύναι, τότ' αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.* Cp. on **76 E** 43 and **79 D** 36.

10. **πειράσομαι δή**: here *δή* has the force of *igitur* 'accordingly' (Hadley 1037. 4 a). In this use it does not refer to a word, but to a clause, and is practically a connecting particle. Ast (s.v. *δή* p. 447 bottom) quotes some instances in Plato amongst 'innumerable' others. See Kuhner § 500. 4. *δή* is in origin a temporal particle, connected with *ἤδη*, F. W. Thomas in *JP.* XXIII pp. 89 foll. The temporal force has to a great extent disappeared in Attic. 'Now,' which has undergone a similar widening of meaning, or 'well now,' will often serve as a translation; as here, *Rep.* 366 B, 368 A *δοκεῖτε δή μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι* 'well now, I really think you are *not* convinced,' 494 A, *Phaedr.* 218 E etc. Where the result of an exposition is summed up with emphasis, *δή* = 'in fact,' 'in a word'; *Rep.* 361 B *ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν*, 486 B etc. Cp. on **81 B** 30.

12. **τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι;** This is the form in which the recog- **E**
nition of the terms to be employed is always secured, cp. **76 A** 19, **88 A** 16 etc. An affirmative answer to it implies a recognition not merely of the *name*, but of the *reality of the thing* corresponding to it. The phrase already occurs Hdt. II 2 *Ψαμμίτιχος ἐπυνθάνετο οἵτινες ἀνθρώπων βεκός τι καλέουσιν.* Fr. refers to Xen. *Mem.* II ii 1, IV ii 22, to show that such a question was part of the procedure of Socrates. Cp. *Phaedr.* 237 C.

13. **ἴσως δ' ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο**, 'Prodicus might perhaps quarrel with us on the point,' namely of our nomenclature. For the life of Prodicus the 'sophist' of Ceos see Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II pp. 416–420; for his treatise or lecture (*ἐπίδειξις Crat.* 384 B) *περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος* ibid. pp. 489–491. Prodicus drew distinctions between words popularly used as synonymous. To this we have many allusions in Plato. In *Charm.* 163 D Socrates says he grasps the difference between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις, καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος.* In *Lach.* 197 D Socrates says that Prodicus *δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.* In *Protagoras* 314 C he is one of the sophists in the house of Callias with Protagoras; at 337 A foll. a speech is put into his mouth exemplifying, or caricaturing, his method, cp. 339 A foll.; and at 358 A he is requested for the moment to waive his insistence on verbal niceties, somewhat as here in the *Meno*. In *Euthyd.* 277 E Socrates in consoling the puzzled Clinias says *πρῶτον γάρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ.*

We know that Protagoras as well as Prodicus speculated on

ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης (*Phaedr.* 267 C, *Crat.* 391 C). None of the early philosophers were specialists. Prodicus' teaching was by no means confined to questions of language. He had at least *some* views on rhetoric (*Phaedr.* 267 B), and wrote on ethics and religion (Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 473, 482–3, 486; see his 'Choice of Heracles,' Xen. *Mem.* II i 21). For Socrates' debt to him see on **96 D** 23.

15. **καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι**, i.e. '*πεπεράνθαι*' *καλεῖς τι.*

17. **ἀλλὰ καλῶ**: complemental ἀλλά after an ellipsis suggested by *οὐδὲν ποικίλον*: 'I make no refinements, I accept your term.' Cp. *Rep.* 437 B *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἂν ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῃ διοίσει. ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων.*

76 A 20. **οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις**, 'the well-known terms, you know, used in geometrical problems.' *οἷον velut*, as **72 B** 27, **74 A** 27, **86 E** 23, etc., Riddell § 16.

γεωμετρίαι: *Rep.* 510 C, 511 B, 533 C, 536 D in the same sense. The plural, as often in the case of abstracts, expresses separate instances of the quality, or manifestations of the faculty: cp. *ἐπιστῆμαι* **86 A** 10, *ὑγίειαι Prot.* 354 B, *εὐγένειαι Euthyd.* 279 B, *Rep.* 618 D (Kühner § 348. 3, Hadley § 636).

24. **περαίνει** intransitive: see L. & S. IV, under which head this place should be quoted.

25. **στερεοῦ πέρας**: a model definition, *πέρας* expressing the Genus and *στερεοῦ* the Differentia.

CHAPTER IX

B 9. **κατακεκαλυμμένος**, 'blindfold.'

11. **ἔτι εἰσίν**: cp. Xen. *An.* II vi 28 *ἔτι ὡραῖος ὤν.* This passage, as showing that Meno was no longer very young, indicates that the dramatic date of the dialogue is shortly before the starting of Cyrus' expedition (Intr. p. xxiv).

12. **τί δή;** 'how *so*, pray?' (with surprise). This form (cp. **79 A** 6, *Gorg.* 486 E) must be distinguished from *τί δέ;* (**71 C** 15, **73 A** 31, **B** 46, etc.) or (less correctly, see Fr. prol. pp. 46, 47) *τί δαί;* which simply draws attention to a coming question.

13. **οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττεις**, 'you do nothing but lay down the law.' We must understand *ποιεῖς* with *οὐδέν*. See on **71 C** 13. Should we regard ἀλλ' in this usage as representing ἀλλά or ἄλλο? L. & S. explain ἀλλ' ἤ as *always* arising from

ἄλλο ἤ, the accent on ἄλλο having been lost. Ast (s.v. ἄλλος p. 108) thinks that both here and at **84 D** 31 we have ἄλλο, and he writes ἀλλ' ἤ (with the accent) in both places. This the MSS. do not confirm. Against the view of L. & S. may be urged (1) that in many instances of ἀλλ' ἤ we have ἄλλο already expressed earlier in the sentence: e.g. *Phaedo* 81 B (where Geddes remarks that in these combinations ἀλλά is properly dependent on μηδέν and ἤ on ἄλλο), ib. 97 D, *Rep.* 429 B, 553 D: (2) that in many places ἄλλο is not the part of ἄλλος that would be required, e.g. *Prot.* 334 C μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ, 356 A, *Apol.* 34 B τίνα λόγον ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν; *Phaedr.* 258 E, *Phaedo* 83 A, *Rep.* 427 C. I believe that in Plato where ἄλλο ἤ is intended it is always written in full (as **80 A** 4, *Theaet.* 195 E, *Crat.* 412 D, *Euthyd.* 277 E), and that where we have ἀλλ' ἤ the first word is always ἀλλά. (But ἀλλ' ἤ is ἄλλα ἤ, as *Phaed.* 91 D.) The ἤ gives ἀλλά additional point; ἤ 'than,' which comes naturally after ἄλλος, is used with ἀλλά, though it is no longer felt as a case of ἄλλος. Kühner § 535, 6 (=Jelf § 773 Obs. 1) says that the form arises from the merging together of two constructions, οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . ἀλλά and οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . ἤ, ἀλλά and ἤ nearly agreeing in meaning. See also Riddell § 148, Hadley 1046 c. The ἤ is not indispensable, *Laws* 710 C εὐτυχὴς μὴ κατ' ἄλλο, ἀλλά κτέ. In *Prot.* 354 C and *Symp.* 181 D ἤ after ἀλλ' has been introduced against the MSS. We have the same variation in the interrogative formula ἄλλο τι; or ἄλλο τι ἤ;

14. **οἱ τρυφῶντες**, 'spoiled children.' τρυφῶ is from a lengthened form of the stem of τρυ-ω, which again is a lengthened form of the stem of τείρω. θρύπ-τω is a further formation from the stem of τρυφῶ. The meanings of τρυφῶ, θρύπτομαι, διαθρύπτομαι are nearly parallel, and should be compared. The original meaning is 'broken up,' 'soft.' For the transition to the moral meaning cp. Latin *fractus*, *de-lic-atus*. The notion here is slackness combined with pride, 'to be exacting,' 'to expect too much from others.' So *Euthyphro* 11 E, 12 A τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ' ὦ μακάριε ξύντεινε σαυτόν 'you are playing with the matter; pull yourself together.' Cp. †*Alc.* i 114 A. A slightly different shade is 'to be hard to please,' *fastidire*, *Prot.* 327 E νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς: Xen. *Mem.* III xi 10 τὸν ἐντρυφῶντα 'the disdainful.'

15. **ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας, ὅτι**: the regular constr. of this verb in **C** this sense, *gen.* of person, *acc.* of charge. F. E. T. § 102, Hadley § 752, *Phaedo* 116 C, Xen. *Mem.* I iii 10, etc.

16. **εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν**: there is no doubt that Plato

here preserves a trait of the historic Socrates, to whom similar expressions are attributed by Xenophon : *Symp.* viii 2 *ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω χρόνον ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἐρῶν τινὸς διατελῶ.* Cp. *Mem.* II vi 28 *ἴσως δ' ἄν τί σοι κἀγὼ συλλαβεῖν ἔχοιμι διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι,* IV i 2 *πολλάκις γὰρ ἔφη μὲν ἄν τινος ἐρᾶν, φανερὸς δ' ἦν οὐ τῶν τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὥραν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὖ πεφυκότων ἐφιέμενος.* This is richly illustrated by Plato in such passages as *Charm.* 154 B, 155 D, *Lys.* 204 B. See Grote I 352, note.

In *Phaedrus* 227 C Phaedrus tells Socrates that the discourse he has been listening to is especially suited to Socrates, as the subject happened to be Love. Cp. 257 A. In *Symp.* 177 D Socrates is very ready to discourse on Love, *ὃς οὐδὲν φημὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά* : and ib. 216 D Alcibiades says *ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι Σ. ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ τούτους ἐστι καὶ ἐκπέπληκται, Euthyphr.* 14 C, †*Theages* 128 B. See Zeller *Socrates* pp. 71 foll., 127, 165, Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* App. I p. 152, Hug *Symp.* pp. xviii foll. Now though in many of these passages (as certainly in the present and **86 D**) a strong tinge of irony is to be observed, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the language is purely metaphorical, and to ignore the physical attraction out of which it grew. The story of the judgment passed by the physiognomist Zopyrus on the character of Socrates, with the latter's explanation, may have a basis of genuine tradition. Cic. *Tusc.* IV 80 *cum multa in conventu vitia collegisset in eum Zopyrus, qui se naturam cujusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent; ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi insita sed ratione a se dejecta dixerit.* Cp. *de Fato* § 10. The words of Thoreau (Walden, '*Higher Laws*') may be quoted : 'the generative energy which when we are loose dissipates and makes us unclean, when we are continent invigorates and inspires us.' This is the truth underlying Aristotle's representation of *σωφροσύνη* as a mean between *ἀκολασία* and *ἀναισθησία.*

This is not the place for a full discussion of the erotic philosophy of Plato. (Grote II pp. 206–210, Zeller pp. 455 foll.) But it is closely connected with the point just mentioned. As the dialectic method of Plato was grounded on the dialectic of Socrates, similarly his erotic philosophy had a root in the emotional side of his master's character. In the *Symposium* 198 D Socrates, who earlier had professed himself to know nothing but the lore of love, recants and declares himself unable to pronounce a suitable eulogy. All that he knows of any value was communicated to him by the gifted Diotima. Thus the erotic Socrates passes into the exponent of the erotic doctrine of Plato.

The point is the more relevant because there is a close analogy between δόξα, the main subject of the *Meno* and ἔρως. (Exc. VII p. 301). To Plato these two things are the great mediators between the world of Being and the world of Sense. To express the state of emotional exaltation that appeared to Plato to be (for mortals) the indispensable condition in any attempt to pierce the Veil, he found no language so apt as that drawn from physical love.

19. **βούλει ἀποκρίνωμαι**: see on **75 B** 14.

22. **ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ 'Εμπ.**: Empedocles, of Acragas in Sicily, explained sensation by the hypothesis that material objects gave off films adapted to the several channels of sense. See Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 165–6; cp. pp. 133–4; R. & P. § 139, especially note *d*; Grote I 47. The most important places in ancient writers on the point are Emped. line V 337 (Mullach) *γνῶθ' ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαὶ ὅσσ' ἐγένοντο*, Theophr. *de sensu* § 7 *'Εμπ. φησὶ τῷ ἐναρμόττειν (τὰς ἀπορροὰς) εἰς τοὺς πόρους τοὺς ἑκάστης (αἰσθήσεως) αἰσθάνεσθαι*, Aristotle *de gen. et corr.* I 8=324 b 26 foll. Cp. *Rep.* 530 D *κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι* and Soph. *O. T.* 1387 *εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ' ἦν πηγῆς δι' ὤτων φραγμός*, where *πηγή* is much the same as *πόρος*: see Verrall on *S. e. T.* 571. We seem to have a filtration of the same doctrine put into the mouth of Euripides by Aristoph. *Thesm.* 16 foll.—

> *ᾧ μὲν βλέπειν χρὴ πρῶτ' ἐμηχανήσατο*
> *ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντίμμον ἡλίου τρόχῳ*
> *δίκην δὲ χοάνης ὦτα διετετρήνατο.*

Zeller *pre-Socratics* II p. 166 note 3 (cp. *Plato* p. 428) says that Plato's explanation of sight in the *Theaetetus* (153 D, 156 B–E) and *Timaeus* was the same as that of Empedocles; but Archer-Hind in his note on *Timaeus* 45 D shows that there are considerable differences. We have the same doctrine indicated in the *Phaedr.* 251 B *δεξάμενος τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων*.

A similar view of sensation was taken by Democritus and the Atomists (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 230, Grote I 80). The Atomists were driven to some such view by their assumption that all influence of one thing upon another implies mechanical contact. From Democritus it was adopted by Epicurus, and we find it reproduced in Lucretius IV 42–6:

> *dico igitur rerum effigias tenuisque figuras*
> *mittier ab rebus summo de corpore rerum* etc.

Diogenes Laertius VIII 58 quotes from Satyrus a statement

that Gorgias was a pupil of Empedocles. They were probably contemporaries, as Diogenes (ib. 74) tells us that Empedocles flourished in the 84th Olympiad (444 B.C.). Some writers appear to have confused Empedocles the philosopher with his grandfather of the same name. Quint. III i 8 says of Gorgias *Empedoclis, ut traditur, discipulus, cum aequalis fere esset et potius familiaris.* See R. & P. § 167 note *d*, § 190 note *a*. Words denoting 'pupil' are sometimes interchanged with *ἑταῖρος* (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 211 note) or *γνώριμος* (Muller *FHG.* III p. 159). Cp. **79 E** 2. Whether strictly a pupil or not, Gorgias could hardly fail to be influenced by his great compatriot. But Gorgias probably cared little for scientific research (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 460).

28. **ἁρμόττειν**: Empedocles' doctrine of sensation postulated a certain homogeneity between the perceived object and the perceiving organ. For sensation implies intermixture, and like seeks to mingle with like. The extreme form of this doctrine he expressed in the verses—

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἄταρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον.

Of course the words in the present passage do not imply so much as this.

D 33. **σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω**, 'please take my meaning': these words, used by Pindar (fr. 82 Bergk) to prefer a modest request —on behalf of another—became a catchword. Aristophanes (*Birds* 945) puts them into the mouth of the poet, who, having got the jerkin, delicately hints that he would like the cloak as well. Plato here and *Phaedr.* 236 D uses the words without reference to their original association.

ἔφη Πίνδαρος: for this form of quotation—without *ὡς*—cp. *Prot.* 315 B *ἔφη Ὅμηρος.* So *φησί Phaedr.* 260 E, *Theaet.* 170 E, *φασίν Hipp. maj.* 301 C, *φαίη ἄν Phaedo* 115 A, *φαῖεν ἄν †Alc.* I 120 B. Cp. Ar. *Wasps* 1183; Lucian *Dem. Enc.* § 13 *φησὶν ὁ τραγικός*; Diog. L. III 47 *Γλαῦκα γὰρ εἰς Ἀθήνας, φάσιν.*

34. **ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα**: Gedike observes that this is nearly the same definition as Plato gives in *Tim.* 67 C. But there the definition is part of a reasoned system; it no longer rests on an isolated hypothesis.

36. **ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς**: contrast Meno's enthusiasm here with his silence after the definition of *σχῆμα* **76 A**.

E 43. **τραγική**, 'high-flown.' Does the epithet refer to the *language* or to the *matter* of the definition? The former may be credited mainly to Gorgias, the latter to Empedocles. Both

these Sicilians in different ways were infected with the *τραγικὸς τύφος* (cp. Diog. L. VIII 70). As to the style, possibly an echo of Gorgias may be detected in the ring *σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός*. (Cp. Hug's note at the beginning of Agathon's speech, *Symp.* 194 E, and on **72 A** 14.) But it is to the *matter* of the definition that the epithet is chiefly directed. It is a definition in regular form, like that of Figure, *ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων* being Genus, *ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός* Differentia (*ὄψει* goes with both adjectives). But the terms of the definition, though accepted by *ὁ ἐρωτῶν* (see on **75 D** 7), are not accepted universally. The definition assumes an *unproved hypothesis*; it is thus a definition for the Few. *τραγική* is opposed to '*popular*.' Cp. Heind. ad *Crat.* 414 C 'Mox *τραγῳδεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα* est *σεμνότερα καὶ θαυμαστότερα ποιεῖν* ut 418 D *τετραγῳδημένον*. Unde explicanda illa in Menone 76 E et Rep. 413 B.'

47. **ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν . . ἀλλ'**: see on **71 C** 10.

οὐκ ἔστιν: I have put a comma before *βελτίων*, making that predicate to *ἔστιν*. Buttmann says that in that case you would need *αὕτη* to contrast with *ἐκείνη*. I cannot think it indispensable, as the new definition is so prominent in thought. This course seems preferable to leaving *ἔστιν* without a predicate.

ὦ παῖ 'Αλεξιδήμου: this form of address (*πατρόθεν*) is solemn and impressive. See Thuc. VII 69, where, before the final seafight in the harbour of Syracuse, Nikias goes round encouraging each Athenian, *πατρόθεν ὀνομάζων*. So Plut. *Pelop.* 28, 4. Its mock solemnity is well suited to the character of Socrates, who often is made to use it; *Hipp. min.* 373 A, *Charm.* 158 B, *Euthyd.* 278 E, 279 D, *Prot.* 328 D, 335 D, *Symp.* 198 A, *Rep.* ii 368 A *ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός*, †*Alc.* i at the beginning, †*Theag.* 128 C, *Lysis* 204 B, with the youth's name added for special effect, *ὦ παῖ Ἱερωνύμου Ἱππόθαλες*: ib. 204 E (a rather different use) we are told that Lysis is still called 'Democrates' son,' *διὰ τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γιγνώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ*. The style was also official, Xen. *Oec.* vii 3. So Socrates impressively addresses Meno's slave, *ὦ παῖ Μένωνος* **85 B** 50. So Lysimachus addresses Socrates, *Laches* 180 D.

49. **οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον**: the infinitive *ἂν δόξαι* represents *δόξειεν ἄν*, and with *ἀναγκαῖον* must be supplied *ἦν*. The *present* of *εἰμί* is usually omitted with expressions of necessity and duty, and here this is extended to the impf., though otherwise the ellipsis of *ἦν* is rare (Kühner § 354, Anm. 2; Jelf § 376 b, and Obs. 1). For the change of mood see on **74 B** 6.

50. **πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων**: Meno is on his way back to Thessaly, **71 C** 12. There are many passages in Plato in which he applies the phraseology of the mysteries to initiation in philosophy; Diotima uses it of her erotic doctrine, *Symp.* 209 E *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ μυηθείης· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης, Gorg.* 497 C *εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά.* In *Theaet.* 155 E the materialists are spoken of as *ἀμύητοι.* In *Euthyd.* 277 E the triumph of the two sophists over Clinias is compared to a Corybantic dance around the neophyte. With bitter irony in *Rep.* 560 E the language of initiation is applied to the process by which the soul is purged of all its *better* elements to form the *δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ.* In the present passage the literal meaning is combined with a metaphorical. Plato seems to have entertained respect for at any rate certain of the mystic rituals (*Phaedo* 69 C and Archer-Hind's note, cp. *Gorg.* 493 A). But he often uses language in which the regeneration thus wrought is held up as something superficial and imperfect in comparison with that effected by philosophy (*Phaedo* 81 A, *Phaedrus* 248 B, 249 C, 250 B C).

Chapters X–XII (**77 A–79 E**). MENO. *Virtue is the love of what is noble, conjoined with Power.* SOCRATES. *But every one loves the Noble, desires the Good: that we may eliminate. May we say Virtue is the power of securing Good Things?* MENO. *Yes.* SOCRATES. *Well; but if you mean Material Goods, Power will not be Virtue unless it is exercised in accordance with certain personal characteristics, Justice, Temperance etc., as we saw with Rule just now. We still have not the one thing that lies at the root of these characteristics.*

We here have Meno's third attempt at a definition, if we may count as one the statement at **77 B** 12 and its amended form at **78 C** 12. The original form is loose and poetical. It leads to an interesting parenthetic exposition of the doctrine *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός*—a doctrine so closely connected with the identification of Virtue and Knowledge that some reference to it in this dialogue was necessary. The amended definition, *δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι ἀγαθά* (which Socrates suggests), is far nearer the mark than anything yet put forward. 'Hanc definitionem,' says Fr. (intr. p. 16), 'Meno, si tenuisset veram et sinceram *boni notionem*, valenti argumentatione defendisset.' But Meno is thinking of *external* goods; and to obtain these virtuously the 'members of Virtue' (*μόρια ἀρετῆς*) have again to be called in, as with the second definition at **73 C**.

1. **προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω**, 'I shall not fail for want of goodwill.' So *Symp.* 210 A, *Rep.* 533 A, *Laws* 961 C, *Tim.* 20 C *οὔτε ἐλλείψομεν προθυμίας οὐδέν* : cp. Aesch. *P.V.* 341 *προθυμίας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐλλείπεις.* Cp. further *Rep.* 602 D *γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει* : *Phaedo* 69 D *οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον . . ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην.* 77 A

3. **ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι** : *ὅπως μή* is often used to introduce some idea that is repelled. The word denoting *fear* or *prevention* on which it depends may either be expressed, or, as here, understood. The repulsion to the idea may be weakened to mere caution in the entertainment of it, as here, where the meaning is 'perhaps I shall not be able.' (Contrast *Phil.* 48 D *οὐ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ*, 'I certainly shall not be able.') Where the word on which *ὅπως μή* depends is expressed, it will determine whether prevention, fear, or mere caution is expressed. (See Kühner § 552. Anm. 6 ; Jelf § 812, 2 ; Goodwin §§ 271–83, especially § 278, also § 370 ; F. E. T. §§ 234, 235 ; Riddell § 59 ; see also notes on **89 C** 6 and 10.)

We have *ὅπως μή* with *fut. ind.* after *φυλάττειν Gorg.* 480 A, *Rep.* 421 E ; after *εὐλαβεῖσθαι Gorg.* 487 D, *Rep.* 561 C ; after *ἀντιτείνειν Phaed.* 91 C ; after *φόβος ἐστίν Symp.* 193 A ; cp. also *Gorg.* 513 A. Without any governing verb, we have at *Rep.* 506 D the same phrase as here : *Menex.* 236 C *ἀλλ' ὅπως μή μοι χαλεπανεῖ ἡ διδάσκαλος, ἂν ἐξενέγκω αὐτῆς τὸν λόγον* : *Prot.* 313 C. Plato often has *ὅπως μή* with 2nd person of this tense as a gentle *prohibition*, *Rep.* 336 D, 337 B, *Gorg.* 489 A, *Menex.* 249 E, *Hipp. maj.* 286 B ; but apparently never *ὅπως* without *μή* as a gentle *command*, like Aristophanes etc.

(In some of the above cases the MSS give the 1st *aor. subj.*, which recent editors mostly agree in correcting to the *fut. ind.*, in accordance with the Canon Davesianus : see Kühner § 553. Anm. 5 ; Jelf § 812, 1 ; Goodwin § 364 ; F. E. T. § 239. We have a 2nd aor. *ἐπαναστῇ* after *ὅπως μή* depending on *παραφυλάττοντες* at *Laws* 715 B.)

With the pres. subj. we have *ὅπως μή* after *φοβεῖ Euthyphr.* 4 E ; after *ἐνέστηκεν Phaed.* 77 B ; after *σκεψώμεθα* denoting cautious entertainment of an idea, *Crat.* 439 B ; and without *σκεψώμεθα*, in just the same sense, *Crat.* 430 D.

Both *fut. ind.* and *pres. subj.* are thus capable of various shades of meaning in this construction, and no general difference of meaning between the uses of the two moods can be traced.

6. **πολλὰ ποιῶν** : cf. **79 A** 7 *μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν.*

8. **σκώπτοντες** : there seems to be reference to a similar joke in *Rep.* 422 E *ἑκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων.* The scholiast and many modern

interpreters of that passage held there was a reference to the *game* Πόλεις. The President of Magdalen and Mr. J. A. Stewart (*CR.* VII 359) oppose this view, thinking that τὸ τῶν παιζόντων is simply an equivalent to σκώπτοντες here. Prof. Ridgeway, however (*JHS.* XVI 288), believes there *is* a reference to the game πόλεις, and I incline to agree with him. It is difficult to see the point of the word πόλις if it does not come from the game. If the πόλις was an invulnerable combination of πεττοί, which lost its virtue when disintegrated, the gibe is an obvious one.

ἐάσας: for the aor. ptcp. see **92 D** 27.

ὑγιῆ: '*Gorg.* 493 D πίθοι ὑγιεῖς, quibus opponuntur ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα' (Fr.). Cp. *Crat.* 440 C ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ. L. & S. quote other applications of the word to inanimate things—Lys. †*Or.* 6 § 12 of the Hermae 'unmutilated'; Thuc. VIII 107 of ships 'undamaged.' Cp. **89 C** 12.

B 12. **χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι**: the citation of the author as ὁ ποιητής would imply that he is some one of eminence. Simonides of Ceos is probably the man. (See Fr. on *Euthyphr.* 12 A.) He was much connected with Thessaly, and the poem of his discussed in the *Protagoras* was addressed to a Thessalian prince. See Cic. *de or.* II §§ 352-3 and J. & A. M. Adam's note on *Prot.* 339 A, where it is shown as probable that besides *Rep.* 338 E (where Plato quotes Simonides by name) there are two other passages in the *Republic* where Plato quotes, without naming, him. See on **87 E** 2.

For the quotation see Bergk[4] *fragm. adespota* 130 (vol. III p. 729). I do not think there is any allusion to it in Aristotle *Pol.* V 5 = 1339 b 1. The metre suggests that it came from a scolion, such as—

> [οὐδὲν φέρτερόν ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ θνητῷ
> ἢ] χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι.

Meno in going to a poet for a definition is yielding to a tendency, common in many ages, to regard the works of eminent poets as of oracular authority (cp. Ov. *Am.* III ix 18 sunt etiam qui nos numen habere putent). Against this spirit of bibliolatry the Platonic Socrates often protests. See *Prot.* 347 C foll. (Grote II 57–8), *Hipp. min.* 365 C (Grote I 388), *Phaedr.* 274 B foll. (Grote II 239-240), and Butcher *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*: 'The Written and Spoken Word' pp. 184, 188, 197, 203; see also note on **71 D** 26. The dead book, as the absent master, is a poor substitute for the friction of living minds.

Plato, however, so far gives in to the notion that poets are

oracular, that he regards them as the inspired mouthpieces of words the true significance of which they know not (*Apol.* 22 B C, *Io* passim ; see on **95 D** 35 and **99 D** 28). This must be Plato's excuse for the great latitude he allows himself in the interpretation of poets ; see Socrates' exposition of Simonides' poem *Prot.* 342 A foll. Other instances of arbitrary interpretations of poets in Plato are found *Lach.* 191 B, *Lys.* 212 E, †*Alc.* ii 147 D. In the present instance the violence done to the poet is slight. By *δύνασθαι* the poet was thinking of *political* power, having before his mind the position of some prince or despot of cultured tastes. For *δύνασθαι* absolute (= *δυναστεύειν*) see L. & S. s.v. I 1. Meno gives it a different tinge by accepting Socrates' interpretation, *δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά*.

The word *δύνασθαι* recalls two kindred passages. One is *Gorg.* 466 B foll., where Polus says that orators *μέγα δύνανται*, and is shown by an argument, parallel to the one here beginning, that the only true Power is Knowledge. The other is *Hipp. maj.* 295 E, where Hippias eagerly assents to Socrates' suggestion *δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλόν, ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν ;* and is met by a similar argument (note *ἐξαμαρτάνουσιν ἄκοντες* at 296 C in regard to a point presently discussed). A third passage closely bearing on the present is *Prot.* 351 B foll. Socrates puts before Protagoras the position : *τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀηδῶς κακόν.* To this Protagoras answers : *εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γε ζῴη ἡδόμενος.* The reservation here made by Protagoras is parallel with the *χαίρειν καλοῖσι* of Meno. The nullity of the reservation is brought out in a long argument, in the course of which (352 C) Protagoras admits *καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδένος, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἃ ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.*

The doctrine enunciated in what now follows is often labelled with the phrase *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός.* It is in its origin a corollary from the doctrine that identifies Virtue and Knowledge, and is Socratic (Xen. *Mem.* III ix 4 ; IV vi 6). For an exposition of the view as it presented itself to Socrates see J. Adam's edition of the *Apology* Intr. p. xi ; Zeller *Socrates* 143. The view was one to which Plato adhered (with modifications) at all stages of his career. For the proof of this see Cope, Translation of Plato's *Gorgias* Intr. p. xli and pp. lxiv foll. It underlies the words of the *Apology* 26 A *δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ.* Another side of the same doctrine appears in the paradox of the *Hippias minor* that it is better to do wrong voluntarily than involuntarily.

In the *Protagoras* Socrates assumes the doctrine in criticising the poem of Simonides (345 D E); it forms the basis of the long discussion beginning 351 B (referred to above), of which the result appears at 357 C D and 358 C D *ἄλλο τι οὖν ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται κτέ.* In the *Gorgias* it appears especially 467 C (where see Dr. Thompson's note) and 468 C *οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα;* also 509 E, where the meaning of *δύναμις* and *δύνασθαι* in the context should be noted. In *Symp.* 205 A foll. we find again a clear statement, *πάντας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι.* In the second book of the *Republic* the doctrine occurs repeatedly (see especially 358 C, 360 C, 364 A, 366 C D), chiefly as a contradiction of the 'sophistic' view *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος*—the view that Justice is artificially forced upon man against the dictates of his nature (see *Prot.* 337 D, *Gorg.* 483 foll., etc.). At 438 A and 589 C passing references take the doctrine for granted. Among the later dialogues it is found in the *Philebus* 22 B (all must choose the Good) *εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.* The notion that Vice is Ignorance seems also involved in the doctrine of False Pleasures 41 A foll. In the *Sophistes* 230 A foll., on the assumption *πᾶσαν ἁμαθίαν ἀκούσιον εἶναι*, Education, especially in the form of the *ἔλεγχος*, is held up as a higher purificatory agent than *νουθέτησις.* Again, *Tim.* 86 D foll. *καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα, ὅσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια καὶ ὀνειδος ὡς ἑκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται· κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινα τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός κτέ.* (see Archer-Hind's note). Lastly Cope refers to *Laws* 731 C, 734 B, 860 D; to which 689 A foll. may be added.

The maxim, especially in its earlier and more Socratic aspect, was assailed by Aristotle. In *Met.* Δ 29 = p. 1025 a 9 he attacks specifically the position of the *Hippias minor.* Socrates, says Aristotle, overlooked the freedom of the will; the *ἀρχή* of moral action resides in ourselves; not till the habit of Virtue is confirmed does Vice become involuntary (Grote I 399). The doctrine is also attacked, with apparent reference to the *Protagoras*, in *NE.* VII 2 = p. 1145 b 24, VII 3 = p. 1147 b 15 (Grote II 62). See also for *βούλησις* Aristot. *Rhet.* I x 8, with Cope's note. (Zeller p. 420.)

16. **ἆρα λέγεις κτλ.**: the argument here, as elsewhere in Plato, depends on successive substitutions of nearly synonymous words. The first step is to substitute *ἀγαθά* for *καλά* (so, less explicitly, at *Prot.* 351 C). Thus any poetic tinsel adhering to the word *καλά* is removed. Then the position *κακῶν*

ἐπιθυμοῦσί τινες is undermined piecemeal by the following division :—



Though in general terms Meno has asserted the existence of **B**, yet when it is pointed out that *κακόν* must be regarded in relation to *one's self* (which is done first by the phrase *γενέσθαι αὑτῷ* and then by the introduction of the antithesis *ὠφελεῖν*)(*βλάπτειν*) he is shaken, and confesses that **B** (1) must either disappear or be merged in **A** (**77 D**). It remains to dispose of **B** (2). Meno is led on by a series of quasi-synonyms (*βλάπτεσθαι—βλαβήσονται —ἄθλιος εἶναι—κακοδαίμων εἶναι*) until in '*κακοδαίμων*' he meets with a term from which he definitely recoils. Thus Meno is led to give up **B** altogether.

Examples of somewhat similar procedure occur several times in the *Gorgias*, 474 C 479 E (see Grote II 90–101 ; Bonitz *Platonische Studien* p. 21), 495 C–497 D, 506 D–507 C, where the numerous steps include the not infrequent play on the double meaning of *εὖ πράττειν*.

The first book of the *Republic* furnishes other examples : the argument at 348 B foll. to show that Injustice is not profitable, culminating in the phrase *θεοῖς ἐχθρός* at 352 B ; again 353 E foll. : the soul in which its special *ἀρετή* (*δικαιοσύνη*) resides *εὖ ἀπεργάσεται τὰ αὑτῆς ἔργα—εὖ πράττει—εὖ βιώσεται — ἔσται μακαρία καὶ εὐδαίμων*—hence *δικαιοσύνη λυσιτελεῖ*. See also *Prot.* 333 D, *Euthyd.* 281 B C, *Hipp. min.* 365 D E, †*Alc.* i 116 B foll., and J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 12 B and *Crito* 47 B.

Such verbal arguments are often, as Dr. Thompson says (in his note on *Gorg.* 497 A *οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες*), 'rather unconvincing than illogical.' Something of this Plato must have felt when at *Rep.* 487 A he makes Adimantus say *ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἵός τ' εἴη ἀντειπεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι κτέ.* Cp. *Phaedr.* 261 E foll.

C 26. **γιγνώσκοντες:** cp. *Prot.* 353 C *γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν.*

32. **τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὑτῷ;** cp. *Symp.* 204 D E *ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι αὑτῷ*, and presently *ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι αὑτῷ. κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες.* Cp. also the analysis of *ἐπιθυμία Rep.* IV 437 C, *ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἥτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληταί οἱ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὑτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως;*

D 34. **ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον:** the step taken by the introduction of the word *ὠφελεῖν* is practically what Aristotle would have expressed as that from the *ἀγαθὸν* in itself to the *ἀγαθὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς*. Sometimes the distinction between *ὠφέλιμον* and *ἀγαθόν* sinks to nothing, as at *Prot.* 358 B; so at *Gorg.* 474 E, 477 A *ὠφέλιμον* is ranked with *ἀγαθόν* as opposed to *ἡδύ*, the former representing the permanent, the latter the transient object of desire (Grote II 105, 127–29). See too *Gorg.* 468 C. At *Crat.* 419 A we have *ὠφέλιμον*, *ἀγαθόν*, and other words grouped together as practically synonymous, there being no object in drawing distinctions. But with most synonyms there remains a latent possibility of drawing distinctions when that is to the purpose. The following passages may show the relation of the two terms when not synonymous. In *Prot.* 333 D foll. it is agreed that all *ἀγαθά* are *ὠφέλιμα to something*; cp. Xen. *Mem.* IV VI 8 *τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ.* Here *ὠφέλιμον* appears as a relative notion. So *Euthyd.* 280 B *ἆρ' οὖν εὐδαιμονοῖεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθά, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ, ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ; εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν ἄν τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν, χρώμεθα δ' αὐτοῖς μή; Gorg.* 499 D ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν *ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι (τῶν ἡδονῶν), κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;* ΚΑΛ. *Πάνυ γε.* ΣΩ. *Ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαί* (so the texts, but? *βλαβεραί*) *δὲ αἱ κακόν τι; Rep.* 379 B *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is *ὠφέλιμον* and *αἴτιον εὐπραγίας.* Cp. 608 E. We may say that in the order of Nature *ἀγαθόν* is 'prior' to *ὠφέλιμον* and is the cause of it. But from our point of view *ὠφέλιμον* appears as the cause why we regard something as *ἀγαθόν*. So *Hipp. maj.* 296 E *ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν*, cp. ibid. 303 E. From these places, perhaps, the compiler of the Platonic *Ὅροι* 414 E drew his definition: *ὠφέλιμον· τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εὖ πάσχειν· τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.* Cp. **87 E** 36 and **96 E** 2.

E 44. **ᾤφοντο:** 'ubi compotes fiunt, error demitur.'—Fr. Cp. a somewhat similar use of the impf. *Phaedr.* 256 B *μακάριον τὸν βίον διάγουσιν . . δουλωσάμενοι ᾧ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγίγνετο,*

i.e. was growing, before its subjection; *Rep.* 352 C *δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη.*

ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά: cp. on **74 D** 35, **90 E** 32.

55. The word **ἄθλιος** has strong associations. It is intro- **78 A**
duced with solemnity *Gorg.* 469 A, 507 C *τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον*: cp. Aristoph. *Plut.* 118 *ἄνθρωπος οὐτός ἐστιν ἄθλιος φύσει.*

57. **κακοδαίμονας**: this word, like our 'God-forsaken,' though vulgarly abused, was capable on occasion of carrying the full weight of an awful meaning. The Greeks were apt to regard crime and madness alike as visitations of the higher Powers, Aristoph. *Plut.* 501.

67. **οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι**: of course *κινδυνεύει* is understood. **B**
Similarly at **96 D** 23.

CHAPTER XI

1. **ἔλεγες**: see on **73 A** 31. But the answer has *εἶπον.* 'Were you not saying just now?' 'Yes, I did say so.'

3. **εἶπον γάρ**: cp **97 B** 25 and Exc. III.

19. **ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον**: see **87 E** 2 and note there. We **C**
here have the types of two great classes of *bona*, corporeal and external goods. The word *πλουθυγίεια* as a synonym for 'all earthly blessings' occurs thrice in Aristophanes: *Knights* 1054, *Wasps* 667, *Birds* 731. We may be surprised at the prominence given to health by a people we are apt to picture to ourselves as hardly knowing illness. Cp. *Rep.* 583 C. Note 'interrogation emerging late in the sentence,' Riddell § 309.

21. **καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς**: the first and third *καί* serve to couple, and at the same time to distinguish, the two things, wealth and political power, each of which is denoted by a pair of nouns coupled by *καί*. Meno regards *πλοῦτος* as insufficiently representing external goods, and adds to it the objects of political ambition. By so doing he raises himself a stage above the lowest grade (*ὑστάτην ἡδονὴν δὴ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς Rep.* ix 583 A), and shows that in him the *φιλοχρήματος* is combined with the *φιλότιμος* (*Phaedo* 68 C, 82 C). At *Apol.* 29 D E we have the same scale: *χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος . . καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ;* In the enumeration at **87 E** *πλοῦτος* remains

the single representative of the external goods, while in the corporeal goods *ἰσχύς* and *κάλλος* are added to *ὑγίεια*.

23. **μὴ ἄλλ' ἅττα**: *μή* (*num*) puts the matter tentatively. Meno is given a last chance of amending his conception of Goods. *τἀγαθά* is *subject* of the dependent statement: 'I suppose there are no things of a different class that your list of Goods includes?'

25. **οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα**: ἀλλά here should not be translated (see on **71 C** 10). For though Meno says 'I do not include any other class, but I do include the whole of the class I have indicated,' there is little emphasis on the affirmative half of the statement. 'No, I mean everything of this sort.'

D 26. **εἶεν· χρυσίον δὲ δή**: cp. **75 C** 30. The *δέ* succeeding the interjection *εἶεν* is of the same nature as the *δέ* succeeding other interjections, e.g. vocatives. Here, as Stallbaum points out, we have a paratactic variant for the conditional construction that might seem more natural: *εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ χρυσίον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστι, πότερον προστιθεῖς κτλ.*

27. **ἀρετή ἐστι**: not necessarily the *whole* of Virtue, but an instance of it, which is all S. wants for his argument.

τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως: cp. *Apol.* 40 D, *Euthyd.* 274 A, *Gorg.* 470 E, *Soph.* 230 D. The proverbial illustration passed into Latin: *Persarum vigui rege beatior*, Hor. *Od.* III 9. 4.

28. **πατρικὸς ξένος**: Gedike suggests that the ancestors of Meno may have entered into a league of friendship with Xerxes at the time of his invasion, as the Alcuadae did (Hdt. VII 6). As the tie was with the royal *house*, it hardly implies treachery in Meno that he should help Cyrus against his brother, the reigning king. But Xenophon represents Meno as the personal friend rather of Ariaeus than of Cyrus himself (*Anab.* II i 5 etc.), whereas Aristippus is the friend of Cyrus (ibid. I i 10).

πότερον προστιθεῖς κτέ.: the argument which here begins partially anticipates that at **87 E** foll. showing that except *φρόνησις* no good is Good *per se*, all other goods being merely contingent.

29. **τῷ πόρῳ**: for *τῷ πορίζεσθαι* or *τῷ πορισμῷ* the concrete word is substituted; so lines 36, E 46 below. Similarly we have at **E** 44 *ἀπορία* for *τὸ μὴ πορίζεσθαι*, **98 A** 36 *δεσμῷ* for *τῷ δεδέσθαι*, **99 B** 15 *εὐδοξία* for *τὸ εὖ δοξάζειν*. See on **99 B** 15.

τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως: *ὁσιότης* had been omitted by Meno in his enumeration of the virtues at **74 A**. Now we have *ὁσίως* put on an equal footing with *δικαίως*. Are we to suppose

that the *Meno* belongs to the dialogues written before the conception of the Four 'cardinal' Virtues—without ὁσιότης—was formed by Plato? Those who think so hold that *Meno* was written earlier than *Euthyphro*, the latter being the dialogue in which ὁσιότης as a separate virtue is eliminated. The question is argued by J. Adam in the introduction to his edition of the *Euthyphro* pp. xxxii, xxxiii (see also his and A. M. Adam's introduction to the *Protagoras* p. xxxiv). His conclusion, in support of which he quotes Bonitz *Plat. Stud.* p. 234, is that there is no reason to suppose the *Euthyphro* later than other dialogues, where Plato, adopting the popular view, mentions Piety among the other virtues. Such is the case in the *Protagoras*, where at 325 A, 329 B, 349 B ὁσιότης is included in the list of virtues. See also Zeller p. 451 n. 47. Cp. *Laws* 860 D.

33. **οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες**: Meno shows no disposition to revolt against current notions of morality, and is thus on a par with another pupil of Gorgias, Polus, who is only partially emancipated ('Polus, the half-thinker' Cope calls him, *Gorg. Intr.* p. xl) as distinct from the more thorough-going Callicles (see Callicles' speech in the *Gorgias* at 482 D).

38. **μόριον ἀρετῆς**: this expression is used of the several virtues *Prot.* 329 C D; cp. *Laws* 696 B *ἀνδρεία που μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔν.*

44. **ἡ ἀπορία**: see above, **D** 29. Here the etymological meaning of *ἀπορία* is helped out by the fact that the word has for one of its senses 'need, poverty' (see L. & S.), much as we talk about 'being in difficulties.' We have the word played on *Apol.* 38 D *ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας.* Other examples of negative words used by Plato in an unusual sense are *ἀνόητος*, used simply as the opposite of *νοητός Phaedo* 80 B, *ἀπίθανος Parm.* 133 C, *ἀσήμαντος Phaedr.* 250 C. **E**

CHAPTER XII

5. **εἶτα**: see on **71 C** 18. **79 A**

7. **ἄρτι**: viz. at **77 A.** For *κερματίζειν* of breaking up a class-entity, cp. *Rep.* 525 E. So *κατακερματίζειν* below, **C 24.**

15. **ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ**: after an infinitive of which the subject is indefinite (as *πράττειν* here) Greek prefers the third person singular, Latin the second. Sometimes *τις* is inserted, but often, as here, it is omitted. Many of the instances are subjunctives used with the relative and *ἄν*: *Euthyd.* 289 B *ἐπιστήμης* **B**

δεῖ, ἐν ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ ὃ ἂν ποιῇ, *Lys.* 212 B οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου ὃν ἂν φιλῇ; *Crito* 49 C οὐκ ἄρα ἀντιδικεῖν δεῖ οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπὸ τούτων. Cp. **97 A** 9, *Hipp. maj.* 304 B, *Laws* 661 B. With indicatives: *Charm.* 167 B εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ' εἶναι ἢ οὔ, τὸ ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι <οἶδε καὶ ὅτι> οὐκ οἶδεν, *Apol.* 29 A τὸ γὰρ θάνατον δεδιέναι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν, *Gorg.* 456 D, 505 A. The use of the third person singular without subject expressed is considerably wider in Aristotle, e.g. *προῄδει Anal. Post.* I 1, quoted on **80 D** 1. See Kühner § 352 g, Jelf 373. 6.

18. **τί οὖν δή;** 'well, and what then?' cp. **89 D** 13, **97 E** 19, *Crat.* 398 A, *Gorg.* 497 D, in all which places the meaning of the combination is the same.

20. **πολλοῦ δεῖς**: A. Sidgwick (*CR.* III 148 b) gives this use of *δέω* ('I lack') '*entirely confined to quantities and numbers*,' as an example of Personalization. See on **92 A** 1.

C 22. **ὥσπερ εἰρηκώς**: the fallacy of which Meno has been convicted is what logicians call 'circulus in definiendo,' when the term to be defined is itself introduced in the definition (Jevons *Elem. Lessons in Logic* pp. 110, 114).

25. **πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς**, 'making a fresh start.' So **E** 1 and often.

27. Of the instances of *εἰ* with *ἄν* and the optative in Plato, three occur in the *Meno*. Besides the present place (1) we have (2) **91 D** 12 *τέρας λέγεις εἰ—οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν*: (3) **98 B** 4 *ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ἓν δ' οἶν καὶ τοῦτο θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα*. Other instances are: (4) *Lach.* 200 D *ἀλλ' ὅρα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, εἴ τι σοῦ ἂν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης*: (5) *Prot.* 329 B *ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι*: (6) *Phil.* 58 D *διερευνησάμενοι—εἰ φαῖμεν ἄν*: (7) *Crat.* 398 E *οὐδ' εἴ τι οἷός τ' ἂν εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω*: (8) *Laws* 905 D *εἰ δ' ἐπιδεὴς ἔτι λόγου τινος ἂν εἴης, λεγόντων ἡμῶν ἐπάκουε*.

These instances do not all stand in the same position. In (1), (2), and (4) *εἰ* does not introduce a real condition. In (1) *εἰ* = *ἐπεί*. See Kühner § 577. 1 and cp. Xen. *Mem.* I v 3 *εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι*; Dem. 23 (*Aristocr.*) § 144 *δίκην δόντ' ἂν δικαίως τὴν μεγίστην, εἴπερ οἱ κακόνοι καὶ φενακίζοντες ὑμᾶς κολάζοιντ' ἂν δικαίως*. In (2) *εἰ* = *ὅτι*, as often after words of strong feeling, Kühner § 551. 8; Xen. *Cyr.* III iii 37. In (4) and (6) *εἰ* = 'whether,' in an oblique question; Kühner § 396. 5.

In (3), (5), (7), and (8), however, *εἰ* introduces a really

conditional clause. But the condition is itself conditional ; it depends on an unexpressed protasis which *ἄν* represents. Thus in (3) *εἴπερ φαίην ἄν* is 'if I should say, if asked' ; in (5) *εἴπερ πειθοίμην ἄν* is 'if I should believe, if he told me.' These two instances are noticeably parallel ; they differ, however, in that (3) has for its apodosis an optative with *ἄν*, while (5) has, less regularly, an indicative, *πειθοίμην ἄν* being equivalent to *μέλλω πείσεσθαι*. We may translate (7) 'no, even though I might, if I tried, discover something, I refuse to make the effort.' See Kühner § 577. 1, Goodwin § 506, F.E.T. § 186, who quote Dem. IV (*Phil.* I) § 18 *οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ποιήσαιτ' ἂν τοῦτο ὡς ἔγω γέ φημι δεῖν, εὐκαταφρόνητόν ἐστιν.*

I have left out of account †*Alc.* I 124 B *ὧν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μή περ ἐπιμελείᾳ τε ἂν καὶ τέχνῃ* and †*Alc.* II 144 B *εἰ ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἄν*, in both which places Sch. removes *ἄν*. See Appendix on the text.

30. **ἢ οὐ . . ἀλλ' οἴει** : ἀλλά complemental : see on **71 C** 10.

35. **εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι**, 'if you do but *remember*.' Cp. **D 80 A** 8.

36. **ἀπεκρινάμην** : viz. at **75 C**. The aor. because it was a *single* answer (App. on text on **72 C** 4). **ἀπεβάλλομεν** : impf., see on **73 A** 31. But we have aor. succeeded by impf. also at **99 E** 3 *ἐζητήσαμεν καὶ ἐλέγομεν*. See on **72 B** 22.

περὶ τοῦ σχήματος : the article recalls the particular instance of discussion ; 'about that matter, colour.'

που : cp. on **75 C** 29.

38. **μήπω** : see on **90 E** 31.

46. **τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς κτέ.**, 'what *is* this virtue about **E** which you speak as you do?' 'Egregia graeci sermonis brevitas' Gedike. Cp. **86 D** 8.

Chapter XIII (**79 E–80 D**). MENO. *You stupefy and benumb me, Socrates. I thought I understood the matter well enough, but in your hands I am helpless.* SOCRATES. *If you think it is any superior knowledge in me that benumbs you, you are much mistaken. But I am willing to go into partnership with you in the quest.*

Meno has now had his 'three falls' (cp. *Euthyd.* 277 C), and confesses himself beaten. He is thus reduced to *ἀπορία* (contrast **72 A** 13), the consciousness of ignorance which is the first real step to knowledge. The situation is parallel to

others in Plato. In *Euthyphro* 11 B and *Theaet.* 148 E the speakers whose names these dialogues respectively bear make a similar confession. In each case the confession is followed by a half-serious simile ; in the *Euthyphro* Socrates introduces the comparison of the images of Daedalus (cp. **97 D**) ; in the *Theaetetus* he compares himself to a midwife (*μαῖα*) who, childless herself, can bring to birth the thoughts of others. Here, however, it is not Socrates but Meno who makes the comparison. 'Nowhere in the Platonic dialogues is this provocative shock' (of the Socratic elenchus) 'more vividly illustrated than in the *Menon*, by the simile of the electrical fish' Grote II 15. Cp. also *Lach.* 194 B *καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὑτωσὶ ἃ νοῶ μὴ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐμοίγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅ τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ' ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν.*

80 A **4. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ** : see on **76 B** 13.

5. τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν : so Socrates (*Theaet.* 149 A) answers 'people do not credit me with the maieutic art, but say *ὅτι ἀτοπώτατός εἰμὶ καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.*

7. μεστὸν ἀπορίας, 'one mass of confusion.' Cp. *Rep.* 556 D, *Soph.* 236 E, *Theaet.* 151 A *ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται.*

8. 'δεῖ pro *πρέπει* vel *ἔστι* modeste, nam animo obversatur *οὐ δεῖ*. Hdt. IX 65 *δοκέω δέ, εἴ τι περὶ τῶν θείων δοκέειν δέει* : Aristoph. *Lys.* 1132 (*πόσους | εἴποιμ' ἂν ἄλλους εἴ με μηκύνειν δέοι ;*)' Fr. Cp. the phrase *εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν.*

εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, 'if I may e'en have my joke' : *καί* accentuates *σκῶψαι*. See on **71 B** 8 and **79 D** 35.

9. τό τε εἶδος : the comparison is to Socrates' face, which was broad and flat (*σιμός*). Cp. *Theaet.* 143 E : Theodorus says to Socrates that Theaetetus *οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων* ; so *πλατείᾳ* here. It was likened by Alcibiades to Silenus or the satyr Marsyas (*Symp.* 215 A B, Xen. *Symp.* 4. 19, Zeller *Socrates* p. 79). See on **76 C** 16.

10. ταύτῃ : 'notae illi : cp. **76 A** 20'—Fr.

τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ : the electric ray (*torpedo*) : a fish allied to the skate. Fr. says that it often occurs in Greek vase-paintings. He quotes Aristot. *Hist. An.* IX 37. 3 *ἥ τε νάρκη ναρκᾶν ποιοῦσα ὧν ἂν κρατήσειν μέλλει ἰχθύων . . τρέφεται τούτοις· κατακρύπτεται δ' εἰς τὸν ἄμμον καὶ πηλόν, λαμβάνει δὲ τὰ ἐπινέοντα, ὅσα ἂν νάρκήσῃ ἐπιφερόμενα τῶν ἰχθύων.* Plut. *de Sollertia An.* 27. 2 *τῆς δὲ νάρκης ἴστε που τὴν δύναμιν, οὐ μόνον τοὺς θιγόντας αὐτῆς ἐπιπηγνύουσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς σαγήνης βαρύτητα ναρκώδη ταῖς χερσὶ τῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένων*

ἐμποιοῦσαν. Pliny *Nat. Hist.* XXXII 2 'etiam procul et ex longinquo vel si hasta virgave attingatur (torpedo) quamvis praevalidos lacertos torpescere, quemlibet ad cursum veloces alligari pedes.' Add Claudian *Idyll* 3. Aristoph. *Wasps* 713 ὥσπερ νάρκη κατὰ χειρός μου καταχεῖται. It was used for food; see Athenaeus VII 314 A, who quotes from a comedian, νάρκη γὰρ ἐφθὴ βρῶμα χαρίεν γίγνεται. Fishes of this tribe have furnished other opportunities for caricature. 'Perhaps the reader may remember Hogarth's "Gate of Calais," where a fisherwoman has upon her knees a huge skate, into whose face the painter has wickedly infused an expression precisely like that of the weather-beaten, withered old dame who holds it' (J. G. Wood *Common Objects of the Sea Shore*).

19. **οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε**: the stay-at-home habits of Socrates (who has been compared in this respect and in some others with Dr. Johnson) are well known, *Crito* 52 B οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, οὔτ' ἀλλόσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτ' ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι: *Phaedr.* 230 C (Phaedrus to Socrates) ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὐτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὐτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι. B

21. **ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης**: ἀπάγειν, ἀπαγωγή, the regular phrases for summary arrest, a process resorted to when the facts were patent or notorious. Buttmann quotes *Gorg.* 486 A εἴ τις εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι: cp. *Apol.* 32 B ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων. For the process see Dem. 22 (*Androt.*) § 26, and the commentators.

The context of the passage just quoted from the *Crito*, as well as the pathetic passage in the *Apology* 37 C D, in which Socrates urges the impossibility of his proposing exile for himself as an alternative penalty, not only shows Socrates' love for his own city, but makes it probable that in any other he would have fared even worse. This passage receives illustration from the subsequent interlude in which Anytus plays a part; see especially **91 C** 19 (note) and **94 E**. Cp. *Gorg.* 522 B C.

23. **ὀλίγου**, 'almost.' The idiom is best explained by supposing an ellipsis of δεῖ (or δεῖν), Hadley 743 b, F. E. Thompson § 95, Goodwin *MT.* § 779 (b), Krüger § 47, 16. 6, and is therefore a gen. of *want*; *Apol.* ad init. ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην. (Kühner § 418. 6 explains it as a gen. of *price*.) It is fairly common in Plato, though he never has the Aristophanic πολλοῦ 'exceedingly,' without δεῖν. (For πολλοῦ δέω see **79 B** 20, **92 A** 1.) Nor has he σμικροῦ, μικροῦ in sense of ὀλίγου, like Xenophon and Demosthenes.

25. **τί μάλιστα;** 'accuratius inquirit et cum admiratione' Fr.; 'and pray *why*, Socrates?' cp. *Gorg.* 448 D.

C 28. **ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω**: such *εἰκασίαι* were a fashionable amusement at Greek social gatherings. Walz *Rhet. Gr.* VIII p. 789 *τὸ εἴκασμά ἐστι σκῶμμα κατ' ὁμοιότητα, ὡς ἔχει τὸ παρ' Εὐπόλιδι—*

κατεικάζουσιν ἡμᾶς ἰσχάδι.

See Hug's introduction to Plato's *Symposium* pp. xiv and xxv Aristophanes gives us examples of it: *Wasps* 1308 foll. —

εἶτ' αὐτὸν ὡς εἶδ' ἤκασεν Λυσίστρατος·
"ἔοικας, ὦ πρεσβῦτα, νεοπλούτῳ τριγὶ
κλητῆρί τ' εἰς ἀχυρμὸν ἀποδεδρακότι."
ὁ δ' ἀνακραγὼν ἀντήκασ' αὐτὸν πάρνοπι
τὰ θρῖα τοῦ τρίβωνος ἀποβεβληκότι,
Σθενέλῳ τε τὰ σκευάρια διακεκαρμένῳ.

Birds 804 foll.—

ΠΕΙΣΘ. *οἶσθ' ᾧ μάλιστ' ἔοικας ἐπτερωμένος;*
εἰς εὐτέλειαν χηνὶ συγγεγραμμένῳ.
ΕΥΕΛΠ. *σὺ δὲ κοψίχῳ γε σκάφιον ἀποτετιλμένῳ.*

So in Plato's *Symposium* 215 A Alcibiades says he will praise Socrates *δι' εἰκόνων*. In the *Republic* 487 E Socrates says he can explain the position of philosophers in existing states only *δι' εἰκόνος*. Adimantus rejoins ironically *σὺ δέ γε οἶμαι οὐκ εἴωθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν*. Socrates, parrying the raillery, says *ἄκουε δ' οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως* ('in what a laboured style') *εἰκάζω*.

Hor. *Satt.* I v 56 would suggest that the same sort of thing was current in Italy.

It may be paralleled by the modern diversion 'what is my thought like?' that led to Lord Byron's well-known comparison of Lord Castlereagh to a pump.

29. **εἰκαζόμενοι** is probably middle:—'they like engaging in a game of *εἰκασίαι*, for they get the best of it.'

34. **οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτός**: *εὐπορῶν* is simply the opposite to *ἀπορῶν*, cp. *Theaet.* 150 C *ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας*. Meno had allowed (**80 A** 4) that Socrates himself *ἀπορεῖ*.

35. **παντὸς μᾶλλον**, 'most assuredly.' See on **96 D** 24.

D 37. **περὶ ἀρετῆς ὅ ἔστιν**: cp. **71 B** 4. Note that we have here *ὅ ἔστιν* (not *ὅ τι ἔστιν* as at **72 A** 14). This therefore is an instance of *ὅ* in the sense of *οἷον*. See on **92 C** 19.

39. **ὁμοῖος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι**, 'you look very much like not knowing.' This perhaps is Socrates' *ἀντεικασία* of Meno, notwithstanding that he has just said he does not intend to attempt one. For the expression cp. **97 A** 10 *τοῦτο ὁμοῖοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν*. The dat. ptcp. is a common construction with *ἔοικα*, especially in Plato and Xenophon. See Heind. on *Crat.* 416 A (*καὶ ἔοικάς γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι*).

Chapters XIV, XV (**80 D–82 B**). MENO. *But how can you search for a thing of which you know nothing? How will you know you have the thing for which you are searching even when you get it?* SOCR. *This is a well-known catch of the Eristics. I should explain the process of acquiring Knowledge by supposing that the soul of each of us had infinite experience before entering on its present life, and that what we call the acquisition of Knowledge is really merely the revival of it. I can perhaps show you this by an experiment.*

We here enter upon the second of the five divisions (or acts) of which the *Meno* consists, extending to the end of chap. xxi (**86 C**). In this, which deals with the genesis of Knowledge, we have presented to us an account of the relation of Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) to Opinion (*δόξα*). As the upshot of the whole dialogue is that 'popular' Virtue depends rather on Opinion than on Knowledge, it is clear that this 'episode' (as it at first seems) is really most intimately connected with the main discussion. 'Neque igitur casu quodam, ut Plato rem finxit, aut solum ad refutandum eristicum argumentum forte injectum, sed necessaria sua progressione quaestio devenit ad examinandam scientiae naturam et condicionem; qui locus tantum abest ut forte tractetur, ut caput contra et janua universae quaestionis putandus sit.'—Fr. Intr. p. 16. See Excursus VII.

CHAPTER XIV

1. **καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτέ.**, 'why, Socrates, how will you search for a thing when you are totally unable to say what it is? What kind of thing that you know not can you set before yourself as the object of your search?' (*καὶ admirantis*).

The first two puzzles brought forward in the *Euthydemus* are closely connected with the present *ἐριστικὸς λόγος*, namely (275 D) *πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;* and (276 D) *πότερον οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἃ*

ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται; Socrates (277 E foll.) explains the puzzles as merely verbal: Prodicus, he says, would remind us that the word *μανθάνειν* is used in two senses, firstly in the sense of acquiring knowledge, secondly as a synonym for *συνιέναι*. 'All this,' adds Socrates, 'is a mere game of words': *παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδείη πῇ ἔχει.*

A similar treatment of the quibble is given by Aristot. *Soph. El.* ch. iv. §§ 1, 2 *εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιόιδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι . . . τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.* Cp. Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 465.

It is clear, however, that the explanation which dealt with the problem as merely verbal is a partial one, and that there underlay it a problem dealing with *πράγματα*. *ἐπιστήμη* was regarded as something complete, final, and not admitting of degrees. How then could it admit of *γένεσις*? There is thus a certain analogy between the question of the origin of Knowledge, and that of the possibility of Motion (Zeller *Socr.* p. 270). These problems turn on the conception of the nature of Becoming. Difficulties in the notion of partial Knowledge give rise to many of the Megarian puzzles, especially those attributed to Eubulides: *ὁ διαλανθάνων*, *Ἠλέκτρα*, *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος*, which as R. & P. say (226 C) are *eadem argumenta diversis nominibus.* Cp. Grote III 482, Zeller *Socr.* p. 268.

In the spurious Platonic dialogue † *Sisyphus* 388 B–E, Socrates asks *ζητοῦσι δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι πότερον ἃ ἂν ἐπιστῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἃ ἂν μὴ ἐπιστῶνται;* 'Both.' 'You mean, for instance, that one may know *who* Callistratus is, but not know *where* he is, so that searching for him is searching for something partly known, partly unknown?' 'Yes.' 'But so far as *search* is concerned it is only the unknown part that is the object of it. If this argument appears to you to be eristic, and not brought forward *τοῦ πράγματος ἕνεκα*,' says Socrates, 'take another instance. Geometers do not inquire *what a diameter is*; they know that well enough; *ἀλλ' ὁπόση τίς ἐστι μέτρῳ πρὸς τὰς πλευρὰς τῶν χωρίων ὧν ἂν διατέμνῃ. ἆρ' οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον περὶ αὐτῆς;* The reference to the problem of the diagonal (see **82 B** foll.) makes it probable that the writer had the *Meno* in his thought.

In the *Theaetetus* (165 B) Socrates asks what he calls *'δεινότατον ἐρώτημα.' Ἆρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι;* 'Impossible,' Theaetetus answers. The answer is used to show that Knowledge must be different from Per-

ception; for partial Perception is possible; we can see and not see a thing at the same time, if one eye be closed; but partial Knowledge is impossible. Cp. ib. 188 A and see Grote II 368.

Plato solves the problem of the origin of Knowledge by calling in δόξα as a mediate term between Ignorance and Knowledge; Aristotle, by denying the simplicity and finality of Knowledge; see *Posterior Analytics* (ad init.): πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως κτέ.: Knowledge is not simple; there are various modes of it, and Knowledge in one mode may be increased and supplemented by Knowledge in another mode. Among the illustrations given we have one that bears on the problem dealt with by Mill (*Logic* bk. ii cc. 2 and 3): whether a syllogistic argument implies an addition to Knowledge. 'Some Knowledge,' says Aristotle, 'is simply the recalling of previous Knowledge; sometimes Knowledge arises from an act of Perception, as when you recognize that a certain particular falls under a class you know: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας προῄδει· ὅτι δὲ τόδε[1] [τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ] τρίγωνόν ἐστιν ἅμα ἐπαγόμενος ἐγνώρισεν. πρὶν δ' ἐπαχθῆναι ἢ λαβεῖν συλλογισμὸν τρόπον μέν τινα ἴσως φατέον ἐπίστασθαι, τρόπον δ' ἄλλον οὔ. He may know that the angles in ABC are equal to two right angles, in so far as he knows the proposition generally (καθόλου); but if he does not know that ABC is a triangle he cannot be said to know it absolutely (ἁπλῶς). εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι ἀπόρημα συμβήσεται· ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν μαθήσεται ἢ ἃ οἶδεν.' See Grote *Aristotle* pp. 211–214. Another passage bearing on the same subject, where again there is a reference to the *Meno*, is *Anal. pr.* II xxi 7 = 67 a 19, for which see Grote *Aristotle* p. 183.

In his review of this passage in the *Meno* Grote says (*Plato* etc., vol. II p. 16 note): 'If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of philosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted if we are to have a body of "reasoned truth" called philosophy.' To

[1] It is very difficult to see any point in the words τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ. What is important is simply the recognition that the figure before us is a triangle. Either the words are an interpolation, or else there must be a reference to the figure of some well-known proposition, e.g. to the proof that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Thales, we are told, busied himself with the problem of inscribing a right-angled triangle in a circle, and thought the solution of such importance that he sacrificed an ox on accomplishing it. It became a hackneyed problem, so that to put it forward was to show one's self behind the times: Procl. II 23 ὥστε εἴ τις προβληματικῶς σχηματίσας εἴποι εἰς ἡμικύκλιον ὀρθὴν ἐντεῖναι γωνίαν, ἀγεωμετρήτου δόξαν ἀναλάβοι (Schultz in *Jahrb. für Philol.* 1882 p. 27).

estimate justly our debt to the persons, whoever they were, who first raised the point, we should know to what extent they apprehended the full bearings of their problem, and their objects in raising it. It is clear that it was capable of being treated on two different *planes*, as a verbal quibble tending to stultify philosophy, or as an inquiry into the origin of Knowledge. In what spirit the 'sophists' really approached it we cannot be sure. Plato gives us to understand that the former and lower, the 'eristic' object, was theirs. In that case, though our debt to them may be great, it will be similar to that we owe to the poets and soothsayers, who prophesy they know not what.

3. **ποῖον γὰρ ὢν οὐκ οἶσθα;** to what extent does the interrogative *ποῖον* here imply feeling? The word belongs to a class used (*α*) with weaker accent in indefinite sense, (*β*) with stronger accent in exclamatory or interrogative sense. This distinction, we are told, goes back to Indo-European times (Brugmann in I. M.'s *Handbuch* vol. II §191). With regard to (*β*) it seems probable that the interrogative sense developed from the exclamatory. Exclamations may be used to provoke an answer. *ποῖος* in Homer generally expresses surprise and anger (L. & S. s.v.). The more the word is used *bona fide* expecting information, the less will be the amount of feeling attaching to it. In Attic writers the exclamatory force of *ποῖος;* is strongest where it is used in repartees, picking up a word or phrase used by the previous speaker. This is common in Aristophanes, and in Plato: *Euthyd.* 290 E *ποῖος Κτήσιππος;* 304 E *ποῖον χαρίεν;* (*Gorg.* 490 D; *Theaet.* 180 B; *Hipp. maj.* 285 D; *Charm.* 174 B; *Lach.* 194 D E *δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν.* ΛΑ. *Ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν;* (ironical). ΣΩ. *Οὐκοῦν τόνδε τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;* ΛΑ. *Ἔγωγε.* ΣΩ. *Ἴθι δή, αὐτῷ εἶπε, ὦ Νικία, ποία σοφία ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον* (a real question). In *Polit.* 280 B *πολλῶν δὲ ἑτέρων ξυγγενῶν ἀπεμερίσθη.* ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Ποίων, εἰπέ, ξυγγενῶν;* the word *εἰπέ* shows that we have here a genuine question, and there is little, if any, feeling. In repartees of the kind just mentioned the word repeated is generally a noun or adjective; but in *Rep.* 330 A *πότερον ὧν κέκτησαι τὰ πλέω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω;* *ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην;* *ἔφη,* it is a verb. *πόθεν* and *πῶς* are similarly capable of being used in repartees: *Lysis* 208 B *κἂν εἰ βούλοιο λαβὼν τὴν μάστιγα τύπτειν, ἐῷεν ἄν.* *Πόθεν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐῷεν;* ibid. C *ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐπιτρέπουσί σοι;* *πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐπιτρέπουσιν;* *Crat.* 398 E *ἢ σὺ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;* ΕΡΜ. *Πόθεν, ὠγαθέ, ἔχω;* *Πόθεν;* is also used by itself as a scornful denial.

The prefixing of the article to *ποῖος* does not necessarily reduce it to a colourless interrogative. The article occurs with *ποῖος* in repartee in Theocr. 5. 5 *τὰν ποίαν σύριγγα;* See Soph.

O.C. 1415 and Jebb's note ; also Heind. on *Soph.* 240 A. When δή is added to ποῖος ; it implies not so much surprise as *interest* in the question : *Lach.* 194 C ποίῳ δή, ὦ Νικία ; *Rep.* 377 C D ποίους δή (μύθους) ; 'and pray *what* stories?' ; *Hipp. maj.* 285 B ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δή σε πρὸς θεῶν ἀκούοντες ποῖα ; *Theaet.* 147 D, etc. The addition of the enclitic τις to ποῖος *generally* shows that no feeling is implied ; Cobet *Nov. Lect.* 276 says *always* ; but see *Phaedr.* 260 C ποῖόν τινα οἴει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν ;

The question whether ποῖος is a pure interrogative, or whether some exclamatory force still attaches to it, can often only be determined by the context. Thus in *Gorg.* 483 D ἐπεὶ ποίῳ χρώμενος δικαίῳ Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλαδα ἐστράτευσεν ; it is clear that the question is merely rhetorical. †*Alc.* i 110 C ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξενρών ; is a somewhat doubtful case. In Aesch. *Ag.* 278 ποίου χρόνου δὲ καὶ πεπόρθηται πόλις ; I think that Verrall is right in thinking that ποίου ; 'gives the question the air of incredulous wonder,' though Shilleto in his note on Dem. *F.L.* § 257 quotes this as a colourless question on the ground that the καί is *suffixed*, not *prefixed*. In the present place Meno's whole speech is scornful and sceptical. Replies are hardly expected. Cp. **95 D** 37 ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν ;

προθέμενος ζητήσεις : see on **94 D** 2.

4. **εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα**, 'however much.' The phrase also occurs *Rep.* 450 C ; *Euthyphr.* 4 D, 9 C ; *Parm.* 135 A ; *Crat.* 435 B, and no less than eight times in the *Charmides*. Madvig (who only counts seven of these, omitting 167 B), thinks this frequency a ground for suspecting the genuineness of the *Charmides* (*adv. Crit.* vol. I p. 402 note 2). The expression, however, springs naturally from the *a fortiori* line of argument that plays a great part in that dialogue.

7. ἐριστικόν : see Excursus V. **E**

κατάγεις : see App. on the text.

ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν : the ordinary use of ἄρα is simply to mark an inference. But if the inference be one from a statement we have not fully examined, it may cause *surprise* ; or if it be from a statement for which we do not vouch, it may be expressed with *doubt* or *irony*. In the strongest case, where a false position is exposed by a '*reductio ad absurdum*,' ἄρα is generally preceded by δέ (see on **91 E** 17). So Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 493 A καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν says : 'The particle ἄρα frequently denotes an inference false but specious.' Often, as here, some particle like ὡς shows that it is a case '*ubi aliquis non suis verbis utitur*' Fr. See Kühner § 509. 3, Jelf § 788.

4, 5. Cp. **91 C** 2 *οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι*, **81 D** 12, **97 C** 33; *Apol.* 26 C *ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι; Theaet.* 171 C *εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι*; *Rep.* 358 C, 375 D, 595 C; *Clit.* 408 A *δούλῳ ἄμεινον ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ διάγειν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν βίον ἐστὶν ἄρα*; *Gorg.* 508 B C (thrice); *Prot.* 331 A B. With *ὡς*, *Apol.* 40 E, *Euthyphr.* 11 C *ἴσως ἄν με ἐπέσκωπτες ὡς ἄρα κτέ.*, *Phaedr.* 245 A *πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος*, 249 E, *Hipp. maj.* 289 A, *Rep.* 468 E, *Parm.* 127 E, *Laws* 822 A, etc.

81 A 17. **περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα**: Socrates is speaking slowly and impressively, and here pauses to excite attention. The device is fairly common in Plato. Cp. *Phaedr.* 273 C *ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τούτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μή* — ΦΑΙ. *τὸ ποῖον*; 277 D, *Rep.* 609 D, *Soph.* 265 C, *Polit.* 277 E, *Phil.* 57 D, 59 E, *Laws* 861 A, etc. Instances seem to be rare in the earliest dialogues.

Dr. Abbott (*How to write clearly* p. 30) quotes from *Hamlet* in illustration of a similar point:

Ghost. If thou didst ever thy dear father love—

Hamlet. O God!

Ghost. Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder.

It has also its use in comedy: Ar. *Eccl.* 865—

A. *ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις ἑστώς* B. *τί δράσεις; εἰπέ μοι.* Cp. *Wasps* 1443.

21. **τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν**: there was in Greece no priestly *caste* — a point in which Greece is broadly and strongly distinguished from Egypt and other Eastern nations. The fact is used by Zeller (*pre-Socratics* I p. 56 note) to show the improbability of any considerable Oriental influence on Greek religious thought. Certain families in Greece were no doubt associated with certain religious cults. It is to be noted, however, that Plato does not refer to priests and priestesses as a class, but to those of them who have been led by the accident of their position to speculate on the meaning of the rites they performed, and give an account (*λόγον διδόναι*) of their practice.

It is now established that the ritual with which these speculations were associated was, chiefly if not entirely, the Orphic. The Orphic cult in Greece is at least as old as the sixth century B.C. (Zeller *pre-Socratics* I 62). It was closely connected with the worship of Bacchus. Herodotus II 81 uses the names 'Bacchic' and 'Orphic' as interchangeable. This worship was imported into Greece from Thrace, a country whose people were specially susceptible to the quasi-mesmeric influences of worship of the kind to which the name 'orgiastic'

has been given. This stands quite aloof from the national Greek religions, of which the chief characteristic, as with their Art and Literature, was balance, dignity, and self-restraint. The importance of the ecstatic Bacchus-worship imported into Greece in promoting the idea of immortality has been elaborated by Rohde in his work *Psyche*. (See a notice of this by Miss Jane Harrison in the *Classical Review*, vol. VIII p. 165.) It was by a kind of inspired assault that the Greeks first attempted, so to speak, to carry the heights of heaven. To this Plato superadded a more scientific investment by process of Reason; but even with him the mystic element is by no means superseded, and some appeal, though with varying prominence, is still made to the forces of divine intoxication or 'divine madness.' See Excursus VI.

23. **λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος**: 'there is no evidence in any Greek poet before Pindar of the hope of a future life' (Zeller *pre-Socratics* vol. I p. 127). It seems probable that Pindar derived these doctrines, not from the Pythagoreans, but directly from the Bacchic and Orphic cult, of which Thebes was a seat (Zeller l.c. p. 71). The passages in Pindar referring to a future life are chiefly to be found in the fragments of the *Θρῆνοι* or Dirges. B

24. **ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν**: Empedocles is chiefly meant. See on **76 C** 22. The dates of his life are uncertain, but he was somewhat junior to Pindar. He was a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood as was also Aeschylus (Cic. *Tusc. D.* II § 23). After them many others took up the tale.

ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν: see on **99 C** 22. Socrates intends the word to be taken in its colloquial sense, 'gifted,' 'distinguished,' though for him it has a deeper meaning.

28. **τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν**: the best commentary on this is the *Phaedo* 70 C foll. The moment of death is not identical with the moment of re-birth. Between the two intervenes a period in which the soul is *ἐκεῖ*, 'yonder,' in Hades. During this it is in a state of 'death,' which is the correlative and antithesis to the state of 'life.' Cp. also Pindar *Ol.* 2. 69 where *ἑκατέρωθι* means 'in our world and in the Other World.' On this view life and death are alternative modes of the soul's existence, so that we may say with Euripides:

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν; (*Gorg.* 492 E).

Cp. Soph. *Ant.* 560—

ἡ δ' ἐμὴ ψυχὴ πάλαι
τέθνηκεν ὥστε τοῖς θανοῦσιν ὠφελεῖν.

Symp. 192 E *κοινῇ τεθνεῶτε* of lovers united in Death; Ar. *Frogs* 868—

ὅτι ἡ ποίησις οὐχὶ συντέθνηκέ μοι,
τούτῳ δὲ συντέθνηκεν ὥσθ' ἕξει λέγειν.

The doctrine comes from Heraclitus, in whose philosophy the resolution of Existence into a contrast of Opposites plays a great part. See Dr. Thompson's note on the passage in the *Gorgias*; R. & P. §§ 38, 39; Zeller *pre-Socratics* II p. 84 and notes.

29. **πάλιν γίγνεσθαι**: 'Servius ad Virg. *Acn.* III 68: Pythagoras non *μετεμψύχωσιν*, sed *παλιγγενεσίαν* esse dicit' Fr.

30. **δεῖν δή**: from these words to the end of the quotation must be regarded as a parenthesis. It has nothing to do immediately with the point under discussion: 'How is learning possible?' But it has a very important bearing on the final result of the dialogue. The hint is expressed so briefly that it may easily elude notice. Virtue comes to a man *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ* (**99 E**); but the 'divine apportionment' is determined by the soul's previous history. We have then here at least the germs of the theory elaborated in the *Republic* and *Phaedo*. *δή* here is equivalent to *nota bene*, 'by the way'; not a common use. Cp. use with relatives, line 28 above: *Clitophon* 408 B *τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικήν, ἣν δὴ σὺ πολιτικήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις ἐπονομάζεις*: *Prot.* 328 B *ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι*: also the constant use of *διὸ δή*: *Gorg.* 518 A *διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας (τὰς τέχνας) δουλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι*: *Symp.* 203 C *διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκόλουθος γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρως*: *Phaedr.* 249 C *διὸ δὴ μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια.*

32. **οἵσι γὰρ ἂν κτέ.**, 'for from whomsoever Persephone hath accepted the atonement for the ancient evil, of all these in the ninth year she sends back the souls to the upper Sun again. From these grow up glorious kings, and men of mighty strength, and men surpassing in wisdom; and for all future time they are called holy heroes among men.'

This fragment is referred to one of Pindar's *Θρῆνοι* (Bergk[4] fr. 133). The rhythm appears to be this:—



οἵσι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος (4 bars)

δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἄλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτει (4 bars)

ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν, (2 bars)



ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σο- φί- ᾳ τε μέγιστοι
(4 bars)

ἄνδρες αὔξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἀγ- (4 bars)



νοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται (2 bars).

οἷσι: this construction with *δέχομαι* occurs in Homer *Il.* II 186 *δέξατό οἱ* ('from him') *σκῆπτρον*, XV 87 *Θεμίστι δὲ καλλιπαρήῳ δέκτο δέπας*. See Kühner § 423, 24, Leaf on *Il.* I 596, and elsewhere in Pindar, *Ol.* 13. 29, *Pyth.* 4. 23, ibid. 8. 5, *Isth.* 5. 4. Porson on Eur. *Hec.* 533 *δέξαι χοάς μοι* collects a number of instances. It is not clear whether it arises from the *locative* dative (cp. the Scottish 'to ask *at* him') or from the true dative of the indirect object, of which the *dativus commodi* is a development. The present instance rather favours the latter view.

παλαιοῦ πένθεος, 'the ancient trouble,' 'original sin.' *πένθος* is in origin a by-form of *πάθος*, just as *βένθος* of *βάθος*. Thus *πένθος* is 'an affliction.' From this meaning it passed, by an euphemism characteristic of the Greeks, to the meaning 'sin.' Cp. the history of the word *συμφορά*. Stallbaum is wrong in saying that *πένθος* here means 'culpa in mortali corpore contracta.' It means rather the sin, or 'fall,' by which the soul, originally free, was doomed to be enchained in a mortal body. This notion of an 'ante-natal lapse' arose naturally out of the pessimistic view, to be found in Greek literature from Homer downward, that life is an *evil*. See Clem. Alex. *Strom.* III ch. 3. It was easy to infer from this that life is a *punishment* (see Exc. VI.). Perhaps we may compare William Blake:—

> Didst close my tongue in senseless clay,
> *And me to mortal life betray.*

See *Rep.* 612 E *τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν*

γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν;

33. **δέξεται** is aor. subjunctive.

The exact meaning of these words by no means lies on the surface. We must remember that no interpretation of the passage is satisfactory that does not find in it an argument grounding the position *δεῖν δὴ ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον.* We must further remember that if we had the context of the quotation its applicability might be much more obvious than it is at present. Lastly, that we may indeed expect from Pindar a hint or illuminating vision, but hardly a complete or consistent scheme. 'Pindar's eschatology follows no fixed type' (Zeller *pre-Socratics* I 70 note).

In considering ancient views as to man's spiritual history, we have to take into account two causes. First, there is the ante-natal lapse—a matter standing so remote from positive experience that it has almost the character of an external or fatal force, a character which is definitely given to it in the *Timaeus* (41 E; see Zeller *Plato* p. 391). Besides this we have to recognise as a second cause acts due to the soul's own initiative or 'free-will.' These are the sins, and virtuous deeds, 'done in the body.' The notion that for these there is a retribution after death is one that appeared very early in Greece. The soul's history is thus doubly conditioned. First, there is the struggle of Soul with Matter due to the ante-natal lapse: this must end logically in the eventual re-emergence of the Soul in purity. Besides this there is the moral effect of each particular life. (See Exc. VI for further treatment.) One hypothesis favoured by Plato is that the time for the restitution of the Soul to its primeval state is fixed. There is a cycle of years—9000 in the *Phaedrus*—and the restitution of the Soul after this time is as much a matter of fate as the original lapse. This cycle includes a certain number of lives, and the same number of intervals, or 'deaths,' that follow between each life and the next. The 'death' following each life furnishes the retribution for the deeds done in that life. Strictly speaking, according to this view the effects of each life will not extend beyond the subsequent 'death,' and will not have any bearing on any further life. It seems clear that this is not the view that Plato takes here. For we have here no hint of *punishment* as a ground for living a holy life. We have instead a clear suggestion that the most desirable lives on earth are those that have been earned by good conduct in previous lives, that the *élite* of earth are those who, having practically squared their account, are passing through a last earthly life before the final release of their souls. Cp. the Buddhist doctrine of Karma

'We are born as we deserve to be born' (Kidd *Social Evolution* p. 111). According to this view, conduct in any life will have its chief effect by influencing further lives, and perhaps also by hastening or retarding the time of the soul's final restitution. On this view the idea of a period of retribution following each life becomes possibly superfluous. But it is not necessarily excluded. See *Laws* 870 D E, where we have the view, drawn from the Mysteries, that murderers are not only punished in Hades, but are doomed in their next life to suffer the fate they have inflicted. The mention of the alternative states of death and life in the context, and the words *ἐνάτῳ ἔτει* (see subsequent note), make it probable that such periods of retribution are contemplated here.

εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον: this implies another sun in the nether world. Plutarch *cons. ad Apoll.* c. 35 = 120 C quotes Pindar (Bergk [4] fr. 129) as saying of the righteous in Hades—

τοῖσι λάμπει μὲν μένος ἀελίου τὰν ἐνθάδε νύκτα κάτω κτέ.

So the chorus of the Initiated in Aristoph. *Frogs* 454 sing—

μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρὸν ἐστιν.

Cp. Verg. *Aen.* VI 641 solemque suum, sua sidera norunt.

ἐνάτῳ ἔτει: the words raise two questions: 'What is the meaning of the number?' and 'From what point is the time counted?' The number nine has a sacred character: it was *δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους* that Minos sought the instruction of Zeus (*Laws* 624 B). But there may possibly be here a more definite reference. According to the view in the *Phaedrus* (249 A B) the period from birth to re-birth is 1000 years. This includes the period of life and that of purgation. The time of purgation is thus something over 900 years. (On the other hand, in *Rep.* 615 A B the 1000 years, the period of 'wandering' for the soul, is exclusive of the period of life, and this Vergil follows, *Aen.* VI 748:—

> has omnis, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
> Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat ordine magno.)

If, then, the normal period of purgation was 900 years, it seems possible the notion was that in the case of spirits on the eve of their last incarnation the 900 years was reduced to nine. But perhaps this is refining over-much.

35. **βασιλῆες ἀγαυοί κτέ.**: there are three classes of heroes here recognised: (1) Kings, (2) Warriors or Athletes, (3) Philosophers and Poets. With the passage should be compared Empedocles, quoted by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* IV ch. XXIII *φησὶ δὴ* C

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τῶν σοφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς θεοὺς γινέσθαι, ὧδέ πως γράφων,

> εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνόπολοι καὶ ἰητροὶ
> καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται,
> ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι.

Here Empedocles is speaking of souls who have reached their last stage before final restitution to the circle of the gods.

36. **ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον**: 'tempore post mortem futuro' Fr., referring to *Rep.* 469 A καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων θεραπεύσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θηκάς, and *Phaedo* 81 A ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγούσῃ. The words ὡς ἀληθῶς look as if the phrase that follows had associations with mystic ritual. (Cp. on **76 E** 50.)

ἥρωες ἅγνοί: the term ἥρωες is used here practically as a synonym for δαίμονες. The ἥρως and the δαίμων are both on the same plane, intermediate between man and God. They are bracketed *Rep.* 392 A περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου. Cp. *Crat.* 397 D. But in *Laws* 717 B we have a distinction: after sacrificing to the gods ὁ ἔμφρων will sacrifice to the daemons, next to the heroes. Cp. 738 D. But the term ἥρως necessarily refers to an incarnation on earth; the recognition of a deceased mortal as a δαίμων amounts to a sort of canonization. Thus the chorus speak of *Alcestis* (995 foll.):

> μηδὲ νεκρῶν ὡς φθιμένων χῶμα νομιζέσθω
> τύμβος σᾶς ἀλόχου, θεοῖσι δ' ὁμοίως
> τιμάσθω, σέβας ἐμπόρων.
> καί τις δοχμίαν κέλευθον
> ἐμβαίνων τόδ' ἐρεῖ·
> αὕτα ποτὲ προῦθαν' ἀνδρός,
> νῦν δ' ἐστὶ μάκαιρα δαίμων·
> χαῖρ' ὦ πότνι' εὖ δὲ δοίης.

Cp. with this *Rep.* 540 B C; we are to assign sacrifices to men who have served their city well, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία ξυναναιρῇ, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις. The word ἁγνοί recalls Hesiod *O. et D.* 121 foll. about the Golden Age:—

> αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ' ἐκάλυψεν,
> οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι καλέονται
> ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων.

The upshot of the teaching which Plato here derives from Pindar is this: the θεῖος ἀνήρ is the Soul in its last incarnation,

before it rejoins the gods. After death he is regarded as a *ἥρως* or *δαίμων*.

CHAPTER XV

6. **ἅ γε**, 'quippe quae.' '*γε* indicat rei rationem afferri' Fr. Stallbaum on *Euthyphr.* 4 A quotes many instances, including *Gorg.* 471 A *πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος, ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν, κτέ.*; ibid. B, *Phaedo* 96 E, *Crat.* 403 E.

7. **ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης**, 'as the whole of nature is bound by a tie of kinship.' D It seems clear that this doctrine is stated by Plato not as something original, but as one already current. It in fact stands in much the same position as the utterances of the 'priests and priestesses' above, from which it is separated by the parenthesis *δεῖν δή κτέ.* That the doctrine was Pythagorean we may be pretty sure. It is really implied in the doctrine of Transmigration. A fragment attributed to Philolaus (Stob. *Ecl.* I 420 = R. & P. § 57) speaks of the universe as *εἷς ἐὼν καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ φύσι διαπνεύμενος καὶ περιαγόμενος ἐξ ἀρχᾶς ἀιδίου.* This fragment shares the suspicion that attaches to all the remains attributed to Philolaus, and even in a greater degree than some. But the view stated follows directly from the doctrine *ἓν πᾶν* held by Xenophanes (Plato *Soph.* 242 D) and after him by Parmenides (line 81 *τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν, ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει* R. & P. 96). There is evidence of connexion between Parmenides and the Pythagoreans, R. & P. 91.

The present passage represents no further stage than had already been reached by Plato's predecessors. But the doctrine is one that was subsequently developed into something that formed the very centre of Plato's system. His doctrine of the World-Soul is elaborated in the *Timaeus*. 'The *Timaeus* sums up the result of its whole cosmogony in the concept of the world as the perfect *ζῷον*' (Zeller p. 386). Note the emphatic concluding words: *θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῷα λαβὼν καὶ ξυμπληρωθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος οὕτω, ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν, εἷς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενὴς ὤν.* 'Having received all mortal and immortal creatures, and being therewithal replenished, this universe hath thus come into being, living and visible, containing all things that are visible, the image of its maker, a god perceptible, most mighty and good, most fair and perfect, even this one and only-begotten world that is' (Archer-Hind's translation). Cp. ibid. 36 E.

Important also is *Phil.* 30 A ΣΩ. *Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ' οὐ*

ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν ; ΠΡΩ. *Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.* ΣΩ. *Πόθεν ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα.* See Zeller p. 345.

Later the doctrine passed into the common heritage of the Academic and Stoic schools ; see Cic. *Div.* II 33, 34, *Acad.* I 28 ; also Vergil *Georg.* IV 220 foll. :—

> deum namque ire per omnes
> terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum, etc.

and *Aen.* VI 724 foll. :—

> principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentes
> lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque astra
> spiritus intus alit, etc.

See Grote II 17 note, and II 202 note.

11. **τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα** : see on **80 E** 8. The combination γὰρ ἄρα occurs in Plato, either in juxtaposition (*Prot.* 315 D, *Gorg.* 469 D, *Rep.* 438 A, *Laws* 698 D) or separated, as here, *Rep.* 358 C. [At *Symp.* 199 A and 205 B Herm. and Sch. follow B in omitting ἄρα.] In some cases the reference is to a particular statement, as *Prot.* 315 D *ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος* 'for P. *was* in town, as I had expected' : cp. 314 C. In *Gorg.* 469 D *ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ*, the ἄρα marks a parody of Polus' boasts, such as at 466 C. Here ἄρα marks a fresh link in a chain of argument that all hangs from borrowed premises.

12. **ἀνάμνησις** : for references to the principal places in Plato bearing on this doctrine see R. & P. 266 C. The first to be noticed is *Phaedr.* 249 B : *οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μή ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε (ἀνθρωπεῖον) ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι τὸ κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἰόντ' αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως.* See on this Grote II 218. In *Phaedo* 72 E foll. we have an elaborate account of *ἀνάμνησις*, which opens with a direct reference back to the *Meno* : *Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. Ἀλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις ; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι*

ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἢ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Socrates carries on the further exposition from 73 B (Zeller p. 83 note), and in the sequel we have an important supplement to the argument in the *Meno*.

Plato defines ἀνάμνησις below **85 D** 24 : τὸ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην. It is distinguished from μνήμη, *Phil.* 34 B C. μνήμη is σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως : when the soul without the body *recovers* some previous impression this is ἀνάμνησις. Cp. *Laws* 732 B ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης.

Does the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, as propounded in the *Meno*, necessarily involve the Ideal theory ? Grote II 17 remarks that 'in the *Phaedo* pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial, intelligible Ideas, which are not mentioned in the *Menon*.' J. S. Mill, however, makes it clear that the doctrine of Recollection does imply the knowledge of separate Universals in a previous state (*Dissertations* III 351). Cp. Zeller's valuable note 82 on p. 126 : 'It seems equally clear to me that the doctrine of Reminiscence really supposes that of the Ideas. The objects of reminiscence can only be the universal concepts —the sensuous forms of which meet us in individual things— not individual presentations which we have experienced in our former lives.' See too p. 395 : 'How could sensible things remind us of universal concepts if the latter were not known to us independently of the former?' and p. 406 foll. : 'Reminiscence is in Plato's opinion the only explanation of the possibility of thought transcending sensuous perception.' If all our previous lives were on a level with the present, the problem of the origin of Knowledge would not be solved, but only thrown back.

Cp. J. B. Bury in *JP.* XV 81 note : 'The argument of the *Phaidon* shows (cp. Mr. Archer-Hind's preface) that ἀνάμνησις was to Plato merely the defective way in which the imagination represents the kinship of the soul to the ideas.' See on **86 B** 15.

Whether the Ideal theory had actually found expression at the time when the *Meno* was written is another question. See Intr. § 17.

14. **οὕτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν** (cp. **86 B** 24) : in these words we see indicated the radical vice of Eristic. It is a cheap substitute for Philosophy. Its votaries are like Formalist and Hypocrisy in the *Pilgrim's Progress*, who come 'tumbling over the wall,' and so, by a short cut, put themselves on a level with those who have borne the burden and heat of the day. For he who can show the futility of Reason may appear as good a man as he who has attained it.

The spirit of the philosopher in regard to the duty of inquiry has never found more perfect expression than in the words of Simmias (*Phaedo* 85 C D): *ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχαλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῖσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι.* As a strong contrast to this may be quoted the cynical epigram (*Anth. Pal.* x 118):—

πῶς γενόμην; πόθεν εἰμί; τίνος χάριν ἦλθον; ἀπελθεῖν.
πῶς δύναμαί τι μαθεῖν μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος;
οὐδὲν ἐὼν γενόμην· πάλιν ἔσσομαι ὡς πάρος ἦα·
οὐδὲν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν μερόπων τὸ γένος.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι Βάκχοιο φιλήδονον ἔντυε νᾶμα·
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κακῶν φάρμακον ἀντίδοτον.

The analogous fatalistic argument, that would stultify all action, was definitely labelled *ἀργὸς λόγος* ('ignava ratio' Cic. *de fato* § 28).

E 17. **ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι**: 'Notanda constructio composita e duabus aliis *πιστεύω τούτῳ* et *πιστεύω τοῦτον εἶναι ἀληθῆ*' (Buttmann). Cp. *Phaedo* 90 B; contrast *Gorg.* 524 A.

18. **ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅ τι ἔστιν**: the nom. is much rarer than the acc. in similar combinations. See on **71 A** 25. Heindorf on *Phaedr.* 271 D *εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἶδη ἔχει* quotes *Laches* 199 E *οὐκ ἄρα εὑρήκαμεν ἀνδρεία ὅ τι ἔστιν.*

23. **ἄρτι**: **80 B** 23.

82 A 25. **ὃς οὔ φημι**, '*though* I deny.' Instances where, as here, the relative introduces what is practically an adversative clause are rare. Kühner § 561 c quotes †Isocr. 17. 47 *ἀλλ' εἰς ἀγῶνα καταστὰς ᾤμην καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον πλέον ἕξειν Πασίωνος παρ' ὑμῖν; ὃς οὐδὲ μένειν ἐνθάδε παρεσκευαζόμην*: 'on the contrary, I did not even intend to remain here.'

26. **ἵνα δή**: see on **86 D** 14.

29. **ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους**: Simmias in the *Phaedo* 73 B is more wary: *αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι.* See on **91 E** 17.

33. **προσκάλεσον**: perhaps the choice of the active instead

of the more usual middle of this verb is due to the fact that Socrates means not 'call him to yourself,' but 'call him before *me*.'

34. **τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων**: 'Vox propria de servis qui dominos honoris causa in publico comitabantur: *Charm.* 155 A, *Symp.* 217 A, *Laws* 845 A' (Fr.). 'Retainers.'

35. **ὄντινα βούλει**: 'Stallbaum says that this allusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of Meno. In my judgment it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident —the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon.' Grote II 19 note. See Intr. § 7. B

38. **Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι**: '*μέν* in questions implies that if assent is not given the conversation cannot be proceeded with,' Verrall on Eur. *Med.* 676. Other examples in Plato are: *Charm.* 153 C *παρεγένου μέν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ; παρεγενόμην*: 'I believe I may assume'; *Theaet.* 161 E. It is not uncommon in Euripides: *Med.* 676, 1129; *Hipp.* 316; *Alc.* 146; *Ion* 520. See also Aristoph. *Birds* 1214.

39. **οἰκογενής**, *verna*, not bought or captured. He was probably one of the Thessalian serfs or *πενεσταί*. Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* E.T. p. 132.

41. **εἰ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων**: see App. on the text.

43. **ἀλλὰ προσέξω**: the negative clause to which ἀλλά is opposed is suppressed, and ἀλλά has little force. 'Very well; I will attend.' Cp. **75 E** 17.

Chapters XVI to XIX (**82 B–85 B**). *Socrates puts a series of questions to a Slave of Meno's, who has never been taught geometry, the answers to which show that there exist latent in the slave's mind the materials for solving a geometrical problem, namely, the construction of a square which shall be double a given square.*

The dialogue with the Slave is a perfect model of Socratic procedure. It copies on a small scale the discussion with Meno himself. It consists of two parts, negative (chaps. xvi and xvii) and positive (chap. xix). These two parts are separated by an interlude between Meno and Socrates (chap. xviii). The negative portion again may be divided into two parts: (1) chap. xvi, where the slave starting full of confidence

gives an answer hopelessly wrong; (a word or two between Meno and Socrates intervenes); (2) chap. xvii, where the Slave is shown the error of the first answer, and reaches what may be called the stage of *partial disillusionment*. He amends his answer. When the amended answer too has been shown wrong he is completely disillusioned, and is ready for the constructive process to begin. Grote I 530 D compares the Slave to Clinias in the *Euthydemus*; 'each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of Socrates into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor traceable to any teaching.'

The scene attracted attention in antiquity. It is alluded to by Cicero *Tusc. D.* I § 57; by Arnobius *adv. gentes* II ch. 24.

Socrates makes his figures on the sand or dust—the blackboard of antiquity.

CHAPTER XVI

1. **γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον κτέ.**: 'You recognize that a square is a thing like this.' This is the usual prefatory agreement as to the use of terms. See on **75 E** 12.

C 4. **ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον κτέ.**, 'there exists then a square having all these four sides equal,' the definition being accompanied by an assertion of the reality of the thing defined. Three lines below *ἐστίν* is merely a copula. For *ἐστι* as simple auxiliary with *present* participle see **84 A** 1, **E** 21; *Phaedr.* 249 D *ἔστιν δὴ οὖν ὁ πᾶς δεῦρο ἥκων λόγος*, *Gorg.* 500 C *καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων*; *Soph.* 267 E *εἴτε διπλόην ἔτ' ἔχων τινά ἐστιν*, cp. **99 E** 5: for other instances see Campbell, General Introd. to *Soph.* and *Polit.* p. xxxiv. The square is of course not sufficiently defined by specifying that its sides are equal, for a rhombus also has four equal sides. If, indeed, the lines *διὰ μέσου* presently mentioned (**C** 7) were *diagonals*, we should have the conditions of a square sufficiently expressed; for a square is the only figure that has all its four sides equal and its diagonals equal; though the definition would be a clumsy one. The lines *διὰ μέσου*, however, are not diagonals, but lines parallel to the side, and so help not at all in differentiating the square from the rhombus. That the figure is rectangular is assumed. The Greeks were so much accustomed to regard superficial measure as the simple product of the two linear dimensions, that it was natural to them to assume that they were dealing with rectangular figures in default of notice otherwise (see on **87 A** 24). The diagonals (*διάμετροι*) are first mentioned at **85 B** 48.

7. **ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου**: the lines EG, FH. The lines

are wanted presently to show that the square on a side of two feet contains four square feet.



10. **τοιοῦτον χωρίον**, 'a *similar* figure'; cp. **D** 28; note that *τοιοῦτον* refers to *shape*, *τοσοῦτον*, *πηλικόν* (**85 A** 28), *ποσάπουν* (**85 B** 41) to *size*. See on **87 A** 30.

13. **εἰ οὖν εἴη . . . πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν; εἰ ἦν . . . ἄλλο τι ἂν ἦν;** a good opportunity of comparing two different classes of conditional sentences. The first is indefinite; the length has not been measured: 'say that this is two feet, of how many square feet will the whole be?' The latter is an instance of an unreal supposition.

14. **πόσων ποδῶν**: the same expressions are used in Greek for linear and superficial measure. You have to judge by the context whether *πούς* means a linear foot or a square foot. See *Theaet.* 147 D and Campbell's note there.

15. **εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ** (AB) **δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ** (AE) **ἑνὸς ποδός.**

16. **ἄλλο τι**, 'nonne.' The full and original form was *ἄλλο τι ἤ*, 'is aught else the case than?' which is kept at **D** 19 just below, **83 B** 17, and often in Plato (see Ast I 107). *ἄλλο τι* is an irrational abbreviated form, which occurs again in this dialogue **84 D** 12, **97 A** 15, and very often elsewhere. Fr. compares the irrational abbreviation *ἄλλως τε* for *ἄλλως τε καί* at **85 E** 37. See Kühner § 587. 17 and J. & A. M. Adam's note on *Prot.* 353 c.

ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν: the genitive is an attributive genitive, and is not grammatically affected by *ἅπαξ*: 'the space would be one of once-two-feet.' But *διπλάσιον*, *ποσαπλάσιον* (**84 E** 15), *ἥμισυ*, etc. do 'govern' genitives.

34. **ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε**: the exposition is a good deal helped **E** by the fact that the feminine gender can always stand for *γραμμή*, the neuter for *χωρίον*, while at **83 E** 62 the masculine *οἵδε* can only refer to *πόδες*.

36. **δῆλον δή**: the boy answers with confidence, a characteristic of the state of complete ignorance. This corresponds to Meno's answer **71 E** 1 *ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν.*

37. **οὐδὲν διδάσκω**: it was noted by Schleiermacher (quoted by Fr. on **84 A**) that the questions put by Socrates are in large proportion leading questions, so that it is hardly fair to regard the Slave as the *parent* of the notions brought to light by Socrates' aid. Schleiermacher adds that this is not fatal to Socrates' present purpose, which is merely to show, from the ease with which the notions are grasped by the Slave, that they are not now for the first time implanted in his mind. Grote (II 19), after quoting Schleiermacher's criticism, observes that the theory of *ἀνάμνησις* 'is in a great degree true. Not all learning, but an important part of learning, consists in reminiscence—not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent life, but of past experience and judgments in this life.' Grote, however, makes in these words no concession whatever to the Platonic doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*, the essence of which is that all knowledge of Universals depends upon reminiscence of experience that is both ante-natal and generically different from sense-experience. It was on this point that, for a long period in the history of philosophy, raged the controversy about Innate Ideas (see Bain *Mental and Moral Science* App. B). Is all our knowledge ultimately rooted in sense-experience? Or is the soul furnished at birth with certain notions inherent in it? The position of the one party was given in the formula: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.' This Leibnitz amended by adding the words 'nisi intellectus ipse.' It must be understood that the partisans of 'experience' limited their view of it to *sense-experience within the present life*, as Grote does in the passage just quoted. Since Grote wrote the problem has entered on a new phase by a recognition of the fact that a great deal of our mental furniture is *inherited*. The opponents of 'Innate Ideas' have had to enlarge their notion of 'experience,' and to admit that the sense-experience of the present life is not adequate to account for the phenomena of mental development. But the doctrine of heredity does not assume any previous experience *generically different* from the sense-experience of the present life, and the necessity for assuming anything of the sort has by the admission of heredity been very considerably lessened.

Grote (II 20) quotes in illustration of the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις* Wordsworth's ode, 'Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,' etc. But J. S. Mill, *Diss.* III 351, points out a fundamental opposition between the two utterances. Cp. A.-H. on *Phaedo* 76 D, 'According to Wordsworth we are born with the ante-natal radiance clinging about us, and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.'

38. **ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶ**: see on **71 C** 10.

39. **οἴεται**: of mere opinion, as below, 44. Cp. **97 B** 23.

ὁποία ἐστίν: we might have expected *πηλική* or *ὁπόση*. But as lines have, for the purpose in hand, no property but length, the distinction between *ὁποία* and *ὁπόση* disappears. Cp. **83 C** 37 *ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς*, **E** 77, **84 A** 79, **85 B** 43. Similarly we have *ποῖος* used of time, which has no 'quality': Aesch. *Ag.* 278 *ποίου χρόνου δὲ καὶ πεπόρθηται πόλις*, Eur. †*I. A.* 815, Aristoph. *Birds* 920 [see L. & S. III]. In some of these cases 'feeling' may be intended; but we might similarly say 'what sort of time?' 'what sort of distance?' See on **80 D** 3.

44. **οἴεται δέ γε**: the *γε* has its separate force and emphasises *οἴεται*. Cp. **95 E** 9 and note there.

CHAPTER XVII

2. **ἐφεξῆς ὡς δεῖ ἀναμ.**: see on **86 A** 10.

10. **αὕτη** (AK), **ταύτης** (AB), **ἑτέραν τοσαύτην** (BK): see on **83 A 82 E** 34.



13. **ἀπὸ ταύτης**: AK.

16. **ἴσας τέτταρας**: 'this is speaking inclusively, as the B line AK itself is one of the four'—Stocks.

17. **τουτί**: the *space* AKLM.

20. **ταυτὶ τέτταρα** : Socrates has drawn the lines CP, CQ, showing that the large square divides into four squares of the original size.

26. **διπλάσιον οὖν κτέ.** : the steps here are very minute. But it cannot be brought out too clearly that we have not got what we wanted.

C 34. **τεττάρων** : in full, (*χωρίον*) *γὰρ τετράκις τεττάρων* (*ποδῶν*) *ἐστὶ* (*χωρίον*) *ἑκκαίδεκα* (*ποδῶν*). *τετράκις* cannot govern a genitive any more than *ἅπαξ* at **82 C** 16. In the *Theaetetus* (147 D) we are told that Theodorus has carried his analysis of numbers into those which are perfect squares and those that are not, up to sixteen ; and that there he stopped. Perhaps some diagram like the present illustrated his discourse. Intr. § 22.

40. **ταυτησὶ τουτί** : the deictic forms imply that he here *points* to the line AB and the square ABCD, whereas in the sentence before he *referred to* the line AK and the square AKLM. In the next sentence *τοῦδε* is the square ABCD, *τούτου* the square AKLM. The Greek wealth of pronouns dispenses with lettering.

D 50. **τὸ γὰρ δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου** : the present imperative makes the injunction refer to a habit, not to a particular answer. See Appendix on the Text on **72 C** 4. The injunction is an important point in Socratic procedure, as distinguished from Eristic (see Excursus V). Perhaps the best illustrative passage is *Theaet.* 154 C D *ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν ; τί ἀποκρινεῖ ;* ΘΕΑΙ. *Ἐὰν μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν* κτέ. In the conversation with Thrasymachus (*Republic* bk. i) the point appears : 337 C (the respondent must be left free :) *ἧττόν τι αὐτὸν οἴει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ ἐάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐάν τε μή ;* (see the context) : 346 A *καὶ ὦ μακάριε μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.* Cp. 350 E. The passage at 349 B affords no real exception. Thrasymachus (unlike the waverers Polus and Meno) has not scrupled to call injustice *καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν.* Socrates compliments him on now speaking his mind sincerely. Thrasymachus rejoins *τί δέ σοι τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις ;* Socrates answers *Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι.* Here the '*οὐδέν*' is ironical ; cp. *Prot.* 333 C. To the same effect as the present passage are *Crito* 49 D, *Lach.* 193 C, *Prot.* 331 C, *Gorg.* 495 A, 500 B, *Phil.* 14 A. The importance of getting at genuine *δόξαι* appears at **85 C**, where we see that *δόξαι* are the raw material from which Knowledge is evolved.

52. ἦν, 'is, as we agreed.' The source of this idiom, which is of frequent occurrence, is a transference of the time of our *thought* about a fact to the fact itself. It occurs most frequently in the imperfect tense: *Phaedr.* 230 A ἆρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ' ὅπερ ἤγες ἡμᾶς; the existence of the tree is thought of relatively to the time when they began to approach it. This imperfect often appears, by a sort of attraction, of things permanently existing, mentioned in a narrative of past events: thus we have ὅσα διδασκάλων εἴχετο **93 D** 19, **94 A** 8: cp. Xen. *Anab.* II iv 12 ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος· ἀπεῖχε δὲ Βαβύλωνος οὐ πολύ. So often in referring to past points in a discussion, where the imperfect is equivalent to the present with ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, ὥσπερ ᾠόμεθα, or the like. It is sometimes called the 'philosophic imperfect' (Goodwin *MT.* § 40). See Kühner § 383. 5, Jelf § 398. 4. The imperfect most common is ἦν, as *Polit.* 264 A: *Rep.* 407 A ἆρα . . . ὅτι ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, ὃ εἰ μὴ πράττοι οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζῆν; ibid. 436 C, 441 D, 477 A, 522 A, 609 B: *Gorg.* 478 C, 507 A (see Dr. Thompson's note): *Charm.* 159 D: *Soph.* 267 E (ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν): *Crat.* 387 C: *Phil.* 41 C, 55 A. Other imperfects: **88 D** 5 ὥσπερ ἡ φρόνησις ἐποίει, i.e. ποιεῖ, ὡς ἐλέγομεν: *Crito* 47 D ἐκεῖνο ὁ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δ' ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο (for γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐλέγετο): *Euthyd.* 289 C ἆρά ἐστιν αὕτη ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι; *Prot.* 356 D ἡ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτά; *Rep.* 490 A ἠγεῖτο, 614 A παρείχετο. We have a similar idiom in future time: **98 C** 13, *Gorg.* 475 B ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται 'will be *found* to be.' Certain uses of temporal particles as πω (οὐδ' ἄρα πω γίγνεται, presently at **E** 75) and ἔτι (**73 A** 29, **99 A** 2, where see notes) are to be explained on the same general principle. The idiom occurs in various languages, including our own. We might translate here '*was* not this the square of two feet?' So in Latin, Cic. *Acad.* I § 23 (repeatedly), § 30 tertia philosophiae pars quae *erat* in ratione et in disserendo: Livy VII 1 hic annus *erit* memorabilis, 'we shall find this year memorable.'

(We may separate from these cases: (*α*) the imperfects dealt with on **77 E** 44; (*β*) the imperfect with ἄρα, as at **97 C** 31; (*γ*) the curious use of ἦν at *Theaet.* 156 A (ὡς τὸ τῶν κίνησις ἦν), *Charm.* 174 B, *Rep.* 505 E, *Laws* 628 C, which is allied to (*β*); for, as Campbell says, 'What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began.' We may connect with this the Aristotelian τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, and the Aristophanic τουτὶ τί ἦν; (*Wasps* 183). Cp. Isaeus 11 § 17 ὃ συγγενέστατον μὲν ἦν τῇ φύσει πάντων, and

Jebb's note on the passage in his *Selections from the Attic Orators*.)

E 60. **τρίποδα**: this of course is a mere 'shot.' It does not follow that because four is too much and two too little, that three is right (cp. Aristot. *NE.* II vi 7). We have here the second stage, that of partial disillusionment. The difficulty is partially grasped, and the confidence is less.

61. **τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης** (AB) **προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους** (AR); **δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε** (AB), **ὁ δὲ εἷς** (BR)· **καὶ ἐνθένδε** (AT) **ὡσαύτως**: for *οἵδε* (*πόδες* being understood) see on **81 E** 34.

75. **πω** refers to time of *thought* (see on **D** 52). 'We have not yet got the square containing eight feet from the three-foot base.' (Beware of translating 'the square of eight feet,' which would be at least ambiguous.)

79. **εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν**: not without some ironical point; an exact arithmetical answer being impossible, as $\sqrt{2}$ is incommensurable with 1. Socrates himself does not give the measure of the line; he only *δείκνυσιν*. 'The side and the diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitude among the ancient reasoners' (Grote III 356 note).

ἀλλὰ δεῖξον, 'at any rate.' Instances of ἀλλά in the sense '*saltem*,' with an imperative, after a conditional clause, are not very common. But see below **86 E** 18 *εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν . . . χάλασον*; *Laws* 860 C *εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ νῦν ὡς λέγοντά με τίθετε*; †*Hipparchus* 231 A *εἰ δ' αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς ἔχεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει*. This use of ἀλλά with imperatives may be classed with the 'appealing' force, for which see Jebb on Soph. *El.* 337, also L. & S. ἀλλά I 2. They quote Soph. *El.* 411 *ὦ θεοὶ πατρῷοι συγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν*. See Aristoph. *Clouds* 1364, 1369 for ἀλλά with an indirect command.

84 A 81. **ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα**, '*I* don't know.' The emphasis in *ἔγωγε* logically belongs not so much to the pronoun as to the denial. A good example of false emphasis on a pronoun is Soph. *Phil.* 910 foll.—

> ΦΙ. *ἀνὴρ ὅδ', εἰ μὴ 'γὼ κακὸς γνώμην ἔφυν*
> *προδούς μ' ἔοικε κάκλιπὼν τὸν πλοῦν στελεῖν.*
> ΝΕ. *λιπὼν μὲν οὐκ ἔγωγε, λυπηρῶς δὲ μὴ*
> *πέμπω σε μᾶλλον, τοῦτ' ἀνιῶμαι πάλαι.*

See Postgate in *CR.* XI 21: *καλῶς σὺ ποιῶν*, 'and you were *right*.'

This marks the completion of the process of disillusionment; the destructive process is ended; the false conceit of knowledge

is eradicated. The situation is parallel to chap. xiii **79 E-80 D.** Meno does not indeed there say *ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα*, but Socrates can say of him *ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι*. Meno somewhat resents the treatment; the Slave of course does not; and Meno is able to see (**84 B**) that in the case of the Slave the torpedo-shock is not unattended with good.

CHAPTER XVIII

1. οὗ ἐστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι, 'what point on the track of reminiscence he has now reached.' Cp. *Lysis* 204 B *πόρρω ἤδη εἶ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος*. (In these cases the use of *εἰμί* with the present participle serves to bring out the continuous force of the tense; cp. **82 C** 4.) Fr. compares *Rep.* 445 C *ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου* and *Euthyphr.* 4 B *πόρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος*. The genitives are 'partitive.'

Wayte on Dem. 22 (*Andr.*) § 16 *εἰς τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθε τοῦ νομίζειν* points out that a *genitive infin.* is rare in this construction, and quotes the present passage.

5. In the combination **ἀλλ' οὖν . . . γε**, *οὖν* has the force 'however that may be,' as in *δ' οὖν*; *γε* at once emphasises and limits the word to which it belongs. The combination often introduces an apodosis after *εἰ μή* (*Phaedo* 91 B, *Soph.* 254 C, *Laws* 885 E). In *Prot.* 327 C *ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν*, as here, the construction is coordinate.

7. ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν κτέ., 'ut nescit ita se scire ne putat quidem.' **B**

18. **τότε δὲ ῥᾳδίως κτέ.**: Socrates caricatures Meno's language at **80 B** 15. Geometry, to be sure, offers less temptation to rhetoric than ethics, so ignorance of it is more easily detected, and is less dangerous. **C**

26. **πρὶν κατέπεσεν**: Goodwin *MT.* § 637: 'When the clause introduced by *πρίν*, *until*, refers to a result *not attained* in past time in consequence of the non-fulfilment of some condition, it takes a past tense of the indicative.' Cp. **86 D** 13, *Theaet.* 165 D E. See F. E. T. § 218. The question here is equivalent to *οὐκ ἂν ἐπεχείρησεν*.

31. **ὅ τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει**: see on **71 B** 8. Here the force of the *καί* is, 'see, what *after all* (in spite of his bewilderment), he will discover.' So *Euthyd.* 272 *ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅ τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα*; *Euthyphr.* 3 A *λέγε τι καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους*; Aristoph. *Clouds* 1344 *καὶ μὴν ὅ τι καὶ λέξεις ἀκοῦσαι βούλομαι*; *Eccl.* 946.

D 32. **οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ** : see on **76 B** 13.

33. **φύλαττε δέ κτέ.** : see on **82 E** 37.

35. **ἀλλὰ μή** : see on **71 C** 10.

CHAPTER XIX

1. At this point all the figures are rubbed out, and a fresh start is made. The four squares, each containing four feet, are



successively constructed ; first ABCD (*τοῦτο* line 2), then BKPC (*ἕτερον* line 4) ; then DCQM (*τρίτον* line 7), then CPLQ (*τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε* line 9).

E 12. **ἄλλο τι** : see on **82 C** 16.

85 A 21. **ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμή** : DB. See on **82 C** 4.

22. **τείνουσα, τέμνουσα** : see Appendix on the Text.

25. **τέτταρες αὗται** : BP, PQ, QD, DB.

26. **ἴσαι** : Euclid would have thought it necessary to *prove* the equality of the diagonals. **τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον**, BPQD.

31. **τούτων**, the four squares ; **ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμή**, the four diagonals.

35. **τηλικαῦτα**, the triangles ; **ἐν τούτῳ**, the sq. BPQD.

37. **ἐν τῷδε**, the sq. ABCD.

B 41. **τόδε**, the sq. BPQD. The step taken here is a comparatively long one. This led Schleiermacher to think that

something has fallen out in the text, which he reconstructs thus :—

ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν < ποσαπλάσιον γίγνεται τούτου (scil. ABCD).
ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσιον.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ πηλικὸν ἦν ;
ΠΑΙ. Τετράπουν.
ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν > ποσάπουν γίγνεται ;

But perhaps the Slave's mind is supposed to have become more agile. Campbell Intr. *Soph.* etc. p. 15 points out the greater conciseness of Plato's later *dialogues.*

48. **διάμετρος** : the word is used elsewhere in Plato of the diagonal of a square : *Polit.* 266 A B where there seems a fantastic reference to the present problem ; †*Sisyphus* 388 E (quoted on **80 D** 1) ; *Rep.* 510 D of a rectangle (where there may be a reference to the present problem) ; *Tim.* 54 D E of a trapezium. The word *διαγώνιος* is much later. Of course *γραμμή* is to be understood with either word.

οἱ σοφισταί, 'the Professors.' The word is used here in its original sense, entirely without odious signification. It implies little more than the Expert, contrasted with the *ἰδιώτης.* This is the usual signification of the word in the poets : Pind. *Isthm.* v 28 ; Diog. L. prooem. § 12 says *καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν Ἀρχιλόχῳ τοὺς περὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον ἐπαινῶν οὕτως καλεῖ* ; Eur. *Hipp.* 916 *δεινὸν λέγεις σοφιστήν κτέ.*

In Plato the word is used colourlessly as here *Lys.* 204 A *οὐ φαῦλός γε ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸς σοφιστής* : *Crat.* 403 E *οὕτω καλούς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ Ἅιδης καὶ ἔστιν . . . ὁ θεὸς τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ* : †*Minos* 319 C, Zeus, the trainer of Minos, is a great *σοφιστής.* The only other place in the *Meno* where the word occurs is **91 C** 18 ; and there it is clear that the word, to some ears at least, excites odium. See the note there.

50. **ὡς σὺ φῂς** : the *Slave* has found the materials for the conclusion—a point presently developed.

ὦ παῖ Μένωνος : see on **76 E** 48.

Chapters XX, XXI (**85 B**-**86 C**). SOCR. *Observe that all the Opinions to which he has given utterance are his own. By the calling up in order of these Opinions he has recovered latent Knowledge. This Knowledge he did not acquire in this life. Therefore he must have acquired it in a previous state of existence. The soul's possession of Knowledge is thus proved to be independent of its connexion with the human form, and*

so independent of death. However, this is rather by the way. I have shown practically that the transition from seeming Ignorance to Knowledge is possible; and I insist most strongly that we shall be better men if we regard research as part of our duty.

C 3. **οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ**: see on **71 C** 13.

4. **ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον**: **82 E.**

10. **τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι κτέ.**: see App. on the text.

14. **καὶ νῦν μέν γε κτέ.**, 'at present these opinions have just been conjured up in him like a dream': that is, they are still fluid and insecure. Cp. *Symp.* 175 E, where Agathon says that his own wisdom, compared with that of Socrates, is *φαύλη καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος, ὥσπερ ὄναρ οὖσα*. Similarly the metaphor of *ὕπαρ* and *ὄναρ* is used to express the contrast between real Knowledge (of Universals) and mere Sense-experience or Opinion: *Rep.* 476 D; cp. 533 C, 534 C, and *Laws* 969 B, quoted on **100 A** 9.

15. 'But if some one shall question him again often and in different ways about these same things, you know that finally he will understand these matters as well as any one.' For the future condition see note on **86 A** 8 and Exc. IV.

The *δόξαι* now arrived at need to be clinched by repetitions of the dialectic process. For the relation of *δόξα* to *ἐπιστήμη* see **97 B** 17, with note, and Exc. VII. The intimate bearing of this discussion upon the main subject of the dialogue has been already pointed out in the note on the summary of chaps. xiv, xv. *δόξα* is a sort of half-way house on the road from Ignorance to Knowledge.

D 20. **ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος**: see on **71 C** 10. Fr. observes that *ἀλλά* cancels the negative in the preceding *οὐδείς*, and compares *Rep.* 366 D, *Phaedr.* 260 D, *Symp.* 192 E.

24. **τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν κτέ.**: see on **81 D** 12. Cp. *Phaedo* 75 E *εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ' οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη;*

28. **ἤτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν**: the addition of *τοι* to the former *ἤ* accentuates the contrast between the two alternatives offered (Kühner § 540, 5. Pindar *Nem.* 6. 5 appears to be the only place where *ἤ* . . . *ἤτοι* occurs. *ἤτοι* without *ἤ* occurs in Plato *Rep.* 344 E, 400 C, 433 A). The particle *τοι* implies a personal appeal. The effect of it is not to press the acceptance of the member to which it happens to be attached, but

to press the choice between the alternatives, which often involves a dilemma. It cannot be made out that *τοι* is attached to the member the speaker desires to have accepted. At 89 A 20, the other place in which the combination occurs, Plato leaves it an open question whether *φρόνησις* is the whole of *ἀρετή* or a *μέρος* of it. Cp. *Phaedo* 76 A *ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὓς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι.* Other passages are: *Apol.* 27 D *τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; Prot.* 341 A: *Gorg.* 460 A *ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ*, ibid. 467 E, 474 D, 475 A, 478 B: *Rep.* 453 D *ἤτοι δελφίνά τινα ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν;* ibid. 330 E, 437 C: *Phaedo* 68 C: *Parm.* 131 A: *Laws* 898 C: Soph. *Antig.* 1181—

ἐκ δὲ δωμάτων
ἤτοι κλύουσα παιδὸς η τύχῃ πάρα;

Hdt. I 11 *ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἐκεῖνόν γε δεῖ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἢ σέ*: Thuc. VI 34. 2, 38. 2, 40. 1, etc.

30. **εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων**: Socrates propounds a dilemma. If the slave always had this Knowledge, then he always existed as an intelligent being. But to say that the Slave *ἀεὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων* may be going too far. The knowledge may be there but latent or potential. Knowledge admits of genesis. But this admission does not destroy the tie to a past existence. If this genesis took place it was not confined to this life. Part of the work was done before. The *δόξαι* remain as permanent relics of previous *μάθησις*, and are capable of being reconverted into knowledge. Plato held that the soul has no beginning. In the *Phaedrus* (245 C D) we read 'that as the soul is ever in motion and is the first beginning of all motion, it must be indestructible as well as underived,' Zeller p. 398; cp. 405.

32. **εἰληφὼς εἴη**: simple perfects optative are rare, save in a few perfects used in present sense, as *πεποιθοίην, τεθνήκοιμι*. Plato also has periphrastic forms for the plqpf. active: *Phaedo* 76 B *εἰληφότες ἦμεν, Euthyd.* 273 A *περιεληλυθότε ἦστην.*

36. **δίκαιος εἶ**: the usual 'personalisation.' See A. Sidgwick in *CR.* III pp. 147 foll. **E**

37. **ἄλλως τε**: the omission of *καί* is remarkable, as it was from the force of *καί* that the formula *ἄλλως τε καί* derived its sense ('otherwise in general *and particularly*'). Like *ἄλλο τι* for *ἄλλο τι ἤ* it comes under the head of irrationally abbreviated phrases. So Buttmann, who in his note quotes Xen. *Mem.* I ii 59, Isoc. 2 (*ad Nicocl.*) § 51, and Soph. *O.T.* 1114—

ἄλλως τε τοὺς ἄγοντας ὥσπερ οἰκέτας
ἔγνωκ' ἐμαυτοῦ,

on which Jebb quotes Hdt. VIII 142 (Kühner § 522. 4). In the present place some (not the best) MSS. add *καί*, which was to be expected. Cp. *Hipp. min.* 363 A—perhaps the only other place in Plato.

CHAPTER XXI

86 A 5. **ὅτ' οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος**, 'before he entered into the human shape.' For full explanation of the import of this, chap. xix of the *Phaedo* must be consulted, especially the end 75 B: *πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἁρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅ τι ἔστιν* and C *πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν (τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην) εἰληφέναι.*

8. **εἰ οὖν κτέ.**, 'if then, alike during the time when he is, and in that when he is not, a man, true opinions are to exist in him, which when awakened by questioning become matters of knowledge, must not his soul be for all time in the possession of them? (lit. 'be in a condition of having learnt': cp. *ἐμεμαθήκει* above). For it is clear that for all time he either is or is not a man.'

The argument here is commonly regarded as fallacious (Zeller p. 127 note, p. 405 note; cp. Fr.). It is certainly highly compressed and somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear how much Plato conceives that he has proved. The argument seems to be this: 'The human form is not essential to the soul's existence. It existed apart from the human form before. It made its way into the human form without losing hold of its heritage of Ideas.' So much may be said to follow fairly from the premises. But Plato has cast the argument in such a form as to suggest a larger conclusion. The tenses *ὄν τ' ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν μὴ ᾖ* refer to indefinite *future* time. The implied argument is that, as the soul has safely passed the gate Birth into the human form, so she may be expected to pass the other gate Death, which, as the *Phaedo* explains, is its correlative. This, even if a probable surmise, has not been proved; and so we find in the *Phaedo* (77 C) that Kebes treats the argument for immortality drawn from *ἀνάμνησις* as imperfect: *φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡμῖν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσται ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν.*

It must be remembered that the argument for immortality here is merely by the way. There is no reference to the general

argument given in the *Phaedrus* 245 C (Zeller 398). Indeed it is noticeable that the words *ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε* might be omitted without obvious loss to the argument. Perhaps Plato's only object in referring to future immortality here is to be found in the hint at **81 B**. Plato did not regard immortality as an end in itself; see *Euthyd.* 289 B *οὐδέ γε εἴ τις ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἶναι* and *Laws* 661 B C.

εἰ ἐνέσονται: this is not a real future condition. It is, as Fr. says, equivalent to *ἐνεῖναι φήσομεν*, which is pretty much what Kühner (§ 573 a; cp. § 387, 4) calls a *modal* signification. It thus belongs to the class of idioms treated on **83 D** 52. This sense of the future is common in Plato, especially after *εἰ*; but see also **78 E** 38 where *οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή* means *εὑρήσομεν μὴ εἶναι ἀρετήν*. Cp. *Parm.* 134 D, etc. Contrast **85 C** 15 *εἰ ἀνερήσεται*, where we have a *real* future condition. The two classes may be thus distinguished. In the 'modal' condition the pres. indic., in the 'real future' condition the subjunctive (with *ἐάν*) or the optative, may be substituted for the fut. indic. in the protasis with little change of meaning. Here, for instance, we might have had *εἰ ἔνεισιν . . μεμαθηκυῖά ἐστιν*. For in the apodosis the time is not really future, and the fact that we might in English translate *μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται* 'will not his soul be in possession?' only shows that we can use our auxiliary 'will' *modally*. But it is possible that Plato has, somewhat sophistically, used the future forms here to help the leap to *ἀθάνατος* in the next sentence. See Excursus IV.

10. **ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσα**: cp. *Phaedo* 73 A quoted on **81 D** 12. This art of questioning is the *μαιευτικὴ τέχνη*, the positive side of Socrates' work (*Theaet.* 149 A–151 C; art. 'Socrates' *Encycl. Brit.* p. 236). Plato, while giving abundant examples of this art, nowhere attempts a detailed analysis of it. Note that in *Rep.* 532 E Socrates when asked to give an account of dialectic says that the time has not yet come. For the plural *ἐπιστῆμαι* cp. **98 A** 33, *Symp.* 207 E, etc.

11. **μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται**: the fut. perf. active is not common, but cp. *Charm.* 174 D *ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται*; *Rep.* 582 D *γεγονὼς ἔσται*.

15. **ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων**: this can only mean the **B** world of Ideas. Cp. *Phaedr.* 249 B *οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μή ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα* (the human form); ibid. D *τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος* and 247 C. See note on **81 D** 12. The same is implied at *Phaedo* 73 C *ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι.*

17. **ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρὴ κτέ.**: it should be noted that to support this conclusion it is not in the least necessary that the *future* immortality of the soul should have been proved. All that is wanted is the admission of the soul's previous converse with truth, and consequent power of recovering it. Even so much of the metaphysical basis as remains is presently represented as less essential than the recognition of the moral duty of research. See on **81 D** 14.

20. **MEN. εὖ μοι δοκεῖς κτέ.**: *Meno*—'I like what you are saying, Socrates—I hardly know why.' *Socr.*—'Yes, Meno, and *I* like what I am saying.'

21. **οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως**: Meno's *δόξαι* are still unsettled. Cp. **95 C** 31. So Callicles in the *Gorgias* 513 C *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.*

23. **οὐκ ἂν πάνυ**: see on **71 C** 19; cp. *Gorg.* 513 C just quoted and *Phaedo* 63 C quoted below.

ἂν . . . διισχυρισαίμην, '*asseveraverim.*' The word occurs in two passages of the *Phaedo* of similar tendency: 63 C *νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο*; also 114 D *τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί κτέ.* Cp. also *Rep.* 533 A. For the attitude of Plato towards 'myths' see Zeller 396. Plato 'clearly asserts that these myths were viewed by him not as mere myths, but also as hints of the truth worth serious consideration; and he therefore combines with them moral exhortations which he never would have grounded on uncertain fables. It is difficult, however, to make out precisely where that which is intended to be dogmatic ends, and that which is mythical begins. Plato himself was manifestly in uncertainty, and for that very reason betakes himself to the myth.' See ibid. pp. 160–3.

24. **ὅτι δ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν**: we here revert to the point taken at **81 D** 14.

Chapters XXII, XXIII (**86 C–87 C** 18 *πάνυ γε*). SOCR. *Shall we then resume the inquiry what Virtue is?* MENO. *I would rather put the question as I did before, 'Is Virtue teachable?'* SOCR. *Well, if you must have your own way, we may consider this point on a hypothesis as to the nature of Virtue. If Virtue is Knowledge it will be teachable, and if not, not.* MENO. *Certainly.*

Here begins the third section of the dialogue (chaps. xxii–xxv). Reason is shown for connecting Virtue with Knowledge (**89 A** 20 *φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἥτοι ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι*).

1. **βούλει ἐπιχειρήσωμεν**: see on **75 B** 14. **C**

4. **οὐ μέντοι . . ἀλλ'**, 'not but that.' See on **71 C** 13.

7. **πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ**: we have here a dative **D** depending on *ἐπιχειρεῖν*, followed by a genitive absolute clause, *ὡς παραγιγνομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς*. Fr. refers to **79 E** 47, **87 C** 18, etc., for *ὄντι αὐτῷ*, referring to *ἀρετή*, but attracted into the gender of the predicate.

8. **τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ**: note the facility with which the Greek language introduces direct interrogatives in adverbial clauses, and cp. **79 E** 46, **87 B** 4, and **88 A** 10. Cp. *Symp.* 206 B *τῶν τίνα τρόπον διωκόντων αὐτὸ ἡ σπουδὴ ἔρως ἂν καλοῖτο;* See on **71 D** 27.

12. **εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν**: it is very difficult to draw any distinction between the use of *οὐ* and *μή* in the second half of an indirect disjunctive question. We have *οὐ* here and **87 B** 3; but *μή* at **71 A** 27, **87 B** 35, **92 C** 20, **93 A** 14. *μή* predominates where the predicate is not repeated (as in the last two instances). Kühner § 513 Anm. 1 says that *μή always* stands in cases where the distinction is between what *is* and what *is not*, if the predicate has to be understood in the second clause. This rule seems to be infringed by *Phaedo* 70 C *σκεψώμεθα εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ*. Where *οὐ* stands alone the predicate to be supplied with it will generally be one that readily forms with it a privative notion; e.g. *οὔ* above = *οὐκ εἰσιν*, *Rep.* 387 D *σκόπει δὴ εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἢ οὔ* (= *οὐκ ὀρθῶς*). See Jebb's notes on Soph. *Ajax* 7 (who there quotes for alternative questions *Crat.* 425 B *μή*, *Rep.* 451 D *οὐ*), and on Antiphon *περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόνου* § 14 (*Selections from the Attic Orators* p. 161); F. E. T. p. 357; Hadley § 1022.

13. **πρὶν . . ἐζητήσαμεν**: see on **84 C** 26.

αὐτό, 'the main point.' It refers not to the thing *ἀρετή*, but to the question *ὅ τι ἐστίν*. Cp. **71 A** 28, **100 B** 21.

14. **σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν**: the irony is best illustrated by *Gorg.* 491 D. Callicles says *τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἔστιν, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. Socr. τί δὲ αὑτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε;* [so Schanz, rightly]. *Cal. πῶς λέγεις; Socr. ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;*

ἵνα δή: the *δή* marks that the expectation is illusory. Cp.

Rep. 420 E ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῇ ; ibid. 563 B, 610 C, *Gorg.* 495 A, *Theaet.* 183 A ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, *Polit.* 264 A, etc. : **82 A** 26.

15. **ἐλεύθερος** : Fr. quotes *Rep.* 576 A ἐλευθερίας . . . τυραννικὴ φύσις ἀεὶ ἄγευστος.

E 17. **ποῖόν τι** : cp. **71 B** 4 and note there.

18. **εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλά**, 'if you will not do more, at least,' etc. Riddell § 20. The ἀλλά here is not parallel to the uses given on **71 C** 13. It belongs to the 'appealing' use, with the imperative, dealt with on **83 E** 79. Cp. *Rep.* 509 C καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών. Nearly akin is the phrase in *Symp.* 222 E ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι ἄλλο, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν ἔα Ἀγάθωνα κατακεῖσθαι.

19. **ἐξ ὑποθέσεως** : the word ὑπόθεσις was familiar in Plato's time in the ordinary scientific sense 'an assumption.' L. & S. quote it from Hippocrates. Plato often so uses it. Thus, the principle of Parmenides, 'Existence is One,' is a ὑπόθεσις. When this was attacked, Zeno defended it by showing that the opposite hypothesis, 'Existence is manifold,' led to more absurd results than any that could be deduced from the principle of Parmenides (*Parm.* 128 D). To Zeno Plato attributes the method of investigation that consists in tracing not merely the consequences of a hypothesis, but also those of its contradictory : *Parm.* 135 E χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι. Cp. 160 B, 161 B ; also *Soph.* 244 C ; *Theaet.* 183 B the maxim of the Heracliteans πάντα ῥεῖ is a ὑπόθεσις ; *Phaedo* 92 D the position μάθησις ἀνάμνησις rests on a ὑπόθεσις ἀξία ἀποδέξασθαι ; ibid. 94 B the surmise that the soul is a harmony is a ὑπόθεσις to be discarded. [We see how the meaning 'title,' 'argument,' 'summary,' was arrived at, from *Parm.* 127 D κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι. So the Platonic Ὅροι (415 B) give, besides the first definition of ὑπόθεσις ("ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος"), a second, "συγκεφαλαίωσις λόγου."]

The physical meaning 'base,' 'pedestal' seems never to occur, but it is played upon *Euthyphr.* 11 C. Euthyphron's definition of holiness has proved unsound. Socrates says that if it had been *his own definition* that had slipped away, he would have been reminded of his ancestor Daedalus (see on **97 D** 12) νῦν δέ, σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν, ἄλλου δή τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. So too *Rep.* 511 B τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, 'standing-ground in the literal sense, as it were foot-holds and starting-points.'

There is a special Platonic usage of the term, to indicate a *provisional definition of a common term or concept*. This usage goes back to Socrates. His effort was by a comparison of particulars to find the common point in a general term. Xen. *Mem.* IV 6, 13 (quoted by R. & P. 194 B) *εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περί του ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς λέγοι ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως*, 'he led the discourse inductively up to the formation of the concept,' namely of the *πολιτικός*, the *ἀνδρεῖος*, or whatever it might be. So in *Gorg.* 454 C *ἵνα σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς*, the *ὑπόθεσις* is Gorgias' definition of rhetoric.

The passages which deal with *ὑποθέσεις* in this sense are (1) *Rep.* 510 B–511 D (further explained by 532 A B, 533 B–D), (2) *Phaedo* 99 E–101 E. See by all means H. Jackson in *J.P.* X pp. 145, 6, XIII pp. 263, 4, and A.-H.'s notes on the *Phaedo*, ad loc. The *ὑποθέσεις* (or *λόγοι*) of universals, whether gathered from observed particulars, or by class-division, are provisional and precarious. A full knowledge of any universal would imply an a priori derivation of its Idea from the original and central Idea of the Good. 'In other words, Plato conceives that whenever we can draw up a scheme of *ὑποθέσεις* culminating in the *ἀγαθόν*, so as to show that the supposed system of *ὄντως ὄντα* is the best that intelligence working to an end could devise, we may be sure that our *λόγοι*, though originally derived from the inspection of particulars, are accurate representations of Ideas. The moment we pass from *ὑποθέσεις* to the *ἀγαθόν*, our *λόγοι* will thereby receive the attestation which they have hitherto lacked, and will be converted from *ὑποθέσεις* into *ἀρχαί*, whence we may descend to conclusions (*τελευταί*) as much more certain than the *τελευταί* of the geometer, as certified *ἀρχαί* are more certain than uncertified *ὑποθέσεις*' (H. J. *J.P.* X). 'When dialectic is made perfect, *λόγοι* will be exchanged for *ἰδέαι*, *ὑποθέσεις* for *ἀρχαί*' (A.-H. on *Phaedo* 100 B). Plato looked forward to a great deductive scheme by which the Universe should be justified. This he attempted in the *Timaeus*. In the places of the *Republic* a broad distinction is drawn between the methods of dialectic and geometry. The method of dialectic is what has been indicated. In geometry, on the other hand, the *ὑποθέσεις* (namely the axioms, definitions, etc.) are arbitrary. They are never verified, or shown to be necessary, by reference to the fountainhead of the *ἀγαθόν*; moreover, the reasoning is carried on by means of Sense-representations.

Here the word *ὑπόθεσις*, as applied to the geometrical illustra-

tion, has its ordinary scientific sense; as applied to the thing illustrated, Virtue, it means a 'provisional definition.'

23. **ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς κτέ.**: the geometrical problem here may claim a second place to that of the 'Nuptial Number' in *Rep.* VIII 546 for exercising the ingenuity of commentators. A difference, however, may be noted. In the *Republic* certain words (545 E) do at least give a shadow of excuse for the view that the problem is not to be taken seriously. There is nothing of the sort here, and the fact that we have here undoubtedly to deal with a seriously intended problem gives support to those who take a similar view of that in the *Republic*.

'Virorum doctorum XXII diversas de hoc loco sententias et conjecturas congessit Patze, comm. de loco math. in Pl. Menone, Susati 1832; recentiores enumerat Schultz, Jahrb. f. Philol. 1882, p. 19 sqq.'—Fr. See Addendum I p. 232.

I follow the interpretation put forward by Prof. Butcher *J.P.* XVII pp. 219 foll. (1888), and render thus:

'When any one asks for instance with regard to a rectangle, whether it is possible for this rectangle to be distributed as a triangle within this circle, one might say, "I do not know yet whether it has the required property; but I think, if I may so put it, that I have a certain serviceable *hypothesis* of the following nature: if the rectangle be such that when you extend it along the given line (i.e. the diameter) of the circle, it is defective by another rectangle similar to the



original one, then one result follows; if not, there is a different result."' 'In other words' (here, and in the notes that follow, quotation-marks indicate that I borrow Prof. Butcher's words) 'if, when you apply the given rectangle ABCD to the diameter BH of the circle, it falls short of the completed rectangle ABHG upon the diameter by a rectangle DCHG similar to the original

rectangle, then a triangle BDF may be inscribed in the circle whose diameter is BH, which triangle is equal in area to the original rectangle.

'Since the rectangles ABCD and DCHG are similar, it follows that BC : CD :: CD : CH ;

'∴ the point D lies on the circle whose diameter is BH (BDH being a rt. ∠).

'If DC is produced till CF = DC, the point F will also be on the circle.'

(The triangle BDF consists of the two triangles BDC and BCF, which are obviously equal to the two triangles BDC, ADB, of which the rectangle ABCD is composed.)

'It is worth observing that the above solution depends on CD being a mean proportional between the segments of the diameter, and that mean proportionals were among the subjects of chief interest in mathematics in Plato's time.'

24. **τόδε τὸ χωρίον**: that *χωρίον* may here be taken for a **87 A** rectangle is shown by Benecke (Elbing 1867). Cp. Butcher: 'The technical *ἐλλείπειν* here suggests reference to a parallelogram, and in geometrical problems dealing with parallelograms the right angle was constantly assumed.' See on **82 C** 4.

25. **τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι**: *τρίγωνον* must be taken *adverbially*. See on **30**. The problem cannot be whether a triangle equal to a given area can be inscribed in a given circle; for this can always be done provided that 'the given area is not greater than that of the equilateral triangle, i.e. the *maximum* triangle, which can be inscribed in the given circle.' Some such limitation of the problem as that adopted in the rendering given above must be assumed. With this limitation the converse hypothesis will also hold; if the rectangle DCHG is *not* similar, the required distribution *cannot* take place. And it is necessary that the converse hypothesis should also hold, if the illustration is to be an apt one for Plato's purpose.

Plato's geometrical terminology is loose; but the brief and imperfect expression here is, perhaps, partly due to the fact that he is presenting a well-known problem.

The regular word for 'inscribing,' e.g. a triangle in a circle, is *ἐγγράφειν*, used by Hippocrates. *ἐντείνειν* after the present passage entirely drops out of geometrical language, so far as recorded, until we come to Proclus in the fifth century A.D. (See E. F. August *Zur Kenntnis der geometrischen Methode der Alten in besonderer Beziehung auf die platonische Stelle in Meno*, Berlin 1844.) In Proclus it occurs twice in one passage, of which a part is quoted on **80 D** 1 (footnote), but the passage does not help us to the exact meaning here.

26. **ὥσπερ**: for this parenthetic use of *ὥσπερ* see **71 A** 20 and note.

μέν: Madvig *adv. crit.* I 413 proposed *μέντοι*, needlessly. For *μέν* with *ἀλλά*, not answered by *δέ*, see *Crito* 43 D, *Prot.* 344 A. The antithesis to *μέν* is anticipated in the negative clause which precedes *ἀλλά*. (It is just possible we should read *ὥσπερ μέ τινα.*)

27. **προΰργου . . ἔχειν**: 'i.e. *ἀνυσίμως ἔχειν*' Fr. But I can find no instance of *προΰργου adv.* with *ἔχειν* = *εἶναι*, and should rather take *ὑπόθεσιν* as object of *ἔχειν* = 'have,' and *προΰργου*, *indecl. adj.*, as oblique predicate.

29. **οἷον**: Fr. says *οἷον* = *ὥστε*, quoting **100 A** 7 (*τοιοῦτος οἷος ποιῆσαι*), and *Euthyphr.* 11 A *ἔστιν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι.*

παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμήν: 'Here *αὐτοῦ* might at first be supposed to refer to *χωρίον* and not to *κύκλος*. But the sense requires the reference to *κύκλος*; otherwise there is no mention of the circle in this clause, which defines the relations that must exist between the circle and the *χωρίον*.' (*αὐτοῦ* can hardly in any case refer to *χωρίον*; you can get no sense out of 'applying a figure to a given side of *itself*.') 'The reference of *αὐτοῦ* to *κύκλος* is less harsh if we bear in mind that the cases of *αὐτός* are capable of a vague use which no English pronoun can bear.' Cp., e.g., *αὐτοῦ* at **B** 34. 'The *γραμμή* of the circle will denote its diameter in precisely a similar way, as the side of the square is repeatedly called the *γραμμή* of the square (e.g. **82 E**, etc.).' Buttmann, however (Excursus II), thought that there was a lacuna, which he supplied by reading *παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν <τοῦ κύκλου διάμετρον κατὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν> αὐτοῦ γραμμήν κτέ.*

παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν: the only other place in any classical author where *παρατείνειν* occurs as a geometrical term is in *Rep.* 527 A. It is noteworthy that Plato there includes it among the terms in vogue in the utilitarian geometry which he disparages, perhaps not without reference to the present problem. The usual phrase is *παραβάλλειν*, which Euclid uses I 44, etc., and VI 27, 28, 29, where the problems are similar to the present. *παρατείνειν* was thought to have disappeared entirely from the geometrical vocabulary after Plato, till August found it in some scholia on Euclid in a Munich MS., from which he restored it almost with certainty in Proclus' commentary on Euclid I 44: *ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχαῖα, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὔδημον, καὶ τῆς τῶν Πυθαγορείων μούσης εὑρήματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε παραβολὴ τῶν χωρίων, καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις. ὅταν γὰρ εὐθείας ἐκκειμένης τὸ δοθὲν χωρίον πάσῃ τῇ εὐθείᾳ συμπαρα-<τείνηται, τότε παρα->βάλλειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον φασίν κτέ.*

August holds that this place in Proclus shows that παρατείνειν and παραβάλλειν are synonymous; and this may be accepted. (See Allman *Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid* p. 25 note *e*.)

Next, as to the case of παρατείναντα. If the accusative is retained, ἐλλείπειν must be taken with a personal subject, 'you have a deficiency.' In Euclid (VI 28, etc.) it is always the *area* that is said ἐλλείπειν. But, in other senses than the geometrical, ἐλλείπω is constantly used with a personal subject: Polybius, for instance, says Ἀννίβας ἐνέλειπε τοῖς ἱππικοῖς (XV 3. 5). By a similar 'personalization' we say 'I am short of money.' This view is taken by Buttmann, who translates 'Si est ejusmodi ut qui illud applicaverit deficiat.' Benecke follows him, observing that if Plato had written οἷον . . . παρατεταμένον ἐλλείπειν the construction would have been smooth enough, but he wanted παρατεταμένον in the next line, and desired to avoid repeating the word. Plato therefore changed the construction to the active. I believe Plato chose the *acc.* rather than the *dat.* or *gen.* because it was distinctly masculine, and could by no possibility be taken as agreeing with any other word in the sentence. We have here a principle that may be called 'dissimilation of cases,' which Prof. Jebb well illustrates by his note on Soph. *Ant.* 546—

μηδ' ἃ μὴ θιγες
ποιοῦ σεαυτῆς.

He explains the unusual acc. with θιγγάνω by saying that ὧν would have been intolerable on account of the second gen. after ποιοῦ. Cp. Aesch. *P. V.* 233. I think then we may hesitate to change παρατείναντα, especially in a passage whose expression still leaves much uncertain. Serranus (followed by Mollweide) read παρατείναντι, Wex παρατείναντος. Another possibility is that a word has fallen out, as παρατείναντα <εὑρεῖν> ἐλλείπειν. Herm., Sch., Fr. all keep παρατείναντα, the last remarking that as Plato uses ὑπερβάλλειν in both constructions (impersonal and personal), so he may possibly have used ἐλλείπειν.

30. As to the problem in general, little space can be given to the discussion of other proposed solutions. Mollweide, whose explanation Buttmann gives in his Excursus II, saw that the key to it is the fact that a right-angled triangle can be cut up into two similar triangles. But he made the mistake of translating εἰ οἷόν τε τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι 'if *this triangular figure* can be inscribed.' Buttmann, who criticises Mollweide's solution, takes the words in the same way. But see on 25 and Addendum II p. 232.

Other solutions take the χωρία to be *squares*; some of the critics supposing that the squares already drawn for the previous

problem are used for the purpose. Such are Benecke's solution (quoted by Prof. Butcher) and that of Schultze, adopted by Fr. with the somewhat premature eulogy 'palmaris interpretatio.' Schultze takes *αὐτοῦ* (line 29) of the side of the square, making the square to be applied to a side of itself. One objection to making the problem refer to squares is that it then could only refer to the *size* of the given squares and you would expect *τοσοῦτον ὅσον* and *τοσούτῳ ὅσον* rather than *τοιοῦτον οἷον* and *τοιούτῳ οἷον* in lines 28 and 30. Moreover, the *ὑπόθεσις* would then cease to have any *general* character. Buttmann objects to taking *τοιοῦτον οἷον* of *similar figures*, observing that the Greek for this is *ὁμοῖον*. No doubt it is in Euclid, but is it in Plato? See on **82 C** 10.

There may possibly be an allusion to our problem in Aristot. *Anal. Post.* I i 4 quoted on **80 D** 1.

The chief criticism to which the solution adopted is open, is that it seems a rather roundabout way of ascertaining a very simple point. Apply the side BC of the rectangle to the diameter BH of the circle; then if the point D falls on the circle the required condition is satisfied; if not, not. What need of the intermediate *ὑπόθεσις* at all? We can only suppose that Plato regarded the direct application to the circle as impracticable, and the length of the diameter (*τὴν δοθεῖσαν γραμμήν*) as the only real *datum*.

But if we further ask whether the geometrical illustration really helps us, or casts a light on the 'hypothetical method,' we shall be obliged to say, 'Very little.' The passage, like the more formidable one on the Nuptial Number, is simply an excrescence. Dr. Gow (*History of Greek Mathematics* p. 175) quotes from Hankel, who says that the text is unnecessarily difficult for describing so simple a fact, and adds, 'I am inclined to think that Plato was fond of showing off his mathematics.' In fact, Plato was rather an enthusiast for mathematics than a mathematician. His vivid mind was no doubt impressed, to an extent excessive even among Greeks, by the amazing cunning manifested in the properties of space and number. He wrote, as we are told, over the door of the Academy, *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω*, thus exacting an entrance examination in geometry from all the alumni of his University. But his direct services to geometry (or mathematics generally) were small. Dr. Allman (*Greek Geometry* p. 215) quotes from the summary of Eudemus' *History of Geometry*, preserved in Proclus: Πλάτων δ' *ἐπὶ τούτοις* (viz. Hippocrates of Chios and Theodorus of Cyrene) *γενόμενος, μεγίστην ἐποίησεν ἐπίδοσιν τά τε ἄλλα μαθήματα καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν λαβεῖν διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδήν, ὃς που δῆλός ἐστι καὶ τὰ συγγράμματα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς λόγοις*

καταπυκνώσας ('cramming') καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ περὶ αὐτὰ θαῦμα τῶν φιλοσοφίας ἀντεχομένων ἐπεγείρων. Dr. Allman adds, 'The way in which Plato is here spoken of is in striking contrast to that in which Eudemus has in his summary written of the promoters of geometry.' Cp. Grote I 219 note.

33. **τὸ συμβαῖνον . . . εἴτε ἀδύνατον**: note the 'prolepsis'; see on **71 A** 25.

35. **εἴτε μή**: see on **86 D** 12. Buttmann thinks that *μή* here **B** is due to the fact that *εἴτε . . . εἴτε* here is an alternative *condition* (*sive . . . sive*), not a double *question* (*utrum . . . an*). This can hardly be maintained.

CHAPTER XXIII

1. What follows exemplifies the process described in *Phaedo* 101 D E. Here the *ὑπόθεσις* as to Virtue is that it comes under the genus Knowledge. The consequence of this *ὑπόθεσις* is stated; in this case it must be *διδακτόν*. Then at **C** 19 the *ὑπόθεσις* itself is investigated, by being referred to a higher *ὑπόθεσις*, 'Virtue is good.' (Cp. *Phaedo* 101 D *ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις.*) This *ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν* (**D** 25).

3. **εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν**: see on **86 D** 12.

4. **εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστι**: see on **86 D** 8. Stallb. quotes *Hipp. maj.* 288 A *εἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλά;* 'Under what class of mental attributes must Virtue fall for it to be teachable, and under what for it to be otherwise?' Note the elasticity of phrase. Here we have *τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχήν* (cp. *Rep.* 618 D), at **88 A**, **C** *τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν*, at **88 C** *τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*. The prepositions represent a series of metaphors by which Plato expresses his meaning; cp. on **73 D** 5. The later phraseology of the *Philebus* (11 D), *ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν*, is more abstract and technical, and so nearer to modern idiom.

6. **πρῶτον μέν κτέ.**, 'to begin with, if it be of a class different from Knowledge will it be teachable or not?' Cp. **C** 21.

8. **ἀναμνηστόν**, 'capable of being acquired by reminiscence.' The word does not occur elsewhere, but is formed on the analogy of *διδακτόν*, etc. See on **70 A** 2.

διαφερέτω δὲ μηδέν: Plato attends to one thing at a time.

10. The hypothesis is a double one: if it is *ἐπιστήμη* it is **C** *διδακτόν*; if not, not. See on **A** 25, **98 D** 35. For *ἐπιστήμη τις* see **73 E** 17 and **D** 30, 31 below, and cp. **89 A** 20.

17. **τούτου μὲν ἄρα κτέ.**, 'we have quickly disposed of this stage.'

18. **τοιοῦδε . . τοιοῦδε**: a few inferior MSS. put in *μή* before the second *τοιοῦδε*. 'Sedulo in proximis quoque cavere videtur Plato, ne distinguat inter *ἐπιστήμην* et *οὐκ ἐπιστήμην*, cujus loco ponit *ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης*. Itaque hic etiam non dicit *μὴ τοιοῦδε*, sed bis *τοιοῦδε*, ut species positione notionis servetur in utroque.' Buttm.

Chapters XXIII (**87 C** 19) to XXV (**89 B**). SOCR. *But is Virtue Knowledge? We may find sure ground in the position that Virtue is good and beneficial, that is, good to us. Now as to goods of the body and external goods, we see they only become good to us when the mind uses them rightly; as to goods of the mind, they are only beneficial when under the conduct of Wisdom. We may conclude, then, that Virtue is Wisdom (φρόνησις), or a branch of it. This leads to the corollary that Virtue is not inborn in men.*

D 23. **τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι**: Riddell § 18. *Prot.* 323 C *τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι*. *Laws* 658 D *τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς νενικηκὼς εἴη; τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο*: 'this is the next question.'

25. **αὐτὸ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν**: Riddell § 215. *Prot.* 360 E *τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή*, etc. Cp. **73 C** 2.

29. The phraseology here is very careful, and should be compared with **89 D** and **99 A**, where the position that *ἀρετή* is *ἐπιστήμη* is modified.

35. **καὶ μήν** clearly marks a fresh stage in the argument.

E 37. **εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι**: see on **77 D** 35.

πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα: 'probandi negotio Plato h.l. supersedet, quia Prot. 333 D sqq. hic locus copiose tractatus est' Fr. See especially *Prot.* 334 A–C.

40. **καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφ.**: *δή*, 'of course.'

CHAPTER XXIV

2. **ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ**: Dr. Reid in his note on Cic. *Acad.* I § 19 says that the *τρίας* or *τριλογία τῶν ἀγαθῶν* i.e. the division of goods into mental, bodily, and external, in the distinct shape which it assumed in later Greek philosophy, is foreign both to Plato and Aristotle. Here the bodily and

external *bona* are first mentioned; the *bona mentis* appear presently at **88 A** 15, kept separate from the others for a reason which appears at **88 E** 14. The distinction between *bona corporis* and *bona externa* is not emphasised, but both classes are represented, as at **78 B, C**, where the *bona mentis* are conspicuous by their absence. We have similar popular views of *bona*, confined to *bona corporis* and *externa*, *Gorg.* 451 E, based on the scolion attributed to Simonides:

> *ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,*
> *δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι,*
> *τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως*
> *καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.*

Here we have health and beauty (*bona corporis*); wealth and friends (*externa*). Cp. *Laws* 661 A *τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος, μύρια δὲ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ λέγεται.* (See for the sequel note on **88 A** 7.) Cp. *Hipp. maj.* 291 D.

At *Gorg.* 467 E *οὐκοῦν λέγεις ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα*, we have samples of each of the three classes. At *Euthyd.* 279 A–C in answer to the question 'What things are good to us?' first is suggested *τὸ πλουτεῖν*. Next *τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τἄλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι.* Then we return to *externa*, *εὐγένειαί τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ.* 'What yet remains?' says Socrates. 'Why, *τὸ σώφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον.*' Then, last but not least, comes *σοφία*. Socrates mischievously pretends that *εὐτυχία* has been forgotten, but shows that its addition is unnecessary.

One of the most elaborate enumerations of *ἀγαθά* in Plato is in *Laws* 631 B foll., where the division is twofold, not threefold, though *bona corporis* and *externa* are both represented: *διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα, ἤρτηται δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηταί τις τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτᾶται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα ὧν ἡγεῖται μὲν ὑγίεια, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι, τέταρτον δὲ δὴ πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλὸς ἀλλ' ὀξὺ βλέπων, ἄνπερ ἅμ' ἕπηται φρονήσει· δ δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις, δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦν σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ ἀνδρεία.*

Ibid. 697 A B we have a recognition of three grades of honour among *ἀγαθά*: *ἔστι δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τιμιώτατα μὲν καὶ*

πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ κεῖσθαι, σωφροσύνης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῇ, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα. Cp. 743 E and †*Ep.* viii 355 B. See the list of *ἀγαθά* in Aristot. *Rhet.* I vi §§ 8–16, and II xxi 5 (with Cope's note).

The distinction between *bona mentis* and other *bona* is far more important than the subdivision of the latter. Plato's view, which really rests on a dichotomy,



is more philosophical than the later *τριλογία*, which made the three classes co-ordinate. Diog. Laertius III 80 quotes Aristotle as ascribing to Plato the statement *τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐν σώματι, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός.* Plato's writings, as has been seen, give some colour to this statement, which nevertheless does not accurately represent his position.

3. **καὶ πλοῦτος δή**, 'and wealth of course': *καὶ—δή* seriem aliquam claudit cum vi.' Buttmann on Dem. *Mid.* (21) § 20.

88 A 7. **ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν**, 'are sometimes positively injurious.' Cp. *Hipp. maj.* 284 D *τίθεται μέν, οἶμαι, ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ βλάπτει, ἐὰν κακῶς τεθῇ ὁ νόμος.* Cp. on **71 B** 8.

Of the argument that follows, showing the sovereignty of *φρόνησις*, we have already had a hint at **78 C** foll. See *Phaedo* 69 A for a strong statement of the doctrine; also *Hipp. maj.* 295 E foll., already referred to on **77 B** 12. Cp. Xen. *Oec.* I §§ 12–14. The argument is developed in the most elaborate form in the *Euthydemus* cc. viii–x (278 E–282 E) and cc. xvii–xix (288 A–293 A). Fr. quotes 281 D *κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· . . ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγῆται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι· ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησίς τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθά· αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι.* Note 280 D E, and 288 E foll., where it is shown that Wealth is not a Good *per se*; if we possessed the secret of turning mountains into gold it would not advantage us if we did not know how to use the gold; and the same is true of immortality: see on **86 A** 8. Cp. *Laws* 661 B C (after the popular enumeration

of *bona corporis* and *externa*) ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγώ που τάδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταῦτά ἐστι ξύμπαντα δικαίοις μὲν καὶ ὁσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄριστα κτήματα, ἀδίκοις δὲ κάκιστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας κτέ. See on **C** 32.

The very full treatment of the subject given in the *Euthydemus*, set beside the concise, though not immature, treatment here, suggests the view that the *Euthydemus* was published before the *Meno*, on the principle adduced by Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 467 E: 'Plato will often be found to take for granted in a later what he has been at great pains to prove in an earlier dialogue.' See Intr. § 18.

10. **ὅταν τί ἡγῆται**: see on **86 D** 8.

16. **σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς**: see on **75 E** 12. The list of *bona mentis* here differs from that at **74 A** in that εὐμαθία and μνήμη are added, representing the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί of Aristotle, distinguished from the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί (*NE.* I xiii 20); σοφία is omitted, to be introduced presently, on a different level from the other virtues, as ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις or νοῦς.

22. **οἷον ἀνδρεία**: this is an instance of 'Binary Structure'; **B** it was only necessary to have ἀνδρεία once, as the subject of φρόνησίς ἐστι; as it is, we have for the sake of emphasis οἷον ἀνδρεία (scil. ἐστί), a part of the thought put forward introductory of the rest. Fr. quotes *Euthyd.* 301 E οἷον βοῦς καὶ πρόβατα, ἆρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι; For οἷον, '*velut*,' see on **76 A** 20.

23. **εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία**: the doctrine that ἀνδρεία, like other Virtues, may be reduced to φρόνησις, is Socratic (Zeller *Socr.* p. 144). Xen. *Mem.* IV 6. 11 οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί. In several of Plato's earlier dialogues the same view is taken. In *Apol.* 29 A B a particular kind of Cowardice, the fear of Death, is shown to spring from a certain kind of ἀμαθία. In the *Protagoras* the doctrine 'Virtue is Knowledge' is defended all round. Courage, which seems to give most difficulty to the thesis, is dealt with first in ch. xxxiv (349 E–350 C) but in a way that arouses objection from Protagoras, and is clearly not intended to be satisfactory. The final proof comes in ch. xxxix, the conclusion being reached at 360 D, ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν. Neither the brave man nor the coward goes to meet what he believes to be τὰ δεινά; but the brave man knows what really are δεινά, the coward does not. To that exposition the present passage of the *Meno* looks back. The dialogue *Laches*, which must probably be regarded as earlier than the *Protagoras*, is devoted

to an examination of the virtue Courage. (Note the similarity of illustration at *Lach.* 193 B C and *Prot.* 350 A.) Laches, who is no philosopher (see on **71 E** 1), at 192 B gives as a definition of Courage *καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς*. But, says Socrates, *καρτερία μετ' ἀφροσύνης* is *βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος*. We must amend the definition by saying *φρόνιμος καρτερία*. Then the question comes *ἡ εἰς τί φρόνιμος;* Mere technical intelligence as to the conditions of the combat it cannot be; for the man who fights knowing he is at a disadvantage is the braver. Laches is at fault. Nikias is appealed to. He has already imbibed something of Socrates' teaching, and, objecting to Laches' definition, says to Socrates (194 D) *πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἅπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός*. He presently defines Courage as *τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην*. Nikias may be taken as representing the actual position of Socrates. He soon shows (195 C D) that he sees the knowledge that constitutes Courage to be something much more than the mere technical knowledge of arms, etc. The final and most important argument comes in cc. xxvii–xxix (198 A–199 E). (We often find Plato making his ideal Socrates criticise the views the real Socrates held. See Intr. p. xxxix.) In these chapters we are led up to a conception of the Supreme Art, the knowledge of Good and Evil, through which all other Arts and Virtues are made beneficial. (This is the Kingly Art of *Euthydemus* 291 B foll. where, however, a further problem is raised.) Courage then (199 C D) becomes *οὐ μόνον δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη . . . ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων*. 'But a man who knows thus much' (so Grote summarises the sequel), 'cannot be destitute of any part of Virtue. He must possess Temperance and Justice as well as Courage. Courage therefore, according to your definition, is not a part of Virtue, it is the whole.' A solution of the problem on what the differentiation of the Virtues rests is first offered by Plato in the *Republic*.

From this point till 89 C for *ἐπιστήμη* we find substituted the term *φρόνησις*, the mental faculty correlative to it.

οἷον θάρρος τι: for the relation of *ἀνδρεία* to *θάρρος* see *Prot.* ch. xxxiv; the conclusion *οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι θάρσος καὶ ἀνδρείαν* is enunciated by Protagoras (351 A). *θάρσος* or *θάρρος* (which of course must be carefully distinguished from *θράσος* and *θρασύτης*) differ from *ἀνδρεία* by being a mere emotion without rational basis. *θάρσος* is the antithesis of *φόβος* (rather than *δέος*: see *Prot.* 358 E with J. & A. M. Adam's note there) and so is coupled with it (*Tim.* 69 D) in the list of passions, *θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε ξυμβούλω.*

27. **οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία:** the rest of the Virtues are not treated seriatim.

As to *σωφροσύνη* we are told of Socrates by Xenophon (*Mem.* III 9. 4) *σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῷ τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε.* The earlier treatment of *σωφροσύνη* to which the present passage looks back is chiefly to be found in the *Protagoras*. In ch. xx (332 A-333 B) we have the identity of *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* grounded on the argument that they both have the same opposite, *ἀφροσύνη*. But this merely verbal argument is subsidiary to the more general one in cc. xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii (351 B–357 E), already referred to on **77 B** 12 as illustrating the doctrine *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός*. It is a mistake to talk of a man as 'overcome by pleasure.' Say rather that he mistakes in the measuring or valuing of different pleasures and pains.

The dialogue *Charmides* is devoted to an examination of the Virtue Temperance, in some respects analogous to the treatment of Courage in the *Laches*. The criticism of the first two definitions of Temperance as (1) *ἡσυχιότης τις* 159 B, (2) *αἰδώς* 160 E, go chiefly to show that Temperance is not a merely negative notion. See on **76 C** 16. (It is unnecessary to suppose that the criticism of the first definition is directed against the view of the *Gorgias* that makes *κόσμος* an element in *σωφροσύνη*. See Dr. Thompson's note on 507 A.) The remaining definitions, *τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*, *τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτὸν κτέ.*, which emanate from Critias, are near akin to the Socratic view. The most important part of the criticism, which is very elaborate, is reached at 173 D: if *σωφροσύνη* be identified with *ἐπιστήμη* we have yet to find the link connecting it with the Beneficial and the Good: *ὅτι δ' ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔπω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ φίλε Κριτία.* We are thus again led to the question, '*What* knowledge constitutes the Master-art?' 'Knowledge of Good and Evil,' says Critias. *Ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ ξυμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν* (174 B).

28. See Appendix on the text. The order *σωφροσύνη—εὐμαθία—μανθανόμενα—καταρτυόμενα* is chiastic. The only other place in Plato where *καταρτύειν* ('discipline' or 'regulate') occurs is *Laws* 808 D *παῖς ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην*. The word is rather poetical.

33. **ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα,** 'active and passive **C** effort.' The words do not correspond with *μανθανόμενα* and

καταρτύομενα, but are a general and exhaustive division of moral energy. The word *καρτέρημα* appears to be coined for the occasion.

ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως: cp. *Prot.* 352 B *δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικόν, οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι.* With the Stoics *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν* became the technical term for Reason. Cp. also the simile in *Phaedr.* 246 A foll., where Reason is the *ἡνίοχος* and Courage and Appetite the steeds. In the list of the virtues that constitute the philosophic character (*Rep.* 485 B foll.) first comes the love of Eternal Truth, that is, *σοφία*: from this we deduce the other virtues (*τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χόρον* 490 C) in orderly sequence. *μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διειληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις;* says Socrates (486 E) after the enumeration. The list corresponds very nearly to that at **88 A** 16. See on **A** 7.

38. **ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι**: the dative *ὠφελίμῳ* is due to 'Attraction'; cp. *Hipp. maj.* 294 B *ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι.*—Rid. § 183. Cp. **81 E** 17.

CHAPTER XXV

D 2. **πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα**: these words are introduced to explain *τἄλλα*, namely, the *bona corporis* and *bona externa* which he has dealt with at **87 E** foll. They interrupt the construction, but there is no reason to follow Hirschig in bracketing the words *τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι.*

5. **ἐποίει**, 'makes, as we saw'; see on **83 D** 52.

E 13. **κατὰ πάντων**: see on **73 D** 5.

14. **εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι**: literally '*dependere*'; for the word cp. *Menex.* 247 E; for the matter *Laws* 631 B (quoted on **87 E** 2) and 963 A ΚΛ. *Τὴν δέ γε ἀρετὴν τέτταρα ἔθεμέν που.* ΑΘ. *Πάνυ μὲν οἶν.* ΚΛ. *Νοῦν δέ γε τούτων πάντων ἡγεμόνα πρὸς ὃν δὴ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ τούτων τὰ τρία δεῖ βλέπειν.* For the supremacy of *ψυχή* generally over things of the Body, etc. see *Gorg.* 465 C; the true and false arts of the Body are easily distinguished; those of the Soul are not so: if the Soul did not provide a Court of Appeal in the case of arts of the Body (*εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει*) discrimination there would be impossible. Cp. *Phaedo* 79 E *ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.*

89 A 17. **φρόνησις** is predicate.

20. **φρόνησιν** again is predicate. The argument in bare syllogistic form is

All *ὠφέλιμον* is *φρόνησις*.
All *ἀρετή* is *ὠφέλιμον*.
∴ All *ἀρετή* is *φρόνησις*.

With **ξύμπασαν** supply *ἀρετήν* ; and with **μέρος τι**, *ἀρετῆς*. Wherever Virtue is found *φρόνησις* is found. But the notion Virtue may include other elements (*μέρη*) besides *φρόνησις*.

24. **οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί** : the form of the apodosis *ἂν εἶεν* is only a polite modification of the indicative. For this form of the conditional sentence cp. *Apol.* 25 B *πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει*. Goodwin § 403. See Appendix on the text. For the abbreviated predicate see Kühner §§ 597 f. and cp. *Prot.* 325 B *σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί* (so the MSS.), and 344 D *τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι* (scil. *κακῷ*).

The point now arrived at should be compared with the original statement of the problem at **70 A**. There the alternatives as to the origin of *ἀρετή* were threefold ; it is either—

(I) acquired, and that (*a*) by teaching (*διδακτόν*), or (*b*) by practice and example (*ἀσκητόν*) ; or
(II) native ; or
(III) given *ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ*.

Here alternative II (*φύσει*) is eliminated, and we hear no more of *ἀσκητόν*, I (*b*). In the final result (**98 C D** and **99 E**) we have *φύσει* again discarded as an alternative. For the relation of *φύσις* to *θεία μοῖρα* see article 'Δύναμις and Φύσις in Plato' by R. G. Bury (*CR.* VIII 300): 'Φύσις may denote what is independent of *human* effort or volition ; so *φύσει* is opposed to *νόμῳ* (*Prot.* 337 C, *Gorg.* 482 E, etc.), to *τέχνῃ* (*Rep.* 381 A), to *διδακτόν* (*Prot.* 323 C), to *σοφίᾳ* (*Apol.* 22 C). So it indicates what is innate, instinctive –the inherited, permanent, and transmissible characteristics as opposed to the acquired and artificial.' It is opposed to *ἐπίκτητον Rep.* 618 D.

In the *Protagoras* (323 C) the sophist is made to say *ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν (τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει . . ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν.* At *Apol.* 22 C it is noticeable that *φύσει* is used as equivalent to *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ* : *ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν, ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις*

κτέ. We appear to have a similar identification in the difficult passage *Laws* 642 C: *μόνοι γὰρ (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀληθῶς καὶ οὐ πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί,* for which see Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* p. 184 note. Sch., however, cuts out *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ.* See on **98 D** 24 and **99 E** 5.

B 28. **οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον**: 'when a conditional relative clause depends on a past tense of the indicative implying the non-fulfilment of a condition, it regularly takes a past tense of the indicative by *assimilation*,' Goodwin § 559; cp. § 528. Here the relative depends on the *apodosis* of a conditional clause. So in *Charm.* 171 E *οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα κτέ.* Kühner § 399, 6 a. Such temporal sentences introduced by *πρίν* as occur at **84 C** 25, **86 D** 13, are analogous.

31. **ἐν ἀκροπόλει**: as the treasury of the city. So at the end of the *Laws* (969 C) of ideal guardians of the city: *ἐὰν ἄρα οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι, παιδευθῶσί τε προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν.*

κατασημηνάμενοι: the allusion, as Buttmann pointed out, is not to minting, but to the putting a seal on a door, such as that of the Ὀπισθόδομος, containing valuables, to mark them as *public property.* He refers to Boeckh *Public Economy of Athens* (p. 442 E.T.). See Hicks *Hist. Inscr.* 37 A § 6 = *C.I.A.* I 32: *καὶ (οἱ ταμίαι τῶν θεῶν) συνοιγόντων καὶ συγκλειόντων τὰς θύρας τοῦ ὀπισθοδόμου καὶ συσσημαινέσθων τοῖς τῶν τῆς Ἀθηναίας ταμίαις.* Xen. *Hell.* III i 27 *ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ εἶδε πάντα, κατέκλεισεν αὐτὰ καὶ κατεσημήνατο καὶ φύλακας κατέστησεν.*

Ueberweg (*Untersuchungen* p. 294) points out that **100 A** contemplates an Ideal State, such as that of the *Republic.* Dr. Henry Jackson has pointed out to me that this might still more be said of the present passage; cp. *Rep.* 415 A. In the *Meno* the Gold is used as a simile; in the *Republic* it has developed into a pious fraud: *ἐστὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει συνέμιξεν αὐτοῖς, κτέ.* Cp. *Crat.* 398 A.

32. **ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν**: 'in Attic Greek the secondary tenses of the indicative are used in final clauses to denote that the purpose is dependent upon some unaccomplished action or unfulfilled condition, and therefore *is not* or was not attained,' Goodwin *MT.* § 333, Kühner § 553. 7, Hadley § 884, F.E.T. § 230; *Crito* 44 D *εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον οἷοί τ' εἶναι τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τ' ἦσαν αὖ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, Prot.* 335 C, *Symp.* 181 D, etc. See App. on the text.

33. **ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο . . . γίγνοιντο**: 'if the purpose is future, at the time of speaking, or if it is left uncertain whether the object is or was attained, it must be expressed in the ordinary way by the subjunctive or optative,' Goodwin *MT.* § 336. He quotes our passage, translating and commenting: 'we should guard (in that case) in the Acropolis, that no one might corrupt them (as some now corrupt them), and that when in the future they should become of age they might become useful to their states. (Here it is not implied that they never become useful, this depending partly on the future.)' The change from *ἵνα διέφθειρεν* to *ἵνα γίγνοιντο* marks a change from an unrealized supposition to a vague future supposition. [Cp. Kühner § 399. Anm. 4.]

εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, 'of age.' 'Etiam *εἰς ἡλικίαν* (*Theaet.* 142 D) per eminentiam de juvenili aetate: Liv. xlii 34 cum primum in aetatem veni pater mihi uxorem dedit.' Fr.

Chapter XXVI (**89 B–90 B**). SOCR. *It seems then that Virtue is a matter of teaching. But a very serious difficulty remains. Where are the teachers? I have often tried to find them without success. Let us invite Anytus here to share the quest. He appears to be an example of successful education himself, and ought to be able to help us.*

This chapter forms a transition to the fourth section.

6. **μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν**: this passage and the **C** sequel furnish an interesting collection of usages of *μὴ οὐ*. We have:—

(*α*) the present passage (*μὴ οὐ* with *indic.*, dependent on no word expressed):
(*β*) *μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ δοκεῖν* (*μὴ οὐ* with *subj.*, dependent on no word expressed) **C** 10:
(*γ*) *ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ᾖ* (*μὴ οὐ* with *subj.*, dependent on *ἀπιστεῖς*) **D** 14:
(*δ*) *οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι* (*μὴ οὐ* with *infin.*, dependent on *οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι*) **D** 18.
With these may be considered **D** 18 *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν*, dependent on *ἀπιστεῖν*.

In (*α*) and (*β*) it is clear that *μὴ οὐ* expresses the opposite of what would be expressed by *μή* alone, and *οὐ* can be connected closely with some word in the context: (*α*) *οὐ καλῶς*, (*β*) *οὐ μόνον*. In these cases, then, the *οὐ* needs no explanation.

Three uses of *μή* with the indicative mood must be distinguished.

(I) In a direct question, where *μή*, like *num*, expects a negative answer (Kühner § 587. 11, Jelf § 873. 4, § 741 c d, Hadley § 1015). This usage appears first in Aesch. (*P. V.* 247 *μή πού τι προῦβης τῶνδε καὶ περαιτέρω ;* 962 *μή τί σοι δοκῶ ταρβεῖν ; Pers.* 344). This usage is common in Plato ; one has occurred at **78 C** 23. The negative expectancy is stronger with *μῶν* (= *μὴ οὖν*, see **73 B** 46). *μή* is sometimes qualified by *πῃ* : *Prot.* 356 c, *Rep.* 442 d, 466 a, 486 e.

Though *μή* in this use 'expects' a negative answer, the expectation is sometimes *not justified* or *ironical* (**78 C** 23, *Crito* 44 e ΚΡ. Ἆρά γε *μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων ;* ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, *Rep.* 552 e *μὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πόλεσιν εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας ; οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν*). This is one difficulty in the discrimination between this class and (III).

(II) *μή* dependent on a word expressing fear, caution, etc. The verb is most frequently in the subjunctive mood ; but occasionally in the future indicative (Goodwin § 367), and not uncommonly in present or past tenses of the indicative, when the object of fear is supposed to be happening now (present), or to have happened (perf.), or to have been happening (imp.). No instance of the aor. indic. is given in Attic Greek, but see *Od.* v. 300 (Goodwin § 369, Kühner § 589. 6, Jelf § 814 a, F.E.T. § 238, cp. § 300). Good instances for comparison of the moods are furnished by Soph. *El.* 580 *ὅρα μὴ πῆμα σαυτῃ καὶ μετάγνοιαν τίθῃς* (referring to the future) and 584 *ἀλλ' εἰσόρα μὴ σκῆψιν οὐκ οὖσαν τίθῃς*, 'see that you are not making a false excuse' (she is actually making one). See Jebb's note on 580. This usage goes back to Homer. We may say that *μή* introduces the idea repudiated, or the fear entertained. Cp. on **77 A** 3.

(III) A usage probably developed from (II) : *μή* is used, not dependent on any word, in 'cautious assertions' (Goodwin § 269 ; 'presumptive use,' Riddell § 59). The subjunctive is common ; instances of the indicative are few (Kühner § 394. Anm. 5 ; § 589. Anm. 5). *μή* with a past tense of the indicative (like *ὡμολογήσαμεν*) expresses a suspicion about a past fact. Another (probable) instance of the aor. indic. in this construction is *Euthyd.* 291 a (quoted below). Buttmann, asserting that the perfect was the only tense quoted in this use from prose authors, and noting that *ὡμολογήκαμεν* is the tense used at **96 E** 2 and **98 E**, etc., says that one might be tempted to alter the aorist here to the perfect, but adds : 'aptior tamen hic videtur aoristus in re praeterita quidem sed quae non firma maneat.'

This use of *μή* with the *indic.* does not appear before Plato. The use of *μήποτε* 'perhaps,' common in Aristotle and later

writers, does not occur in Plato. In *Phaedo* 78 D *μήποτε* is a question with negative tendency, and falls under (I). The difference between this usage and (I) is parallel to the difference between *οὐ* in statements and in questions; only with *μή* the contrast is less strong, and the tendencies are *reversed*. Thus: *οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν* is a negative assertion: *οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν;* is a question with strong affirmative tendency. But *μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν* is a cautious affirmative assertion: *μή τοῦτό ἐστιν;* is a question with negative tendency.

In some of the examples that follow it is not easy to distinguish whether we have a 'cautious assertion' (III) or an *ironical* question, i.e. one not really expecting a negative answer (I).

Prot. 312 A *ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι.* Most editors print this as an interrogation; J. and A. M. Adam, however, quoting this place in the *Meno* and others, rightly say that in all of these passages it is better to take *μή* as 'perhaps' than as an equivalent to Latin *num?*

Gorg. 512 D *ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ ἢ τὸ σῴζειν τε καὶ σῴζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁπόσον δὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἑατέον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον.* (So the MSS.: Sch. writes *ἢ γάρ* for *μὴ γάρ*, and the passage has been otherwise altered, unnecessarily.)

Lys. 220 A *ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ὃ περὶ παντὸς ποιούμεθα.* (Here it is not certain that the second clause is still under the influence of *μή*.)

Euthyd. 290 E *ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ τοιαῦτα εἰπών.*

Ibid. 291 A *ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων, μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρὼν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγξατο.* Heind. Herm. Sch. all print the last two as questions.

Ibid. 298 C *μὴ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις.* (So Heind.) 'I think you are weaving flax with not-flax,' i.e. not arguing *in pari materia*. (Herm. and Sch. punctuate *μὴ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· κτέ.*, *μή* thus being deprecatory **as at 75 B 13.**)

Apol. 25 A *ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους· ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες;* (Kühner § 589. Anm. 5, I think rightly, regards this as a cautious assertion, followed by a question. Most editors put note of interrogation after *νεωτέρους*).

As to the present passage in the *Meno*, Kühner (§ 394. Anm. 5) and Ast (s.v. *μή* p. 335) both regard it as a 'cautious assertion'; so does Goodwin, § 269, adding, however, that 'it *may* be interrogative.' I take the former view, and have therefore,

following Buttmann, printed it without a mark of interrogation, which Herm. Sch. and Fr. all add.

In *Lys.* 213 D ἆρα *μή*, *ὦ Μενέξενε*, *τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐζητοῦμεν ;* the ἆρα clearly marks the sentence as interrogative, and it furnishes a good example of the ironical class of direct questions with *μή* spoken of above (I). For though the sentence pretends to say 'can it be we were not right?' i.e. 'surely we *were* right,' the answer is *οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ*, 'I think *not*.'

10. **ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ** : there are large classes of cases, corresponding to the indicative uses (II) and (III) above, where *μή* is used with the *subjunctive* either, like (II), *dependent* on a word expressive of fear, caution, etc. (Goodwin § 365, Kühner § 589. 2, Jelf § 814, F.E.T. § 237), or, like (III), *independently*, as a 'cautious assertion' (Goodwin § 265, Kühner § 394. 6, F.E.T. § 300). Of the latter class Goodwin l.c. gives many instances from Plato, with whom it is a favourite construction. See **94 B** 20, **E** 14. The only real example before Plato is Hdt. v 79 ἀλλὰ *μᾶλλον μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ μαντήιον*. The instances from Homer given by Kühner (cp. F.E.T. § 309) are a somewhat different class, of the nature of wishes (Goodwin § 261). Probably the 'cautious assertion' was a later development from a construction dependent on a verb of fearing, after this had been stereotyped, whereas the dependent construction was itself developed 'from an original *parataxis* or co-ordination of two independent sentences,' namely an expression of fear (*δείδω*) followed by a repudiation of an idea (*μὴ νῆας ἕλωσι*) (Goodwin §§ 307–309, cp. §§ 262, 366). Goodwin (§ 268) further recognizes a small class corresponding to (I) above ; instances of '*μή* with the subjunctive in a cautious *question*, with a negative answer implied.' Three instances are quoted from Plato, besides a doubtful one from the † *Sisyphus*.

Rep. 603 C *μή τι ἄλλο ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ; οὐδέν.*

Parm. 163 C *τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἢ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ; οὐδὲν ἄλλο.* (The MSS. give ἢ. Heindorf substituted *ἦν*. Herm. and Waddell keep ἢ.)

Phaedo 64 C ἆρα *μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο ; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.* (Bekker, Sch. Archer-Hind excise ἢ. Heind. Herm. Wohlrab, Geddes retain it.) Kühner § 587. 14.

With these may be ranked two places in Xenophon, *Mem.* IV ii 12 *μὴ οὖν οὐ δύνωμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι ; Oec.* iv 4 ἆρα *μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα μιμήσασθαι ;* These, although in the first person, are not 'deliberative' questions, and in both *μή*=*num*. In the real deliberative question (Goodwin § 287) *μή* either is *nonne* (see especially *Rep.* 337 B *μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν ;* and 554 B *μὴ φῶμεν ; καὶ μάλ', ἔφη*) or is indifferent.

οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον : this is characteristic of the Socratic temper as distinguished from the 'Eristic,' at least as caricatured by Plato. See Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 464, who quotes *Euthyd.* 287 B εἶτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβών, οὕτως εἶ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμιμνήσκει, καὶ εἴ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένοις λόγοις οὐχ ἕξεις δ τι χρῇ ;

12. **ὑγιές** (see on **77 A** 8) : a very favourite with word Plato.

14. **ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ** : in such a verb as *ἀπιστῶ* **D** we have two notions combined, namely of denial or disbelief and of fear or misgiving. From the former point of view it will be followed by an infin. or *ὅτι* with an indic. ; from the latter by *μή* with the subjunctive. *Phaedo* 91 C Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ προαπολλύηται. Cp. ibid. 91 D and 70 A, Xen. *Symp.* viii 14 δοκοῦσι δ' ἔμοιγε ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐοικέναι μὴ χωρὶς γενόμενοι οὐκ ἀποτελῶσι τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα. *μή* introduces the idea warded off, which is a negative one : 'You have a misgiving lest (*μή*) it be *not* knowledge' (*οὐκ ἐπιστήμη*).

17. **οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι** : the metaphor is from revoking a move in a game : 'ἀπὸ τῶν πεττευόντων καὶ τὰς κεκινημένας ἤδη ψήφους διορθούντων' Harpocration : *Phaedo* 87 A οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως ἀποδεδεῖχθαι : *Charm.* 164 C ἐκείνων ἄν τι ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην (note the active *ἀναθέντι* = *dedicanti* in the immediate sequel) : *Prot.* 355 A ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν : *Gorg.* 462 A. But in *Gorg.* 461 D and † *Hipparchus* 229 E the meaning of *ἀναθέσθαι* is to *give* a move back.

18. **μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι** : 'after a principal sentence containing verbs and expressions of *denying*, *hindering*, *forbidding*, and *avoiding* *μή* is used with the infin., where in English we use no negative' F.E.T. § 298, cp. § 308 ; Hadley 1029 ; Kühner § 516. 3. See also on **90 E** 26.

The explanation of the difference between the Greek and English use is that the object of these verbs may be looked upon from two different points of view. It may be either expressive of the thing denied or prevented (*external* object), or expressive of the *upshot* of the denial or prevention (*internal* object). English leans to the former use, Greek to the latter. There are instances in Greek where the *μή* is omitted, and the infinitive put positively as an external object (F.E.T. pp. 366 note 2, p. 369, 1 ; Goodwin §§ 807, 811 ; Kühner § 516. Anm. 9 a ; Jelf 749. 1). This is chiefly with verbs of *prevention*, etc. ; the omission of *μή* after verbs of *denial* is very rare. Jebb on

Soph. *Ant.* 442 says that after ἀρνεῖσθαι when it means to *deny*, μή regularly precedes the dependent inf., but not when it means to *refuse*.

The ambiguity may be paralleled by a similar one in the word 'doubt.' We say 'I doubt if he is dead' or 'I doubt his being dead,' where the clause 'if he is dead' or the noun-phrase 'his being dead' are external objects to the verb 'doubt.' But an old writer, or a North-country man now, would say 'I doubt he is dead,' where the clause 'he is dead' is really an internal object of the word 'doubt,' and expresses the opinion held.

When the verb of denial, etc. is itself negatived, then if the dependent infinitive is to remain an internal object, i.e. to express the upshot of the state of mind, or state of fact, the ordinary μή will have to be reversed, which is effected by οὐ. Thus the meaning here is 'I do *not* revoke my position, the net result being that there was *no* mistake.' Cp. *Phaedo* 87 A (quoted above); *Gorg.* 461 C τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι (i.e. εὖ οἶσθα οὐδένα ἀπαρνησόμενον) μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια;

There is however considerable variety of construction possible. But after a verb of *denial* negatived, μὴ οὐ with the infin. is much the most common construction (Kühner § 516. 4, Hadley § 1034, Goodwin §§ 807, 815). Instances of the simple infin. however occur (Kühner § 516. Anm. 9 b, F.E.T. pp. 368, 9): Aesch. *Eum.* 611 δρᾶσαι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα; Aeschines 3 § 250 ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαρνοῦνται πράττειν. Twice in Soph. (*Aj.* 96, *Ant.* 443) we have οὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι τὸ μή (Goodwin § 812). (We have in Plato *Phaedr.* 256 A μὴ ἂν ἀπαρνηθῆναι χαρίσασθαι, and *Rep.* 468 C μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν. But in both these places ἀπαρνεῖσθαι means 'refuse,' not 'deny.')

Metrical considerations sometimes led to μή rather than μὴ οὐ: in Soph *O.T.* 1388, Ar. *Peace* 315 after a negative verb of *hindrance* we have the initial vowel of the infinitive cut off after μή, so that μὴ οὐ would have been impracticable; but this does not apply at Soph. *Phil.* 349, when μὴ οὐ might have been expected.

ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη: Kühner § 516. 3 b, Jelf 749. 2. ἀπιστῶ regarded as a '*verbum sentiendi vel declarandi*' may be followed by an infinitive with μή, or by ὅτι with οὐ and a finite verb. See on D 14 above. The explanation of the negatives is similar to that in the case of ἀνατίθεμαι. The clause ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν κτέ. is of the nature of an '*internal* object.' μή with the infin. after ἀπιστεῖν is fairly common; Thuc. IV 40 ἠπίστουν μὴ εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ὁμοίους, 'they did not believe that those who had given up their arms were

like those who had fallen' ; also I 10, II 101 ; Hdt. I 68 (but III 66 an infin. of the thing disbelieved, without *μή*) ; *Rep.* 555 A, *Polit.* 301 C ; after passive, *Charm.* 168 E, *Laws* 839 C. *ὅτι οὐ* after verbs of this class is very rare, and I can find no other instance of it after *ἀπιστῶ*. We have *ὡς without οὐ Rep.* 450 C D *καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται ἀπιστοῖτ' ἄν, καὶ ὡς ἄριστα ἂν εἴη ἀπιστήσεται*, and *ὡς οὐ* after some similar words, as *ἐξελεγκτέος*, *Gorg.* 508 B. Cp. *Euthyphr.* 8 B, etc. (*ἀπιστῶ* is also treated as a verb of *inquiry* : *Phaedo* 73 B *ἀπιστεῖς πῶς μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν.*)

24. **οὔ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν** : the relative clause represents a conditional clause of the same kind (*εἰ — εἶεν*) : 'a future condition of the less vivid form,' Goodwin § 531 ; cp. F.E.T. pp. 201, 202, Hadley § 917. (These examples must be distinguished from the optative 'of indefinite frequency' in relative clauses referring to past time, 'when the verb in the antecedent clause denotes a customary or repeated action or a general truth' Goodwin § 532 ; e.g. Thuc. II 52 *οἱ δέ, καιομένου ἄλλου, ἐπιβαλόντες ὃν φέροιεν, ἀπῆσαν.*) Cp. **96 C** 8 and see on **92 C** 18. Other places in Plato similar to the present are *Phaedr.* 276 B *ὁ νοῦν ἔχων γέωργος ὧν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο καὶ ἔγκαρπα βούλοιτο γενέσθαι πότερα σπουδῇ ἂν θέρους εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους ἀρῶν χαίροι ; Euthyd.* 302 A *ἆρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἃ σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι ὅτῳ βούλοιο θεῶν ; Lys.* 214 D *ὃ εἴη*, 214 E *ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ὃ μὴ καὶ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ πάθοι ;* 215 A *ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῷτο πῶς φίλον* (scil. *ἂν εἴη*) ; 215 B *ὃ μὴ ἀγαπῴη* (but Sch. *ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν*) ; 219 E ; *Hipp. maj.* 284 A, 296 B ; *Rep.* 412 D, 549 B, 557 B. In all these cases the relative clause depends upon an optative (or infinitive representing an optative) with *ἄν*, i.e. upon an apodosis. Instances where the relative depends on *εἰ* with the optative (a protasis) are much rarer. See † *Erastae* 136 C *εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ οὗ σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχοις, πότερον τὸν φιλόσοφον εἰσάγοις ἂν ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν λάβοις ;* E

25. **καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι** : *αὐτό* is here transferred from its natural place after *εἰκάζοιμεν* by 'hyperbaton' (Riddell §§ 287 foll., F.E.T. p. 418, Hadley § 1062). The usual object of hyperbaton is, by changing the common order, to get, besides the direct meaning given by the syntax of the words, an additional meaning suggested by their collocation. Here the impression is for a moment left on the mind that *αὐτό* is governed by *εἰκάζοντες* used in a transitive sense, as at **80 C** 26. See too on **98 B** 2. (An occasional object of hyperbaton is to avoid the juxtaposition of like cases.

This I think is exemplified by *Euthyd.* 275 E *ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαί μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ*, where *τῷ μειρακίῳ*, dependent on *παρακελεύσασθαι*, is kept well apart from *μοι*.)

Riddell's elaborate list of examples of hyperbaton in Plato is far from exhaustive. The present example, which he omits, would seemingly come in § 289. Add *Euthyphr.* 11 C *τὸ γὰρ περιιέναι τούτοις τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς*, where see Fr.'s. note. He quotes *inter alia* *Phaedr.* 239 A *τοσούτων κακῶν . . . ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων, τῶν μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν.* The tendency to elaborate the order of words grew on Plato.

26. **μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι**: cp. the reference to this passage at **96 C** 8, where we have *μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι*. We need not infer (with Buttm.) that *μηδέ* should be read here.

29. **εἰ εἶεν**: indirect question; the optative being used because *ζητῶν* is here imperfect.

33. **εἰς καλόν**, '*opportune*, ut sescenties' Stallbaum. See *Hipp. maj.* 286 C D; *εἰς κάλλιστον Euthyd.* 275 B.

34. Ast regards the forms *ἐκαθεζόμην*, *παρεκαθεζόμην* as always *aorists* in Plato; I believe rightly. No present indic. *καθέζομαι* or *παρακαθέζομαι* occurs in Plato. (The simple *ἕζομαι* in all its forms is foreign to Attic prose.) The apparent exception † *Axiochus* 371 C *καθέζονται δικασταί* is significant. Nor does the imperative or infinitive occur, in which the accent would discriminate. I know of no instance in Plato where the sense would require *ἐκαθεζόμην* or *παρεκαθεζόμην* or the corresponding participles to be impf.; and in all cases the aorist sense is better. Thus, here 'Anytus has just sat down'; he has not 'been sitting' for some time, for it would have been difficult to ignore him, and the share he takes presently suggests no acquaintance with the previous dialogue (Fr. p. 23). Cp. *Charm.* 153 C *δεῦρο καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι*, 'come and sit down here, and tell me all about it'; ibid. *παρακαθεζόμενος*; ibid. 155 C *καθέζοιτο, ἐκαθέζετο*; *Lys.* 206 C *ἂν γὰρ εἰσέλθῃς καὶ καθεζόμενος διαλέγῃ* 'if you go in and take a seat and engage in talk'; ibid. 207 A *ἐκαθεζόμεθα καὶ διελεγόμεθα*, 'we had seated ourselves, and were in conversation'; *Euthyd.* 274 B *ἔτυχε πόρρω καθεζόμενος τοῦ* Κλεινίου, 'happened to have taken a seat at some distance from C.'; *Phaedo* 61 C *καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ καθεζόμενος* ('assuming a sitting posture') *οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.* Cp. Xen. *Mem.* IV ii 8 *παρακαθεζομένου.*

ᾧ μεταδῶμεν: the relative here has a *definite* antecedent,

and so has no effect on the mood of the following verb: the subjunctive is hortatory. Goodwin § 519. Buttm. strangely regards it as *final*: see Goodwin § 572.

36. **Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε**: for Anytus see Introd. § 6. **90 A**

37. **Ἀνθεμίωνος**: we know nothing of him beyond what we read here. Plato's object in eulogizing him is not, as Cobet thought (*Coll. crit.* p. 47), merely to furnish a foil to the faults of his son, but also to give another instance of the truth set forth cc. xxxii-xxxiv (**93 B** foll.) that even the best of fathers cannot communicate virtue to their children.

39. **τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα**: the name of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos in the sixth century B.C., whose history is given by Herodotus in his third book, is here used proverbially as a type of wealth. We generally use the name of Croesus in this connexion. Fr. quotes other instances; *τὰ Ταντάλου τάλαντα Euthyphr.* 11 E. Cp. *Laws* 660 E *ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα πλουτῇ Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μᾶλλον.*

40. **Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος**: this important man was a leader of the democratic or anti-Spartan party at Thebes. We find him in the year 403 B.C. helping the exiled Athenian democrats, Thrasybulus, Anytus, etc., to return. Justin v 9 itaque Ismenias Thebanorum princeps etsi publicis non poterat, privatis tamen viribus adjuvabat. In 395 B.C. Tithraustes, the successor of Tissaphernes, irritated by Agesilaus' successes in Asia Minor, sent over Timocrates the Rhodian to Greece with thirty talents to bribe the leaders in various states to make war against Sparta. Xenophon (*Hell.* III v 1) mentions as recipients of this money Androcleidas, *Ismenias*, and Galaxidorus at Thebes, two men at Corinth, and 'Cylon and his friends' at Argos (Grote *Hist.* ch. lxxiv). The share that would thus fall to Ismenias could only be described as *τὰ Πολ. χρήματα* by a hyperbole. Fr. as to this shrewdly observes that nothing is more liable to exaggeration than wealth. But it is not at all necessary to suppose that the money brought by Timocrates was the only instance in which Ismenias received gifts of this kind. Believing, as I do, that the *Meno* was not written till at least ten years after 395, I think Plato may well have had later instances in his mind. Reference to these gifts from Persia is made in the words *οὐδὲ δόντος τινός* just above; Anthemion's wealth was not, like that of Ismenias, the result of bribery. Plato in one other place (*Rep.* I 336 A) refers to Ismenias, whom he evidently disliked. The *Meno* has points of kinship with the first book of the *Republic*, the composition of which probably followed it at no long interval (Introd. § 19). Socrates there

thinks the definition of Justice 'to benefit one's friends and harm one's foes' Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός. The collocation of names is not without irony, but the mention of Ismenias is made appropriate by the fact that he distinctly used his wealth as a political engine—to 'help his friends and harm his foes.' Ismenias was put to death in 382 B.C. by the Spartans after they had obtained control of Thebes by seizing the Cadmea. *Xen. Hell.* v ii 35 τότε δὴ κατηγορεῖτο τοῦ Ἰσμηνίου καὶ ὡς βαρβαρίζοι καὶ ὡς ξένος τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος γεγενημένος εἴη καὶ ὡς τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετειληφὼς εἴη καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχῆς πάσης ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ Ἀνδροκλείδας αἰτιώτατοι εἶεν. (See Grote *Hist.* ch. lxxvi.)

Were the passages in the *Meno* and the *Republic* written after the death of Ismenias? Plato very rarely mentions by name a person living at the time of his writing. But this rule is not universal. Isocrates certainly, and Lysias probably, were living at the time when the *Phaedrus* was written. Moreover, the *Meno* and the first book of the *Republic* can hardly have been written long after 382, and it is not likely that such references to Ismenias should be made immediately after his death. I think both passages were written while Ismenias was still powerful at Thebes, that is, before the end of 382 B.C., but probably not *much* before (Intr. §14).

We have here one of several anachronisms in which Plato introduces in dialogues where Socrates is present mention of events that happened after Socrates' death. Cp. *Symp.* 193 A, where allusion is made to the breaking-up of Mantinea by the Spartans in 385 B.C.; *Menex.* 244 D foll.

The Ismenias here mentioned must not be confused with his son Ismenias, who in 367 accompanied Pelopidas to the court of the Great King (Plut. *Artox.* 22).

42. **δοκῶν εἶναι**: the editors note the anacoluthon. You would expect *δοκοῦντος*. But the structure of the whole sentence is loose. The *πρῶτον μέν* at line 36 referring to Anytus is not answered by either the *ἔπειτα* at line 41, or that at 44, both of which refer to Anthemion. After the introduction of the relative sentence *ὃς ἐγένετο*, Anthemion becomes the main subject, and the participle *δοκῶν* naturally follows the case of *κτησάμενος*.

B 43. **ὀγκώδης**: lit. 'bloated.' The word occurs nowhere else in Plato; and is very rare in this sense elsewhere. But *ὄγκος* occurs often in the tragedians in the sense 'dignity,' 'self-importance.' So *ὀγκοῦμαι*, as Aristoph. *Frogs* 703.

ἐπαχθής = *odiosus* often in Plato, as *Phaedo* 87 A *εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν*. Cp. Thuc. VI 54 *ἐπαχθὴς ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλούς*.

44. **εὐσταλής**: not elsewhere in Plato; lit. 'well braced,' 'compact,' the opposite of *ὀγκώδης*. L. & S. quote Plut. *Marius* 34 *εὐσταλὴς τὸν ὄγκον*.

46. **αἱροῦνται γοῦν**: 'Xen. *Apol.* 29 (*Ἄνυτον*) *τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ἀξιούμενον*. Creatus est *στοφύλαξ* (Lys. XXII 8) et *στρατηγός* (a. Chr. 409, Diod. Sic. XIII 64 [Grote *Hist.* ch. lxiii], et a. Chr. 403, Lys. XIII 78); Theramenes apud Xen. *Hell.* II iii 42 tres principes enumerat Thrasybulum *Anytum* Alcibiadem; post expulsos tyrannos, quorum inter audaces fuerat oppugnatores (Lys. XIII 78) [Grote *Hist.* ch. lxv], magna florebat gratia et potestate (Isocr. XVIII 23)' Fr. He was one of the most important men in Athens in the years succeeding 403 B.C. He is 'undoubtedly' (Jebb *Att. Or.* I 117) the Anytus who was called on the defence in the trial of Andocides in the same year as that of Socrates. See *de Myst.* ad fin.; Holm *History of Greece* E.T. III 26.

47. **ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους**: Stallbaum quotes for words of learning and teaching with *περί* and the gen. of the thing learnt or taught *Lach.* 186 C *διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου πέρι*, ibid. E, *Menex.* 235 E *διδάσκαλος οὖσα οὐ πάνυ φαύλη περὶ ῥητορικῆς*, *Phaedr.* 265 D, *Crat.* 413 C. Cp. presently *περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος*: also *εἰδὼς περί* at **71 B** 3 and note there. See Cope on Aristot. *Rhet.* I ix 14 *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν*. He observes that the substitution of a prep. with its case for a simpler construction (e.g. the object of a verb) is characteristic of fourth-century, as distinguished from earlier, writers. Among other places he quotes *Phaedr.* 250 C, where *περὶ κάλλους* stands for *subject*, *Rep.* 427 A *εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας*, where *περί* with its case stands, as here, for the simple gen. after a noun. For the structure *ζητεῖν διδασκάλους εἴτ' εἰσίν* see on **71 A** 25. 'Prolepsis' often occurs after verbs of inquiry; see **92 C** 22 *οὐ τούτους ἐζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσίν*.

Chapters XXVII (**90 B**) to XXX (**92 C** 20).—Socr. *Suppose we wanted to make Meno a shoemaker, or a physician, or a flute-player, we should send him to a professional teacher?* Anytus. *Naturally.* Socr. *But, as it is, what Meno desires is political Virtue and Wisdom. I suppose we ought to send him to the paid and accredited teachers of this—I mean, of course, the Sophists.* Anytus. *Don't name them: they do infinite mischief.* Socr. *Strange that they should be*

so successful. No other craftsmen could succeed in imposing on the public so long. Or do they impose upon themselves as well? ANYTUS. *Certainly not. They are a designing set that ought to be turned out of every respectable city. I have never had anything to do with them, and do not wish to, but I know all about them.*

Here begins the fourth section of the dialogue, extending to the end of ch. xxxiv.

CHAPTER XXVII

2. **τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ**: cp. **92 D** 26 *τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον*. Fr. (Introd. p. 24 note 2) makes it appear probable that this *ξενία* was inaugurated between Anthemion and the Meno who helped Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. II 22, 2). This Meno cannot have been the father of the Meno of our dialogue, whose father's name was Alexidemus (**76 E** 48): he may have been his grandfather. Fr.'s reason for thinking that the *ξενία* between the families did not go back farther than Anthemion is that the latter had made his money himself, so that his ancestors were probably not so wealthy or prominent as to enter into such a relation.

περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος: these words do not depend on *συζήτησον*, but on *διδάσκαλοι*, as just above. But here, for the sake of variety, we do not have the 'prolepsis' *διδασκάλους, τίνες ἂν εἶεν*.

5. **ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι**: we have here one aspect of the standing paradox as to the difference of Virtue from the special Arts. See *Prot.* 311 B foll. Of the special arts there are special and accepted teachers. Of Virtue, or the Political art, the only visible teachers are the people called Sophists. But whereas the doctor makes you a doctor, the Sophist makes you, not a Sophist, but what? *εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἱπποκράτη τὸν Κῷον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν κτέ.* Cp. 318 B foll. See on **93 B** 17; † *Alc.* I 124 E foll. is an imitative passage; *Gorg.* 514 A foll., *Hipp. maj.* 283 B foll. are germane. See also Xen. *Mem.* IV ii 2 and iv 5, and particularly Aristot. *NE.* X ix 18 *ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς*

ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἳ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται . . . οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. (Grant in his note thinks there is a reference to the *Meno*.) Cp. Grote *Hist.* ch. lxviii.

Before the time of Plato the notion of general mental training, i.e. a gymnastic beneficial to the mind apart from the matter learnt, was hardly apprehended. To elaborate this view is the chief object of the 'Educational Dialogues' and one of the objects of the *Republic*.

16. **καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν**: contrast **D** 23 *καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν*. **C** For the first supposition—that he is to be sent to a physician —is clearly unreal; but in the second case the supposition is generalized and so not impossible. See on **74 B** 6.

20. **ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ**, 'avowedly for this service.' *ἐπί* with **D** the dat. implies *condition*, and may be used to express either the thing conceded or the thing received. In *CR.* VIII 444 I have tried to show that *ἐπὶ ἕκτῳ μέρει* may mean either 'on condition of paying' or 'on condition of receiving' a sixth part. Like the present passage is *Rep.* ix 590 A *Ἐριφύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ* ('at the sacrifice of her husband's life') *τὸν ὅρμον δεξαμένη*, *Hipp. maj.* 284 C *χρήματα ἔλαβεν ἐπὶ παιδεύσει*, *Apol.* 41 A *ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτο;* on the other hand *Laws* 745 A *φανεῖ ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν* 'on condition of *receiving* one half.' Often of course the conditions may be looked at from either point of view: *Apol.* 29 C *ἀφίεμέν σε ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν;* these are the terms which the Athenians *exact*, and which Socrates is to *concede*. Cp. on **75 A** 7. Nearly allied is the use in *ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ* **70 B** 11.

21. **τοῦ βουλομένου**: in this phrase the force of the article is exhausted in making the participle into a noun; no demonstrative force is left; so that *ὁ βουλόμενος* is 'any one who chooses,' just as *ὁ τυχών* is 'any one who chances,' *ὁ κωλύσων* 'any one to hinder.' (Something similar is *τὸν Ἀθηναῖον* 'any Athenian' Aristoph. *Birds* 1035, Dem. 23 (*Aristocr.*) 38, etc.: cp. *Gorg.* 487 E *ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα* 'the typical man.')

The phrase *ὁ βουλόμενος* is common from Herodotus (I 54) downwards, especially in the orators in the legal phrase *ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν* 'any duly qualified Athenian' (Meier and Schömann *Attische Process* (564) 756). We have it in this dialogue **70 C** 17, **91 B** 14: *Laws* 745 A (see last note): *Gorg.* 521 B *ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος*, etc.

E 26. **τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα;** 'does not the same hold?' Herm., Sch., Fr. all print a note of interrogation after these words, understanding *ἔχει*, or the like. This view I have followed. Riddell § 18 regards *τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα* as a forestalling of the sentence that follows it, and therefore puts only a comma after *ταῦτα*.

πολλὴ ἀνοιά ἐστι . . μὴ ἐθέλειν: it is clear that here *μὴ ἐθέλειν* stands as a *subject* to *πολλὴ ἀνοιά ἐστι*, and that the negative is a real negative, to be translated in English. Thus these cases of *μή* with the infinitive are to be distinguished from such as *κωλύω σε τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν*, where *μὴ ποιεῖν* stands as an *object* (see on **89 D** 19), and the negative is redundant (or 'reflected') and not to be translated in English. But after such expressions as *πολλὴ ἄνοια* — a class which may be generalized as falling roughly into two divisions (*α*) expressions denoting *impropriety* (as the present, *ἄλογον, αἰσχρόν, οὐχ ὅσιόν ἐστιν*, etc.), (*β*) expressions of *impossibility* or *improbability* (*ἀδύνατον, οὐ προσδοκία ἐστίν*, etc.) — we *more commonly*, when the thing deprecated is negative, have *μὴ οὐκ* instead of, as here, the simple *μή*. Heind. on *Prot.* 352 D *αἰσχρὸν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι* says 'Post *αἰσχρόν ἐστι* interdum simplex *μή*, *frequentius multo* ut h.l. *μὴ οὐ* cum infinitivo copulatum reperies.' He refers to *Theaet.* 151 D *αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι*, † *Erastae* 139 A, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* vi 2, etc. (On the other hand *Laws* 820 A *ἐν ἐκείνων τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἔφαμεν αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.*) So with the phrase before us, *Symp.* 210 B *πολλὴ ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι*: cf. ibid. 218 C *πάνυ ἀνόητον μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο χαρίσασθαι*: with *ἄλογον*, *Soph.* 219 E *τήν γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῇ*: further *Theaet.* 181 B *οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτὸν μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι* (contrast *Laws* 861 D *τούτοιν τοίνυν τοῖν δυοῖν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτόν, τό γε δὴ μὴ λέγειν κτέ.*): *Rep.* 427 E *οὐχ ὅσιον μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ*: *Phaedo* 88 B *οὐδενὶ προσήκει.* (The examples are all from class (*α*): examples from class (*β*) may be dispensed with.)

μὴ οὐ in these cases is analogous to *μὴ οὐ* after positive verbs of prevention or denial where the thing prevented or denied is itself negative, the *μή* being reflected from the negative idea in the previous verb, while the *οὐ* remains to be translated as a qualification of the object of it. On the other hand when we have *μὴ οὐ* with the infin. after *negatived* verbs of prevention, etc. (as at **89 D** 18), both *μή* and *οὐ* are reflected from the previous negatived negative idea, and neither remains to be translated. Kühner deals with the two classes in § 516, sections 4 and 5 respectively. See Goodwin *MT.* §§ 816, 817: F.E.T. pp. 367, 381. Perhaps the clearest account

is given by Mr. Whitelaw *Cambridge Philolog. Soc. Transactions* vol. I pp. 42, 43. In *οὐχ ὅσιον μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν, οὐχ ὅσιον* is resumed by *μή*, which repels *οὐ βοηθεῖν*; deprecation of not rendering assistance is the state of mind of the speaker.

With such an expression as *πολλὴ ἄνοια* we may have an infin. as a subject (*μὴ ἐθέλειν*); but we may also have a looser 'consecutive' infinitive, *μὴ οὐκ ἐθέλειν*, expressing the 'net result' of what is recommended.

F.E.T. is therefore right in observing (p. 381) that in these cases of *μὴ οὐ* 'we may be sure that the force of each negative was, originally at least, felt in Greek.' But the idiom was sustained by an 'irrational' tendency in the Greek language. Mr. Whitelaw *CR.* X 244 *b*, at the end of a valuable article, says: 'It is evident that these combinations (of negatives) had a certain fascination for the Greek mind. This appears especially in the ingenious and unnecessary developments of the consecutive *μὴ οὐ*.' The fact that *μὴ οὐ* was pronounced as one syllable in verse is further evidence how closely the words had coalesced. Somewhat similar is the development of *κἄν* for *καί* (see on **72 C** 1). By the time we get to *μὴ οὐ* with the participle we have clearly passed the bounds that separate 'rational' from 'irrational' idiom. For *δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἂν εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτίρων ἕδραν* is not capable of logical explanation: it is a variant, by 'personalization,' for *δυσάλγητον ἂν εἴη μὴ οὐ κατοικτίρειν*. So *Phil.* 12 D *πῶς γὰρ ἡδονή γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη;* may be regarded as a variant for *ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἡδονήν γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι*. A similar method may be applied to *Gorg.* 509 A, *Euthyd.* 297 C, where also we have personalising extensions of the infinitive usage.

31. **μήτε—μήτε**: 'the relative takes *μή* when the antecedent is indefinite' F.E.T. p. 362, Hadley § 1021. In these cases the relative clause may be looked on as conditional. Cp. **80 D** 2, **95 B** 17, **96 C** 7, **99 C** 23. Cp. *μήπω* **79 D** 38.

32. **μήτ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν**: 'when a relative clause is continued by a clause *co-ordinate* with it, the relative word is hardly ever *repeated*. Where this would be necessary' [owing to a change of the case required] 'the relative construction is abandoned in the second clause, and the relative word is sometimes (*a*) entirely omitted, and sometimes (*b*), if in an oblique case, replaced by a personal or demonstrative pronoun' Hadley § 1005. See on **74 D** 35. As examples of (*a*) in Plato see *Rep.* 533 D, *Symp.* 201 B, *Menex.* 239 C (nom. omitted), *Prot.* 313 B (dat. omitted). As examples of (*b*)—of which the present is an instance—Stallbaum quotes *Rep.* 395 D *ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι*, *Gorg.* 452 D *ὃ φὴς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ*

σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. Kühner § 561. 1 (cp. Jelf § 833) also quotes from Plato *Rep.* 505 E *ὃ δὴ δι᾽ὧκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, Phil.* 12 B, *Hipp. maj.* 289 D *ᾧ καὶ τἄλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται.* Add *Theaet.* 192 A *ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγῖδα* : ibid. B *ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον.* For the (exceptional) repetition of the relative see *Prot.* 313 A, and J. & A. M. Adam's note. Analogous to the idiom now considered is the transition from a causal clause to a direct statement, as Eur. *Alc.* 1057 *δίπλην φοβοῦμαι μέμψιν, ἥκ τε δημοτῶν μή τίς μ᾽ ἐλέγξῃ . . καὶ τῆς θανούσης . . πολλὴν πρόνοιαν δεῖ μ᾽ ἔχειν.* (See Graves on Thuc. V 61, and Marchant on Thuc. VI 31.) Perhaps these phenomena indicate incomplete development of the subordinate sentence.

34. **οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ κτέ.**, 'does not this seem to you a serious flaw in reasoning?' 'Indeed it does, and brute stupidity to boot.' Buttmann well expresses the difference between *ἀλογία* and *ἀμαθία*. The former is the case of the man who for the time fails to apply his reasoning power; the latter that of the man whose reasoning power has never been cultivated. As to *ἀμαθία* see Archer-Hind on *Timaeus* 86 B, and J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 2 C.

CHAPTER XXVIII

91 A 2. **ἔξεστί σε . . βουλεύεσθαι**: the subject of *ἔξεστί* is *σε βουλεύεσθαι*. See Kühner § 475. Anm. 1, 2. Cp. *Gorg.* 486 C *τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, Polit.* 290 D *οὐδ᾽ ἔξεστι βασιλέα χωρὶς ἱερατικῆς ἄρχειν* ; *Crito* 51 D *ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι, Laws* 721 D. Mr. St. George Stock points out that *ἔξεστί σε* 'is more complimentary than *ἔξεστί σοι* would have been. The latter would have meant "you have the opportunity"; this means "there is the opportunity," i.e. "I have the opportunity of your assistance."'

4. **ταύτης τῆς σοφίας κτέ.** : this corresponds pretty much to Meno's definition of *ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή* **71 E**. Meno however has said nothing about treatment of parents. But he has laid stress on *μεγαλοπρέπεια* (**74 A**). Cp. *Prot.* 318 E foll., where Protagoras says that what he teaches is *εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.* See Xen. *Mem.* IV ii 11 (quoted by Fr.) *οὐ δήπου, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσαι, δι᾽ ἣν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίγνονται καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἄρχειν ἱκανοὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τ᾽ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς. . . ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη (ἡ τέχνη)*

καὶ καλεῖται βασιλική. Cp. *Rep.* 600 c d. Isocr. *Antid.* (15) 285 speaks of himself and his pupils as τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνοντας καὶ μελετῶντας, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικήσουσιν.

7. **πολίτας καὶ ξένους**: Xen. *Oec.* ii 5 ἔπειτα ξένους προσήκει σοι πολλοὺς δέχεσθαι καὶ τούτους μεγαλοπρεπῶς· ἔπειτα δὲ πολίτας δειπνίζειν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν (Fr.).

8. **ὑποδέξασθαι καὶ ἀποπέμψαι**: not merely the substantial duties of hospitality, but the art to 'welcome the coming, speed the parting, guest' with all due etiquette. 'Charondas ap. Stob. flor. xliv 40 (προοίμια νόμων): ξένον—εὐφήμως καὶ οἰκείως προσδέχεσθαι καὶ ἀποστέλλειν. Arist. *NE.* iv ii 15 ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια—καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς' (Fr.).

14. **κοινούς**, 'open.' cp. Xen. *Cyneg.* xiii 9 οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι **B** κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι. See *CR.* xi 424 b.

15. **ταξαμένους**: aorist, because the fee is fixed once for all; **πραττομένους**: pres., because it is exacted from time to time.

16. **καὶ τίνας**: *καί indignantis.* Cp. **80 D** 1. Contrast Eur. *Phoen.* 1358 καὶ πῶς γένοιτ' ἂν τῶνδε δυσποτμώτερα; with 1363 πῶς καὶ πέπρακται διπτύχων παίδων φόνος; The first question has feeling; the second asks for details. The explanation of the difference is that *καί* accentuates the word that follows it. See Shilleto on Dem. *F.L.* (19) § 257.

18. **σοφιστάς**: see on **85 B** 49. For the process by which **C** the word acquired an opprobrious sense, see the article 'Sophist' in *Encycl. Brit.*, Zeller *pre-Socr.* ii 429 foll., Grote *Hist.* ch. lxvii, Sidgwick in *JP.* iv pp. 288 foll., v pp. 66 foll. Grote rightly protested against the representation of the sophists as a conspiracy against morality and philosophy. But he perhaps hardly attached sufficient weight to the indirect consequences of the one common attribute that they did undoubtedly possess, namely that they were *professional* teachers. Their forth-coming was the response to a feeling of the narrowness of the older training, and the demand for something at once more elaborate and more effective (Zeller *pre-Socr.* ii 396, 397; 430, 436; Sidgwick *Hist. of Ethics* 17–22). But the rise of the 'professional element' put a new aspect upon the pursuit of knowledge. 'The introduction of payment for scientific instruction,' says Zeller (ut sup. ii 441), 'is a sign that now instead of honest inquiry, satisfied with knowledge of the actual, only that knowledge is sought which may be applied as a means to other ends.' Then would follow that reaction upon teaching which must occur when it has to

be accommodated to the practical demands of the taught. No man, says Plato (*Soph.* 232 D), would resort to the sophists if they did not promise to make men clever in debate about Law and Politics. This suggests some of the reasons that led to the odious connotation of the word 'sophist' and the unpopularity of the class. With a nation so prone to *φθόνος* as the Greeks, the mere assumption of special knowledge easily became invidious. Already in Aesch. *P.V.* 944 Hermes uses the term *σοφιστής* as a taunt to Prometheus. Riddell Introd. p. xxvii shows how in 1791 the name 'Philosopher' became a term of opprobrium among British abhorrers of the French Revolution. The title 'Professor' has before now lent itself to an uncomplimentary use. See *Prot.* 312 A (the conclusion of the passage referred to on **90 B** 5) *Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.* The sequel gives further evidence of the unpopularity of 'sophists.' Callias' porter (314 D) has no more discrimination than Aristophanes or Anytus; he mistakes Socrates and his companion for *σοφισταί τινες*, and shuts the door in their faces. Later, 316 C D, Protagoras speaks with some feeling of the odium attaching to his profession, and the great caution he has to exercise: *οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί.* See also Xen. *Cyneg.* ch. xiii, from which Fr. quotes (§ 8) *σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὅ ἐστιν ὄνειδος παρά γε τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν.* (Xen. concludes his tract in the true spirit of the country squire by advising young men to avoid the sophists and stick to hunting.) So Isocrates *Antid.* (15) 168 speaks of *ἡ κοινὴ περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς διαβολή.*

19. **'Ηράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες**, 'good gracious, Socrates, spare our ears!' The source of Anytus' hostility to the sophists, and to Socrates, whom he included among them, is explained by Grote II 27: 'He is a man of plain sense, practical habits, and conservative patriotism—who worships what he finds accredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorizers about virtue in general.' We must also take into account the circumstances of the time. After the amnesty of 403 B.C. 'the *ἐπιείκεια* of the restored people did not last long, and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions' Riddell Introd. p. iv (cp. p. xxix). Culture of any kind was associated with oligarchic reaction. Not that the fear of culture was confined to democrats, for the Thirty had attempted to put down those who taught *λόγων τέχνην* (Xen. *Mem.* I ii 31). In spite of the boasted *παρρησία* and *ἐξουσία* at Athens (see *Gorg.* 461 E, *Rep.* 557 B), the Athenian temper was at bottom intolerant

(Holm *Hist. of Greece* ET. II 293), though we may concede to Grote *Hist.* ch. lxviii that it was less so than that of other states. Cp. on **80 B** 21.

The view of Callicles in the *Gorgias* is very similar to that of Anytus. Callicles too is a lover of the δῆμος (*Gorg.* 481 D, 513 C) and a hater of the sophists (ibid. 519 E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;). Callicles, like Meno, has been trained in rhetoric by Gorgias, but spurns the idea that Gorgias can teach τὰ δίκαια (482 C foll.), and disbelieves in the sophists who profess to train men εἰς ἀρετήν. Compare his view ibid. 485 A φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετασχεῖν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ἔτι ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν κτέ., a view which Socrates sums up at 487 C: ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. See on **95 C** 23. So the practical soldier Laches disparages sophists, *Lach.* 197 D (cp. 183 C foll.). The view of Isocrates recalls that of Callicles (*Antid.* (15) 268). See note on **100 A** 6, Jebb *Att. Or.* II p. 39, and Sidgwick in *JP.* V 75 foll.

It is this unpopularity, shared by Socrates with other philosophers, but in an even greater degree (Riddell Introd. xxvi), against which he protests (*Apol.* 28 A): καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. Cp. Zeller *Socr.* 219, 220.

Rep. VI is an apology for philosophy. See 492 A ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς κτέ. See by all means Grote's vivid summary of the whole passage (III 81, 82); also note on **95 C** 23.

21. **ἀστόν**: cp. **92 B** 7. The word is always used by Plato in contrast with ξένος (as *Gorg.* 514 E), or μέτοικος (as *Rep.* 563 A). See *Laws* 869 D: 'If a fellow citizen (kills) another' is ἐὰν πολίτης πολίτην, but 'if a citizen (kills) a stranger' is ἐὰν ἀστὸς ξένον: πολίτης being a correlative term. See **70 B** 8, **91 A** 7.

23. **ἐστι** agreeing in number with the predicate: Hadley § 610 quotes Antiphon *τετρ.* II 3 § 8 αἱ χορηγίαι ἱκανὸν εὐδαιμονίας σημεῖόν ἐστι. This usage must be distinguished from such instances as *Euthyd.* 302 C ἔστι ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοί, where there is no singular predicate, and the ἔστι is only justified by coming first, the number of the subject being not yet determined.

CHAPTER XXIX

1. οὗτοι ἄρα: see on **80 E** 8.

οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι: we have here and in the sequel another aspect of the paradox referred to on **90 B 5**. Cp. *Apol.* 24 D foll.: in the special Arts, says Socrates, many can spoil, few can benefit: in Virtue the reverse seems according to Meletus to be the case: the 'man in the street' works for good; the experts—the sophists and I—for evil.

3. **ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν**, 'they differ so much as amounts to this—they not only,' etc.; see J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 11 D. For *ὅσον=ὥστε* followed by the *indicative* cp. Xen. *Cyr.* VIII i 4 *τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρειν δεῖ τῶν δούλων ὅσον οἱ μὲν δοῦλοι ἄκοντες τοῖς δεσπόταις ὑπηρετοῦσιν*: Isocr. 13 (*in Soph.*) 20 *τοσούτῳ δὲ χείρους ἐγένοντο τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας καλινδουμένων, ὅσον οὗτοι μὲν . . ὅμως ἀρετὴν ἐπηγγείλαντο*: also 8 (*de Pace*) 43 *τοσοῦτον ἀπολελείμμεθα . . ὅσον οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων σωτηρίας τὴν πατρίδα τὴν αὑτῶν ἐκλιπεῖν ἐτόλμησαν κτέ.*; ibid. 54 *τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐποιοῦντο καὶ στρατηγοὺς ᾑροῦντο*; ibid. 96 *τοσοῦτον γὰρ ὑπερβάλοντο ἁμαρτήμασιν ὅσον πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι σφαγὰς ἐποίησαν*. The instances are all after expressions of *difference* (Kühner § 582. 1).

D 6. **τούτων**: the gen. of price is here substituted for *ἐπί* with the dat. (*ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ*) at **90 D** 20.

χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι: the taking of fees for instruction was the distinguishing note of the 'sophists,' who thus created a teaching profession. See on the general question Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 436 foll., also *Hipp. maj.* 281 B–283 B, particularly 282 C *τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἠξίωσεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδ' ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας*. The context tells us that Gorgias (see on **70 A** 7) and Prodicus have made more money by their *σοφία* than any artist from any art, and so did Protagoras before them; but Hippias can boast of having made as much money as any two sophists. On the contrary, Anaxagoras, instead of growing rich, spent a fortune that had been left him.

8. Protagoras was the first to make *σοφία* a profession. So in *Prot.* 317 B he avows himself a sophist, and Socrates, ibid. 348 E, says to him *καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας,*

σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι. Diog. L. (IX 52) says of Protagoras οὗτος πρῶτος μισθὸν εἰσεπράξατο, μνᾶς ἑκατόν. Protagoras, however, recognized that the success of the master is best attested by the pupil's recognition of the benefit conferred, and so 'left it to the pupil to decide at the end of the instructions what he would give, if the price seemed to him excessive.'—Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 409 note (see *Prot.* 328 B C).

As to the priority of Protagoras we read in † *Alc.* I 119 A that two Athenians, Pythodorus and Callias, each paid 100 minae to Zeno of Elea for their instruction. The statement is probably to be rejected; for, though the date of Zeno's birth is uncertain, there is little doubt that he was older than Protagoras (Zeller *pre-Socratics* I 609 note). Still it is not impossible that Zeno, like Gorgias, though older than Protagoras, may have followed an example set by his junior. The same fee is asserted for Gorgias (Diod. XII 53, Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 415: he thinks these fees 'greatly exaggerated'). Euenos of Paros was content with the more modest figure of 5 minae (*Apol.* 20 B).

Fees were also charged for separate lectures: Diog. L. XI 50 says that Protagoras and Prodicus made collections after their readings (λόγους ἀναγιγνώσκοντες ἠρανίζοντο). See *Crat.* 384 B, where Socr. says he could not afford to hear τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν of Prodicus, but only τὴν δραχμιαῖαν.

12. **τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οὐκ ἄν**: for εἰ after expressions of wonder, etc., to express the object of the emotion see Goodwin *MT.* § 494. For εἰ followed by ἄν with the optative see on **79 C** 27. For εἰ οὐκ see Goodwin *MT.* §§ 386, 387: 'When two clauses introduced by μέν and δέ depend upon a *single* εἰ, which precedes them both, οὐ is used even more frequently than μή.' He refers to *Phaedo* 97 A θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκατέρων αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν . . οὐκ ἤστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις κτέ.

17. **τῷ λιμῷ**: words denoting affections of the mind or **E** body when spoken of as causes (in the dative, or in the genitive with ὑπό), often take the article, denoting not the feeling in general but the particular occurrence of it. So here τῷ λιμῷ, 'fame quae tunc oriatur necesse est' Fr. We have the art. with λιμός Ar. *Peace* 483, Xen. *Anab.* I v 5, Dem. *Aristocr.* (23) 156. In Plato, where the word λιμός occurs, it is always, as here, mentioned as a cause; we have the art. here and *Symp.* 207 B; the art. omitted *Rep.* 416 A, *Euthyphr.* 4 D, *Gorg.* 464 E. At *Symp.* 191 A the MSS. vary: Sch. writes ὑπὸ λιμοῦ without the article. Cp. ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους **82 A** 29.

δὲ ἄρα : the sentence as a whole is an argument by contrast (*'ex contrariis conclusum'*), to which the rhetoricians gave the name *ἐνθύμημα par excellence*. See Cicero *Top.* § 55, and cp. Quint. v x 1, 2 ; xiv 2. We have several instances of it in this portion of the dialogue.

In sentences of this sort the combination of particles *δὲ ἄρα* imports that a juxtaposition of two ideas reveals an incongruity. The idiom is common in Plato. The sentence is in form *paratactic*, the real emphasis being on the clause with *δέ*. Sometimes we have *ἄρα* with the *μέν* clause as well as with the *δέ*, whereby each part of the antithesis is brought into relief (see exx. 7, 8, 9 below).

A. Sometimes the paradox is introduced by some phrase expressive of surprise, as *τέρας λέγεις εἰ* here.

(1) *Apol.* 34 C *τάχα δ' ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν εἰ ὁ μὲν ἱκέτευσε . . ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω.*

(2) Ibid. 37 C D (I should be a fool to think that) *ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μοι οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς . . ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως.*

(3) *Gorg.* 512 A *λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν . . εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστίν.*

(4) *Theaet.* 161 C (Protagoras might have jeered at us) *ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὢν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων γυρίνου.*

(5) *Phil.* 30 A B *οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμεν . . τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν . . σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι . . τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ . . ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων φύσιν.*

B. Sometimes it appears as a question, as **94 B** 18.

(6) *Crito* 46 D *ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἐλέγετο ;*

(7) Ibid. 50 E *ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον . . ὥστε ἅπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν . . πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι ;*

(8) *Prot.* 325 B C *διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος (τῆς ἀρετῆς) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς ὑεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία . . ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ζημία θάνατος . . ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται ;*

(9) *Rep.* 600 C D (Homer cannot really have been an educator, or his contemporaries would have made much more of him) *ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος . . ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται . . Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου . . ἢ Ἡσίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν περιιόντας εἴων ;*

(10) *Phaedo* 68 A *ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν . . ἀποθανόντων*

πολλοὶ δὴ ἕκοντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθεῖν . . φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν . . ἀγανακτήσει ἀποθνήσκειν;

(11) Ibid. 80 D *ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος . . ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν· ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδὲς . . αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν . . ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται;*

(12) *Laws* 647 C *ἢ τῇ μὲν δειλίᾳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ προσμαχόμενον καὶ νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλεον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν . . σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελέως ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἡδοναῖς . . διαμεμαχημένος;*

In all these places *δὲ ἄρα* occurs in the second half of an antithetic argument. But *δὲ ἄρα* often occurs without any previous antithesis, where *δέ* is merely connective, and *ἄρα* has its usual force. For instances of this see *Hipp. maj.* 283 B, *Euthyd.* 279 A, *Gorg.* 493 B, 513 A, *Phaedo* 107 E, *Laws* 660 E, † *Hipparch.* 229 C. See also on **97 C** 30.

18. **ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων**: a similar argument is used by Socrates in his own favour, *Apol.* 33 D foll.: 'If I really corrupt youths, they, or at any rate their guardians, would have found it out and assailed me long ago.'

21. **ἀποθανεῖν**: according to Philochorus (ap. Diog. L. IX 55), he was drowned on a voyage to Sicily. The limits of his life appear to be about 481–411 B.C. According to Diog. L. IX 51 and 54, he was accused of impiety before the Four Hundred, exiled, and his books burnt (cp. Cic. *N.D.* I § 63). If we accept this story, the shipwreck may have taken place on his flight from Athens. But Mr. St. George Stock, in his note here, has pointed out that the story of his prosecution is very doubtful. The expressions here and those which Plato puts into his mouth, *Prot.* 317 B, seem inconsistent with his ever having suffered seriously from any attacks.

ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα: no other instance of *ἐγγὺς καί* is forthcoming. *καί* is struck out in Γ (Coislinianus) by a later hand, and does not appear in Stephanus. Except Buttmann all the modern editors keep it. It must be explained on the analogy of *καί* after *ἴσον*, etc. (L. & S. *καί* A III i). The use with *ἐς* (*καὶ ἐς ἑβδομήκοντα μυριάδας* Hdt. II 60, cp. 68; L. & S. s.v. *καί* A v) is not parallel.

26. **οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου**: who these were is not very clear. See on **91 D** 8. Gorgias was probably rather older than Protagoras (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 413 note; Frey's dates for his life, 483–375 B.C., are accepted by Ueberweg-Heinze § 29 and R. & P. 183 A), but he was younger in the profession. Hippias (*Hipp. maj.* 282 E) and Prodicus (*Prot.* **92 A**

317 C) were both younger. (The expression of Protagoras at the place last quoted, *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην*, must be hyperbolical, as he was only about twelve years older than Socrates. Cp. 320 C.)

But perhaps Socrates here is not confining his remarks to professional sophists. Protagoras (*Prot.* 316 D) asserts that the wise men of old were really sophists in disguise, and this fancy Socrates seems to countenance (ibid. 342 A B).

27. **οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες**: this is probably to be referred to the dramatic date of the dialogue, about 402 B.C. At that time Protagoras was dead, but the other three great sophists, Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus, were probably alive. Zeller (*pre-Socratics* II 417 note) points out that Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias are all spoken of in *Apol.* 19 E as flourishing at the time of Socrates' trial in 399 B.C.

CHAPTER XXX

1. **πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι**: cp. *τοσούτου δέω εἰδέναι* **71 A** 26, and on **79 B** 20. The infin. is 'consecutive,' the meaning being the same as if *ὥστε* accompanied it: *Apol.* 30 D, 37 B, *Lysis* 204 E, *Phaedr.* 228 A, *Laws* 660 B. Cp. *Prot.* 329 B *σμικροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν*, 35 D (Kühner § 477 e). Where the infin. is negative we often have *μὴ οὐ*: *Euthyd.* 297 B *ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν*, 'I am far from not running away from *two*.' (The *μὴ οὐ* is a real negative, as after *αἰσχρόν, ἀδύνατον*, etc. See on **90 E** 26.) At *Theaet.* 166 D we have the article with *μή*: *πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι*.

All the above instances are 'personal': we have the impersonal *πολλοῦ δεῖ* at *Gorg.* 517 A (where with Madv. and Sch. place full stop after *ὦ Σώκρατες*), *Apol.* 35 D etc.

At *Symp.* 203 C *πένης ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ ἁπαλός τε καὶ καλὸς . . ἀλλὰ σκληρός κτέ.*, it is not so well to understand *εἶναι* (which Badham would insert) as to suppose that *πολλοῦ δεῖ* is stereotyped in the sense 'by no means.' We have *πολλοῦ δεῖν* once in this sense, Dem. *Aristocr.* (23) 7 *ἵν' εἴδητε πολλοῦ δεῖν ἄξιον ὄντα* (Goodwin § 779 a). Cp. on **80 B** 23.

3. **τῶν νέων**: 'partitive' gen. The word is put at the end for emphasis, and is balanced by *οἱ προσήκοντες*. Anytus believes in 'home' teaching *versus* professional. Interference with home influence was one cause of jealousy against the 'sophists,' *Prot.* 316 C. Cp. Xen. *Mem.* I ii 51 for the same feeling in the case of Socrates. Intr. § 6.

B 6. **εἴτε ξένος . . εἴτε ἀστός**: see on **91 C** 21. Here *ξένος* is

characteristic of most 'sophists,' who were travellers, men without a fixed home or city—thus 'vagabonds' in the eyes of the many. By *ἀστός* Socrates himself is hinted at. In *Soph.* 223 D we have the art of the sophist divided according as he carries his wares from city to city (*ἐμπορική*) or sells them at home (*καπηλική*) (cp. *Prot.* 313 C). The wandering sophist is defined at 224 D, and then, ibid. E, follows the definition of the stay-at-home sophist, who may either retail goods bought from others, or sell goods of his own manufacture (*καπηλικὸν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικόν*).

11. **οὐδὲ . . οὐδέ**: see on **75 A** 4.

15. The **γε** implies an affirmative answer: 'I am, and may **C**
I continue so.' See App. on the text.

16. **ὦ δαιμόνιε**: see on **73 D** 11.

18. **ἄπειρος εἴης**: see on **89 E** 25. Goodwin § 531 quotes this passage, translating 'how then could you know about that thing of which you had no experience at all.' *τούτου* is here an indefinite anaphoric (*ejus* with *rel.* and *subj.*). Cp. *Euthyd.* 302 A *ταῦτα ἃ σοι ἐξείη*. Cobet, *Coll. crit.* p. 49, dissatisfied with this, proposed for *τούτου τοῦ πράγματος* to read *ὁτουοῦν πράγματος*. (See *CR.* XIV 11 for a criticism on his view, where inter alia *Gorg.* 450 B is quoted: *εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς ἢ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους*). Sch., on the other hand, believing that the question is not general, but concerning 'this particular matter,' reads *ἄπειρος εἶ*. AN. Ἢ *ῥᾳδίως*. (One MS., Coisl., has *εἴης* corrected to *εἶ*.) I think the reply of Anytus shows that the question is put in a *general* form. He replies *ῥᾳδίως* to the general question, and then with *τούτους γοῦν* restricts himself to the particular case of the sophists. Kühner § 399. 6 b quotes this place, regarding *εἴης* as '*attracted*' into the mood of *εἰδείης ἄν*; and Goodwin, at the end of § 531, where he quotes this passage, observes that 'all these examples fall under the general rule for *assimilation* § 558.' But the fact that the antecedent and relative clauses both have the optative mood is due to the similarity of the nature of the clauses; it is hardly necessary to call in such a cause as 'assimilation' to explain the usage. Moreover, such optative relative clauses, expressing a vague future condition, do not always depend on another optative. See **96 C** 8 and *Theaet.* 155 A (*φήσομεν*) *ᾧ μήτε προστιθοῖτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε μήτε φθίνειν*, Kühner § 560. 4.

19. **οἵ εἰσιν**: see App. on the text. There are many places in which the relative *ὅς* is used in the sense of *οἷος*. Kühner § 562. 4 says that *ὅς* is often used in dependent questions, not

like *τίς* or *ὅστις* to determine the *identity* of a person or thing (**71 B** 7), but in the sense of *οἷος* (Lat. *qui* for *qualis*). In these cases the object is supposed known; its quality has to be determined. E.g. Thuc. I 136 (*Θεμιστοκλῆς*) *δηλοῖ ὅς ἐστιν* (=*qui sit*, 'shows *what* he is.' 'shows his true character'); but ibid. 137 *φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστίν* (*quis sit*, 'tells him *who* he is'). Cp. **80 D** 37: Eur. *Alc.* 640 *ἔδειξας εἰς ἔλεγχον ἐξελθὼν ὃς εἶ*: Soph. *Aj.* 1259 *οὐ μαθὼν ὃς εἶ φύσιν*: *O.C.* 1171: *Rep.* 484 A *οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι καὶ οἱ μὴ . . ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι*: ibid. 559 A *παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων αἵ εἰσιν*: *Gorg.* 512 A *εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἵ ἐνέβησαν*: *Euthyd.* 283 D (in a sophism) *ὃς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ὃς δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι*: *Phaedr.* 243 E *ἔωσπερ ἂν ἦς ὃς εἶ*. See also Kühner § 554. 2.

On the other hand we have **94 B** 11 *ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν*, *Lach.* 183 C, *Menex.* 249 D *οἶδα οἷα ἐστίν*, etc.

20. **εἴτ' οὖν**: the particle *οὖν* is originally confirmative; its later inferential use is foreign to Homer and Pindar, and very rare in Aesch. In alternative suppositions it is added to the one that it is desired to bring into prominence: *Apol.* 27 C (*δαιμόνια*) *εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά*; *Laws* 639 B *ἄν τ' οὖν ναυτιᾷ ἄν τε μή*. Sometimes both members have *οὖν*, if it is intended to give separate prominence to each: *Apol.* 34 E *καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα* (*σοφὸν*) *ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος*; *Laws* 934 D *ἐάν τ' οὖν δοῦλον ἐάν τ' οὖν καὶ ἐλεύθερον* (*μαινόμενον*) *περιορᾷ*. Here *εἴτ' οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν* is said with dark meaning, for Anytus believes that he has at the very moment the prince of 'sophists' before him.

εἴτε μή: see on **87 B** 35.

Chapter XXX (**92 C** 20) to Chapter XXXIV (**95 A**).—Socr. *I am not concerned to defend the sophists. But who do teach Virtue if they do not?* An. *Any respectable man.* Socr. *But look at the great men of our city, Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Thucydides; they had their sons educated in everything that could be learnt, but in ἀρετή they never trained them to be anything like as good as themselves.* An. *You have no veneration, Socrates, you will get into trouble.*

22. **ἐξ ὧν**, 'to judge from what.' This use of *ἐξ* is common in Plato. Cp. **93 B** 1 *ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου*, *Crito* 43 D *ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου*.

23. **ἀλλὰ γάρ**: see Excursus III.

D 26. **ἐκείνους**: prolepsis. We expect in the sequel *παρ'*

οὗς ; but after the parenthesis καὶ . . εὐεργέτησον we have the interrogative παρὰ τίνας substituted.

27. **πατρικὸν ἑταῖρον** : see **90 B** 2.

28. **φράσας** : the aor. ptcp. is often used with an aor. tense to express, not an action anterior to that of the main verb, but a circumstance of it. So **77 A** 5 ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι εἰπών, 'perform your promise by saying,' ibid. 7 ἐάσας ὅλην εἰπέ, *Phaedo* 60 C εὖ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με (where see Heindorf's note), *Euthyd.* 282 C εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με.

It seems impossible to separate from these, except by the general sense, instances where the aor. ptcp. used with an aor. tense does denote an anterior action, as Thuc. I Βοιωτοὶ οἱ ἐξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες τὴν Βοιωτίαν ᾤκησαν, Xen. *Anab.* I iv 8 Κῦρος συγκαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς εἶπεν, F.E.T. 139, 148, *CR.* IV 425 (Campbell) ; V 3 foll. (Frank Carter) ; 248 foll. (R. Whitelaw) and VIII 34 a.

29. **τὴν ἀρετήν** : a similar acc. with words like ἀγαθός is common : contrast **91 B** 9, and see note on the text there. Cp. **93 A** 10, **B** 18, **D** 12, 19, **E** 31, *Apol.* 20 B καλώ τε καὶ ἀγαθὼ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν, ibid. D ταύτην (τὴν σοφίαν) εἶναι σοφός, *Lach.* 194 D, *Prot.* 324 D (a passage near akin to the present) ἢν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοί, *Gorg.* 526 A, *Euthyd.* 292 D οἷ τί ἔσονται ἀγαθοί ; *Rep.* 349 E.

31. **τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας ;** this form is equivalent to a forcible imperative. It is commonest in Plato and Xenophon (Kühner § 386. 10, Jelf 403. 3). The aorist is by some explained as referring to past time : 'Why did you not tell him ?' i.e. 'Tell him at once !' It seems, however, that the aorist here was not felt as a past tense, as we find it with primary sequence : *Prot.* 317 D τί οὖν οὐ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἱππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν ; cp. *Parm.* 136 C ἀλλά μοι τί οὐ διῆλθες ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω ; There are certain idioms in which the indic. aor. has no sense of past time, as the exclamations ἤσθην, ἀπέπτυσα, etc. Perhaps the same momentary or exclamatory force of the aorist developed the usage now discussed. τί οὐκ ; with the aorist is rather a command than a question ; τί οὐκ ; with the present is rather a question than a command. The difference is similar to that between 'Why not tell him ?' and 'Why do you not tell him ?'

The great majority of instances are in the 2nd sing. : but see Aesch. *P.V.* 747 τί οὐκ ἐν τάχει ἔρριψ' ἐμαυτὴν τῆσδ' ἀπὸ στυφλοῦ πέτρας ; Soph. *O.T.* 1002 τί δῆτ' ἐγὼ οὐχὶ τοῦδε τοῦ φόβου σ', ἄναξ, ἐξελυσάμην ; Aristoph. *Lys.* 182 τί δῆτα ταῦτ' οὐχ ὡς τάχιστα ξυνωμόσαμεν ; Plato *Charm.* 154 E τί οὖν οὐκ ἀπεδύ-

σαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἴδους ; Prot. 317 D (quoted above), Xen. *Mem.* IV VI 14, Plato *Phaedo* 86 D *εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο ;* ('let him answer'). The line *ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός ;* occurring *Il.* XXI 562 ; XXII 122, is not a question but a self-exhortation.

The following are instances of the 2nd sing. in Plato :—

Charm. 155 A *τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο ;*
Prot. 310 A *τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν ;*
Gorg. 503 B *τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας ;*
Ibid. 509 E *τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ;*
Symp. 173 B *τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω μοι ;*
Menex. 236 B *τί οὖν οὐ διῆλθες ;*
Parm. 136 C quoted above.
Soph. 251 E *τί οὖν οὐκ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω ;*
Phil. 54 B *τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες ;* ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὔ (an assent to a command rather than an answer to a question).
† *Alc.* I 114 B *τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας ;*

Contrast with these *Gorg.* 501 C *τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;* ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, *Prot.* 310 E *τί οὐ βαδίζομεν πρὸς αὐτόν ;* (Socrates explains it is too early), *Lysis* 211 D *ὅδε καλεύει με Μενέξενον ἐρωτᾶν. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἐρωτᾷς ;*

E 34. **ἴσως τι λέγεις**, 'perhaps there is something in what you say.' Contrast *οὐδὲν λέγων* just above, also **79 E** 47, etc.

ἐν τῷ μέρει, 'in your turn' ; *ἐν μέρει*, 'in turn.' The former looks at the succession in reference to some particular member of the series : *ἐν τῷ μέρει Gorg.* 462 A, 474 A B, *Symp.* 198 C, 199 A, *Soph.* 225 E, *Phil.* 50 E (Eur. *Or.* 452).

Contrast *Symp.* 214 B *ἔδοξε χρῆναι ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει λόγον περὶ Ἔρωτος εἰπεῖν* with 198 C *ἡνίκα ὑμῖν ὑμολόγουν ἐν τῷ μέρει* (in *my* turn) *ἐγκωμιάσεσθαι τὸν Ἔρωτα*, Luc. *Pisc.* §§ 8, 28 *ἐν μέρει* 'vicissim,' *Prot.* 347 D, *Gorg.* 496 B, *Crat.* 410 D *ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον προάγον εἰς φῶς, Theaet.* 179 E, 189 E, *Soph.* 242 E, *Polit.* 265 A, *Laws* 819 B.

35. **παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ** : indirect deliberative. Goodwin § 677, F. E. T. p. 190, Hadley § 932, *Phaedo* 115 D *ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ.*

38. **ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ** : see on **91 C 1.**

τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν : the phrase is used in a *moral*, not in a *political* sense ; for Anytus was a democrat. Intr. § 6.

CHAPTER XXXI

2. **ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου**, 'spontaneously': **90 A** 39, *Prot.* 323 C, † *Alc.* i 118 C (etc.).

τοιοῦτοι = καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. The participial clause that follows couples on what is really a separate part of the question: '*and* without learning from anybody are they still able, etc.?'

5. **ἀξιῶ**, 'I expect you to grant'; cp. the (mainly trans- **93 A**
atlantic) use of 'I claim.' Instances where, as here, the verb is followed by a *proposition* in the acc. and infin. occur *Gorg.* 450 C *τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους*, *Phaedo* 86 D *ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν . . ἀπόλλυσθαι*, *Apol.* 18 D, *Rep.* 610 A, *Polit.* 262 E, etc. Different are such places as **91 D** 6 *χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι*.

παρὰ τῶν προτέρων: this is the point of view of Protagoras in his apologue; see on **B** 17 below.

6. **ἤ**, like Latin *an*, was originally attached to the second member of a double question; then often to a question when a former member might be understood. Cp. **71 B** 5, also **C** 11, **D** 13 below, **85 E** 32 and some of the questions quoted on **91 E** 17.

10. **καὶ ἔτι**, 'and, what is more.' So Buttmann: 'insuper,' 'praeterea.' This seems the best way of taking it. Another way is to take *ἔτι* temporally (= *jam*), 'before now.' A third alternative, to take *ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον* in the sense of *ἔτι μᾶλλον*, 'yet more,' may be dismissed, for the litotes *οὐχ ἧττον* would be entirely spoiled by the addition of *ἔτι*.

Socrates hints that the statesmen of a former generation, though he does not think very highly of them, were superior to the men of the present.

14. **ἢ μή**: see on **86 D** 12. Of course *μή* here negatives not *ἀγαθοί*, but *εἰσίν*.

17. **ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες κτέ.**: see on **90 B** 5. This ground **B**
has been gone over in the *Protagoras*. Socrates urges as an argument that Virtue cannot be taught, the fact that good fathers often have bad sons: 319 E–320 C (a passage closely akin to the present). In answer to this Protagoras relates a fable, according to which the rudimentary principles, Shame and Justice, that form the necessary moral basis of society, were implanted at the creation in every human creature. He then (324 D–326 E, cc. xiv, xv) explains the process of moral education to which children are subjected, by instruction, admonition, and punishment. Thence he goes on (ch. xvi) to

deal with the problem why good fathers have bad sons; the reason being that all have not the same aptitude for virtue.

In the *Laches* we have a similar topic. Lysimachus, son of Aristides, and Melesias, son of Thucydides, complain that they are not on a level with their distinguished fathers (179 D): *καὶ αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἴων τρυφᾶν, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα.* They are very anxious that their own sons shall be educated so as to be worthy of their illustrious grandsires, whose names they bear. Whence naturally follows a discussion where to look for teaching. Nearly related is *Apol.* 20 A foll. If Callias' sons were colts or steers, a trainer for them could easily be found; as it is, who is to train them? 'Euenus, of Paros, for five minae': *καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς* ('on such reasonable terms') *διδάσκει.*

† *Alc.* i 118 D foll. looks like an imitation of the passages in the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*. The author of the compilation *περὶ ἀρετῆς* (cp. on **70 A** 1) 377 B foll. has incorporated this passage, **93 D** 13–**94 E** 15, almost verbatim.

18. **ἦν**: see on **92 D** 29.

20. **παραδοτόν**, 'transferable; **παραληπτόν**, 'receivable.' See on **70 A** 2.

CHAPTER XXXII

C 2. Plato for his illustrations takes two pairs of rivals, Themistocles and Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides. Themistocles is remembered only as a great popular statesman. The darker memories attaching to his name are ignored. It must be remembered that the charges of complicity in the treason of Pausanias, brought against him after his ostracism, were never proved. See Dr. Thompson on *Gorg.* 516 D. But for Plato's purpose the truth or falsity of such charges is not very important. In † *Theages* 126 A Themistocles with Pericles and Cimon are spoken of as types of men *τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινοί*. In *Gorg.* 455 E Gorgias couples him with Pericles as achieving practical results by oratory.

It is instructive to compare the *Gorgias* with the *Meno* in regard to the treatment of prominent Athenian statesmen. The lists are different; in the *Gorgias* we have Miltiades and Cimon in place of Aristides and Thucydides in the *Meno*: see 503 C, where Callicles gives the names of four *ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες* who have made the Athenians better. At 515 D Socrates disallows this claim, and at 519 A he says that the people suffering from former pampering will fall out with their present advisers:

and by comparison will praise their older leaders. The object in the two dialogues is different: in the *Gorgias* it is disparagement of their work as statesmen; in the *Meno* the point is that, however good they were, they could not train their sons. Dr. Thompson (Introd. p. xix) also compares *Theaet.* 172 C foll., but adds that 'there is not one of Plato's dialogues in which the public men of the best times of Athenian history are treated with such indiscriminating severity as in the *Gorgias*.' Athenaeus, 506 A, regards Plato's strictures on Aristides and Themistocles as merely a proof of his malevolent spirit.

7. **εἶναι** is imperfect. Cp. *Phaedo* 76 E *ἀναγκαῖον . . τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς.* So presently *φθονεῖν, παραδιδόναι,* and **93 E** 30 *βούλεσθαι.* This is a 'past particular supposition' (Goodwin § 402): 'if any one was a teacher, he was.'

8. **εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε**: see Exc. II and cp. **E** 33. *εἴ γε ἐβούλετο* would be 'assuming, of course, that he wished'; the text is 'if only he *wished* to do so': *γε* points *ἐβούλετο.*

9. **ἂν ἐβουλήθη**: the 'potential indicative,' Goodwin §§ 244, 412, Kühner II § 392. Cp. **D** 23 *ἠτιάσατ' ἄν, Apol.* 18 C *ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε.*

It is clear that in these instances *ἄν* does not point to an 'unfulfilled condition'; nor again do they fall under the 'iterative use' of which familiar examples are Thuc. VII 71. 3 *εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιέν πη τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησάν τε ἄν*: Ar. *Frogs* 1022 *ὃ θεασάμενος πᾶς ἄν τις ἀνὴρ ἠράσθη δἀϊος εἶναι*: Xen. *Hell.* III iv 18 *ἐπερρώσθη δ' ἄν τις κἀκεῖνο ἰδών, Ἀγησίλαον μὲν πρῶτον κτέ.*

In neither of the two instances, here and at **D** 23 (where the *de virtute* gives *αἰτιάσαιτ' ἄν*) is there any expressed protasis, and the supposed conditions summed up in *ἄν* are of the most general description; indeed the omission of *ἄν* here would leave the sense little altered. **94 D** 10 is different.

On the subject of these constructions a 'Symposium' was held, extending over several years, in the pages of the *Classical Review.* The contributions are as follows:

III 276 (summary of paper by Bayfield, read before the Camb. Philol. Soc.).

III 314, 343 (criticisms by R. C. Seaton).

III 417 (ditto by Caskie Harrison).

IV 200 b (Bayfield).

IV 297 (Caskie Harrison).

V 397 'Conditions contrary to fact': Edw. B. Clapp.

VI 90 Bayfield replies.

VI 199 (Sonnenschein).
VI 201 Seaton rejoins.

This debate must have done a great deal to clear up the subject; but the most luminous utterance on the subject with which I am acquainted is Jebb's note on Soph. *O.C.* 964. 'Has not our way of translating ἄν led us to form too narrow a conception of the way in which the Greek idiom was used? Suppose, however, we treat ἄν as what in fact it is—a separate word which qualifies the statement of fact. ἄν is 'on that hypothesis': thus εἰ ἔπεσεν, ἀπέθανεν ἄν is "if he fell, on that hypothesis he died." Thus we see how this use, though in practice restricted to the "unfulfilled condition," is large enough to include κεν κτεῖνεν "he probably slew" (*Od.* IV 546) and ἀνεθάρσησαν ἄν "in that case they took courage."'

The notion of *non-fulfilment* in ἄν with a past tense of the indicative is thus adventitious. When this combination is associated with a protasis containing εἰ and a past tense of the indic. the notion of unreality is inevitable; but to this form of condition may be applied the words of Allen and Greenough, *Lat. Gr.* p. 327 note: 'The implication of falsity in this construction (imp. and plupf. subj.) is not inherent in the subj., but comes from the transfer of future conditions to *past time*. Thus the time for the happening of the condition has at the time of writing already passed; so that if the condition remain a condition, it must be contrary to fact.' [These words will exemplify the quality of the book noted by Prof. Hale in his review of it, *CR.* III 166: (in it) 'syntactical mechanisms are regarded not as results, intellectually perfect, of a rational mind, working with entire logic, but as results of the workings of multitudes of minds, proceeding in part logically, in part under the influence of associations of various kinds.' This is the only true attitude of mind for the study of grammar.]

ἄλλους τε . . μάλιστα δέ: τε . . δέ is not uncommon; in addition to the accession of emphasis expected by τε in the clause that follows it, δέ imports a notion of contrast. Cp. *Euthyphr.* 3 E σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν, Xen. *Hell.* VI v 30 οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες τούτων τε οὐδὲν ἐποίουν, καταλιπόντες δὲ τὰ ὅπλα εἰς ἀρπαγὴν ἐτρέποντο, Aesch. *S. c. T.* 579 (571) with Verrall's note.

C 11. **ὑόν**: this is the preferable spelling, according to Sch. Plato forms the nom. and acc. sing. in the 2nd declension, and all the other forms in the 3rd, as **D** 17 τοῦ ὑέος, **94 B** 13 υἱεῖς.

D 14. **Κλεόφαντον**: see Plut. *Them.* xxxii. 'Dictum ejus commemorat Plut. *de ed. puer.* 2 ὡς, ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὸς βούληται,

τοῦτο καὶ τῷ δήμῳ συνδοκεῖ τῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων· ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐθέλει, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ· ἃ δ' ἂν ἡ μήτηρ, καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς· ἃ δ' ἂν Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ πάντες Ἀθηναῖοι' Fr. If Cleophantus was a 'spoiled child,' we should not need to look much farther for the cause of his failure.

ἐδιδάξατο: this raises the difficult question whether we may regard as a separate force of the Middle Voice the meaning to 'get a thing done by another' ('Causative Middle' F.E.T. p. 127). Against this Riddell strongly argues, § 87. He does not deny that διδάσκομαι often means 'I have some one taught'; but contends that this sense is not peculiar to, or due to, the Middle Voice, except in as far as it is deducible from the general force of the Middle—the *interest* of the agent in the act.

He says that the ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification, διδάσκεσθαι, by some passages in the *Meno*. 'As the favourite example thus falls to the ground, so do the rest. δανείζεσθαι, for instance, is "to take a δανεῖον," as δανείζειν is "to give a δανεῖον"; that is, the general meaning of the verb being "to deal in δανεία," the Middle means "to deal in them for one's self." So, rather differently, "bringing a man to justice" becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, κρίνειν, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, κρίνεσθαι. The fact is that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning "to get a thing done by another"; neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that "qui facit per alium facit per se,"' as we say a man 'builds a house' or 'educates his sons.'

This view I believe to be right. But Mr. St. George Stock's note on this place should be consulted, with *CR.* II 29 a.

Neither Ast s.vv. διδάσκειν, παιδεύειν, nor Kühner § 373. 6, § 374. 7, recognize a *separate* causal sense of the Middle. An examination of these words will show, I think, that there is no constant distinction between the active and middle voices.

(α) διδάσκεσθαι (causal as here) *Prot.* 325 B C (quoted on **91 E** 17): *Rep.* 467 E καὶ διδαξαμένους ('having had them taught') ἱππεύειν, ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν: † *Thages* 122 E οὐκ ἐδιδάξατό σε ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν ἅπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι πεπαίδευνται: † *Ep.* xiii 360 E ('if possible attend this philosopher yourself') εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκδίδαξαί τινα ('get some one "coached"') ἵνα κατὰ σχολὴν μανθάνων βελτίων γίγνῃ: Xen. *Mem.* IV iv 5, *Cyr.* I vi 2, Eur. *Med.* 295—

> χρὴ δ' οὔποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ
> παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς:

Aristoph. *Clouds* 1338 *ἐδιδαξάμην μέντοι σε*· Lucian *Somn.* init. *ὁ πατὴρ ἐσκοπεῖτο μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὅ τι καὶ διδάξαιτό με.*

In Hdt. II 154 *παῖδας παρέβαλε αὐτοῖσι Αἰγυπτίους τὴν Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι*, the last word may be either passive ('for them to be taught'); or middle in *causal* sense ('so as to have them taught'), as L. & S. take it: see s.v. *ἐκδιδάσκω*.

The middle appears in sense of the active, or 'merely with the idea of the teacher's interest superadded' (Jebb on Soph. *Ant.* 356) *Menex.* 238 B: (the gods) *οἳ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν κατεσκεύασαν πρός τε τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν δίαιταν, τέχνας πρώτους παιδευσάμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας φυλακὴν ὅπλων κτῆσίν τε καὶ χρῆσιν διδαξάμενοι*: Pind. *Ol.* 8. 59 *τὸ διδάξασθαι δέ τοι εἰδότι ῥᾴτερον*: Simonides (Bergk[4] 145 = *Anth. Pal.* VI 213) *διδαξάμενος χόρον ἀνδρῶν*: Mosch. 3. 97 *διδάξαο σεῖο μαθητάς*: Bion 12 (2). 9. The use of *ἐδιδάξατο* in Soph. *Ant.* 356, 'hath he taught himself,' is exceptional, and seems due to the analogy of the pres. *διδάσκομαι* reflexive, as in Aristoph. *Wasps* 2, and Simonides *γηράσκω δ' ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος*. Cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 783 *οὐκ ἂν διδαξαίμην σ' ἔτι* (Elmsley *διδάξαιμ' ἄν σ' ἔτι*, approved by Jebb l.c.): Plato *Rep.* 421 E *καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἢ ἄλλους οὓς ἂν διδάσκῃ χείρους δημιούργους διδάξεται* (Cobet *διδάξει*. The tense *διδάξομαι* is usually passive. See on **95 D** 4). On Luc. *Somn.* § 10 *οὐκ ἐς μακράν σε διδάξομαι* Heitland observes that the *fut. mid.* is used just like the active *by late writers.*

(β) *διδάσκειν* occurs **94 B** 16, **D** 2, 3, where the context makes it clear that the teaching was done *by means of others*; *Prot.* 324 D (cp. *διδάσκεσθαι* 325 B).

(γ) *παιδεύεσθαι* '*institui curo*' **D** 18: *Rep.* 546 B *οὓς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε*: Eur. *fr.* 1053—

> *οὐ γάρ τις οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύσεται*
> *ὥστ' ἐκ πονηρῶν μὴ οὐ κακοὺς πεφυκέναι.*

παιδεύεσθαι like active: *Menex.* 238 D (quoted above): Eur. *I.A.* 562 *τροφαὶ αἱ παιδευόμεναι*: *παιδεύεται* humorously for *τρέφει* Nausicrates ap. Ath. VII 325 E (*τρίγλας*) *ἃς κλύδων Αἰξωνικὸς πασῶν ἀρίστας ἐν τόποις παιδεύεται.*

(δ) *παιδεύειν*, '*institui curo*': **93 E** 31 *παιδεῦσαι* **94 A** 9, **B** 17, **C** 24: *Prot.* 319 E *ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν*: ibid. 320 A *ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε*: *Crito* 50 D (the laws) *παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν*: † *Theages* 122 E (quoted above).

All this goes to show that the differentiation between the two voices was still incomplete. See Mr. E. H. Miles *On the Early Meaning and Developments of the 'Middle' Voice*, pp. 26. 7; 31. 2: also note on *ψεύδω* **71 D** 29. Another verb that well

illustrates the intermixture of meanings in the two voices is *φυλάσσω*.

A few instances of 'causal middles' may be added.

(1) *Phil.* 14 E *διομολογησάμενος* no doubt means 'having got him to admit'; but this arises not so much from the voice as from *δια-*. The admission which is to his interest is part of a *mutual* process (cp. *δια-λέγεσθαι*, etc.).

(2) *ποιοῦμαι*, 'I get made,' see L. & S. A 1. Add Plato † *Ep.* xiii 361 A *τὸν μὲν Ἀπόλλω ἐποιησάμην* 'I got the Apollo made': Plut. *Them.* v 4 *αὑτοῦ ποιούμενον εἰκόνας*. The notion of *procuring* springs from the notion of interest.

(3) Kühner § 374. 7 points out how *κατασιωπᾶν* (Xen. *Hell.* v iv 7) and *κατασιωπᾶσθαι* (ibid. II iv 20) are used in identical sense 'to put to silence,' where the causal sense is due, not to the voice, but to *κατά* (cp. *κατηχεῖν*, originally 'to elicit a resonance from,' so 'to test'; later 'to catechise').

(4) *προστρίβεσθαι*: Aristoph. *Eq.* 5 *πληγὰς ἀεὶ προστρίβεται τοὺς οἰκέτας* 'he gets stripes inflicted' (L. & S. III): *ἐντρίβεσθαι* (L. & S. I 2). Here the causal sense is clear, and seems confined to the middle: but it may be deduced from the notion of interest.

(5) *παρατίθεμαι*, 'I have served up to me,' Thuc. I 130, etc.

But L. & S. s.v. B 1 quote the same verb from *Od.* xv 506 *ἠῶθεν δέ κεν ὔμμιν ὁδοιπόριον παραθείμην*, of setting meat *before others*: and from Plut. *Per.* 26 *παρετίθεντο τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅσα κτέ.*, of providing *yourself*.

(6) *Symp.* 205 E *ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γε καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμνεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, which may mean either 'to cut off from themselves,' or 'to have cut off from themselves (by another).' It is absolutely indifferent who the agent is.

ἱππέα ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν: *διδάσκειν* and *παιδεύειν* are treated as 'factitive' verbs, with subst. or adj. as secondary predicates. This appears in some of the instances quoted above. Cp. Eur. *Her.* 575—

καὶ δίδασκέ μοι
τοιούσδε τούσδε παῖδας ἐς τὸ πᾶν σοφούς.

Soph. *O.C.* 919 *καίτοι σε Θῆβαί γ' οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακόν*: Eur. *Andr.* 601, Aristoph. *Ran.* 1020.

So in the pass., Soph. *O.C.* 562 *ἐπαιδεύθην ξένος.*

15. **ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς**: the 'ars desultoria.' Cp. *Il.* xv 680 foll.

18. **ἐπαιδεύσατο**: see on *ἐδιδάξατο* (line 14 above).

καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν: change from rel. to demonstrative construction. See on **74 D** 35, **90 E** 32.

19. **διδασκάλων εἴχετο**: for the phrase cp. **94 A** 8, **B** 18; *Prot.* 319 E, 324 D: for the tense see on **83 D** 51.

22. **τήν γε φύσιν**: nothing can illustrate more strikingly the difference between Plato's point of view and ours. Because, forsooth, he had ability to learn horsemanship, he had ability to learn virtue.

23. **ᾐτιάσατ' ἄν τις**: see on **93 C** 9. Plato is fond of using *αἰτιῶμαι* with inf.: *Prot.* 333 E *τὸν λόγον ἠτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι*: *Rep.* 407 C *ἰλίγγους αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι*: ibid. 599 E (addressed to Homer) *σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι; Crat.* 396 D *καὶ αἰτιῶμαί γε μάλιστα αὐτὴν (τὴν σοφίαν) ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος προσπεπτωκέναι μοι.*

E 32. **τῶν γειτόνων**: below **94 A** 10 *βελτίω ὁτουοῦν*. Note the love of variety through this passage. **ποιῆσαι** depends on *βούλεσθαι*.

33. For **εἴπερ . . γε** see on **C** 8 and Exc. II. There is a slight ellipse: 'as he would have wished, if etc.'

CHAPTER XXXIII

94 A 2. **ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον**: Kühner § 349 b 7 i, Hadley § 652. This strengthened superlative occurs in Hdt. and is commonest in Thuc. and Plato (*Symp.* 178 C, etc.). The origin is probably from a phrase in which the superl. was repeated (*ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄριστον*), and the best MSS. at *Crat.* 427 E actually give *ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις μέγιστον*; but Sch. cuts out *μεγίστοις*.

4. **Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου**: see on **93 C** 2. In the passage in the *Gorgias* in which the great statesmen of old are disparaged, the name of Aristides does not appear. In one place of the dialogue Plato recognizes Aristides' superiority (526 A B): 'the just use of power is very rare; still, there are some both here and elsewhere, and yet will be, *καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου.*'

8. Lysimachus and Melesias (**94 C** 23) appear in the *Laches* (see on **93 B** 17). Lysimachus is there represented as an elderly man (189 C, cp. 201 B). The dramatic date of the *Laches* must be before 420 B.C., the date of Laches' death. We may probably assume then that Lysimachus was born not very much after 500 B.C. He and Sophroniscus the father of Socrates were *ἑταίρω τε καὶ φίλω Lach.* 180 E. (Socrates was born in 469 B.C.) 'Lysimachus obscuram degebat vitam a civibus agro et argento

donatus ob paternae virtutis memoriam' Fr., who refers to Dem. *Lept.* (20) 115, and schol.

10. **καὶ συγγέγονας**, 'you have actually met'; contrasted with ἐκήκοας in the case of Cleophantus **93 E** 27.

11. **ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν**: this implies that Plato regards **B** Lysimachus as still alive at the dramatic date of the *Meno* (say 402 B.C.). According to what we gather from the *Laches* he must then have been at such an advanced age as to make a fair estimate of his powers difficult. Lysimachus would be some seventy years older than Meno. But Plato is not very careful about consistency in chronology. See Athenaeus 505 E.

εἰ δὲ βούλει: see on **71 E** 2.

Περικλέα: see on **93 C** 2.

13. **δύο υἷεῖς**: these are the two sons which Pericles had by his Athenian wife, the widow of Hipponicus. They were both carried off by the plague in 429 B.C. (Plut. *Pericles* 24. 5; 36. 4, 5). After their death the Athenians legitimated his son by Aspasia, named Pericles. Schol. on *Menex.* 235 E ἔσχε δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς (Ἀσπασίας) ὁ Περικλῆς νόθον υἱόν, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ ἐτελεύτα, τῶν γνησίων προαποθανόντων.

The two sons (of whom Xanthippus seems to have been the elder) are mentioned in the *Protagoras*. At 315 A they appear in the row of listeners walking up and down with Protagoras. At 320 A the sophist gives them as examples of youths whose education has been neglected: νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι ('browsing at large'), ἐάν που περιτύχωσι τῇ ἀρετῇ. In † *Alc.* i 118 E we read τὼ Περικλέους υἱέε ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην: with the scholium οὓς καὶ βλιτομάμμας ἐκάλουν. (The scholiast adds an explanation of the epithet, which, however, still remains obscure. It occurs in Aristoph. *Clouds* 1001, where the suggestion is that it was applied to the sons of Hippocrates.) Plut. *Per.* 36. 1 speaks of Xanthippus' extravagance, and his variance with his father; and Athenaeus v 220 D says that Antisthenes wrote disparagingly of both the youths. Lastly note Aristot. *Rhet.* II xv 3 ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφυᾶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἦθη . . τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους, with which cp. Plato *Polit.* 310 C foll.

18. **δὲ ἄρα**: see on **91 E** 17.

20. **μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτόν**: see on **89 C** 10.

23. **Θουκυδίδης**: the son of Melesias (unrelated to the **C** historian), an aristocrat of unblemished respectability, is reserved for the climax. (See App. on the text **B** 21). His son Melesias is introduced in the *Laches* (179 C) as the com-

panion and coëval of Lysimachus. Here again the dates give trouble. For whereas Aristides died about 168 B.C., Thucydides was ostracized in 444 B.C., returned to Athens, renewed his opposition to Pericles, and perhaps survived him. His death thus was later than that of Aristides by some forty years. Are their children likely to have been coevals? Thucydides, to have a son coeval with Lysimachus, cannot have been born much later than 520 B.C. (see on **A** 8). This would make him at least 76 at the time of his ostracism. This is, of course, not impossible, but none of the accounts we have suggest his being so much older than his rival Pericles. Stephanus' name appears in a quotation from Polemo ap. Athen. IV 234 E *στήλη τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ ψήφισμα μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου, γραμματεὺς δὲ Στέφανος Θουκυδίδου.*

25. **ἐπάλαισαν**: wrestling may have been a favourite sport of Thucydides, as is suggested by the anecdote Plut. *Per.* 8, Abbott's *Hist. of Greece*, II 414 note.

26. **που, 'as I understand'**: see on **75 C** 29.

CHAPTER XXXIV

1. **οὐκ ἄν ποτε**: the negative refers to the whole double supposition following; or rather, if we regard the sentence as an instance of parataxis, to the latter half of it: 'he would not, while teaching his sons this, have omitted to teach them that.' This place and some quoted below are instances of *argumentum ex contrariis conclusum* (see on **91 E** 17).

In sentences like this, where each member consists of a protasis and apodosis, we often have *μέν* twice in the first number, *δέ* twice in the second: *Apol.* 28 E *δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον . . τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον . . τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος . . ἐνταῦθα δὲ λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν*: *Gorg.* 512 A (quoted on **91 E** 17): ibid. 514 B C *καὶ εἰ μὲν . . οὕτω μὲν . . εἰ δὲ . . οὕτω δέ . .*: *Crat.* 386 A *ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δ' ἄν σοι, τοιαῦτα δέ σοι*: † *Alc.* I 108 E *αἰσχρόν γε εἰ μέν τις ἐρωτήσειεν . . περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν . . περὶ δὲ οὗ . . τούτου δὲ πέρι κτέ.* Kühner § 529. 2 quotes instances of *μὲν . . μὲν . . δὲ . . δέ . .* from Hdt. (II 26, 102, 174); from Xenophon (as *Oec.* IV 8) and from Isocrates, whose love of *παρίσωσις* perhaps led him to affect this structure (see Sandys on *Paneg.* § 60). But often the structure is *imperfect*, *μέν* being omitted in the first apodosis, as *Prot.* 313 A *ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῷ . . πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέμμην . . ὃ δὲ*

περὶ πλείονος ἡγεῖ . . περὶ δὲ τούτου κτέ., *Charm.* 173 C D : or with both the first protasis and apodosis, *Phaedo* 78 C, *Laches* 194 D; or *δέ* omitted in second apodosis as Xen. *Oec.* iv 7 ; or it is *varied* as Hdt. II 39, where we have *δέ* substituted for *μέν* in the first apodosis, and in consequence *δή* for *δέ* in the second protasis. See Buttmann's Demosthenes' *Midias* Exc. XII pp. 153 foll.

2-4. **δαπανώμενον . . ἀναλώσαντα** : in both these clauses **D** the *participle* contains the main thought that is dependent on *ἔδει*. Cp. *Euthyd.* 282 E *ἐπιστήμην ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι* : *Gorg.* 484 D *οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, etc. So **80 D** 3 *προθέμενος*, not *ζητήσεις*, contains the important idea.

6. **ἀλλὰ γάρ** : see Exc. III. This is an instance of *ἀλλὰ γάρ* introducing a supposed objection—a usage very rare in Plato, though Riddell (§ 147) does not think it necessary to illustrate it. *Rep.* 365 C *ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα* is the only parallel I can cite, and this itself differs from the present and other places, inasmuch as the words *φησί τις*, usually understood, are expressed. Other instances occur in the orators ; Lysias *κατ' Ἐρατ.* § 40, Isocr. *Paneg.* (4) 175. See Sandys' note ibid. 140 : *ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τούτων δίκαιόν ἐστι σκοπεῖν τὴν βασιλέως δύναμιν, ἐξ ὧν μεθ' ἑκατέρων γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ πεπολέμηκεν.* He says the use is 'very common' ; which can only apply to the orators. (I confess I do not understand why the two places first referred to should be printed as interrogations, and the last not.) Here *ἀλλά* goes with the sentence *καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα* ; and the words from *γάρ* to *τῶν συμμάχων* really form a parenthesis, which is felt as a protasis. 'But, —as perhaps I shall be told, etc.—he was both of noble family and etc.'

7. **καὶ τῶν συμμάχων** : Thucydides, as an aristocrat, was likely to favour the claims of the allies.

10. **ἐξευρεῖν ἄν** : see on **93 C** 9. But this instance must be separated from those there treated, for here an unreal condition is implied in the words *εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν*.

12. **τῶν ἐπιχωρίων** : a variation for *ἀστῶν* (**92 B** 7). **E**

τις : this is in apposition to the object of *ἐξευρεῖν*, and so might be accus., but we have an 'attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction' Riddell § 192. He quotes inter alia *Apol.* 41 A *εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κτέ.*

εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν: cp. *Lach.* 179 C *αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἴων τρυφᾶν . . τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἔπραττον.* A simple past condition.

14. **ἀλλὰ γάρ, κτέ.**: see Exc. III. The phrase is often used to sum up in conclusion.

μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή: with the whole of the preceding discussion compare Socrates' argument in the *Protagoras* 319 A foll. The argument falls clearly into two divisions (1) *public*: on matters of *general policy* there are no expert advisers as there are with the special arts: (2) *private* 319 D: if we look at the matter from the point of view of *individuals*, we find that even the best and wisest citizens cannot secure a similar virtue in their sons.

For *μὴ οὐκ ᾖ* see on **89 C** 10.

16. **ῥᾳδίως** often has a bad meaning: 'lightly,' 'recklessly'; Fr. refers to *Apol.* 24 C *ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους*: *Crito* 48 C *τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτιννύντων*: add *Rep.* 377 B, 378 A, *Laws* 917 B *θεῶν ὀνόματα μὴ χραίνειν ῥᾳδίως*: *Phaedo* 63 A *τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν*; and soon afterwards *οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων*, with which cp. the reproach of Hippolytus to Artemis (Eur. *Hipp.* 1441) *μακρὰν δὲ λείπεις ῥᾳδίως ὁμιλίαν.*

κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους: undoubtedly Socrates' disparagement of Athenian statesmen, both past and present, was one chief cause of the suspicion in which he was held. See *Apol.* 23 E foll. Of his three accusers Anytus was angered *ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.* See Art. 'Socrates' in *Encycl. Brit.*

19. **ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ—ἐν τῇδε δὲ καί**: see an article by Milton W. Humphreys dealing with *καί* followed by *δὲ καί* in *CR.* XI 141.

20. Anytus is here no doubt referring to the facilities for prosecutions given by the system of popular juries, of which he is supposed to speak with approbation. Cp. *Gorg.* 521 B, etc.

95 A 21. **καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι**: we read in *Apol.* 32 B–D of two occasions, before the trial that led to his death, on which Socrates *risked* prosecution; but as he does not seem to have been actually prosecuted on either occasion, the reference here is probably quite general. The conversation with Anytus may perhaps be considered as a sample of those by which Socrates says (*Apol.* 21 C) he alienated statesmen; see Diog. L. II 38, Zeller *Socr.* p. 206.

Chapters XXXV, XXXVI (**95 A–96 B**). Socr. *Anytus has left us, apparently angry. He has really no reason for being so. Tell me, in your country do men eminent for virtue profess to communicate it?* Meno. *They utter no certain sound on the subject.* Socr. *Are the sophists then, who alone do profess this, teachers of virtue?* Meno. *The best of them, Gorgias, never made any profession of the sort; he only professed the art of speaking.* Socr. *What do you think yourself about the sophists' teaching of virtue?* Meno. *I cannot make up my mind.* Socr. *Observe that you find the same vacillation in the poet Theognis. A most remarkable result: those who profess to teach virtue are held not to be masters of it themselves; those who admittedly are masters of it are very doubtful whether it can be taught. These doubters can hardly be teachers, can they?* Meno. *No, hardly.*

Here begins the fifth and last section of the dialogue.

CHAPTER XXXV

2. **οἶεται γάρ κτέ.**: of the two assumptions that Anytus makes, it is only the former that is distinctly mistaken. Socrates is eulogistic of the old statesmen; he only points out their limitations. As far as these limitations are concerned, he would no doubt class Anytus with them; whether as equally eminent or not makes no difference.

5. **οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν**: Fr. (Introd. p. 30) thinks these words have some reference to the prosecution which Anytus himself sustained in 409 B.C. According to Diodorus XIII 64, being sent out to relieve Pylos, then besieged by the Lacedaemonians, he failed to double Cape Malea, and returned to Athens having effected nothing. This led to a prosecution: *ὁ δὲ Ἄνυτος ἰσχυρῶς κινδυνεύων ἐρρύσατο χρήμασι τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχήν, καὶ πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων δοκεῖ δικαστήριον ὠροδοκῆσαι.* The fact that the dramatic date of the dialogue is pretty certainly *later* than 409 (Introd. § 8) throws doubt on this interpretation; accordingly Hermann (*Gesch. u. Syst.* I p. 482) finds a reference to a later prosecution of Anytus, leading to his death: of which various improbable and inconsistent accounts are given.

But we may well ask whether in such a case, or if the reference were to any prosecution of Anytus, the words *παύσεται χαλεπαίνων* would be applicable. I believe we have here simply a piece of Socratic irony. To Socrates *κακῶς λέγειν* means 'to speak *untruly, unreasonably*.' Cp. Diog. L. II 35 (Socrates)

πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, κακῶς ὁ δεινά σε λέγει· καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγειν οὐκ ἔμαθε. Cp. *Rep.* 377 E *ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν.* Cp. *Phaedr.* 258 D, 259 E. (A similar word-play *Euthyd.* 284 D *κακῶς ἄρα λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακά, εἴπερ ὡς ἔχει λέγουσιν.*)

B 10. **ἐθέλουσιν**: the meaning stands between *solent* and *volunt*, as at **98 A** 28. This is pretty common in Plato, of things inanimate as well as animate: cp. *Phaedr.* 230 D *τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν.*

11. **διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν**: the sequence *τε . . ἤ* involves a slight anacoluthon. *τε* expects something to be added; *ἤ* instead of adding anything gives an alternative: 'or, what comes to the same thing.' (It has been admitted **89 D** that the propositions *διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή* and *διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς* are equivalent.) Wolf (in Buttmann's edition) wanted to read *καί* for *ἤ*, observing that MSS. often confound these two particles; but this is unnecessary. Ullrich in his note made the use of *τε . . ἤ* clear, quoting *Theaet.* 143 C *περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ὅποτε λέγοι . . ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου*, and *Ion* 535 D *ὃς ἂν κλάῃ τ' ἐν θυσίαις καὶ ἑορταῖς . . ἢ φοβῆται.* In both of these cases, he says, *τε . . καί . .* might have stood; in this place in the *Meno*, not so appropriately. See Kühner § 520. Anm. 2. (See also on **99 C** 27.)

17. **οἷς**: the 'dative of the personal agent' is not very common with the pres. or impf. pass. In the instances here given it will be seen that the dative may generally be explained either as a '*dativus commodi*' or as a 'dative of the person judging.' The latter perhaps best explains the numerous instances with *ὁμολογεῖσθαι*, *Gorg.* 497 D, *Rep.* 434 D, 478 A, *Phaedo* 72 A, *Phil.* 60 B, Andoc. *Myst.* § 15; and with *ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι*, *Laws* 638 D *ἀμφισβητεῖται δ' αὖ καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν.* Cp. *γιγνώσκεσθαι ὑμῖν* Isaeus 11 § 15. Besides these we have (*Laws* 715 B) *λέγεται δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα ταῦθ' ἡμῖν*; and lastly **96 E** 29 *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα.* Are there instances with any other verbs in Plato?

There are some examples in Thuc., as I 51. 2 *αἱ Ἀθηναίων νῆες τοῖς Κερκυραίοις οὐχ ἑωρῶντο*; II 101. 5 *ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐπράσσετο*: III 64. 4 *τίνες ἂν οὖν δικαιότερον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι μισοῖντο* 'in the eyes of' (see Classen's note); III 82. 7 *ὅρκοι ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι* 'by each party'; IV 109. 4 *αἳ οἰκοῦνται συμμίκτοις ἔθνεσι*: VI 873 *τῶν ἡμῖν ποιουμένων.*

In Xenophon *An.* I i 9 *ἄλλο στράτευμα αὐτῷ συνελέγετο*, the dative of interest is apparent.

Some instances in verse may be given:

Homer *Il.* VI 398 *ἔχεθ'* Ἕκτορι 'was held to wife by,' a true

dative, or *dativus commodi*: V 465 κτείνεσθαι ἐάσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιοῖς, VIII 244 Τρώεσσιν ἔα δάμνασθαι Ἀχαιούς, XXI 556 τούτους ὑποκλονέεσθαι ἐάσω . . Ἀχιλῆι are similar, the dative being helped by the verb ἐάω: Empedocles ap. Diog. L. VIII 62 ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξὶ σεβίζομαι: Pind. *Ol.* XII 3 τὶν γὰρ ἐν πόντῳ κυβερνῶνται θοαὶ νᾶες: Soph. *Aj.* 539 προσπόλοις φυλάσσεται (see Jebb's note, who quotes *Antig.* 504 and 1218 and Menander τἀληθὲς ἀνθρώποισιν οὐχ εὑρίσκεται): several times with ὀφείλεσθαι, as Eur. *Alc.* 419: see L. & S. s.v. II 1. (In Aristoph. *Wasps* 1145 τοῦτο τοῖσι βαρβάροις ὑφαίνεται, the meaning is 'this is woven *for* the barbarians.')

As the dative implies mainly the person interested in, or judging of, a result, it was naturally used chiefly with the perfect tense, by which a result or state of things is indicated. But we may have this sense with other tenses: e.g. in Thuc. I 51 the meaning is 'the Coreyreans had not the advantage of having the Athenian ships in sight.'

μηδέ: see on **90 E** 31. For the subject matter Fr. refers to †*Alc.* i 111 B.

23. **καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα κτέ.**: Protagoras definitely pro- **C** fessed to teach ἀρετή. See *Prot.* 318 A ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐάν μοι συνῇς, ἣν ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένῃ, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα· καὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. Socrates presses the question 'but in *what* will he become better?' to which Protagoras (ibid. E) gives the answer quoted on **91 A** 4. It is the πολιτικὴ τέχνη which Protagoras teaches; he will make his pupils good citizens. So too Hippias promises to make men βελτίους (*Hipp. maj.* 283 C), though his methods differed from those of Protagoras, being more indirect, and depending more on special arts (*Prot.* 318 E, *Hipp. maj.* 285 C D). In the *Euthyd.* 273 D the profession the twin sophists make is still general: ἀρετήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμεθα οἷῶ τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα—only here ἀρετή has got narrowed down to the art of quibbling (see on **71 E** 2). On the other hand, Gorgias, in the dialogue named after him, starts by proclaiming himself a teacher of Rhetoric (449 A). (See Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 471 foll.) But it is argued that the study of Expression apart from its contents is inconceivable. So Gorgias is at last forced under press of questions to say that he will give the knowledge of δίκαια and ἄδικα if his pupil does not already possess it (460 A). Thus he is driven to make practically the same profession as Protagoras, and the new frontier which he has tried to draw for his art is shown to be indefensible. Similarly in the *Protagoras* 312 D, Hippocrates, at a loss to say *what* he will

be taught by Protagoras, suggests *τί ἄν, εἰ εὔποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν;* "Ισως ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται· περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν κτέ. (Cp. also *Phaedr.* 260 D with Dr. Thompson's note.)

On **91 C** 19 reference was made to the passage from the *Republic* in which Socrates resists the notion that the corruption of men of exceptional ability is due to a few sophists. Socrates thus proceeds (493 A): *ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. Τὸ ποῖον;* "Εκαστον τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν. Professional teaching has become a mere craft how to humour that great beast, the Demos. It has become a teaching of Rhetoric. Thus while the earlier sophist, who taught 'virtue,' was looked on in a democracy with suspicion almost equally with the philosopher, the rhetor-sophist was there in his element; and in *Gorgias* 520 A B (see Dr. Thompson's notes) we have Socrates distinctly siding with the 'sophists,' in the older sense, against the *ῥήτορες* (*τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς*).

I believe that the thorough discussion in the *Gorgias* preceded the *Meno*, and is assumed by it (Introd. § 16).

Γοργίου ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, 'I admire this in Gorgias.' This is a frequent construction with *ἄγαμαι* and verbs of similar meaning. The *gen.* is in its origin 'partitive,' depending on *ταῦτα*. So *Prot.* 335 E, *Gorg.* 449 D, *Laws* 631 A. Stallbaum quotes similar constructions with *θαυμάζω* (*Apol.* 17 A, etc.), and *ἐπαινῶ* (*Menex.* 241 B, etc.). See Kühner § 417. Anm. 10 b. Sometimes the *acc.* is replaced by a clause with *ὅτι* (*Hipp. maj.* 291 E *ἀγαμαί σου, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοικῶς βοηθεῖν*) or *διότι* (*Laws* 948 D). Plato seems rarely to have an unsupported *gen.* of the person admired with *ἄγαμαι* (at *Rep.* 329 D *καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα*, the ptcp. approaches a *gen. absol.*). The simple *gen.* with *ἄγαμαι* is found in Xen. (*Mem.* II vi 33, 34, *Oec.* iv 21) and in † *Ep.* xii ad init.; and Plato has it with *θαυμάζω* (*Crito* 43 B).

We also often have with *ἄγαμαι* an *acc.* of the person admired, either alone, or with a *gen.* of the cause: *Rep.* 426 D *τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας; Parm.* 130 A (quasi-passive) *ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους.* Once in Plato we have the *dat.* (of cause) substituted for the *gen.*: *Symp.* 179 D *ἀγασθέντες τῷ ἔργῳ*; cp. Xen. *Cyr.* II iv 9, etc., Kühner § 425. 11.

31. **ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα**: see on **86 B** 21.

35. **Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητήν**: for the appeal to poets see on **77 B** 12. This short episode is parallel to the longer one in the *Protagoras* (339 A foll.), where Simonides in one of his poems is apparently guilty of a similar inconsistency. At one moment he says *ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν*: at another he rejects the saying of Pittacus *χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.* **D**

Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides are mentioned by Isocr. *ad Nic.* (2) 43 as enjoying the reputation of being the best moral counsellors. Theognis is also quoted by Plato, *Lysis* 212 E and *Laws* 630 A, but nowhere else. Plato's charge against the poets does not in the *Meno* reach the gravity it attains in the *Republic* (Books II, III, and X). But to this charge the gnomic poets were exposed much less than Homer.

37. **ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν**; see on **80 D** 3. Perhaps some surprise is indicated. It is new to Meno that Theognis is as inconsistent on the point as himself and *οἱ πολλοί*.

ἔπη may nearly always be taken as including elegiac as well as strictly 'epic' (hexameter) verse. The elegiac couplet grew out of the hexameter, and is closely akin to it. We have *ἔπη* distinguished from *dramatic verse*: *Rep.* 602 B *ἐν ἰαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι*: *Rep.* 379 A *ἐάν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ* [*ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν*] *ἐάν τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ* (the words bracketed are absent from the best MSS.); or from *lyric* verse: *Phaedr.* 241 E (after a hexameter) *ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι καὶ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους*: *Rep.* 607 A (we must only have hymns and encomia,) *εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν κτέ.*: or from *dramatic* and *lyric* verse: *Hipp. min.* 368 D *καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ διθυράμβους*: *Ion* 534 C *ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ' ἔπη, ὁ δ' ἰάμβους.* The word is used loosely sometimes of any kind of verse: *Prot.* 339 A *ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι*, before citing the poem of Simonides: *Laws* 810 E *ποιηταὶ ἐπῶν ἑξαμέτρων καὶ τριμέτρων καὶ πάντων τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων.* In Aristoph. *Clouds* 638 *πότερον περὶ μέτρων ἢ ῥυθμῶν ἢ περὶ ἐπῶν*, the last word seems to mean verse of any sort.

CHAPTER XXXVI

1. **ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις**: the word occurs *Rep.* 368 A; nowhere else in Plato. It has been assumed by some that a distinction is here drawn between *τὰ ἐλεγεῖα* and other works of Theognis. 'Apparet hinc Theognidem alia quoque poëmata heroico, ut videtur, metro scripsisse' Buttm. Nothing is known of these other poems. Leutsch (*Philologus* XXIX p. 521) thought that

the poems of Theognis addressed to Cyrnus were called *ὑποθῆκαι* (cp. *ὑποθήσομαι* Theognis v. 27 Bergk[4]), and that other poems of Theognis were called *ἐλεγεῖα* specifically, to distinguish them from the *ὑποθῆκαι*. Against this it may be argued that the lines now cited (vv. 33–36 in Bergk[4]) stand amongst those addressed to Cyrnus, and therefore would belong rather to the *ὑποθῆκαι*. I believe no such emphasis on the word *ἐλεγείοις* is intended, and have put no comma after the word. The meaning is simply 'in the lines where.'

2. See App. on the text.

3. **ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις**: i.e. *δυνάσται*, oligarchs. See on **77 B** 12.

4. **ἐσθλῶν**: Theognis of Megara, a bitter oligarch, continually uses *ἐσθλός*, *ἀγαθός*, *κακός*, in the political sense, which appears to be earlier than their moral one. See Grote *Hist.* Pt. II, note at the end of chapter ix.

διδάξει: pass., as the tense generally is: Soph. *Ant.* 726, Eur. *Andr.* 739, Aristoph. *Clouds* 127 (but not in *Rep.* 421 E). Most of the forms of the tense *διδαχθήσομαι* (which is late) are impossible in elegiac verse. Cf. on **93 D** 14.

E 6. **ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει**: for *ὡς* thus with *gen. absol.* see Goodwin § 918: cp. *Crat.* 439 C *διανοηθέντες ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων*.

9. **δέ γε**: this combination of particles occurs twelve times in the *Meno*. In some of the places *γε* accentuates some particular word: **82 E** 4 'but he *thinks*' (opposed to *οἶδεν*); **85 C** 7 'but (though he knew not) these opinions really *existed* in him.' At **77 B** 8 there is a hyperbaton of *γε*, which accents *παραδείγματα*. But often (as in the present place, **85 B** 48, **88 E** 10, **96 C** 7, **99 A** 53) *γε* does not point any particular word; the combination, like *utqui*, attaches a further premiss from which a conclusion is to be drawn. At **87 C** 13, **96 C** 5, 14 we simply have *εἴ γε* coupled to the context by *δέ*; and similar is *ἐπειδὴ δέ γε* at **98 D** 29. See Shilleto on Dem. *F.L.* § 102, with §§ 243, 318, 342. Cp. Intr. p. lxii.

ὀλίγον μεταβάς. 'in a somewhat different strain.' The word *μεταβαίνειν* is used technically from early times of transition to a new theme in poetry. So *Od.* VIII 492 Odysseus says to the bard Demodocus *ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι, καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον κτέ.*; three of the Homeric hymns 4 (Aphrodite), 9 (Artemis), 18 (Hermes) end with the line *σεῦ δ' ἐγὼ ἀρξάμενος μεταβήσομαι ἄλλον ἐς ὕμνον*. Cp. *Phaedr.* 262 A *κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα*, and

265 C ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι. In the present place ὀλίγον is ironical. The words have usually been taken as referring to citation from a MS. — 'somewhat lower down.' From this point of view Bekker wished to read καταβάς for μεταβάς. It is no answer to this to say that the interval in our text of Theognis is a *long* one, namely from v. 36 to v. 435; for the order of Theognis' verses followed by Plato may have been quite different from that of the συλλογή preserved to us. See note on the text of **D** 2. But the words used for passing to a point 'lower down' in citations seems to be rather ὑποβάς (as Diog. L. VIII 52) or ὑποκαταβάς (see L. & S.). If μεταβάς be taken as above, no alteration is necessary.

10. See App. on the text.

φησι . . . λέγει: not unfrequently you have some part of φημι introduced in the middle of words quoted *after* a verb of saying that introduces the whole. See L. & S. So *inquit* is often redundant. Buttmann refers to Heindorf on *Crat.* 412 B: see also Heindorf on *Charm.* 164 E. But the case here is different ('*singularis*' says Fr.); here φησι comes first with the line that first occurs to Socrates; and then he goes on in a tentative manner, λέγει πως, 'he says, if I remember rightly'; the sequel being quoted loosely. Stallbaum is wrong in saying that πως here indicates *miratio*. It rather denotes *hesitation*; cp. **73 A** 29. Plato is dramatic artist enough to know that the quotation is more natural, and so more effective, thus, than if reeled off fluently. Cp. on **81 A** 17. See also the quotation from Pindar in *Theaet.* 173 E with Campbell's note: 'Plato almost always thus weaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poets' measures to the rhythm of prose.'

14. **οὔ ποτ' ἄν**: the οὐ of course does not affect πειθόμενος. The sense is as if the participial clause had come first.

20. **ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν κτέ.**: we have here again the argument by antithesis (see **91 D** 17, **94 C** 1). 'Are you able to name any other subject of which the professing teachers not only fail to get recognition as the teachers of others, but are regarded as not even understanding it themselves, and as quite inferior in the very subject of which they say they are teachers; while those who are themselves recognized as accomplished, sometimes say that it is to be taught, and sometimes not?' **96 A**

εἰπεῖν πράγματος οὗ: Buttmann in his excellent note draws a distinction between this place and **C** 7, saying that the latter is a simple case of inverse attraction, but the present is rather an instance of anacoluthon. The first thought here was ἔχεις

εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος διδασκάλους; the acc. being afterwards exchanged for a relative clause. He cites in illustration *Il.* XVIII 192 ἄλλου δ' οὔ τευ οἶδα τοῦ ἂν κλυτὰ τεύχεα δύω· 'ubi Achilles sententiam primariam in animo habet hanc; ἄλλου δ' οὔτινος τεύχεα δύοιμ' ἄν, sed statim transiens in hanc loquendi formam, οὐκ οἶδα οὔτινος τεύχεα δύω, ambas conjungit.' [Perhaps other instances of 'inverse attraction' may also be explained as anacolutha: cp. Aesch. *S. c. T.* 400—

> καὶ νύκτα ταύτην ἣν λέγεις ἐπ' ἀσπίδος
> ἄστροισι μαρμαίρουσαν οὐρανοῦ κυρεῖν,
> τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο μάντις ἡ ἀνοία τινί.

Ar. *Lys.* 408—ὦ χρυσοχόε, τὸν ὅρμον δν ἐπεσκεύασας,
ὀρχουμένης μου τῆς γυναικὸς ἐσπέρας
ἡ βάλανος ἐκπέπτωκεν ἐκ τοῦ τρήματος,

'about that necklace, etc.':

Plut. 200—ὅπως ἐγὼ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ὑμεῖς φατὲ
ἔχειν με ταύτης δεσπότης γενήσομαι,

where the first thought was δύναμιν κεκτήσομαι.] Riddell § 191 gives both the present place and **C 7** as examples of 'Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.' At § 26 D, however, he quotes the present place as an example of a 'Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning'; adding 'Why this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191).' He had evidently changed his mind about the passage, but omitted to give his reasons in § 191.

I do not think the genitive πράγματος can be regarded as a genitive after a verb of mentioning. If the limits of this construction are strictly defined, it will be found that (1) the meaning is always to say something *about* something (so that περί might conceivably be supplied), not simply 'to mention'; (2) that it is nearly always helped by some substantive (noun or pronoun) on which the genitive may be regarded as dependent. Both of these conditions are satisfied by the only prose instance Riddell quotes in support, *Laws* 804 E καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. As to the verse instances he quotes, Soph. *Aj.* 1236 πόλου κέκραγας ἀνδρὸς ὧδ' ὑπέρφρονα is not to the point, the genitive depending on the neuter plural ὑπέρφρονα; ibid. 1257 ὃς ἀνδρὸς οὐκέτ' ὄντος ἀλλ' ἤδη σκιᾶς θαρσῶν ὑβρίζεις κἀξελευθεροστομεῖς the construction is helped (α) by the participle ὄντος, (β) by the expectation of such a verb as καταφρονεῖς; Soph. *O. C.* 355 μαντεῖ' ἃ τοῦδ'

ἐχρήσθη σώματος satisfies both conditions mentioned above. So does *Trach.* 1122—

τῆς μητρὸς ἥκω τῆς ἐμῆς
φράσων ἐν οἷς νῦν ἐστίν·

where *ἐν οἷς νῦν ἐστίν* = *τὰς συμφοράς.*

Riddell in his note on § 26 gives up *Rep.* 439 B, *τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κτέ.*, observing (§ 225) that there the genitive *τοῦ τοξότου* belongs to the following clause *ἀλλὴ μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χεὶρ κτέ.* Similar is *Rep.* 375 E *οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος.*

The genitive which occurs in questions *about* things is often supported by *τί;* see *Rep.* 459 B *τί δὲ ἵππων οἵει;* where, however, the word *γένος*, which comes immediately before (*τό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος*), is the main support of the genitive: ibid. 470 A *τί δὲ γῆς τε τιμήσεως καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως;* 582 C; *Gorg.* 509 D; *Phaedo* 78 D; Aesch. *Eum.* 211 *τί γὰρ γυναικὸς ἥτις ἄνδρα νοσφίσῃ;* *P. V.* 820; Soph. *Phil.* 439, 441; *El.* 317. (See Kühner § 417. Anm. 9.)

Certainly *εἰπεῖν πράγματος* can never be Greek for 'to mention a thing.' I hold, therefore, with Buttmann, that we have here a change of construction.

The present discussion is confined to the genitive after verbs of *speaking.* We have more latitude in verbs of *judging*, etc.:

Rep. 576 D *ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις;*

485 B *μαθήματος ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν, ὃ ἂν αὐτῆς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας.* (But the reading is doubtful.)

Laws 646 D *καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς* (*ὡσαύτως διανοητέον*). Here *περί* is supplied with the gen. from the previous sentence, being omitted on account of the neighbouring *περί* with acc.

21. **οὐχ ὅπως** followed by *ἀλλὰ οὐδέ* (see on **71 C** 13) is used in ascending to a negative idea; the sense then is *non modo non.* The negative is not expressed with *οὐχ ὅπως*, being covered by the wider negative in the clause to which it leads up. *Rep.* 591 C *τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων.* Instead of *οὐχ ὅπως* in this construction, we also have *μὴ ὅπως, μὴ ὅτι*, very rarely *οὐχ ὅτι*: Dem. 23 (*Aristocr.*) 155. Kühner § 525. 3 c; Riddell § 152.

But *οὐχ ὅπως* (or *μὴ ὅτι*) is also used = *non modo non* followed by *ἀλλά*, when the second clause is not negative in expression, but simply opposed in sense to the former. Xen. *Hell.* V iv 34 *ἐδίδασκον τὸν δῆμον ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὅπως τιμωρήσαιντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαινέσειαν τὸν Σφοδρίαν*; Kühner § 525. 3 b.

22. **διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται**: *εἶναι* is omitted on account of the neighbouring *εἶναι*. Presently *ὁμολογοῦνται* is understood with *ἐπίστασθαι* and *πονηροὶ εἶναι*.

B **ἀλλὰ οὐδ' . . ἀλλά**: see on **71 C** 10 and **74 D** 30. Kühner § 535. Anm. 1 refers to *Lys.* 223 A, *Prot.* 341 D, *Symp.* 211 E, for the frequent use of ἀλλά in successive clauses, each limiting the one before it.

28. **κυρίως**, 'in any real sense.'

Chapter XXXVII (**96 B–E**). SOCR. *There really seem to be no teachers of Virtue; therefore no learners either; so that Virtue is not teachable. Yet if Virtue be Knowledge, it must be teachable. But perhaps the practical results of Knowledge may be simulated by something that springs from a different source.*

C 7. **πράγματος οὗ**: a case of 'inverse attraction.' Hadley § 1003 thus defines this idiom: 'The antecedent, without being incorporated into the relative clause, is sometimes attracted to the case of the relative.' If here we had *οὗ πράγματος* instead of *πράγματος οὗ*, the antecedent *would* be 'incorporated into the relative clause.'

Plenty of instances of inverse attraction are given in Kühner § 555. 4. The same thing occurs, but more rarely, in Latin: Verg. *Aen.* I 573 *urbem quam statuo vestra est* ('*quam urbem*' would be simple 'incorporation'); Roby *Lat. Gr.* § 1067.

The following are instances in Plato:—

Polit. 271 C *τὸν βίον ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς* Κρόνου *φῂς εἶναι δυναστείας, πότερον ἦν κτέ.*

Lysis 221 B *οἷόν τε οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρῶντα, τούτου οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν;* (see Heindorf).

Rep. 520 D *ἐν πόλει ᾗ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν ταύτην ἀριστα οἰκεῖσθαι* (for *πόλιν ἐν ᾗ*).

Laws 740 D *πάντων τούτων ἀρχὴν ἣν ἂν θώμεθα μεγίστην καὶ τιμιωτάτην, αὕτη σκεψαμένη . . ποριζέτω κτέ.*

Also *Crito* 45 B, where the attraction takes place in an adverb, *πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε, ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ, ἀγαπήσουσί σε* (for *ἄλλοθι*).

We may bring under this head the instances of *οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὔ*. See on **70 C** 18.

8. **εἶεν**: see on **89 E** 25 and **92 C** 18.

τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι: cp. **89 E** 26.

D 24. **καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος**: see on **75 E** 13. Socrates' obligations to Prodicus are exceedingly hard to estimate. At *Prot.* 341 A

Socrates says that the wisdom of Prodicus is an ancient and wondrous thing: *κινδυνεύει ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι*: and calls himself *μαθητὴς Προδίκου*. Cp. 315 D foll.: in the hall where Protagoras was, *Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς ὡς ἐφαίνετο*. Several were gathered round Prodicus, says S., *περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου· πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα*. *Crat.* 384 B (quoted on **91 D** 8) shows that Socrates did not drink deeply at the wells of Prodicus' etymological learning. Buttmann however points out that the present passage shows his debt to him was not confined to etymology. See also *Charm.* 163 D, quoted on **75 E** 13. Prodicus can hardly have been older than Socrates, and was probably rather younger (Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 417 note). In *Hipp. maj.* 282 C Socrates speaks of *ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος Πρόδικος*. But, as will be seen, Socrates was older than at least one other of his 'teachers.' Cp. on **76 C** 22.

'All the remarks of the Platonic Socrates,' says Zeller (*pre-Socratics* II 419 note), 'concerning the instruction which he received from Prodicus, even those in the *Meno*, have an unmistakeably ironical tone, and as to any historical content, nothing is to be derived from them beyond the fact that Socrates was acquainted with Prodicus, and had heard lectures from him as from other sophists. That he sent certain individuals of his acquaintance to him does not prove any special preference, for, according to the passage in the *Theaetetus* (151 B), he sent others to other sophists.' (See also Zeller's note ibid. pp. 501, 502.)

It may be noted that a similar tone is adopted by Plato towards other persons whom he makes Socrates represent as his teachers. *Menex.* 235 E ΣΩ. *Καὶ ἐμοὶ μέν γε, ὦ Μενέξενε, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν οἵῳ τε εἶναι εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τυγχάνει διδάσκαλος οὖσα οὐ πάνυ φαύλη περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ἀλλ' ἥπερ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς πεποίηκε ῥήτορας, ἕνα δὲ καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου*. MEN. *Τίς αὕτη; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι Ἀσπασίαν λέγεις;* ΣΩ. *Λέγω γάρ, καὶ Κόννον γε τὸν Μητροβίου· οὗτοι γάρ μοι δύο εἰσὶν διδάσκαλοι, ὁ μὲν μουσικῆς, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικῆς*. But Menexenus is very sceptical (236 C, cp. 249 D E) as to whether Aspasia has had much to do with the speech which Socrates proceeds to deliver. As to Connus, Socrates says he did not do his teacher much credit: *Euthyd.* 272 C *ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ ὄνειδος τοῖν ξένοιν περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννῳ τῷ Μητροβίου, τῷ κιθαριστῇ, ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν· ὁρῶντες γοῦν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφοιτηταί μοι ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶσι*

καὶ τὸν Κόννον καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον. Cp. 295 D. Again, Socrates expresses respect for the musician Damon (*Lach.* 180 D, *Rep.* 400 B C, cp. 424 C), who was himself an associate of Prodicus (*Lach.* 197 D, † *Alc.* i 118 C). Later authorities improved upon this and made Socrates a *pupil* of Damon (Diog. L. II 19). Yet the tone in which he is treated is one of mock respect (*Lach.* 200 A B).

It seems inconsistent with the most essential characteristic of Socrates that he should have seriously acknowledged obligations to any one for positive instruction. That he availed himself of the opportunities of culture that Athens afforded, and spoke with 'his unfailing courtesy' of those to whose influence he had been subjected, may be assumed. Plato was not likely to estimate Socrates' debt to others more highly. In the case of Prodicus there are several reasons that may account for a somewhat hostile attitude on the part of Plato.

(1) Aristophanes had praised Prodicus at the expense of Socrates: *Clouds* 360 foll.—

> οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ γ' ὑπακούσαιμεν τῶν νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ, τῷ μὲν σοφίας καὶ γνώμης οὕνεκα, σοὶ δέ, ὅτι βρενθύει τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλεις κἀνυπόδητος κακὰ πόλλ' ἀνέχει κἀφ' ἡμῖν σεμνοπροσωπεῖς.

(2) Prodicus was a friend of Antisthenes, Plato's rival (Xen. *Symp.* iv 62).

(3) Plato, from his love for elasticity of language, and dislike of pedantry, was likely to undervalue Prodicus' distinctions. Socr. after referring to these (*Charm.* 163 D) says ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὅπῃ ἂν βούλῃ ἕκαστον· δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς. (See end of note on **72 C** 2: also Dr. Thompson's note on *Phaedr.* 267 B σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε.)

24. **παντὸς μᾶλλον**: **80 C** 35 *Euthyphr.* 9 B, *Crito* 49 B, etc.

E 27. **τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν κτέ.**: 'the state of the discussion as it stands now is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms, as follows:—

1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
   But virtue is knowledge:
   Therefore virtue is teachable.
2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
   But virtue is not teachable:
   Therefore virtue is not knowledge.

The minor premiss of each of these two syllogisms contradicts the conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not acquired by teaching, and does not come by

nature (**89 A B**), how are there any virtuous men? Socrates continues his argument: the second premiss of the first syllogism — that virtue is knowledge — is true but not the whole truth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But this assumption will not hold.' Grote II pp. 9 foll. Notice the guarded language of **87 B**: virtue is certainly *not* ἀλλοῖον *ἐπιστήμης*, but we cannot say without reserve that *ἀρετή* is *ἐπιστήμη*.

29. **ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ**: cp. **97 A** 15.

30. **τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται**: see on **95 B** 17. The notion of interest may be traced in the dative: 'that men get things done rightly and well not only under the guidance of knowledge.'

ἦ ἴσως κτέ., 'and this no doubt is the path along which the discovery is escaping us.' Personifications of the object of philosophic quest are frequent in Plato: see Campbell's *Theaet.* App. A. 'The argument itself (ὁ λόγος) is continually personified and spoken of under a Protean variety of figures. It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away "like a tale," etc.': *Theaet.* 203 D *καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται*: *Soph.* 231 C *ἀλλά τοι κἀκεῖνον* (the sophist, of whom we are in quest) *ἠγεῖσθαι χρὴ νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον.* Cp. *Polit.* 284 B, *Hipp. maj.* 294 E, etc. See below on **D** 12.

The metaphor is worked out most fully at *Rep.* 432 B *νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τινὰς θάμνον κύκλῳ περίστασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν μή πῃ διαφύγῃ ἡ δικαιοσύνη.* See App. on the text.

Chapters XXXVIII, XXXIX (**96 E–98 A**). Socr. *For practical utility Right Opinion will serve the purpose of Knowledge. Indeed, so long as Right Opinion is held, its effects will be indistinguishable from those of Knowledge. The difference between the two appears to be that the possession of the former is precarious, the latter is bound in our minds by a chain of causal reasoning.*

2. **ὡμολογήκαμεν**: at **87 E**. For the tense see on **89 C** 6 (III).

6. **που**, *opinor*, expresses hesitancy, as at **72 C** 4 and often. **97 A**

7. **ὡμολογοῦμεν**: the change from perf. to imperf. is perhaps not solely due to love of variety. The former admission had

been reached in so many words; the latter agreement they were in process of arriving at; it follows immediately from what is said at **88 C** foll.

9. **ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ**: for the matter see **88 E**. For the omission of *τις* see on **79 B** 15.

10. **ὁμοῖοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν**: see on **80 D** 39.

13. **εἴ τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδόν**: Grote (II 383 note) observes that Plato is here illustrating the difference between Knowledge and Opinion by a matter which belongs to *sensible perception*. Similarly in *Theaet.* 201 B—the passage on which Grote is there commenting—*οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν*, the matters in question about which either Opinion (through the orator) or Knowledge (from personal observation) is obtained, are all matters of fact and sense-perception. So far as the present passage is concerned, it may be noted that it is merely an illustration, and so stands on the same footing as **71 B** 6, where the existence of the class Virtue is illustrated by the existence of the individual Meno. Cp. *Phaedo* 73 C–74 D.

14. **ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε**: this is not a case of 'inverse attraction' (see on **96 C** 7) such as is found at *Crito* 45 C *καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε*, where ἄλλοσε stands for ἄλλοθι by the influence of ὅποι. A simple (not 'inverse') attraction does often occur with *βούλει* as at *Gorg.* 517 B *ἔργα τοιαῦτα οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἴργασται* (for *ἐκεῖνος ὄντινα*): *Ion* 533 A *περὶ Πολυγνώτου ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου βούλει*: *Crat.* 432 A *ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός*. But here there is no attraction at all. The full form would be *ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε αὐτὸν βαδίζειν*.

B 17. **ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων κτέ.**: it was probably in the *Meno* that Plato first propounded his view of two grades of apprehension, a higher and perfect one (*ἐπιστήμη*), and a lower and imperfect one (*δόξα*) (Zeller ch. v pp. 171–175; Grote II 377 foll.). The relation between them is set forth as follows at the end of Bk. v of the *Republic* (476 D–480 A). To the domain of Being or Reality (the world of Ideas) Knowledge is correlative, to that of Non-being, Ignorance (*ἀγνωσία* 477 A, *ἄγνοια* 478 C). But between the realm of Being and that of Non-being lies the realm of Sense, which participates in both Being and Non-being; and to this the faculty Opinion (*δόξα*) is correlative. Opinion differs from Knowledge in being fallible, 477 E *πῶς γὰρ ἂν τό γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταὐτόν ποτέ τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη;* In the region of Opinion fluctuate the conventions of the multitude; 479 D *τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι*

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. See Exc. VII.

This passage in the *Meno* is probably alluded to in *Rep.* 506 c *τί δέ ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰς ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί : ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες ;*

Another reference to the doctrine of the *Meno* occurs in the important passage *Symp.* 202 A : *ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι ἔστι τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας ; Τί τοῦτο ; Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν· ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη ; οὔτε ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία ; ἔστι δὲ δή που τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας.*

The distinction was noted as characteristic of Plato's teaching. Diog. L. III 28 quotes from the Ὑποβολιμαῖος of Cratinus (junior) (Kock *Fr. Com.* II p. 292)

A. *ἄνθρωπος εἶ δηλόνοτι καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχεις.*
B. *κατὰ μὲν Πλάτων' οὐκ οἶδ' ὑπονοῶ δ' <ὦδ'> ἔχειν.*

But though in the *Meno* the dominant phraseology is the antithesis *ἐπιστήμη*)(*δόξα*, we have for each grade a number of synonyms. For *ἐπιστήμη* we find *φρόνησις* substituted line 27, **88 B** 23, etc. ; *φρονῶν* line 23, *φρόνιμος* **A** 10, *σοφία* **99 B** 8, *νοῦς* **88 B** 24, 28, **99 C** 23, *εἰδώς* **A** 13 (cp. **85 C**), with no apparent distinction. In the *Republic* 476 D we have *δόξα* contrasted with *γνώμη*, 477 A with *γνῶσις*, 478 A *δοξαστόν* with *γνωστόν*, 479 E *δοξάζειν* with *γιγνώσκειν*. For the lower grade we have here *οἰόμενος* substituted for *δοξάζειν*, cp. **82 E**, **84 A B**, *Rep.* 506 C, where we have *οἴεσθαι* opposed to *εἰδέναι*. Sometimes *πίστις* represents the lower grade. Cp. on **98 B** 2.

25. **οὐδὲν γάρ** : for *γάρ* thus in answers cp. **78 B** 3, and see Exc. III.

30. **τὸ δέ**, 'whereas.' 'Primus monuit Heindorfius ad Theaet. (157 B) de formula *τὸ δέ* conjunctionis loco inservienti latineque vertenda *cum tamen*.' Buttm. *Apol.* 23 A *τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι*, and J. Adam's note ; *Phaedo* 109 D (or. obl.) *τὸ δὲ ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἵους τ' εἶναι ἡμᾶς*, and A.-H.'s note ; *Phil.* 24 E *τὸ δὲ εἰς αὖθις τε καὶ αὖθις ἴσως λεχθέντα τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς ἂν ξυμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήνειεν.* The idiom is very common in Plato. *τό* is accusative (or rather the primitive case, which became the accusative when the nominative was differentiated from it), and the meaning is 'in regard to this.' It has no definite construction, and does not refer to any particular word in the context. On the other hand in Thuc. I 37. 2 *τὸ δ' ἐπὶ* **C**

κακουργίᾳ ἐπετήδευσαν, *τό* resumes *ξυμμαχίαν οὐδενὸς δέξασθαι* from the previous clause, and is distinctly acc. governed by *ἐπετήδευσαν*; while at II 89. 3 *τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου ἡμῖν μᾶλλον νῦν περιέσται*, *τό* refers to *ἀνδρείοις εἶναι* just before, and is nominative. Some of the instances in Plato are ambiguous: thus, *Apol.* 39 C *τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται*, where I think *ἀποβήσεται* is impersonal and *τό not* nom.; cp. *Soph.* 244 A *ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν*, *τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τοὐναντίον*. Again in *Laws* 731 E *τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε*, *τό* is independent, and does not agree with *αἴτιον*. For *τὸ δέ* with questions see *Laws* 630 D, 967 E.

The idiom often occurs, as here, with *ἄρα* and the imperfect: 'whereas it appears that true Opinion likewise is so,' i.e. a guide to right action. See on **91 E** 17. Compare *Symp.* 198 D *τὸ δὲ ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν*: *Rep.* 357 A *τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον*: 362 A: *Tim.* 51 C *τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος*: *Laws* 803 D *τὸ δ' ἦν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ' οὖν παιδιὰ πεφυκυῖα οὔτ' αὖ παιδεία ἀξιόλογος*. Goodwin (§ 39) rightly distinguishes this from the 'philosophic' imperfect (§ 40), for which see on **83 D** 52. There *ἦν* meant 'is, as we saw,' whereas here it means rather 'was, as we see.'

33. **ὀρθὴ δόξα**: Plato seems to use this phrase and *ἀληθὴς δόξα* indifferently.

36. **ἐπιτυγχάνοι . . τυγχάνοι**: 'verbum simplex praecedente composito. *Phaedr.* 248 A *ὑπερῆρεν . . ἦρεν*. Ad *Phaedon* 59 B (*παρῆν . . ἦν*), *Euthyphr.* 14 A (*ἀπεργάζονται . . ἐργασίας*),' Fr. For *ἐπιτυγχάνειν* 'succeed' cp. *Rep.* 397 C, *Phil.* 61 D.

CHAPTER XXXIX

D 5. **ὅ τι . . δι' ὅ τι**: the change is merely due to love of variety.

12. **τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν**: the present passage strongly recalls *Euthyphr.* 11 B C ΣΩ. Τοῦ *ἡμετέρου προγόνου*, *ὦ Εὐθύφρον*, *ἔοικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην*, *ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες*, *ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἄν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν· ἄλλου δή τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ*. 'As son of a sculptor, Socrates traced his descent to Daedalus, the eponymous hero of artists' (J. Adam). Cp. † *Alc.* i 121 A.

The same idea is carried farther *Euthyphr.* 15 B ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολὺ τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντας ποιῶν; see on **96 E** 29.

The scholium on our present passage runs thus: τῶν πάλαι δημιουργῶν πλαττόντων τὰ ζῷα συμμεμυκότας ἔχοντα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ οὐ διεστηκότας τοὺς πόδας, ἀλλ' ἑστῶτα σύμπoδα, Δαίδαλος ἄριστος ἀγαλματοποιὸς ἐπιγεγονὼς πρῶτος ἀναπετάννισί τε τὰ τούτων βλέφαρα, ὡς δόξαι βλέπειν αὐτά, καὶ τοὺς πόδας, ὡς νομίσαι βαδίζειν, διίστησι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεδέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φύγοιεν, ὡς δῆθεν ἐμψύχων ἤδη γεγονότων αὐτῶν. τοῖς δεδεμένοις οὖν τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐοικέναι δόξας φησί, τοῖς λελυμένοις δὲ τούτων τὰς ψευδεῖς. (The last sentence is perhaps worth citing for its ludicrous misinterpretation of Plato.) Fr. refers, in illustration of the scholium, to Strabo VI 264, Apollodorus II 2, 2, Diod. IV 76.

Other references to moving statues of Daedalus occur: Aristotle *Pol.* I 4 εἰ ἠδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασίν: id. *de anima* I iii 11 ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κινεῖν φασι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, οἷον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ· φησὶ γὰρ τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι τὴν ξυλίνην Ἀφροδίτην ἐγχέαντ' ἄργυρον χυτόν. 'Callistratus Ἐκφρασ. 8 eo progreditur, ut dicat: Δαίδαλον ἐξῆν ἰδεῖν κινούμενα μηχαναῖς τὰ ποιήματα καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρωπίνην αἴσθησιν ἐκβιάζεσθαι τὸν χαλκόν': Gedike, Exc. III in Buttmann's ed. The scholiast on Eur. *Hec.* 838, quotes Eur. (fr. 373)—

> τὰ Δαιδάλεια πάντα κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ
> βλέπειν τ' ἀγάλμαθ'· ὧδ' ἀνὴρ κεῖνος σοφός.

We find in some of these places rationalistic explanations of the legend that the statues of Daedalus could move, such as the introduction of quicksilver or clockwork, besides that which made it an exaggerated statement of the life-like effect given to the statues by opening their eyes and parting their feet. But the legend probably had no rational source at all; it was simply an expression of the marvel excited in primitive man by what seem to him triumphs of art or of invention. To this stock-in-trade of Wonderland belong the tripods and παρθένοι of Hephaestus (*Il.* XVIII 375 and 417), and the Phaeacian ships (*Od.* XIII 81). See too Athen. 301; Crates *Theria* fr. 1 (which seems a realisation of the state of things supposed by Aristotle *Pol.* I 4). Perhaps the *ipsa olera olla legit* of Catullus, 94, has a similar reference. To just the same category belong the stories about Amphion and Orpheus. The estimation of the achievement is strongly coloured by hero-worship. 'It is

not in times when art is mature that people are likely to tell stories of overturning town-walls or taming savage animals with it, but when it is in the elementary stage in which the personal character of the performer adds so much to the effect.' Parry *Art of Music* p. 24.

13. **ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστιν παρ' ὑμῖν**, 'perhaps you have not even got them in your country.' Socrates knew well enough what the extant works of 'Daedalus' at Athens were, and is only mischievously introducing the childish fable about them, much as a Londoner might chaff a country cousin about Gog and Magog. 'Idem (Pausanias) IX xl 2 enumerat sex Daedali statuas, quae sua aetate adhuc reliquae essent: plures sibi notas esse negat': Gedike Exc. III in Buttmann's ed.

15. **πρὸς τί;** cp. **E** 24 *πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτα λέγω;*

16. **ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ**: for keeping slaves bound see Xen. *Oec.* iii 2. Symbolically, deities were represented as chained, to ensure their presence. 'Paus. III xv 5: Lacedaemoni *πέδας ἐστὶν ἔχων Ἐνυάλιος, ἄγαλμα ἀρχαῖον· γνώμη δὲ . . οὔποτε τὸν Ἐνυάλιον φεύγοντα οἰχήσεσθαί σφισιν ἐνεχόμενον ταῖς πέδαις* (cp. Atheniensium *Νίκη ἄπτερος*). Ita symbolico vinculo tenebantur Liber Chii, Diana Ephyrae (schol. Pind. *Ol.* VII 95), Venus Lacedaemoni (Paus. III xv 8), Juno quondam Sami (Athen. XV 672). Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 61 *Τύριοι δεσμοῖς ἀγάλμασι λέγονται περιβαλεῖν.* Lobeck *Aglaoph.* I p. 275' Fr.

17. **ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει**: the former verb is an inceptive, 'to run off'; the latter expresses a state, 'to lie perdu,' 'to lurk in by-holes,' in Bunyan's phrase. *ἀποδιδράσκω* and *δραπετεύω* are often contrasted with *ἀποφεύγω*; the former implies eluding by stealth, the latter by speed. *Symp.* 216 B (Alc. of Socrates) *δραπετεύω οἴν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω*: Xen. *Anab.* I iv 8 *οὔτε ἀποδεδράκασιν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅπῃ οἴχονται· οὔτε ἀποπεφεύγασιν· ἔχω γὰρ τριήρεις ὥστε ἐλεῖν τὸ ἐκείνων πλοῖον*: ibid. II v 7 *τὸν γὰρ θεῶν πόλεμον οὐκ οἶδα, οὔτ' ἀπὸ ποίου ἂν τάχους φυγών τις ἀποφύγοι, οὔτ' εἰς ποῖον ἂν σκότος ἀποδραίη*: VII iii 11 *τὰ φεύγοντα καὶ ἀποδιδράσκοντα διώκειν καὶ μαστεύειν.* The word *ἀποδιδράσκειν* occurs in Plato at *Euthyphr.* 11 C and *Theaet.* 203 D (see on **96 E** 30 and on line 12), *Phaedo* 62 B (of abandoning a post).

18. **παραμένειν**, 'to stand by one')(*περιμένειν* 'to wait about for one.' *Apol.* 39 E *ἀλλά μοι παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον.* So 'to stand one's ground' *Phaedo* 62 E, 98 E *δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην.* From this comes the common name for a slave Parmeno (='Trusty'); cp. Maced. 'Parmenio.'

E 21. The best MSS. of Plato always give *κεκτῆσθαι* etc. after a

vowel, but generally *ἐκτῆσθαι* after a consonant. Schanz vol. XII praef. p. xvii. *Theaet.* 198 D *ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα· ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ κτέ.*; ibid. 199 A *τὸ κεκτῆσθαι . . ὃ μέν τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι*; *Rep.* 505 B *εἰ κεκτήμεθα . . κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι.*

22. **δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον**: for *ἄνθρωπος* 'slave' see L. & S. who quote Philemon

> *κἂν δοῦλος ᾖ τις, οὐδὲν ἧττον, δέσποτα,*
> *ἄνθρωπος οὗτός ἐστιν, ἂν ἄνθρωπος ᾖ.*

23. **πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν**: this too is in the main 'chaff.' The statues attributed to Daedalus had a certain archaic dignity, which to the 'reverent taste' was no doubt very moving; Paus. II iv 5 *Δαίδαλος δὲ ὁπόσα εἰργάσατο, ἀτοπώτερα μέν ἐστιν ἐς τὴν ὄψιν, ἐπιπρέπει δὲ ὅμως τι καὶ ἔνθεον αὐτοῖς.* But in *Hipp. maj.* 282 A we read *τὸν Δαίδαλόν φασιν οἱ ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ νῦν εἰ γενόμενος τοιαῦτ' ἐργάζοιτο οἷ' ἦν ἀφ' ὧν τοὔνομ' ἔσχε καταγέλαστον ἂν εἶναι.*

Plato distinctly regards Daedalus as a human sculptor; in the *Ion* (533 A) he speaks of Daedalus son of Metion side by side with Epeus and Theodorus; in the *Laws* 677 D he couples Daedalus with Orpheus and Palamedes, and thinks they lived perhaps 1000 or 2000 years before his time.

24. **πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα;** see Meno's question at **D** 15. Fr. refers to *Gorg.* 453 C, *Symp.* 178 D, † *Theages* 129 A. See Rid. § 325 'Rhetorical Interrogation.' Cp. **79 B** 18.

28. **ἐθέλουσι**: see on **95 B** 10. **98 A**

30. **αἰτίας λογισμῷ**, 'by a chain of causal reasoning.' The gen. *αἰτίας* is objective (*αἰτίαν λογιζόμενος*).

The phrase is quoted in the *εἰσαγωγή* of Albinus (Teubner text of Plato vol. VI p. 150) *ἵνα δὲ τὰ δόγματα μένῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀναπόδραστα, δεήσει αὐτὰ δεθῆναι τῷ τῆς αἰτίας λογισμῷ.* Another echo is found in † *Ep.* II 313 B (it is assumed that Plato is writing to Dionysius on some point which D. has misapprehended) *σὺ δὲ ἴσως μὲν ἀκούσας του, τάχα δ' ἂν θείᾳ μοίρᾳ κατὰ τοῦθ' ὁρμήσας, ἔπειτα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ὡς ἔχων βεβαίως οὐ κατέδησας, ἀλλ' ἄττεις τοτὲ μὲν οὕτω τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλως περὶ τὸ φανταζόμενον.* See Exc. VII p. 305.

It appeared at **85 C** that the *δόξαι*, in order to be raised to the level of *ἐπιστῆμαι*, must be evoked by a process of questioning in their proper order and relation. Cp. **86 A** 10 for the matter and for the plural *ἐπιστῆμαι.*

32. **ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν**: **81 C** foll.

33. **πρῶτον μὲν . . ἔπειτα**: the words are not to be taken

in a temporal sense (any more than at **90 A** or **95 A**), for they would in becoming *ἐπιστῆμαι* at once be *μόνιμοι*. The meaning is merely 'firstly' and 'secondly.'

36. **δεσμῷ**: 'i.e. *τῷ δεδέσθαι*, significationem ducit ex superioribus, ut *πόρος* **78 D**, *εὐδοξία* **99 B**' Fr. The concrete *δεσμῷ* serves to keep the illustration before the mind.

37. **ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί**, 'it looks something like this.' Here *ἔοικεν* is impersonal, and the meaning is just the same as *ἔοικεν οὕτω πως ἔχειν*. But *ἔοικα* has a liking for a dat. construction. See on **80 D** 39 and cp. *Phaedo* 99 E *ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν*.

Chapters XL–XLII (**98 B**–end). Socr. *Whether the simile I have given justly represents the difference between Right Opinion and Knowledge, I am not sure; but that there is a difference, I am confident. For purposes of practical utility, however, the two things are on a par. Now Virtue, whether based on Knowledge or on Right Opinion, in either case is not ours by Nature. It has been made clear too that the virtue of ordinary statesmen, not being Knowledge, does not arise from Teaching. It remains that it must be allotted to certain men by Divine Dispensation, like the inspiration of soothsayers, poets, etc. Any statesman whose art was based on Knowledge, and who thus was able to communicate it to others, would stand out among his fellows as Tiresias among the shades. But we shall understand the Origin of Virtue when we have ascertained the true Nature of Virtue, and not till then.*

B 1. **καὶ μήν**: **85 C** 4, **87 D** 35, **89 C** 8, below **C** 16. Very similar is *καὶ μὲν δή* **88 D** 1.

καὶ ἐγώ: 'I, as well as you.'

2. **εἰκάζων**: the main meaning here is 'using conjecture,' but the notion 'using likenesses,' or 'speaking in parables,' is also present. It is possible there is a trace of a similar double meaning at **89 E** 26 *καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι*. *εἰκάζειν*, 'conjecture,' is often opposed to exact knowledge: *Crat.* 425 C *οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκάζομεν*: *Phil.* 55 E *εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἄν* (if the measuring arts were removed we could do nothing but 'make shots'): † *Alc.* i 105 C *εὖ οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω*: † *Ep.* vii 324 A *οὐκ εἰκάζων ἀλλ' ὡς εἰδώς* (probably imitated from here, says Karsten, *de Platonis quae feruntur epistolis* p. 43): † *Sis.* 387 D. The terminology of *Rep.* 511 E,

534 A, whereby *εἰκασία* is made the inferior division of *δόξα*, is expressly dropped at the latter of these passages and not resumed. (Exc. VII p. 302.)

3. **οὐ πάνυ**: see on **71 C** 19: for the general tone of the sentence cp. **86 B** 22 foll. (See App. on the text.)

4. **εἴπερ φαίην ἄν**: see on **79 C** 27. In the similar passage *Apol.* 29 B *εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι κτέ.*, *φαίην* stands without *ἄν*. See Exc. II.

5. **δ' οὖν**, 'at any rate.' The appearance of *δέ in apodosi* here is to be explained, as Buttm. points out, by the fact that the antithesis conveyed by *δ' οὖν* refers to the parenthetical words *ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην*.

καὶ τοῦτο, 'this *too* I should place on the list.' Cp. the closely parallel passage *Prot.* 329 B *εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι.*

11. **καὶ τοῦτο . . ἀληθῆ λέγειν**: the phrase *ἀληθῆ λέγειν* became stereotyped, so that it is used with a singular pronoun: *Lach.* 186 A, cp. *Soph.* 226 A *ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον.*

13. **ὠφελίμη**: the fem. form is rare. It occurs *Rep.* 607 D. **C** At *Charm.* 174 D *ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη ἡ ὠφελίμη ἡμῖν* (so B), Sch. (after Madv.) cuts out *ἡ ὠφελίμη*, which certainly is strange after *ὠφέλιμος* just before. The reading *ὠφελίμη* here shows indifference to hiatus.

ἔσται, 'will be found to be'; see on **83 D** 52.

17. **ὁμολόγηται**: at **87 E.**

19. **ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κτέ.**: the sentence is interrupted, and there is no apodosis. The conclusion pointed to is, as Fr. points out, not reached till **99 E**: *ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη.*

ἐπιστήμην . . δι' ὀρθὴν δόξαν, '*on the ground* of Knowledge' rather than '*by means of* Knowledge'; but the practical difference between the acc. and the gen. with *διά* is here, as often, small. Cp. **99 B** 12.

20. **ἂν εἶεν . . εἴπερ εἶεν**: note the 'vague future supposition,' and see on **74 B** 6, **82 C** 13; and for *εἴπερ* Exc. II.

23. See App. on text.

24. **ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν**: at **89 A B** it was shown that Virtue, **D** assuming it to arise from *ἐπιστήμη*, was not innate. If it were, it would be the permanent possession from birth of certain gifted natures who would thus be marked out from their fellows. But can the Virtue that arises from *δόξα ἀληθής*—the other

alternative — be innate? Meno says 'no,' without giving reasons. We get a hint what these reasons would be in *Prot.* 323 C, quoted on **89 A** 24, words which, though put into the mouth of Protagoras, may be taken as expressing the views of Plato.

26. **οὐ φύσει**: we have to supply *ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν γίγνεται.*

οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν: see **89 A** 24 where also the predicate is omitted.

29. **ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει κτέ.**: the transition here is rather abrupt. In the first place we have in *ἐσκοποῦμεν* a change back from an expression of opinion (*εἶεν ἄν*) to a history of the discussion (as *ὡμολόγηται* **C** 17). In the second place, the subject is changed; perhaps with Schleiermacher we may fill up the ellipsis thus: *ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται) ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν (τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι).* This forms a bridge to the next sentence where *ἡ ἀρετή* appears as subject. *ἐσκοποῦμεν* of course refers to **89 C** foll.

35. **κἂν εἰ**: see note on **72 C** 1. This phrase has nearly always a concessive force—'even if.' (An exception occurs at *Phaedo* 72 C *κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, κτέ.*, where the meaning, as here, is simply 'and if.') In the next sentence we have *καὶ εἰ*, and **T** gives *καὶ εἰ* here, which may possibly be right. *καὶ εἰ* also is often concessive; but the instances in which it means simply 'and if' are not rare. See Kühner § 578. 2, F. E. T. § 226. Note *ἄν* repeated with the *infinitive.*

It is here clearly brought out that the hypothesis is a *double* or *reciprocal* one. See on **87 C** 10.

E 41. **μὴ εἶναι** (cp. *μήτε . . μήτε* 44): as to the distinction between *οὐ* and *μή* with a dependent infinitive, Kühner § 541. 1 says that in general you have *οὐ* when the statement (belief, wish, etc.) is regarded as independent of the subject of the governing verb (e.g. *ἔφη*), and as assumed by the writer; *μή*, when it is dependent on the subject of the governing verb, and is expressed as a view attributed to him. Usage, however, has brought it about that with certain classes of verbs *οὐ* prevails, with others *μή*. With *φάναι*, *οὐ* is the rule; an instructive exception occurs in Xen. *Mem.* I ii 39 *φαίην δ' ἂν ἔγωγε μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος*, where Xen. is distinctly stating his private belief. With verbs containing a subjective element, on the other hand, like *ὁμολογῶ*, *μή* prevails; see **96 C** 8, *Phaedo* 94 C *οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτήν, ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν κτέ.*, *Prot.* 336 B etc. Curious is *Prot.* 319 B *ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι, μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν*

ἀνθρώποις. See F.E.T. p. 353, notes 3 and 4, and J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 6 B.

54. **ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται**: see on **88 C** 33. The transition from the individual to the political point of view is here complete. Just as in man a certain faculty acts as guide, so the man in whom this faculty is prominent acts as guide to others. The word *ἡγεῖσθαι* lends itself to this double point of view. We have here a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the *Republic* that the State is the Man 'writ large.' At **88 A–E** we were concerned mainly with the individual, though the wider political view is latent, and indeed clearly appears in the statement **87 E** 37 that all *ἀγαθοί* are *ὠφέλιμοι*, reaffirmed **96 E** 1 and **98 C** 16. The political view—identifying the Good Man with the Statesman—is the dominant one at **97 A** *ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων*: and *οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ*. Meno's conventional view of Virtue, alike with that of Socrates, implies action in a State. **99 A**

55. **τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης**: cp. Aristot. *Rhet.* I x 7, where from the class of actions *ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι* are expressly excluded those that are due to *τύχη*.

CHAPTER XLI

2. **ἔτι γίγνεται**: see App. on the text. 'We no longer hold that Virtue is Knowledge': see on **83 D** 52.

5. **ἀπολέλυται**, 'has been eliminated.' **B**

9. **οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα**: this use of *ἀμφί*, of which Ast quotes nine instances in Plato (also *περί*: *Crat.* 440 C, *Phil.* 44 C), occurs in denoting the head of a school with his followers, 'Themistocles and Co.,' 'our Gladstones.' See *CR.* XIII 168.

15. **εὐδοξία** is another instance of a word pressed to an unusual meaning by stress on its etymology: cp. **78 D** 29. I do not think Plato intended any play on the ordinary meaning of the word 'good repute.' See App. on the text.

17. **τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν**, 'maintain their States.' Cp. **C** *Lach.* 181 A *εὖ γε . . ὅτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα*: ibid. B *οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα*: *Laws* 957 D *αὐτόν τε ὀρθοῦν καὶ τὴν πόλιν. κατορθοῦν*, on the other hand, is rarely used with external acc.; but see *Tim.* 71 D *κατορθοῦντες τὸ φαῦλον ἡμῶν*, and—in the physical sense—† *Alc.* I 121 D *ἀναπλάττοντας τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ κατορθοῦντας*.

18. **θεομάντεις**: the only other place from which L. & S. quote

the word is *Apol.* 22 c (of poets) *ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί.*

19. **ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά**: contrast with *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα* below. The latter is simply 'many great things'; the former is *vera et sane multa*, the *καί* being intensive. Stallb. refers to Elmsley on Eur. *Med.* 871.

22. **θείους καλεῖν**: see **81 B** 24. Plato takes the view that the use of *θεῖος* as a mere expression of admiration is antique. Some support of this is to be found in Homer, with whom it is often merely ornate. The 'divine swineherd' of *Od.* XVI 1 is notorious. For the use in Herodotus see L. & S. Plato appeals to colloquial usage as enshrining a deep truth. Cp. the two grades of meaning of *κακοδαίμων* (**78 B** 57). It is not long ago that a similar colloquial use of 'divine' was common in England; perhaps, as with *θεῖος* at Athens, more among women than men. Plato uses this word frequently, but never, I think, without some notion of inspiration. It is used of Simonides (*Rep.* 331 E); of Prodicus, not without irony (*Prot.* 316 A, quoted on **96 D** 23); of Phaedrus (*Phaedr.* 234 D) *σινεβάκχευσα μετά σου, τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς*, with reference to his rapt look, cp. 242 A; *Soph.* 216 B of the mysterious Stranger; of 'grave and reverend seniors' *Laws* 666 D *τίς (ᾠδὴ) ἂν οὖν πρέποι θείοις ἀνδράσιν;*

27. **θείους τε**: the particle *τε* naturally would come after *χρησμῳδούς*. The hyperbaton, by which *τε* is forced forward in the sentence, is not uncommon in Plato. Buttm. refers to Heindorf's index to the *Phaedo*, and quotes Hdt. VI 86 *ταῦτά τε ὧν ἐπιλεγομένῳ καὶ βουλευομένῳ*. Instances occur *Prot.* 316 D, 325 B, 336 C, *Crito* 43 B (for *Ion* 535 D see on **95 B** 11).

D 28. **χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας**: the divine inspiration of poets is the main thesis of the *Ion*; see especially 533 E. See too *Laws* 719 C *ποιητὴς ὁπόταν ἐν τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἔμφρων ἐστίν* (Fr.): and 682 A *θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν [ἐνθεαστικὸν] ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν πολλῶν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε.* The tendency to appeal to their authority is of course a natural outcome of this view. See on **77 B** 12.

29. **καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς κτέ.**: in the *Apol.* 21 C foll. we find statesmen, poets, and craftsmen alike convicted of ignorance, but the source whence statesmen derive such skill as they have is not indicated. In the *Phaedrus* (244 B foll.) we have three kinds of *θεία μανία*, or divine possession, described, producing respectively the Prophet, the Purifier, and the Poet; to which at 249 D is added the fourth kind, which produces the Philo-

sopher. Nothing is said about any *θεία μανία* of the Statesman. I think it was in the *Meno* that statesmen were first included by Plato in the class of the inspired. See on **E** 5 below.

32. **ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ**: see App. on the text. Fr. endeavours to prove that by this phrase we can only understand Apollo. I doubt whether Plato here intends to attribute the inspiration of statesmen to any particular deity (as he does the four kinds of *μανία* severally in the *Phaedrus*). He is simply personifying the divine agency, without any mythological reference.

35. **καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες**: Stallb. quotes *Crat.* 418 C *αἱ γυναῖκες αἴπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι*. The secluded life of women in Greece would tend to increase their conservatism. See Aristoph. *Eccl.* 214 foll. Cp. † *Alc.* i 120 B *ἔτι τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη, φαῖεν ἂν αἱ γυναῖκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*.

38. **θεῖος ἀνήρ**: Aristot. *NE.* VII i 3 *καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν*. See H. Jackson in *Phil. Soc. Proc.* November 1887. It seems doubtful whether the Spartan address *ὦ θεῖε* (*Laws* 626 C) is really the same word as *θεῖος* 'divine.' See L. & S. on *ἠθεῖος*.

CHAPTER XLII

2. **καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα**: this probably refers to the trial; **E** though we need not suppose this to be immediately impending at the time of the dialogue.

3. **ἐζητήσαμεν καὶ ἐλέγομεν**: for the change of tense see on **72 B** 22.

4. **ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν**: it may be noted that the view here expressed is that which Socr. really holds in the *Protagoras*, though there he pretends to have surrendered it in deference to the sophist; 328 E *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι*. See on **70 A** 1, 2.

5. **θείᾳ μοίρᾳ**, 'by divine dispensation': on this important phrase see Zeller p. 176 note, Grote I 461, 462 (on the *Ion*). It is not confined to Plato; see Xen. *Mem.* II iii 18, *Cyr.* IV ii 1, *Hell.* VII v 10; cp. too Hdt. III 139 *θείᾳ τύχῃ*. In Plato it sometimes denotes the common divine element in man; e.g. in *Prot.* 322 A *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας*: *Phaedr.* 230 A (I study myself to see whether I am a Typhon) *εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον*. Oftener it denotes a privilege of

individuals: *Apol.* 33 C (the Art of Examining has been forced on Socrates by all kinds of agencies) *ὥπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν.* It occurs continually in the *Ion*, contrasted with *τέχνη*, of the gift of poetry: 534 C (also *θείᾳ δυνάμει*), 535 A, 536 C D, and 542 A; *Phaedr.* 244 A *νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης*: ibid. C *ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος (τῆς μανίας) ὅταν θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γένηται*: *Phaedo* 58 E *μηδ' εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι*: *Rep.* 366 C (speech of Adimantus) *ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι, πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος* (cp. Socrates' answer 368 A *πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ*): ibid. 492 E (a democracy offers insuperable obstacles to a virtuous training: by human agency it is impossible) *θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου· εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτιπερ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς.*

For *Laws* 642 C see on **89 A** 24: ibid. 875 C we have the heaven-born governor spoken of as superior to law: *ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἱκανός, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθείς, παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῶν ἀρξόντων ἑαυτοῦ.* The phrase also occurs † *Ep.* ii 313 B (quoted on **98 A** 30): † *Ep.* vii 326 B (see on line 6 below): cp. 327 E *θείᾳ τινὶ τύχῃ.*

Between *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ* and *φύσει* in this dialogue a distinction is made, though the ground of this distinction is not made as clear as could be wished. See on **89 A** 24.

ἄνευ νοῦ: cp. on **70 A** 2 and **97 B** 17; also † *Alc.* ii 146 A *ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα.*

100 A 6. **οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται**: cp. *Prot.* 323 C quoted on **89 A** 24.

εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος κτέ.: the distinction between the philosophic and the popular statesman is parallel to that between philosophic and popular Virtue. 'Socrates had made virtue to consist entirely in knowledge. He had assumed that virtue, like knowledge, could be taught. In all these respects Plato at first followed him; as against the ordinary notions of virtue he would indeed always have acknowledged the view of Socrates to be substantially correct. But riper reflection led him in after life to modify the Socratic doctrines and to determine them more accurately. He became convinced that side by side with perfect virtue, which is no doubt founded on knowledge, the unscientific virtue of ordinary men has its value; that though the former is based on instruction, and the latter only on custom, yet that this virtue of custom

precedes the higher kind as an indispensable preparatory stage' Zeller p. 448.

On the subject of *δημοτικὴ ἀρετή* see Archer-Hind's *Phaedo* App. I. (He refers to Dr. Thompson's note on *Gorg.* 506 D.) He clearly shows under what different aspects *δημοτικὴ ἀρετή* may appear. It may be (1) the reflex of philosophic virtue, possessed, as the best of which they are capable, by men under the guidance of a philosopher. In this light it is the virtue of the Auxiliaries in the Republic, distinguished from the Rulers. Or (2) it may be a precarious guide to right action in certain directions, acquired by the individual either *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ* or by habit and fortunate environment (*Rep.* 619 C; cp. on **70 A** 2). This, according to circumstances, may be either practically beneficial, or deceptive and dangerous. (Exc. VII p. 301.)

J. & A. M. Adam in their Introd. to the *Protagoras*, p. xxxiv, say: 'Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to have expressly invited mention of that "demotic virtue" of which Plato made so much, no mention of it is made'; and add in a note—'It is in the *Meno* that the difference between demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down.' 'The whole discussion in the *Meno* brings out very clearly that the fundamental distinction between popular and philosophic *ἀρετή* is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge' (A.-H. loc. cit.). And in the *Meno* it is popular virtue and popular statesmanship that is conferred *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*.

The only *true* Statesman, Plato holds, is the Philosopher. For the difference between him and the popular statesman see *Rep.* 534 B–D. How the desirable consummation may be brought about we read in *Rep.* 473 D. Either philosophers must gain rule in the States, or else the present so-styled Kings and Rulers must sincerely and thoroughly (*γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς*) embrace philosophy. Compare ibid. 499 B *οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλεος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης παραβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκόῳ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων υἱέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ.*

It is possible that in the latter passage Plato had in mind the affairs of Sicily. We find the writer of † *Ep.* vii (addressed to the supporters of Dion) quoting it (326 B) *κακῶν οὖν οὐ λήξειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη, πρὶν ἂν ἢ τὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ὀρθῶς γε καὶ ἀληθῶς γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἢ τὸ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔκ τινος μοίρας θείας ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ.*

The sequel of events in Sicily affords an ironical commentary on Plato's views, in the contrast it shows between the failure of

Dion, with his philosophic training, and the success of Timoleon, with his belief in *αὐτοματία* or 'spontaneity' (Plut. *Tim.* 36).

In Plato's identification of the Philosopher with the Statesman there is a veiled polemic against Isocrates. Isocrates believed in practical sagacity as of greater utility than theoretical knowledge. His was the sceptical view, the belief in a working rule, to which orators, as J. S. Reid observes (Intr. to Cicero's *Acad.* pp. 11–13), are prone. Thus Isocrates, in his pamphlet against the Sophists (13) § 8, says we see *πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους*, which we should certainly regard as directed against Plato were it not that the date—about 391 B.C.—is too early. See Jebb *Att. Or.* II 51 foll. The jeers at the small fees and at the saying *ὡς οὐδὲν δέονται χρημάτων* in §§ 3, 4 seem to point at Antisthenes and his school. In the *Antidosis* (15) are similar passages: §§ 264 foll. he speaks patronizingly of philosophic studies as a good gymnastic for youth, but a man must not let his mind get fossilized (*κατασκελετευθεῖσαν*) over them, nor 'get stranded (*ἐξοκείλασαν*) among the theories of the old sophists, such as Empedocles and Parmenides.' (The resemblance to the view of Callicles in the *Gorgias* 484 is pointed out by Dr. Thompson, *Phaedr.* p. 174.) At § 271 follows a significant passage: *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν . . ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν* (practical wisdom). Cp. note on **91 C** 19. In the (late) *Panath.* (12) § 9 he says of himself *τὴν δὲ φύσιν εἰδὼς δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων.* At the beginning of the *Helena* (10) we have successive attacks on Antisthenes, on Plato (*οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταὐτόν ἐστιν, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μίαν δ' ἐπιστήμην κατὰ πάντων ἔχομεν*), and Euclides, and come at § 5 to the statement *ὅτι πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάσαι ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι.* Cp. also letter V (to Alexander) §§ 3, 4, 'I hear,' says Isocrates, 'that among philosophies you do not reject *τὴν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας*, but you think that in private society it is too aggressive, and that debate between a ruler and his subjects is somewhat derogatory': *ταύτην μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαπᾶν σε τὴν διατριβήν, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν παιδείαν τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους . . δι' ἣν νῦν τε δοξάζειν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπιεικῶς ἐπιστήσει κτέ.* See Dr. Thompson App. II on the *Phaedrus*.

8. **σχεδόν τι**: Const. Ritter's tables (Intr. p. lxii) show that the phrase *σχεδόν τι* (together or separated) prevails in the

dialogues up to the *Republic*, σχεδόν in the later dialogues. This is the only place in which the word occurs in the *Meno*.

9. **οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος . . τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι**: *Od.* x 494. Cobet refers to the anecdote told by Plutarch (*Cat. maj.* 27) that Cato applied this line to Scipio minor. It is quite possible that Cato knew that this line had been applied by Plato to distinguish the philosophic statesman from others and that he meant to imply that Scipio by force of education stood out in just this manner among his compeers. (We perhaps have here a foreshadowing of the simile of the Cave in *Rep.* VII.) Near the end of the *Laws* (969 B) Plato compares the specially trained Philosophers (the 'Nocturnal Council') with ordinary governments: *ἐάν γε μὴν οὗτος ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος γένηται ξύλλογος, ὦ φίλοι ἑταῖροι, παραδοτέον τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἀμφισβήτησίς τ' οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδεμία οὐδενὶ τῶν νῦν παρὰ ταῦθ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν νομοθετῶν, ὄντως δὲ ἔσται σχεδὸν ὕπαρ ἀποτετελεσμένον, οὗ σμικρῷ πρόσθεν ὀνείρατος ὡς τῷ λόγῳ ἐφηψάμεθα, κεφαλῆς νοῦ τε κοινωνίας εἰκόνα τινά πως ξυμμίξαντες, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι, παιδευθῶσί τε προσηκόντως, παιδευθέντες τε ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῆς χώρας κατοικήσαντες φύλακες ἀποτελεσθῶσιν, οἵους ἡμεῖς οὐκ εἴδομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας γενομένους.*

12. **καὶ εὐθύς**: Buttm. (index) explains 'idem etiam *statim* esset vir ejusmodi in virtute' h.e. '*statim apparet* idem fore etc.' The idiom falls under the class noticed at **83 D** 52. Buttm. quotes Xen. *Hier.* ix 4 *οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐπίχαρι διὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐγένετο, τὰ δὲ ἀντίτυπα δι ἄλλων*, and observes that the use of *αὐτίκα* is somewhat similar.

21. **αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή**: these words **B** appear to me to be a clear reference forward to the *Republic*, where the subject, though formally Justice, is really nothing less than Virtue in its entirety. Thus the *Meno* is designed as a prelude. Very nearly allied to this passage is the conclusion of Bk. I of the *Republic*. Socrates has 'tasted each dish as it was handed round,' and had no satisfaction: *ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστι, σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.*

22. **ὥρα ποι ἰέναι**: it is rare for Socrates to make any excuse for breaking off a colloquy. Cp. the end of the *Protagoras*. The conclusion of these dialogues suits their inchoate character. It says, in effect, 'to be continued.'

ADDENDA TO NOTES ON 87 A 23 AND 30

I. Investigators contemporaneous with or later than Butcher have done little to further the solution (see Ueb.-Heinze p. 150). Gercke (*Archiv für Gesch. d. Philosophie* II 2. 170–174. 1889) would read *τὸ χωρὶς τρίγωνον* for *τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον*. He thinks that the only problem is to apply to a circle a figure (whether triangle or anything else) and see if it fits. But where then is the *ὑπόθεσις*? Tannery in the same volume, pp. 509–514 (also 1889), naturally rejects this, and falls back on the solution of Benecke, which has also received the suffrages of Moritz Cantor. Tannery confesses the inexplicability of the disguise of the problem; 'puisque l'existence de la condition imposée est précisement aussi difficile à reconnaître que la possibilité de la solution.' He would cut out the words *αὐτοῦ γραμμήν* in line 29. Lastly Dummler (*Academica* Anhang IV, 1889) expresses dissatisfaction with Gercke, and says with much point that most of the 'solutions' come to this: 'if it is possible, it is possible.' He says the place is 'stark verderbt,' and rewrites it, bringing it into relation with the tetrahedra of the *Timaeus*.

II. Benecke points out that while *τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον* certainly cannot mean 'this triangular figure,' yet Plato could hardly have written *τὸ τρίγωνον χωρίον* or *τὸ χωρίον τὸ τρίγωνον* in that sense; inasmuch as Plato and Euclid only know *τρίγωνον* as a substantive, and *χωρίον*, unqualified, regularly means a parallelogram, and moreover a rectangle. A rectilineal *figure* is *σχῆμα εὐθύγραμμον*. To the same effect argues Tannery: *χωρίον* properly means a rectangle; it is by an *extension of usage* that the term is applied to *any* figure, insomuch as it can be measured under the form of a rectangle.

APPENDIX ON THE TEXT

The text of the present edition is founded mainly on the valuable recension of Schanz (Sch.). I have however not invariably followed him; but in some cases have sided with Fritzsche (Fr.) where he and Schanz do not agree. In a very few places I have given a reading that differs from both these editions. I have discussed the text at all places of any importance where Sch. and Fr. differ. Fortunately there is in the *Meno* no place, with the possible exception of **87 A**, where any serious doubt as to interpretation is caused by uncertainty in the text.

Fr. has given a full and clear account of the MSS. of Plato, with reference to the *Meno*, in his edition, pp. 35 foll. The work of Sch., besides his edition of the text, is mainly contained in three tracts: *Novae commentationes Platonicae*, Würzburg 1871; *Studien zur Geschichte des platonischen Textes*, Würzburg 1874; *Ueber den Platocodex der Markus Bibliothek in Venedig, append. class* 4 *No.* 1, Leipzig 1877.

The MSS. of the *Meno* fall into two classes. Of the first (a), the great representative is the Bodleian MS. This ranks first in excellence. Fr., following Bekker, marks this as $\mathfrak{A}$; I follow Sch. in referring to it as B. Only one other MS. belongs to this class; a Vatican MS. (Bekker Δ), copied, whether directly or not is uncertain, from B. All the other MSS., some nineteen collated for the *Meno*, form the other class. The best MS. of this class is the Venetian, marked by Sch. as T. Sch. was the first to demonstrate its importance. He holds that all the MSS. of the second class are derived from it (*Ueber den Platocodex* etc.). Fr. divides the MSS. of the second class into two sub-classes. One of these sub-classes (b^2) he allows (p. 43) to have been derived from T. This contains several Paris MSS.; namely the 'Coislinianus' (Bekker Γ), once more highly esteemed than now, and Bekker's BCE and F; also

some Florentine MSS. The other sub-class (b^1) Fr. denies to be derived from T ; he shows that in the *Meno* there are eleven places where this sub-class coincides with B rather than with T. This sub-class contains two 'Veneti,' two 'Vindobonenses,' two 'Vaticani,' two 'Laurentiani.' The most interesting among them is Laurentianus 85, 7, appropriately marked as x by Fr., who says of it 'A libris reliquis familiae saepissime secedit x, qui negligentissime scriptus tamen "multas habet egregias lectiones, quas in ceteris libris frustra quaesiveris."' The last words are quoted from Stallb. See also for this MS. Schanz *Studien* p. 70 and p. 69, note.

70 B 9. **Λαρισαίου** was bracketed by Naber (*Commentationes* II 63, which appeared in the *Tydschrift voor de Nederlandsche Gymnasien*). Sch. and Fr. both follow him. (1) The word is superfluous ; we are presently told that Aristippus was one of the Aleuadae, and every one knew that the Aleuadae were of Larisa. (2) With *Λαρισαίου* the article *τοῦ* would be required. Three MSS. of the class b^1 supply this. The Coislinianus and x, on the other hand, correct to *Λαρισαῖου*. This makes it almost certain that the word is a gloss. The spelling *Λαρισαίου* is better than *Λαρισσαίου* : Sch. prolegomena to *Phaedrus* § 1. Cp. *Λαρίσαν* **97 A** 14.

71 A 23. **ἐρέσθαι** : the proper accent of the aor. is preserved by B as usual ; *ἔρεσθαι* T. See Sch. *Phaedr. prolegomena* p. viii. At *Gorg.* 447 c both B and T wrongly give *ἔρου* for *ἐροῦ*.

25. **ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ' ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι** : Naber (*Commentationes*) brackets these words, I believe rightly, though neither Sch. nor Fr. follow him. The words are clumsy and superfluous, and the use of *γοῦν* is, I believe, not Attic. The Attic use of *γοῦν* is illustrated by *εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις* just above, cp. **89 E** 30 *πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν*, **90 B** 47 *αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτόν*, **93 D** 15 *ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων*. The speaker retires, as it were, to firmer ground from which he defends his former statement. So *γοῦν* is often used in 'quoting an example' (L. & S.) ; a previous general statement is narrowed down to a special instance, which, so far as it goes, supports it. Ast quoting this passage translates *γοῦν videlicet* ; but I cannot see that he quotes any other passage where the restrictive force is absent as it is here. At *Phaedr.* 236 A *ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα* the meaning seems elliptical, like *praesertim cum*, 'which at least you would expect, as.' In later Greek—as in Diog. Laert.—the use of *γοῦν* became much looser. A similar gloss containing *γοῦν* is expelled at *Symp.* 195 D.

26. **τοσούτου δέω** : the MSS. give *τοσοῦτον*, to which

Buttmann took exception. Cobet *Collect. critica* 44 says : 'Certo et perpetuo omnium Atheniensium usu dicebatur *τοσοῦτον ἀπέχω* et *τοσούτου δέω*, et *πολλοῦ, πλείστου, μικροῦ ὀλίγου δέω* et similia sine ulla exceptione, quam natura verbi *δεῖν* non admittit.' The acc. *τοσοῦτον* is defended by Ullrich, and retained by Hermann. Cobet is followed by Sch. and Fr., and I have followed them. It must be noted, however, that the accusative *τοσοῦτον* is logically quite defensible ; indeed either of the three cases is theoretically possible, and the dative actually occurs in the MSS. of Isocr. *Bus.* (11) 5 *τοσούτῳ δέεις ἀποχρῆσθαι*. I may say 'I am lacking of so much' (gen.) or 'by so much' (dat.) or 'in respect of so much' (acc.). Cobet's rule, as all such rules, assumes that Attic usage was quite uniform. The other instances of *τοσοῦτον* are however all from late writers ; twice in the spurious † *Axiochus* 366 B *τοσοῦτον ἀποδέω τῶν περιττῶν* : 372 B *τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀποδέω τοῦ δεδοικέναι* (where, as Buttmann points out, there are already dependent genitives). So too Charito VIII 1 *τοσοῦτον ἀποδέω τοῦ σε κωλύειν*. 'Plut. *adv. Colaten.* X 6 *τοσοῦτον ἐδέησε τοῦ κινεῖν*, qui etiam *μικρόν, ὀλίγον δέω* seq. inf. vel *τοῦ* c. infin. aliquoties praebet' Fr. In Plutarch and other later writers no doubt the desire to avoid hiatus influenced the use. Thus Lucian *Nigr.* 26 gives *τοσούτου δέων*, *Pisc.* 29 *τοσούτου δέω* : but *Icaromen.* 5 *τοσοῦτον ἐδέησαν*.

27. **ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτό** : so the MSS., Buttm. and Fr. Sch., following Stallb., corrects *ὡς* to *ὡστ'*. *ὡς* in consecutive sense, after a demonstrative, is very rare in Plato (see *Prot.* 330 E *οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς οὐκ εἶναι κτέ.*, with J. and A. M. Adam's note) and perhaps unparalleled with the indic. as here. But Xen. affords examples : *Hell.* IV i 33 *νῦν οὕτω διάκειμαι ὡς οὐδὲ δεῖπνον ἔχω*, *Symp.* iv 37 *οὕτω πολλὰ ἔχω ὡς μόλις αὐτὰ εὑρίσκω*, ibid. ix 3. Krüger § 65. 3, 4 ; Goodwin *MT.* § 609.

5. Naber, following x, inserts *ἐστιν* after *ὁποῖόν γέ τι*. I **B** have ventured to follow him.

28. Hirschig, Cobet and Sch. read *εἰπέ*, after one Florentine **D** MS. (n). Fr. keeps **εἶπον**. Rutherford *New Phrynichus* p. 219 'The two (aorists, *εἶπον* and *εἶπα*) accurately supplement one another according to the following paradigm :

Indic.	*εἶπον*		*εἴπομεν*
	εἶπας	*εἴπατον*	*εἴπατε*
	εἶπε	*εἰπάτην*	*εἶπον*
Imper.	*εἰπέ*	*εἴπατον*	*εἴπατε*
	εἰπάτω	*εἰπάτων*	*εἰπόντων*.

This is the scheme to which Attic usage was approximating. But the process of selection and elimination must have taken

time. We should expect to see sporadic survivals, which we actually find.

72 A 12. **εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου**: Cobet (*Collect. crit.* 46) would omit *βούλει*, in accordance with general usage (see expository note). But the repetition of *βούλει* here seems characteristic of Meno's verbose style.

20. **κειμένων** BT, *κείμενον* x, which is adopted by Cobet (*Collect. crit.* 46) and Sch. Fr. keeps *κειμένων*. No one has followed Gedike, who from Plutarch *περὶ πολυφιλίας*, c. 1 wished to read *κινουμένων* or *κεκινημένων*. This spoils the irony of the passage, for the double meaning of *παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων*, and the reference to Meno's real character, cannot be ignored.

C 4. **ἀποκρινάμενον** BT was retained by Bekker and Hermann. Buttm., Sch., and Fr. give *ἀποκρινόμενον*, which is supported by some MS. of the sub-class b^1 and by a Paris MS. (F), derived from T, of small independent authority. Madv. (*adv. crit.* 1 413) condemns the aorist. The reading *ἀποκρινούμενον* given in the old printed editions, and rendered by Ficinus, is not supported by any existing MS. I think there is ground here for adhering to the aorist *ἀποκρινάμενον*. All the neighbouring verbs are aorists. A distinction very commonly observed by Plato is that *ἐρέσθαι, ἐρωτῆσαι, ἀποκρίνασθαι* are used for *single* inquiries and answers; *ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι* of a *process* of inquiry and answer. (See note on **72 B** 22.) *Rep.* 1 will furnish abundant instances: 332 C (aorists); 336 C *μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδάν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται* (aor.), *ἐγνωκὼς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾷον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἰπέ, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον*: 337 E *ἵνα αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται* (pres.), *ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἀποκρίναιτο;* (to the particular question): 338 A *ἀποκρινόμενος* 'becoming respondent,' *τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον* 'the respondent' (so *Prot.* 338 D): 343 A *ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι* 'keeping the part of respondent'—no particular question is now before him: *οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν;* 346 A (pres.); 348 B (aor.); 349 B (aor.); 351 C (pres.); 352 B (pres.). At 340 E the MSS. vary between *ἀποκρίνεσθαι* and *ἀποκρίνασθαι*. Either would suit the sense; a single answer is referred to, but that answer is in the act of being given. In the present dialogue note **74 C** 21 *ὁ ἐρωτῶν*; **E** 3 *τῷ ἐρωτῶντι*; **75 D** 10, with note on text; **83 D** 50 *τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου* (as a general practice). Other considerations may sometimes cause the aor. to be used of a process, as **85 D** 20 *οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται* (where the aor. ptcp. expresses priority of time); or the pres. of a single act: *Phil.* 19 A *σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον*: but just below

διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι. Again, compare εἴ τις ἀνέροιτο **74 B** 6 with εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη **75 A** 8. At *Gorg.* 465 D τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει may be 'why don't you *go on answering?*'; but owing to the special use of the aor. in this idiom (see on **92 D** 30) the pres. is here inevitable. See further *Gorg.* 462 B ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου, 'take which part you prefer,' ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι κτέ. : ibid. 515 B ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι; *Prot.* 330 C E; 351 D οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν . . ἀποκρίνασθαι : *Theaet.* 146 A ἐπιτάξει ὅ τι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι : *Phil.* 24 E τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον. In *Polit.* 258 A ἀποκρινομένου (Bekker) is right. Note ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος for 'the defendant' (L. & S.); cp. ὑπεραποκρίνεσθαι Ar. *Wasps* 951 ; contrast ἀπόκριναι ibid. 964, *Frogs* 1008, of *single* answers. See *CR.* IX 147.

17. **ὑγιειά γε**: all the MSS. give ὑγιειά τε, except X, which **E** gives the reading in the text, adopted by Bekker, Sch., and Fr. (See **91 D** 10 for a converse instance.) γε was also preferred by Buttm., who however mentions another alternative, which has found some favour, to omit the first καί, reading ὑγιειά τε εἶναι ἀνδρός κτέ., with hyperbaton of τε, for which see on **99 C** 27. γε and τε are confused *Polit.* 258 A, etc.

9. **ἄρχειν οἷόν τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου**; the MSS. all give **73 D** οἵῳ τε, a corruption not easy to account for. Wolf read οἵῳ, to which Buttm. rightly objects (1) that the dual implies a *pair* conjointly, not two separate individuals; (2) that the rest of the sentence, especially τοῦ δεσπότου, implies that the slave only, not the child, is here considered. He proposed οἷόν τε or οἷου τε. The latter attraction would be awkward with the genitive δεσπότου following. Madvig *adv. crit.* I 413 οἷόν τε, followed by Sch. and Fr. The language naturally repeats Meno's οἷόν τ' εἶναι just above; cp. l. 13 below.

12. **ἔτι δὲ καί**: so Fr. The MSS. all give ἔτι γὰρ καί. γάρ is certainly out of place; the new point is entirely separate from the former; not a support added to it. Sch. thinks that γάρ has arisen from a dittography of καί, and reads ἔτι καί. On this Fr. rightly says 'asyndeton aegre fertur'; at *Soph.* 239 D we have, it is true, τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἴδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ πάλλα, but this occurs in the middle of a list, and is not parallel, though there also Heindorf wished to insert δέ after ἔτι. Fr. gives many passages in Plato in which δέ and γάρ are confused by particular MSS. Add Aesch. *Choëph.* 32 where Lachmann gave δέ for γάρ of the MSS.; Hes. *O. et D.* 526 where Hermann gave οὐδέ οἱ for MSS. οὐ γάρ οἱ, etc. See *CR.* XIV 433 a.

74 B 5. **προβιβάσαι** is given by one Florentine MS. (n) of no great authority; but seems to be right. It was proposed by Schneider, and is adopted by Sch. Fr. with the other MSS. *προσβιβάσαι*. But *προβιβάζειν, promovere*, is the sense required: cp. *Prot.* 328 B *ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν*. *προσβιβάζειν* is *admovere*; neither of its senses is suitable here. Compounds of *πρός* and *πρό* are continually confused in MSS. See on **75 D** 10, and Badham's note on *Phil.* 45 B. At Xen. *Mem.* I ii 17 most of the MSS. give *καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προβιβάζοντας*, and this I should keep, but most modern editors give, after one or two MSS., *προσβιβάζοντας*.

75 B 21. **πειρῶμαί σοι**: so Sch.: the MSS. give *πειρώμεθα*, Naber *πειράσομαι*. The 'modest' use of the plur. 1st person is rare *in prose*. At **71 C** 12 *ἀπαγγέλλωμεν* refers to Meno *and his suite*. Kühner § 371. 3 quotes examples from Xen. where a plural *pronoun* is used by a person speaking of himself; also the phrase *μοι δοκοῦμεν Soph.* 229 B. But in this case, as in others (as *Rep.* 545 C), the plural is accounted for by the fact that Socr. is regarded as taking his pupil into partnership. This is excluded in the present case by *σοι* (cp. Hadley § 637). I follow Sch., with some hesitation, as the corruption is hard to account for. Dr. Thompson in his note on *Phaedr.* 253 C (*διείλομεν*) gives instances of the converse corruption of the *plural* into the *singular*.

C 30. **εἶεν**: the MSS. give this to Socrates. Heind. (on *Crat.* 410 C) first saw that it was part of a continuous speech of Meno.

D 10. **προομολογῇ**: all the MSS. give *προσομολογῇ* (see crit. note on **74 B** 5). Gedike suggested *προομολογῇ*, but none of the editors have followed him. I believe him to be right. (1) This reading is supported by **79 D** 38 *μήπω ὡμολογημένων*, where the present passage is referred to; (2) *προσομολογεῖν* always (in Plato at any rate) means 'to acknowledge *in addition*'—a meaning not suitable here. I think Buttm. (Index) is wrong in saying that *προσομολογεῖν* is 'idem quod *ὁμολογεῖν*,' and Stallb. wrong in giving the rendering *una cum altero fateri*.

Gorg. 461 B *ὅτι Γ. ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι κτέ.* 'because Gorgias was ashamed not to grant that the rhetorician (*besides* his knowledge of rhetoric) would know the just etc.'

Soph. 248 C *δεόμεθα παρ' αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον, εἰ προσομολογοῦσιν κτέ.*, 'if, after asserting that *οὐσία* has nothing to do with *ποιεῖν* or *πάσχειν*, they *further grant* that *οὐσία* can be known.'

ibid. 261 E *ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν*, 'what

I thought you meant when (after asserting of forms and letters that some would go together, others not) you made the *further* similar statement about *words*.'

† *Hipparchus* 227 D is clearest of all: αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, 'we acknowledged in addition to it.'

L. & S. are wrong in quoting *Theaet.* 159 C under προσομολογεῖν: the reading there is προωμολογημένων.

At *Soph.* 241 A the MSS. vary between προσδιωμολογημένα and προδιωμολογημένα. I believe the latter is required by the context, and that προσδιομολογεῖσθαι occurs neither there nor anywhere else; προδιομολογεῖσθαι occurs *Tim.* 78 A.

In other authors the point is almost equally clear. Xen. *Anab.* VII iv 24 προσωμολόγουν is contrasted with ὡμολόγουν above. Andoc. *de Myst.* § 15 καὶ ταῦθ' ὑμῖν προσομολογεῖται ἅπαντα: after the first μήνυσις of Andromachus comes the second of Teucrus. Isocr. *Trapez.* (17) 39, 'to acknowledge a further debt'; see L. & S. Dem. 27 § 42 = 826 end (in same sense; see L. & S.). Dem. 48 § 44 = 1179. 17, 'granted in addition to my previous collusions with him.' Dem. 56 § 6 = 1284. 17, 'they first promise they will return from Egypt to Rhodes or Athens; afterwards they further promise (προσομολογοῦσι) they will return to Athens and nowhere else. See Aesch. 3. 53 μὴ ψευδῆ ἀλλὰ παλαιὰ καὶ λίαν προωμολογημένα, 'acknowledged before proof is brought' (Weidner), 'self-evident.' (Cobet here from a minority of MSS. gives προσωμολογημένα.) προσομολογία, 'a further admission' (L. & S.); but the one instance they quote (Dem. 39. 41) hardly bears out this rendering. Buttmann, after acknowledging that **79 D** 38 favours Gedike's προομολογῇ, says 'sed in hac forma necessarium foret praeteritum προομολογήσῃ, quo non opus est in forma quoad tempus indefinita, προσομολογεῖν.' If ἐρόμενος be read in the sequel he is probably right. This is one of my reasons for not reading ἐρόμενος.

ὁ ἐρωτῶν: all the MSS. give ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, which is defended by Gedike and Ullrich, and retained by Hermann. It must be wrong; for it is the person who *asks* for the definition who must acknowledge his familiarity with the terms employed. This Meno, now ὁ ἐρωτῶν, presently does, in answer to Socrates' question ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι. Most editors, following Cornarius, correct to ὁ ἐρόμενος, referring to *Hipp. maj.* 293 A, where all the MSS. give ἐρωτωμένου, which is universally corrected to ἐρομένου. In that place the aorist ἐρομένου is no doubt right. Here, after the presents ἀποκρίνεσθαι, προομολογῇ, it comes in strangely. The interpretation of Ficinus, 'qui rogat' is adduced in support of the usual correction. But if Ficinus read ὁ ἐρόμενος, would he not rather have written 'qui

rogavit'? For these reasons I correct ἐρωτώμενος to ἐρωτῶν. The corruption arose either from a dittography $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{ἐρωτῶν}\\ \text{ἐρόμενος}\end{matrix}\right\}$ or because the scribes failed to see how the person who is, on the whole, ὁ ἐρωτῶν, could be expected to make an *admission*; and so altered ἐρωτῶν to ἐρωτώμενος.

A 4. **πράγματα προστάττεις**: so the MSS., which Fr. follows. Many of the editors are dissatisfied. Ast struck out πράγματα; Gedike would substitute παραυτίκα for it; Cobet alters προστάττεις to παρέχεις, whom Sch. follows. No doubt πράγματα παρέχειν is the usual phrase (**90 E** 30, etc.). But as Plato uses προστάττειν with such objects as ἔργον (*Rep.* 530 C, *Parm.* 136 D), δίαιταν (*Rep.* 406 C), οὐ φαῦλον *Polit.* 263 A, it may surely be admitted with the object πράγματα, 'trouble.' See L. & S. προστάσσω II 1. Heindorf in Buttm. quotes for πράγματα προστάττειν Xen. *Oec.* xvii 11, to which Fr. adds *ibid.* ix 16.

77 A 5. **κατὰ ὅλου**: this seems to be the only instance of this combination in Plato. In Aristotle the phrase became stereotyped, and was written as one word καθόλου. L. & S. (s.v. καθόλου) say it was written καθ' ὅλου in 'writers before Aristotle.' But where are the instances? The letter of Philip in Dem. *de Cor.* (18) 77 is not genuine. Ast read καθ' ὅλον, which occurs *Tim.* 40 A, 55 E. κατὰ ὅλον is the form which occurs *Rep.* 392 E. Possibly this is the true reading here: but κατὰ ὅλου, even though this be an isolated instance in Plato, is parallel to κατὰ πάντων at **73 D** 5 etc. The hiatus need not surprise us: Fr. gives instances of hiatus between prep. and relative, all from dialogues not later than the *Republic*. He quotes Cicero *Or.* § 151, where Cicero observes Platonem hiatum non fugisse. But this is much less true of the later dialogues. See Blass *Attische Beredsamkeit* II 426.

8. **ὑγιῆ**: so the MSS.; Sch. ὑγιᾶ. The old rule was 'Those adjectives in -ης that have a vowel before the termination in Attic contract -εα into -ᾶ, not -ῆ' (Matthiae *Gr.* § 113). For this Hadley § 231 b substitutes an amended rule: '-εα is contracted into -ᾶ, not -ῆ, when an ε precedes: ἐνδεᾶ from ἐνδεής, *needy* (*Lach.* 199 D). After ι and υ both vowels occur, ὑγιᾶ and ὑγιῆ from ὑγιής, εὐφυᾶ and εὐφυῆ from εὐφυής.' Sch. appears not to be uniform in practice. At *Gorg.* 478 C, *Phaedo* 89 D, *Laws* 684 C he gives ὑγιῆ; but at *Charm.* 155 E, 156 B, 164 B, *Laws* 735 B, ὑγιᾶ. At *Laws* 857 D most MSS. and editions give ὑγιῆ. As to other adjectives in -εής, at *Rep.* 386 B most MSS. appear to give ἀδεῆ, at †*Alc.* i 122 A ἀδεᾶ, at *Phaedr.* 257 D ψοφοδεᾶ. Meisterhans *Grammatik der Att. Inschriften*

p. 118 gives interesting statistics from Inscr. as to *ὑγιής*: after 350 B.C. the neuter plur. and acc. sing. is *ὑγιῆ* (eight places); in an Inscr. (*CIA.* II 67) between 357 and 354 B.C. both forms occur, *ὑγιᾶ* and *ὑγιῆ*.

32. I have followed Buttm. in reading **αὑτῷ** here, which **C** Sch. gives in the parallel passage *Symp.* 204 D E.

43. **οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά**: Cobet brackets these words, and **E** is followed by Sch., I think quite rightly.

4. **τοῦ λεχθέντος**: the MSS. give *τούτου λεχθέντος*, which Fr. **78 B** retains. But this would mean 'when this has been said,' whereas we want a substantive phrase. Schleiermacher read *τούτου τοῦ*; Ast, whom Sch. follows, *τοῦ*.

29. Before **τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ** the MSS. give *τι*, which Fr. **D** retains. But *τι* with a transitive verb could only be a substantive, not a qualifying adverb (**80 A** 12 referred to by Fr. is not parallel). Sch. substitutes *που*, somewhat boldly. The MSS. vary in their spelling of **προστιθεῖς**, and it seems possible that the uncertainty of the termination originated *τι*. Stephanus, followed by Ast, omits it.

18. **ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή; ΣΩ. Τοῦτο λέγω, κτέ.** The MSS. **79 B** give to Meno the words *τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω;* Heusdius gave the question to Socrates, who thus interrupts and answers himself, as at **97 E** 24 and *Prot.* 343 D. But Schleiermacher pointed out that this usage only occurs to explain a statement the application of which is not obvious, which is not the case here. Buttm. (whom Fr. follows) approves the reading in the text, quoting *Crat.* 398 A; *Gorg.* 497 D; 'unde apparet nostro loco Ἔγωγε sive qualemcunque affirmandi formulam ante *τί οὖν δή;* mente supplendam esse.' Sch. gives the words to Socrates, but punctuates *τί οὖν δή; τοῦτο λέγω, ὅτι κτέ.*

19. **ὅλον**: this reading (Sch.) has the support of the bulk of the MSS. including B. Some MSS. however, and the old editions, give *ὅλην*, which Buttm. and Fr. retain. The fact that we have *ὅλην* at **77 A** 8, where *ἀρετή* is almost personified, cannot decide the point here. Cp. *Prot.* 361 B *εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον.*

25. B, with some other MSS., gives **δεῖται**; T *δεῖ*; x gives **C** *δεῖ τι*. Thus the balance of MS. authority is in favour of *δεῖται* (Sch. and Fr.). Buttm. reads *δεῖ*, denying the impersonal use of *δεῖται*. We have however at **C** 31 *δεῖσθαι*, at **E** 46 *δεήσεσθαι* (where Buttm. would read *δεήσειν*). Cp. *Rep.* 340 A *καὶ τί δεῖται μάρτυρος;* † *Alc.* ii 149 C; Soph. *O.C.* 570 *ὥστε βραχέα μοι δεῖσθαι φράσαι.*

27. **εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς**: all the MSS. (save Paris F, in which *εἰ* is written as a correction) give *ἢ* or *ἡ*. Ficinus (who renders *siquidem*) must have read *εἰ*, and this seems necessary.

28. **τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν . . ἀρετή ἐστιν**: these clumsy and intrusive words are, I think, rightly bracketed by Naber. Fr. keeps the words, and so does Sch., but reading *τοῦτο γὰρ ἄρα λέγει κτέ.*, no doubt including this place among those to which he refers in the Notarum Index to this vol. (p. x) 'In his locis aliquot locos ita emendabam, ut emendatio proficisceretur a compendio vocabuli *ἄρα*.'

D 43. **ὅ τι ἔστιν, οἷον**: both the best MSS. have missed the right reading here: B *ἐστιν οὐ*, T *ἐστι σύ*: *ἐστιν, οἷον* is preserved by x, by Coislin. and some other MSS. of the b^1 sub-class, by Δ (the copy of B), and by the old editions.

E 46. **δεήσεσθαι**: see on **C** 25 above.

80 B 13. **ναρκᾶν** was bracketed by Dobree and Cobet, whom Sch. follows, I think rightly; Fr. retains the word.

E 7. **κατάγεις**: this is generally explained as a metaphor drawn from spinning: *κατάγω* = 'spin' *Soph.* 226 B; *κάταγμα* = 'yarn' *Polit.* 282 E. Fr. quotes as illustrating the metaphor *Hipp. min.* 369 B *ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους* (scil. *captiosos*) *πλέκεις λόγους*. The same metaphor appears in *subtilis*, 'fine-spun,' etc. But nowhere else is *κατάγω* or any of its derivatives found in a metaphorical sense. And Buttmann says with much justice 'comparatio cum filo quod nendo *deducitur* de tam brevi sermone locum non habet.' He suggests *παράγεις*, citing Dem. *Androt.* (22) 4 *πλάττων καὶ παράγων πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων κακούργους λόγους*. Ficinus renders 'in medium adduxisti,' a rendering to be got out of *παράγεις*, but not out of *κατάγεις*.

81 C 34. **ψυχάς**: so Boeckh, whom Sch. follows, for *ψυχάν* of the MSS. which Buttmann and Fr. retain. We might defend *κείνων ψυχάν* by Aesch. *Persae* 28 *δεινοὶ δὲ μάχην ψυχῆς εὐτλήμονι δόξῃ*. But the following *ἐκ τᾶν* seems conclusive for the plural.

3. **καὶ πάντα χρήματα**: I have with Fr. retained *καί*, which is bracketed by Sch.; for (1) it is not clear that the division *τὰ ἐνθάδε* and *τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου* is exhaustive, and (2) it seems to be possible that *καί* might be taken comprehensively (*denique*) as Stallb. suggests.

D 16. **ἐργαστικούς**: so Fr. following B, some other MSS., the old editions and Hermann. T and its descendants give *ἐργατικούς*, which Sch. gives. Hermann's defence of *ἐργαστικούς* (Praef. p. xxi) seems strong: this is from *ἐργάζομαι*, as *ζητητικός* from

ζητέω, and means 'productive'; this is the sense it bears at *Polit.* 280 E, 281 A, and the sense wanted here: *ἐργατικός* is from *ἐργάτης*, 'like a labourer,' opposed to *ἀρχιτέκτων*, which sense it bears at *Polit.* 259 E. It must be noted, however, that *ἐργάτης* occurs as adj. 'industrious' at *Rep.* 554 A *φειδωλὸς καὶ ἐργάτης* (v.l. *ἐργαστής*), *Euthyd.* 281 C *ἄργος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης*. Cp. Xen. *Mem.* I ii 57, III i 6.

19. **ἀλλὰ πῶς** . . ; this, undoubtedly the right reading, has been preserved only by x, by r (another MS. of the *b*[1] class, in the Vatican) and by Stobaeus, who cites from **80 E** 7 to **82 A** 28. Stallb.'s argument against the reading *ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς*, which is given by all the other MSS., is conclusive. Meno would thus be represented as accepting Socrates' statement in the main, and merely asking whether it was to be accepted without qualification. But this is not Meno's attitude. **E**

41. **εἰ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων**: the MSS. give *ἢ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος κτέ.*, which Fr. retains. Sch. thinks the place corrupt. I have followed Ast in reading *εἰ* for the former *ἤ*. At **79 C** 27 and **88 B** 21 we have other instances in the MSS. of confusion between *εἰ* and *ἤ*. The matter is complicated, because in Homer indirect alternative questions are introduced by *ἤ* . . *ἤ*, and the same usage perhaps extends to tragedy; though in some of the places *εἰ* is a v. l. for the former *ἤ*. The chief places are Aesch. *Choëph.* 756, 890 (see Verrall's note): Soph. *O.C.* 80 (see Jebb): Eur. *Med.* 492. In Aesch. *P.V.* 780 *ἐλοῦ γὰρ ἢ* . . *ἤ* is really not an indirect *question*, but a proposed *choice*. The only prose instance given is Xen. *Anab.* I x 17 (which recent editors correct). See Hadley § 1017, Kühner § 587. 19. For *εἰ* . . *ἤ* cp. *Apol.* 18 A etc. **82 B**

10. **τετράπουν**: all the MSS. give *τέταρτον*. Cornarius' emendation *τετράπουν* is generally accepted. **83 C**

45. The reply of the slave has fallen out in the MSS.

1. **οὗ**: Buttm. approved Beck's emendation *οἱ*. Cp. on **84 A** **94 D** 2.

21. *ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τινὰ τέμνουσα* is the reading of the MSS. *τινα* is obviously corrupt, and **τείνουσα** is given as a correction in a Paris MS. (E) and by Cornarius. This Hermann has adopted. It is strongly supported by **85 B** 45 *ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης*. Sch. gives the reading proposed by Wex (Soph. *Antig.* II 80) *εἰς γωνίαν ἀντίαν, τέμνουσα*. This assumes that the first two letters of *ἀντίαν* were lost by 'lipography' after *γωνίαν*; and that the remaining *τιαν* naturally became *τινα*. Palaeographically the two corrections are **85 A**

much on a par ; but in my mind **85 B** 45 turns the balance in favour of Hermann's.

C 10. **τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἆρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε ;** pleonastic as the language is, I see no sufficient reason for any excision. The reading is defended by Heindorf, Ullrich and Buttmann, and retained by Herm. and Fr. Schleiermacher, Bekker and Madv. cut out *περὶ τούτων ὧν μὴ οἶδε* : Sch. cuts out *ὧν μὴ εἶδε* only. The words *περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ* depend closely on *οὐκ εἰδότι*. Plato may wish to remind us that neither Knowledge nor Ignorance is universal. Meno has shown ignorance of Virtue ; the slave ignorance of Geometry. 'In one who lacks Knowledge then on certain subjects, whatever they may be, there are True Opinions about the subjects on which he lacks Knowledge.'

86 A 2. **ἤδη** : so two MSS., Paris E and Venice Ξ : and so Stallb. (approved by Shilleto on Dem. *F.L.* § 83), Sch. and Fr. Most MSS. *ἤδει*.

11. I follow Stallb. here in reading **ἆρ' οὖ** for *ἆρ' οὖν*, which the MSS. give and Sch. and Fr. retain. No doubt there are plenty of instances of *ἆρ' οὖν* in the sense *nonne*, but are there any instances of *ἆρ' οὖν* resuming a previous *οὖν*, or indeed of *ἆρ' οὖν* in any other place than the beginning of a sentence ? *Phaedo* 65 E *ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος* resumed 66 A by *ἆρ' οὐχ οὗτος* favours *ἆρ' οὐ* here.

87 A 25-30 : on textual questions arising in this passage see expository notes.

B 7. **ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ** : so the MSS. ; *ἆρα διδακτόν που* Sch.

E 37. **πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθά** : B has *πάντα* (ending a line) *τἀ γὰρ ἀγαθά*. The MS. Δ, derived from it, reads *τἀ γὰρ ἀγαθά* omitting *πάντα*. All the other MSS. appear to have *πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθά*, which Fr. keeps. Sch. *πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθά*.

88 B 21. **εἰ οὐχί** : the MSS. are divided between *ἢ οὐχί* (B) and *ἢ οὐχί* (T and others). *ἤ* is impossible ; on *ἦ* Heind. (in Buttm.) observes 'in Attico sermone nusquam in interrogatione ante *οὐκ* invenias *ἦ*.' For confusion of *εἰ* see on **82 B** 41.

22. Here Fr. gives *ποτὲ μὲν . . ποτὲ δέ* with BT. Sch. gives *ποτέ μὲν . . ποτὲ δέ*. This is only supported by x (see on **81 E** 19). But it is the form used elsewhere ; **88 D** 2, **95 B** 14, **C** 31, **D** 34, **96 B** 25, **97 C** 37. In *Theaet.* 192 D *καὶ ἅπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, ποτὲ δ' οὔ* the phraseology is different ; (Sch. there expunges *ποτ'*).

C 28. As the text stands in the MSS. and editions, the parti-

ciples *μανθανόμενα* and *καταρτυόμενα* have no substantives to agree with. For it is absurd to speak of *εὐμαθία* as itself *μανθανόμενον*, or of *σωφροσύνη* as *καταρτυόμενον*. I insert *πάντα*. Another remedy would be to cut out *καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα*. For *πάντα* omitted see on **87 E** 37.

25, **B** 28, **C** 2: I have followed Sch. and Fr., who follow **89 A**
the MSS., in reading *ἀγαθοί* once only in the first and second of these places, twice in the third. The consensus of the MSS. is unbroken, except that in the first passage x reads *οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοί*. Cp. **98 D** 27.

33. **διέφθειρεν** BT, Buttmann, Herm. (see Praef. vol. I p. vii), **B**
Fr. *διαφθείρειεν* Madv. *adv. crit.* I 414: 'Rectum esset *διέφθειρεν*, si hoc significaretur, tunc neminem eos corrupturum fuisse, quod nunc fiat.' Sch. follows Madv. But I think Plato wishes to imply that now as a matter of fact they *are* corrupted. See J. & A. M. Adam on *Prot.* 335 C, who think that here we should perhaps read *ἀφίκοντο* and *ἐγίγνοντο*.

34. Both here and at line 36 all the MSS. but one corrupt **E**
the name *Ἄνυτος*. In the former place they give *αὐτὸς ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο*, in the latter T and most MSS. give *εἰκότως δ' αὖ μεταδοῖμεν ἄν· αὐτὸς γάρ κτέ*. B gives *εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδοῖμεν ἄν· αὐτὸς γάρ κτέ*. (Here the priority of the reading of B is obvious; *αὖ* was a correction after *Ἄνυτος* had become *ἂν αὐτός*. *αὖ* is not in place here. Stallbaum extracted from it the reading *εἰκότως δ' αὐτῷ μεταδοῖμεν ἄν*.) The name *Ἄνυτος* is preserved by x alone, which keeps it in both places. It was restored to the text by Struve. Buttmann makes a strange mistake over the passage by supposing that the subj. *μεταδῶμεν* is *final*. See Goodwin *MT.* § 572. For a similar confusion between *Ἄνυτος* and *αὐτός*, cp. *Ἀθ. πολ.* ch. 76. See Cobet *Nov. Lect.* p. 670.

30. Sch. follows Naber in bracketing **ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν** **90 E**
παρὰ τούτων, and I have followed Sch. The sentence runs better without the words, and the change of number from *βουλομένους* to *ζητοῦντα* is very harsh.

9. I follow Sch., who follows Cobet, in assuming a lacuna **91 B**
after **τὴν ἀρετήν**. Cobet would supply *μαθησόμενον* or *βουλόμενοι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι: κτησόμενον*, or *ἀγαθὸν γενησόμενον*, would be equally possible. Biester defended the MS. reading by making *τὴν ἀρετήν* not dependent on *σκόπει*, but an 'absolute' accusative. But such an accusative of reference, connected with no word in the sentence, is impossible. At **92 D** 29 *τὴν ἀρετὴν γένοιτ' ἂν ἄξιος λόγου* such a word is supplied. Buttmann, also separating *τὴν ἀρετήν* from *σκόπει*, says the notion *διδαχ-*

θησόμενον may be extracted from *πέμπειν παρά τινας*. Fr. rightly protests against the separation, and holds that *σκόπει* is to be taken twice, 'regard this Virtue and consider.' But we are not really asked to 'consider this virtue,' and such a 'prolepsis' would only be possible if the word *ἀρετήν* itself were understood later in the sentence, as in such a sentence as *ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πεμπόμενος ἀγαθὸς γίγνοιτο*.

17. I have followed Sch. in reading **οὑς**, which is given by x and two other MSS., rather than Fr. who gives *οἵους* with BT and the majority. It is not a *similarity* between the men under discussion and the sophists, but an *identity*, that is asserted; and though *ὅς* is used sometimes when you might expect *οἷος* (see on **92 C** 18), the converse does not hold.

C 20. **μηδὲ οἰκείων μηδὲ φίλων**: all the MSS. appear to have *μήτε οἰκ. μήτε φ.* That would, as Herm. says (vol. III Praef. p. XXI) make *οἰκεῖοι* and *φίλοι* an exhaustive division of *συγγενεῖς*. He therefore reads *μηδὲ . . μηδέ*, which Sch. and Fr. adopt. Cp. **96 C** 8. *μηδὲ . . μηδέ* (after *μηδένα*) are further suggestions of other classes ('nor yet'), and then the last class (*φίλοι*) is subjected to an exhaustive division by *μήτε . . μήτε*, 'whether they be . . or.' Cp. *Gorg.* 508 D *οὐ τὸ τύπτεσθαι οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον*. (See on **92 B** 10.) As to the sequel, B, which is supported by x, reads *μήτε φίλον μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον*. The other MSS. give *μήτε φίλων μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων*. Correcting the first word to *μηδέ* (as above) we get the best reading by taking *φίλων* from one class of MSS. and *ἀστὸν . . ξένον* from the other. The change of case (from *φίλων* to *ἀστόν*) shows the sub-division.

D 10. **Φειδίαν τε**: here x alone preserves the true reading *τε*: all other MSS. *γε*. Cp. on **72 E** 17.

92 C 15. The emendation of Heindorf *καὶ <ἀεὶ> εἴην γε*, adopted by Sch., though extremely plausible, appears to me unnecessary. Fr. defends the text successfully.

17. **<ἐν> ἑαυτῷ**: the preposition is supplied in x and by a later hand in Γ (Coislin.) and another Paris MS. (E).

18. **ἄπειρος εἴης**: see expository note.

19. **οἵ εἰσιν**: for *οἵ* x and Γ have *οἷοι*. This is adopted by Wolf (in Buttm.), Bekk., Madvig, Cobet and Herm. Buttm. defends *οἵ*, and Sch. and Fr. both keep it. See expository note.

23. **ἐζήτουμεν**: Cobet and Hirschig read *ζητοῦμεν*, which Sch. adopts. The alteration seems hardly necessary.

26. **ἔστων** : the MSS. give *ἔστωσαν*, which Fr. keeps. Sch. *ἔστων*. 'The endings *-τωσαν* and *-σθωσαν*, if Attic at all, belong only to the later Attic.' Hadley § 380. See J. Adam on *Euthyphr.* 9 D. Cobet *nov. lect.* p. 327. See *Soph.* 231 A MSS. *ἔστωσαν* Sch. *ἔστων*, and 244 B MSS. *ἀποκρινέσθωσαν* Sch. *ἀποκρινέσθων* : cp. *Rep.* 352 B. **D**

21. **καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους** : I have kept the MSS. reading, to which Buttm. and Fr. adhere, though it is not free from difficulty. To suppose that the three distinguished statesmen just mentioned could be regarded by Anytus, or any one else, as *φαυλότατοι* would be absurd. But really the words *ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους*, negatived by *μή*, form a kind of litotes. 'Neque ego aliter rem expedire possum, nisi ut neglegentius neque ullo ad superiora exempla respectu sed velut extrinsecus hunc transitum fecerit scriptor ad Thucydidem quem ut hominem divitem et *optimatium praesulem*, aliquo modo tanquam cumulum ceteris videtur potius adjicere' Buttm. See presently **D** 6 foll. Socrates overdoes the distinction between Thucydides and the others. Sch. (following Ast) reads *καὶ <οὐ> τοὺς φαυλοτάτους*, which appears to me to raise fresh difficulties. Stallb. (1827) and Madvig *adv. crit.* I 414 *καί <τοι οὐ> τοὺς φαυλοτάτους*, an objection to which is that it leaves too much stress on *ὀλίγους*. If the only hesitation were due to the *fewness* of the examples, would *one* more entirely remove it? **94 B**

2, 3. **οὗ . . οὗ** : so all the MSS., which Fr. follows. Sch. *οἷ . . οἷ*, which Buttm. favoured (cp. on **84 A** 1). In the corresponding passage of the *de virtute* 378 B, the MSS. give *οἷ . . οἷ*. This is all the external support the reading *οἷ* has here. *οὗ . . οὗ* is quite defensible ; not, as Ullrich would take it, as a gen. of price (!), but with the local sense transferred to circumstances : 'in a case where.' Cp. *Symp.* 194 A *εἰ δὲ γένοιο οὗ νῦν ἐγώ εἰμί*, *Theaet.* 172 B *ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω*, Soph. *Phil.* 1049, etc. So *ὅπου* still more frequently. I doubt very much whether, admitting you can say *δαπανᾶν εἴς τι*, you can say *οἷ δαπανῶ*. I can find no instance of *οἷ* where the local sense is so much weakened ; for it seems clear that this is not the case in *οἷ μ' ἀτιμίας ἄγεις* (Soph. *El.* 404) and the like. **D**

5. **τοῦτο** : the MSS. give *ταῦτα* ; the *de virtute*, *τοῦτο*, this time probably preserving the right reading ; 'tum ob proxime succedens *διδακτόν*, tum ob sensum, cum ceteris artibus omnibus studium virtutis commodius opponatur ita : *ταῦτα μὲν—τοῦτο δὲ*—.' Buttm.

19. **ῥᾷον** : all the MSS. give *ῥᾴδιον*, which is retained by Herm. and the Zürich editors. Buttm. showed that *ῥᾷον* was **E**

necessary here. Riddell § 170 includes this among instances of 'omission of *μᾶλλον*.' These instances have broken down. It was suspicious that so many instances of 'omission of *μᾶλλον*' should have taken place with a word so easily confused with its comparative as PAIΔION with PAION. Heindorf on *Phaedo* 70 D pointed to *Rep.* 370 A as a place where in the MSS. *ῥᾴδιον* had obviously displaced the true reading *ῥᾶον*; at *Phaedo* 70 D one MS. has *ῥᾴδιον* for *ῥᾶον*; at *Rep.* 348 E, on the other hand, the Paris MS. gives *ῥᾶον* for *ῥᾴδιον*, and so the MSS. of Diog. L. I 26. Isocr. V 115, VIII 50, Lys. XII 89, adduced by Riddell, have now all been corrected. Against another possibility, of reading *ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν*, and taking *ἢ εὖ* in the sense '*or* well,' Buttm. argues (1) that in that case the author would have written *καὶ εὖ*; (2) that the words *ἢ εὖ* (or *καὶ εὖ*) are then quite pointless. Ast read *οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν*, omitting *ἢ εὖ*, which two words are omitted, according to Buttm., in Vatican r, probably by a conjecture.

95 D 2 foll. The four lines (33–36 Bergk) appear also in an extract from Musonius Rufus (Stob. LVI 18); lines 35, 36 are quoted by Xen. *Mem.* I ii 20, *Symp.* II 5, Clemens *Strom.* V p. 572 (besides other late authors: see Bergk *PLG.*[4] II p. 121). They are twice alluded to by Aristotle: *NE.* IX ix 7 *γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν*: IX xii 3 *ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν*

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά.

A comparison of the lines as quoted by Plato, with the other quotations, and with the MSS. of Theognis, reveals some diversities of reading.

In V 33 Bergk gives *καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε* from the MSS. He observes, 'offensioni fuit *μετὰ* iteratum, itaque variandi gratia apud Platonem priore loco *παρὰ* substitutum.'

In V 35 Bergk gives (for **διδάξεαι**) *μαθήσεαι*, from the MSS. of Theognis, Clemens, etc. Xenophon and other citators agree with Plato in *διδάξεαι*. Bergk thinks from *NE.* IX xii 3 (cited above) that Aristotle read *ἔσθλ' ἀπομάξεαι*, which appears to me doubtful.

In V 36 the MSS. of Plato give *συμμιγῆς*, and so do most of the late citators and some of the MSS. of Theognis. The best MS. of Theognis, and the MSS. of Xenophon, give **συμμίσγῃς**, which the modern editors of Plato restore. It is probable that the *συλλογή*, or collection of excerpts, from Theognis, which has come down to us, was not made at the time when the *Meno* was written; for Isocrates, in his address to Nicocles, written at a date not far distant from that of the *Meno* (Isocr.

II 43), after mentioning Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides, speaks of the making such selections from them as a task for the future: *εἴ τις ἐκλέξειε τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν τὰς καλουμένας γνώμας κτέ.* (Bergk II 234).

10. The passage of Theognis stands thus in Bergk *F.L.G.*[4]: **E**

φῦσαι καὶ θρέψαι ῥᾷον βροτόν, ἢ φρένας ἐσθλὰς
ἐνθέμεν· οὐδείς πω τοῦτό γ' ἐπεφράσατο,
ᾧ τις σώφρον' ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα, κάκ κακοῦ ἐσθλόν·
εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ' ἔδωκε θεός,
ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν,
πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον·
εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν τε καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,
οὕ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσι· ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.

Line 432 is quoted by Clearchus ap. Athenaeum, 256 c, etc. See Bergk p. 156. Line 434 is quoted by Aristotle *NE.* x ix 3 *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐταρκεῖς πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι.*

Leutsch *Philologus* XXX pp. 211 foll. elaborately discusses the order and continuity of the lines, comparing Plato's quotation with the reading found in the MSS. of Theognis. But such discussions are subject to the consideration that Plato is obviously, and purposely, quoting loosely. (The MSS. of Plato give *ἐγένετο* for *ἔγεντο* in v. 436. It is quite possible that Plato wrote *ἐγένετο*, ignoring the metre; but more probable that the copyists finding *ἔγεντο* altered it to the familiar form. Cp. *συμμιγῆς* above.)

8. **τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι**: the great preponderance of **96 C** MSS. give *μήτε διδακτόν*, the remainder giving *μὴ διδακτόν*. *μηδέ* here is due to Bekker, and is adopted by recent editors. Buttm. thought that at **89 E** 27 also we should read *μηδὲ διδακτόν*. See on **91 C** 20 for confusion of *μήτε* and *μηδέ*.

30. **ἢ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει**: this reading is due to Madvig, **E** and is adopted by Sch. and Fr. The MSS. give *ἢ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγειν*. This is retained by Buttm. and Stallb., in the sense 'or otherwise the knowledge must escape us'; the infinitive being regarded as dependent on the notion *δεῖ* in *προσεκτέον* and *ζητητέον* above. Of the four places adduced by Stallb. in illustration, the most apposite is *Crito* 51 C *ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν κτέ.* But in this (as well as in the other places cited) the notion to be extracted from the verbal is rather *duty* than (as here) *necessity*;

also, the infinitive stands much nearer to the verbal than it does here. (At *Rep.* 424 B the infinitive φυλάττειν is not affected by ἀνθεκτέον above. At *Phaedr.* 245 D we have to understand δεῖ with στῆναι, but from a preceding δυνατόν.)

97 A 12. Sch. brackets **ὀρθῶς**, which occurs in the MSS. and is kept by Fr. The omission is right. The fact that the word occurs *twice* in the speech of Socrates makes it absurd to put the question thus. Which ὀρθῶς does he mean? It cannot reasonably be the second, so Buttm. says the question refers to the *former* ὀρθῶς. To pass over the awkwardness of referring to a former use of a word in spite of the intervention of a latter, the great objection remains that it is not the word ὀρθῶς that requires explanation, but rather the words ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ. Socrates does not in the sequel explain what ὀρθῶς means. It keeps recurring as a known and accepted term, and it was its frequency that caused it to come in here, once too often.

13. **<εἴ> τις**: εἰ is unaccountably omitted in nearly all MSS.

15. Some MSS. of the b^1 class give the fuller form ἄλλο τι ἤ.

C 2. All the MSS. give οὐκ ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι, except x, which gives οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι. The reading **οὐκ ἂν ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι** was advocated by Struve and Madvig, and is adopted by Sch. Fr. keeps the MS. reading. The present affords a good example of cases on which a sort of πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος exists between two different classes of critics. With regard to a rare and doubtful construction, the one class urge that whereas many of the apparent instances can be easily and probably corrected, a presumption is raised against the remainder. The other class reply that as long as a single instance remains for which no plausible correction can be brought forward, this may defend others. The question is further complicated by the fact that in the early language many constructions occurred that were subsequently discarded. But how far did the process of purgation go? Naturally, poets still claimed greater license than prose-writers. But was the line limiting prose-usage a hard and fast one? The best answer is that more thorough examination of the MSS. has undoubtedly got rid of many solecisms. Further help is obtained from analysis of the exceptions remaining. This, in the case of questions with the optative without ἄν, has been given by Professor Jebb, note on Soph. *Ant.* 605, and Exc. on *O.C.* 170. He makes it clear that this construction, even in verse, is limited to places which are exclamations, rather than interrogations, adding that there is 'no real instance in prose.' We should then have no hesitation

in inserting ἄν here. The following is a list of apparent instances of questions in Plato with the optative without ἄν—

Lach. 190 B εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίνα τρόπον σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα; (τίν' ἄν Bekk. Sch.; Cron leaves unaltered).

Euthyd. 281 C πότερον οὖν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις πράττοι κτέ.; (so B, but T has πότερον οὖν ἂν κτέ.).

ibid. 286 B πῶς ἀντιλέγοι; Sch., after one Paris MS., πῶς <ἂν> ἀντιλέγοι;

ibid. 291 E οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν φαίης; Sch., after Ast, οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν <ἂν> φαίης; Badham omits φαίης.

Gorg. 492 B τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη; Sch., following Coraës, gives κάκιον ἂν εἴη.

Rep. 352 E ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν; Οὐδαμῶς. Here we may regard the ἄν as carried on from the first question into the second. But Ast proposed ἀκούσαις ἄν.

ibid. 382 D πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο; Γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ἔφη. Ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; Here again it is possible that ἄν may be mentally supplied from the neighbouring questions.

ibid. 437 B ἆρ' οὖν . . πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις θείης; ('would you regard all such things as opposite to one another?'). The Zurich editors read ἐναντίων ἂν ἀλλήλοις.

ibid. 516 E ἆρ' οὐ σκότους ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς; Herm. gives ἂν πλέως σχοίη.

[Other exx. of ἄν apparently omitted with opt. in Plato are *Charm.* 156 B ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον <ἂν> εἴη (Sch. after Madv.): ibid. 169 A τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν <ἂν> παρέχοι (Sch. after Heindorf): *Lysis* 214 D δ δὲ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀνόμοιον εἴη καὶ διάφορον, σχολῇ γ' <ἂν> τῷ ἄλλῳ ὁμοῖον ἢ φίλον γένοιτο (Sch. after Bekker): *Euthyd.* 299 A δικαιότερον <ἂν> τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι (Sch. after Ast): *Rep.* 360 B οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν (the whole passage is in indirect speech): ibid. 362 D ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη (quotation from an old poet): *Phaedo* 72 C πάντα λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν (Sch. πάντ' ἄν, which A.-H. adopts): ibid. 107 A οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντιν' <ἄν> τις ἄλλον καῖρον ἀναβάλλοιτο (Sch. after Bekker; A.-H. defends the vulgate).] See *CR.* VI 435, 'J. D.' on the 'Remote Deliberative.'

9. **δι' ὃ τι θαυμάζεις**: all the MSS. give θαυμάζοις, which **D** shows with what caution their evidence on such points must be received.

93 A 31. The MSS. nearly all give *Μένων ἑταῖρε*. The omission of *ὦ* with the vocative in prose in an address free from emotion is rare; and the ease with which *ὦ* would fall out probably justifies its insertion in the few cases in Plato where it is wanting. Sch. restores it at *Prot.* 358 A E, 359 A; *Gorg.* 489 A; in all of which cases a contiguous *ω* may have expelled it; also at *Hipp. maj.* 289 B, *Soph.* 220 D. But at *Laches* 198 A he leaves *σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε*, and at † *Theages* 127 B *τί τοῦτο λέγεις, Θέαγες;* 129 C *εἶμι δή, Σώκρατες*. The former of the instances in the *Theages* is a violation of Attic usage; the second instance falls under rule, as excitement is certainly intended. Cp. *τί λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες;* ibid. 129 B. I follow Naber in supposing that here *Μένων* is a gloss upon *ἑταῖρε* which has extruded *ὦ*. The Florentine x gives *ὦ ἑταῖρε Μένων*. At *Crito* 52 A, B reads *ταύταις δή φαμεν καί σε, Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέχεσθαι*, probably rightly, as great impressiveness is intended; but inferior MSS. give *ὦ Σώκρατες*.

B 3. Practically all the MSS. omit *οὐ*. It appears as a correction in Paris E and in the edition of Stephanus. For omission of *οὐ* see Badham's *Philebus* ed. 2 p. 132, and cr. n. on **94 B** 21.

D 23. **οὔτ' ἐπίκτητα**: that there is something wrong about these words is obvious. Buttm. pointed out that the third *οὔτε* cannot stand; for you do not want a third term to add to *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα ἀληθής*, but something as an antithesis to *φύσει*. Hence Bekker read *οὐδ' ἐπίκτητα*. The objection to this is that it goes too far. A human attribute must be either *φύσει* or *ἐπίκτητον*, either part of the original stock or subsequently acquired. (See expository note on **89 A** 24.) Much therefore is to be said for the reading *ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα* given by Gedike, and supported by a correction in Paris E. *ἐπίκτητος* is opposed to *φύσει* in *Rep.* 618 D *τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων*, and to *ἔμφυτος* in *Phaedr.* 237 E.

The words *οὔτ' ἐπίκτητα* were expunged by Cornarius, with the approval of Buttm., Madv., and Ast; and are bracketed by Sch. and Fr.

On the other hand it may be urged that the words are too foolish to have been a gloss. Fr. assumes that *οὔτ' ἐπίκτητα* has arisen from *ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα*, but that this was a gloss. But if we had found *ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητα* in our texts, should we have thought of disturbing it? The corruption of *ἀλλ'* into *οὔτ'* is hard to explain, but perhaps we may assume that in the archetype the copyist carelessly ran on from two *οὔτε*'s to a third.

99 A 2. The MSS. give *ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιγίγνεται*. This would mean 'is an outcome or accident of Knowledge.' So *Phil.*

37 B ὅτι δόξῃ ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθές, *Rep.* 574 A *αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι*, *Hipp. maj.* 303 A. But Virtue has never been described as an *ἐπιγέννημα* of Knowledge. Virtue *is* Knowledge—or something like it. Nor would *οὐδ'* have any point with *ἐπιγίγνεται*, whereas with the correction it is easy: 'as it is not *διδακτόν so neither* is it *ἐπιστήμη*.' The reading in the text, adopted by Sch., Fr., and most modern editors, is due to Schleiermacher; but it is also supported by the version of Ficinus, 'Igitur cum virtus doctrina percipi nequeat, nequaquam scientia est.' [Herm. defends *ἐπιγίγνεται*.]

15. **εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμη. εὐδοξία . . . γίγνεται, ᾗ κτέ.** : so Fr. B following the MSS. Sch. and most editors after Schleiermacher read *εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ . . . γίγνεται· ᾗ κτέ.* I fail to see any sufficient objection to the MS. reading, which I have accordingly kept.

24. **κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πρ.** : Buttm. proposed *κατορθοῦσι δι' ὧν* C *πρ.* which is supported by the version of Ficinus, "multa tamen et magna et agendo et dicendo disponunt."

27. **ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν** : so the MSS. except x, which has *ὀρθῶς ἄρα καλοῖμεν*, and the Paris F, which has *ὀρθῶς οὖν ἂν κ.* as a correction. Sch. defends the asyndeton by *Theaet.* 183 A *καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι*. Ficinus has '*quamobrem* merito divinos vocabimus,' as if he had *οὖν* or *ἄρα* in his text. Fr. (after Stallb.) and Herm. read *ὀρθῶς ἀρ' ἄν* : Bekk. *ὀρθῶς οὖν ἄν*.

32. **ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ** : I have followed the MS. reading, as does D Fr. Sch. reads *ἔκ του θεοῦ*. If that had been Plato's meaning he would rather have written *ἔκ του θεῶν* (which Cobet gives).

38. **θεῖος ἀνήρ** : so the MSS. Sch. gives *σεῖος ἀνήρ*. This no doubt represents the Laconian dialect; but it is not at all clear that Plato wished to reproduce this.

EXCURSUS I

Οὐσία AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TERM IN PLATO (on 72 B 22)

We have no certain examples of *οὐσία* in any sense except 'wealth,' 'patrimony' in any writer before Plato. [The fragments of the Pythagorean Philolaus, in which it appears as a philosophical term in the form *ἐσσία* (cp. *Crat.* 401 C), are almost certainly spurious. See Prof. Bywater in *JP.* I pp. 21 foll., Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 61 D. For a different view see Zeller *pre-Socr.* I 314 and note: for a summary of the controversy R. & P. § 50 c, Ueberweg-Heinze p. 58.]

Plato in his earlier dialogues uses the term with reserve, and leads up to it by periphrases. In the present passage, for instance, we have been prepared for it by:—

71 A 28 *αὐτὸ ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετή*
71 B 3 *οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν*
72 A 14 *εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἔστιν*

The word occurs nowhere else in this dialogue.

In *Laches* 190 we have similar periphrases, but the term *οὐσία* is never reached.

Euthyphro 11 A (see on **71 B** 4) *κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστι, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν.* Here the words *ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστι* lead up to *οὐσίαν*, also heralded at 6 D *τὸ ὅσιον ὅ τί ποτ' εἴη*, and further by the words at 5 D *ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ . . ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν, ὅ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;*

In the *Hippias major* the word *οὐσία* occurs four times:—

(1) (2) 301 B *Hippias:* *διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτόν σε λέληθεν, ὥστε οἴει εἶναί τι ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν, ἢ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερ' ἄττα ἔστιν ἅμα, περὶ δὲ ἑκάτερον οὔ.*

(3) 301 E *Socrates:* *οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἱππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν.*

(1) 302 C *Socrates: τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἑπομένῃ.*

In (2) and (4) the meaning is 'essential nature' (as here in the *Meno*). The use in (2) has been led up to by Socrates, who at 300 E has expressed the same antithesis: *ὃ μήτ᾽ ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μήτ᾽ εἰμί.*

In (1) and (3) the use is curious. Grote (I 384) says 'The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality — of breaking up the integrity of those concretes which occur in Nature as continuous and indivisible wholes' (see his note also). I doubt whether the distinction attributed to Hippias is quite so scientific as this. He paraphrases his criticism at 304 A *κνίσματά τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διῃρημένα.* It is rather a distinction of *treatment*, the 'hair-splitting' or 'logic-chopping' of the dialectician opposed to the broad view taken by the practical man and expressed in continuous discourse—a distinction fully illustrated by Grote at the place referred to. *οὐσία* here then, I think, means 'truth.' [But it is probable that the speech of Hippias, *τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς κτέ.*, contains phrases actually quoted from the sophist, of which *διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας* may be one. Cp. *κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες* with *Hipp. min.* 369 B *ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων, ὃ ἂν ᾖ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχει κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλῳ ἀγωνίζει τῷ πράγματι, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ.*]

In the *Prot.* 329 C foll. the question is raised whether the parts of Virtue, Justice, Temperance, etc., are separate and different, *ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ;* When the same question is resumed at 349 B we have *ἡ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον.*

In *Gorg.* 472 B Plato apparently plays on the meaning 'wealth' and the philosophical sense 'truth,' *ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*, where the philosophical meaning of *οὐσία* is defined by *καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*. 'Substance' or 'reality' will preserve the double meaning. Dr. Thompson, however (ad loc.) doubts if any other meaning of *οὐσία* than 'patrimony' is intended.

In the *Phaedrus* it is used as an accepted term 237 C, 270 E; it is slightly helped out 245 E *ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ λόγον* and 247 C *ἀναφὴς οὐσία, ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς.*

Here in the *Meno* to *οὐσία* the words *ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν* are added as an interpretation. So in *Phaedo* 65 D *περὶ τῶν ἄλλων*

ἁπάντων οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν. Heindorf on that passage observes that the interpretation shows that οὐσία as a philosophic term was not yet established. He refers to this place of the *Meno*, and to *Rep.* 377 E (where οὐσίαν is omitted in the best texts). So the meaning of οὐσία is driven home *Phaedo* 78 D αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι 'as whose principle we assign being,' 92 D ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν 'the very substance that has the title of absolute essence' (the translations are Archer-Hind's). But in these places the additions are not so much for elucidation as for emphasis. At 101 C μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου it is used as an accepted term.

In the *Republic* the word sometimes receives support, sometimes is used without it. In Bk. II 359 A we have γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, which is to some extent prepared by 358 E τί οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη. οὐσία does not occur again, I think, in books I to V. In the account of δόξα at the end of book V, we have always τὸ ὄν, not οὐσία. At the beginning of book VI (484 B) we have τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος, but soon after (485 B) ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης, and again (486 A), in a very wide sense, παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας. In p. 490 the word is avoided: but towards the end of the book it comes noticeably forward (509 B) καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. In book VII we have phrases concerning the power of certain studies to stimulate the Reason, the comparison of which is instructive: 521 D μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν: 523 A ἑλκτικῷ πρὸς οὐσίαν: 524 E ὁλκὸν ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν: 525 A ἀγωγὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: B φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι: C ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν: 527 B ὁλκὸν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. We next come upon a group of instances at p. 534, where the partition of the mental faculties and their respective objects that concludes book VI, is resumed: A καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν. In the earlier exposition (p. 511) the term οὐσία is not used, but meanwhile we have been amply prepared for its use here: B ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; C μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν. The last group of instances of οὐσία as a philosophical term occurs at p. 585 in the discussion of Pleasure: A πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν; C Ἡ οὖν ἀνομοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης

μετέχει ; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ' ἀληθείας ; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας ; which is repeated below at D.

In the later dialogues preparation or explanation of the term is less and less felt necessary. In the *Theaet.* 160 B C, 172 B, 202 B it seems used as current coin ; at 185 C in answer to a question in which the words occur *τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινόν, ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν,* Theaetetus says *οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.*

The philosophical meanings of *οὐσία* in Plato may be classified as follows ; but many usages fall on the line between two divisions, especially between (2) and (3). The 'Ideal Theory' is implied by (2), not by (3).

(1) Being in general, opposed to Not-being and to Becoming : *Rep.* 525 B C, *Phaedo* 78 D, 98 D, *Theaet.* 185 C ; common in *Sophista*, *Parmenides*, also *Politicus* and *Timaeus.*

(2) Essential Nature of a Species, as self-existent (metaphysical) : *Rep.* 509 B, *Phaedo* 65 D, 101 C, *Phaedr.* 245 E (?), 247 C.

(3) Essential Nature of a Species, as apprehended by us (logical) : *Meno* **72 B** 22, *Euthyphro* 11 A, *Hipp. maj.* 301 B, 302 C, *Prot.* 349 B, *Rep.* 359 A, *Phaedr.* 237 C, 245 E (?), 270 E, *Theaet.* 202 B.

(4) Truth : *Hipp. maj.* 301 B E, *Gorg.* 472 B.

To these meanings must be added the uses *Theaet.* 160 B *ἡμῶν* (sc. 'of myself and the thing perceived') *ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ*, 160 C *τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστιν.* Here *οὐσία* = *φύσις* and amounts to little more than a periphrasis.

EXCURSUS II

Εἴπερ AND εἴ γε

On **73 C** 55 *εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν* Stallb., quoted by Fr., says : *εἴ γε usurpatur de re quae jure sumpta creditur, eoque differt ab εἴπερ, quod incertum relinquit utrum quid jure an injuria sumatur.* This note appears to me obscure and misleading. Whether *εἴπερ* or *εἴ γε* be used the view taken of the condition will depend on the mood and tense of the verb in the conditional clause. The meaning here is : 'this would not be the case if their virtue were not, as it is, the same' : and the meaning would be very little altered by substituting *εἴπερ* for *εἴ γε*. [*εἴ γε* is similarly used **74 C** 16, **D** 25 ; cp. Dem.

Aristocr. (23) 93 ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ γράφειν εἴ γε τὸ βέλτιστον τῇ πόλει σκοπεῖν ἐβούλετο: ib. 161 καλά γ' οὐ γάρ; εἴ γ' ἦν ἀληθῆ. *Euthyphr.* 10 E εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν: *Soph.* 255 D.] L. & S. realise this and say that εἴπερ is used 'in Attic mostly to imply that the supposition agrees with the fact: "if, that is to say"; with the impf. it implies that it is contrary to the fact'; and quote Soph. *El.* 312 εἴπερ ἦν πέλας (but he is not); ib. 604 εἴπερ ἔσθενον. This is perfectly true, but does not take us far towards grasping the distinction between εἴπερ and εἴ γε. As diametrically opposed to the view of Stallb. it is instructive to quote a note, itself somewhat over-hasty, of Whiston on Dem. *Tim.* (24) 89 (78): ὥστ' εἴπερ ὑμῶν ἑκάστῳ μέλει τι τῆς πολιτείας, κτέ.: 'Here εἴπερ is used instead of εἰ, for "if, as I assume to be the fact"; this particle *always assuming the truth of the supposition which it makes.* Cf. εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται (Thuc. I 69. 1) which Mr. Shepherd correctly renders "Especially if they carry off the credit of being the liberators of Greece, as I suppose you think is the case."' (A different view of the passage in Thuc. is taken by Classen, as we shall presently see.)

To pass back to an earlier stage of the discussion, Viger p. 512 gives as the principal meaning of εἴπερ '*si modo*,' on which Zeune notes: 'Haec vis videtur esse praecipua, propterea quod particula περ valet ad conditionem limitandam et coercendam'; quoting Plato *Rep.* 457 D οὐκ οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἂν ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι . . εἴπερ οἷόν τε and Dem. *Olynth.* I § 2 τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε. Besides this meaning Viger recognises three others: (α) *si quidem*, instituendo comparationem inter diversa, tuneque particulas illas sequitur καί in opposito membro, quoting Dem. *Tim.* (24) 51 ἄξιον δέ κτέ., where however εἰ περί του καὶ ἄλλου is now read. Zeune notes that sometimes the καί is absent, and quotes Thuc. IV 55. 2 ἐς δὲ τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο [cp. for εἴπερ ποτέ Thuc. IV 20. 1, VII 64. 2, Plato †*Ep.* vii 328 A], Xen. *Cyr.* III iii 19 συμφέρει δ' ὑμῖν, εἴπερ τῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, τὸ νικᾶν. He shows that there is in these cases an ellipse after εἴπερ, and how the ellipse is to be filled up. He gives as a stronger case of ellipse Aristoph. *Clouds* 226—

ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ ταρροῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ; (scil. δεῖ ὑπερφρονεῖν τοὺς θεούς)

and, as a case where there is *no* ellipse, Aristoph. *Frogs* 76—

εἶτ' οὐ Σοφοκλέα, πρότερον ὄντ' Εὐριπίδου,
μέλλεις ἀνάγειν, εἴπερ γ' ἐκεῖθεν δεῖ σ' ἄγειν;

(β) *quandoquidem* (ὅτι δή, ἐπειδή): Arist. *Pol.* VII (VI) 2, 3 =

1317 b 17 εἴπερ τοῦ δούλου ὄντος, τὸ ζῆν οὐχ ὡς βούλεται, to which Zeune adds Plato *Phaedr.* 215 D εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι.

Viger's *third* sense is shown to rest on a misconception, and may be passed over; but Zeune adds another real sense of εἴπερ, 'qua sequente ἀλλά significat *quamvis* . . *tamen*,' quoting Homer *Il.* xxi. 576—

> εἴπερ γὰρ φθάμενός μιν ἢ οὐτάσῃ ἠὲ βάλῃσιν
> ἀλλά τε καὶ περὶ δουρὶ πεπαρμένῃ οὐκ ἀπολήγει
> ἀλκῆς.

G. Hermann in his notes derides Viger's analysis: *multum interest*, he says, *inter* εἴπερ *et* εἴ γε: 'εἴπερ δοκεῖ σοι dicimus ei de quo non certo scimus quid ei placeat, aut de quo id nescire simulamus: εἴ γε δοκεῖ σοι dicimus ei de quo scimus quid ei placeat.' This is apparently the source of Stallbaum's note, which I started by criticising. Hermann's sweeping generalisation has tended to darken counsel. He was probably led into it by too exclusive attention to what Viger rightly says is the *principal* meaning of εἴπερ, 'si modo.' Other examples of this are *Prot.* 319 A ἢ καλὸν τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ ἔκτησαι: ib. 351 C εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῷη ἡδόμενος: *Euthyphr.* 8 D οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν ὡς οὐχί, εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην: *Gorg.* 495 A B οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ: *Phaedr.* 261 E περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη: *Charm.* 170 C: Xen. *Oec.* i 8 (if a man buys a horse, and not knowing how to ride, gets a fall and is hurt, is the horse wealth to him?) οὐκ εἴπερ τὰ χρήματά γ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν: *Symp.* ii. 6 quoted on **70 A** 1: Thuc. vi 21. 1: Eur. *Alc.* 303 εἴπερ εὖ φρονεῖς: *Phoen.* 524 εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή κτέ.: Aristoph. *Wasps* 535 εἴπερ, ὃ μὴ γένοιθ', οὗτός σ' ἐθέλει κρατῆσαι.

It is hardly necessary to prove that alike εἴπερ and εἴ γε may be used with an 'unreal condition.' Examples with εἴ γε are given at the beginning of this excursus; for εἴπερ I may cite Plato †*Ep.* vii 330 A ἢ δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐγένετο, εἴπερ ἐγίγνετο, κάλλιστα. As to other kinds of condition it may be said that either εἴπερ or εἴ γε (or εἰ simply), may express every grade of acceptation of the condition from *quandoquidem* ('since') to *si modo* ('if only'). Indeed the manner in which a speaker regards a condition, is often locked within his own breast. In such cases as *Euthyd.* 284 A εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό, and εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα, it is impossible to say to what extent the sophist accepts as true the answer that has been given him.

There are certainly instances in which εἴπερ *assumes the*

truth of the supposition it introduces, as has already been seen. To the instances given by Viger and Zeune many might be added; e.g. *Lach.* 197 C *φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἔστε ἀνδρεῖοι*: *Prot.* 312 A *εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν*, 329 B *ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι*: *Gorg.* 515 D *οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας*: *Meno* **98 B** 4: *Rep.* 351 A *εἴπερ σοφία καὶ ἀρετή ἐστι δικαιοσύνη*: *Phaedo* 71 C *ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίγνεται ταῦτα εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστίν* (contrast ibid. E *εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιῴσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις αὕτη*, where *εἴπερ* is *si modo*): *Parm.* 134 C *φαίης ἂν ἢ οὔ, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην*; . . *Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην*: Dem. *Aristocr.* (23) 144 *δίκην δίδοντες τὴν μεγίστην, εἴπερ οἱ κακόνοι καὶ φενακίζοντες ὑμᾶς*: Dem. 52. 2 *δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο πώποτε πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐδικάσατε . . οὕτω καὶ νῦν διαγνῶναι* (referred to by Milton W. Humphreys, *CR.* XI 140 b): Thuc. III 113. 4 *εἴπερ γε ὑμεῖς ἐν Ἰδομενῇ χθὲς ἐμάχεσθε* 'yes it is so, since you fought etc.' (see Classen on Thuc. I 77. 6).

On the other hand *εἴ γε* has as its *prevalent* meaning *si quidem*. An obvious instance is Dem. *Androt.* (22) 68: *ἐρωτῶν εἰ μάτην τὸ δεσμωτήριον ᾠκοδομήθη. καταφαίην ἂν ἔγωγε· εἴ γ' ὁ πατὴρ ὁ σὸς ᾤχετο αὐτόθεν αὐταῖς πέδαις ἐξορχησάμενος*, on which Weil says '*εἴ γε, si quidem*, ne diffère guère de *εἴπερ* ou *ἐπειδή, puisque*.' But there are plenty of instances where it means *si modo*: as *Euthyd.* 282 B *εἰ ἔστι γε ἡ σοφία διδακτόν*: *Phaedr.* 242 D *εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις*: †*Alc.* I 106 D *ἀλλ' εἴ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπόν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρέτημα, ἐθέλω*: Xen. *Mem.* IV VI 7 *τίνι γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ τις εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ*;

It may be worth while to put together some instances of *εἴπερ* and *εἴ γε* with *fut. indic.* The instances given are modal futures, not real future conditions; but in the view of the condition I can trace no difference between *εἴπερ* and *εἴ γε*. (See on **86 A** 8 and Exc. IV.)

Thuc. I 77. 6 *εἴπερ, οἷα καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ὑπεδείξατε, ὁμοῖα καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε* 'since you mean to resolve': VI 38. 4 *τὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῆς διανοίας προαμύνεσθαι χρή, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προφυλαξάμενός τις προπείσεται*: *Rep.* 375 A *(δεῖ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι) εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται*: *Phil.* 37 E *ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε ἡδονή* (a possibility *which Protarchus does not accept*), 62 C *εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος.*

Hdt. VII 46 *ὡς βραχὺς εἴη ὁ πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος βίος*, *εἰ* (since) *τούτων γε ἐόντων τοσούτων οὐδεὶς ἐς ἑκατοστὸν ἔτος περιέσται*: Xen. *Mem.* II I 17 *ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν*

τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων εἴ γε πεινήσουσι κτέ. ; ib. III iv 2 (is not Antisthenes' appointment a good thing) *εἴ γε τοῖς στρατιώταις ἱκανὸς ἔσται τἀπιτήδεια πορίζειν* : Plat. *Prot.* 330 E *εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται* : *Phaedo* 106 D *σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται* : Dem. *Aristocr.* (23) 61 (*δεινὸν μὴ ἐξεῖναι*) *εἴ γε μὴ ἐξέσται κτέ.*

With regard to *εἴ γε*, we must distinguish cases where *γε* emphasises *εἰ*, or the whole conditional clause, from cases where some word intervenes between *εἰ* and *γε* on which the *γε* throws its emphasis (Krüger 69. 15. 3). Cp. *Laches* 192 C *εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.* ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, *εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινούμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς* : Hdt. I 60 *εἰ καὶ τότε γε κτέ.*, where *εἰ* is *sī quidem* and *γε* points *καὶ τότε*.

One point that alone should make us doubt any broad contrast between *εἴπερ* and *εἴ γε* is that *εἴπερ* often occurs followed by *γε*. Many instances of this have already been given. Kühner § 511. 9 C quotes Xen. *Anab.* I vii 9 : (the king will fight) *εἴπερ γε Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδός ἐστι παῖς*. Here again we must distinguish cases where *γε* immediately follows *εἴπερ*, and helps *περ* to emphasise *εἰ*, from cases where some word intervenes to which the emphasis of *γε* belongs : *εἴπερ γε* simply *Symp.* 205 B, *Lysis* 216 B, *Theaet.* 182 C ; on the other hand *Hipp. maj.* 290 B *εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε*, *Laches* 193 C *εἴπερ οἷοιτό γε*, etc.

There are two uses of *εἴπερ* which are not shared by *εἴ γε*. One is the *elliptic* use (noticed by Zeune above). This use occurs in Plato, and is common in Aristotle. Riddell § 252. *Euthyd.* 296 B *οὔκουν ἡμᾶς γε* [*σφαλεῖ*], *ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σέ* : *Rep.* 497 E *οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι, διακωλύσει* (here we might give the force of *εἴπερ* by italics 'but, if any one *is* deceived,' 'but, if anything *does* interfere') : *Prot.* 352 C, *Parm.* 150 B, *Laws* 667 A, 900 E. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* ii 6 *ὡς, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν*. Even such milder ellipses as *Apol.* 21 C *ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλέγξων* and *Phaedo* 63 C, would not be found with *εἴ γε* (Kühner § 599. 2, Jelf § 895. 2). See also for the elliptical use of *εἴπερ CR.* XII 271 b, where are quoted from the tragedians Aesch. *Agam.* 934 *εἴπερ τις εἰδώς γ' εὖ τόδ' ἐξεῖπον τέλος* : Soph. *Aj.* 488 *ἐξέφυν πατρὸς εἴπερ τινὸς σθένοντος ἐν πλούτῳ Φρυγῶν*.

The other is the *concessive* force, also noted by Zeune. Kühner § 578 Anm. 2 (cp. § 533. 1) only illustrates this from Homer, but see *Theaet.* 196 B *ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης* 'as if we had a right to use these terms when (i.e. *though*) we have no part in knowledge.' Here *εἴ γε* would give a quite different sense, 'as if, *since* we have

no part in knowledge, we have a right to use them.' Classen, I believe rightly, regards *εἴπερ* in Thuc. 1 69. 1, quoted above in Whiston's note, as *concessive*.

In this dialogue *εἴπερ* occurs thirteen times, seven times with principal tenses of the indic. (**73 B D**, **78 A B**, **89 C D**, **96 D**), four times with impf. indic. (**93 C** twice, **E**, **94 D**), twice with optative (**98 B C**). With this we may reckon *ἐάν περ*, which occurs four times (**72 D E**, **73 B**, **79 B**). *εἴ γε* occurs six times, namely, thrice with impf. indic. (**73 C**, **74 C** twice), thrice with optative (**75 C**, **98 D E**).

73 B 42 *εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι* = si modo.
73 D 5 *εἴπερ ἔν γέ τι ζητεῖς* = si quidem (?): *ἔν* is pointed by *γε*.
78 A 63 *εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι* = si quidem.
78 B 8 *εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων* = si modo.
89 C 4 *εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή* = si quidem.
89 D 17 *εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν* (*ἀρετή*) = si quidem.
93 C 5 *εἴπερ τις ἄλλος διδάσκαλος ἦν κἀκεῖνον εἶναι* = si quidem (*Viger's α*).
93 C 8 *εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε* = si modo ('he was, *or at least would have been*, if he wished': past or unreal supposition).
93 E 33 *εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή* = si modo: unreal supposition.
94 D 10 *εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν*: unreal supposition.
96 D 17 *εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα* = si quidem.
98 B 4 *εἴπερ φαίην ἂν . . θείην ἄν* = si modo: an example of this form where the meaning is *not* si quidem.
98 C 21 *ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν ὠφέλιμοι εἴπερ εἶεν* = si modo.
73 C 55 *εἴ γε μὴ ἦν*: unreal condition.
74 C 16 *εἴ γε προσανηρώτα*: unreal condition.
74 D 25 *εἴ γε ἐκέλευε*: unreal condition.
75 C 1 *εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη* future supposition. (*γε* points *τῶν σοφῶν*, being misplaced.)
98 D 35 *κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη*.
98 E 38 *καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι*. In these last two sentences there is little, if any, difference, from *εἴπερ*.

To conclude: it is impossible to convey in English any uniform difference in meaning between *εἴπερ* and *εἴ γε*. For near juxtapositions of the two see *Theaet.* 203 D *ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται κτέ.*: *Parm.* 162 A *ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γε ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταιτο ποθέν ποι* (here *εἴπερ* is less truly conditional than *εἴ γε*): *Soph.* 255 D *οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλ' εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι*

καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον. The difference must be felt by realising the force of περ and γε in general: περ is emphatic, γε is emphatic but restrictive; εἴπερ lays stress on the fact that the statement is conditional, εἴ γε says that at any rate under that condition it is true. We should often give the force of εἴπερ by italicising *if*; the force of εἴ γε by putting a dash before 'if.'

EXCURSUS III

On ἀλλὰ γάρ (92 C 23, 94 D 6, E 14)

On this idiom Riddell § 147 says 'Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that whereas the γάρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the ἀλλά belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition; for the ἀλλά sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the γάρ does. ἀλλὰ γάρ has two meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of "but be that as it may," or "but the truth is."'

It is one question whether the Greeks in Plato's time were still *conscious* of an ellipse in ἀλλὰ γάρ (see J. Adam on *Apol.* 19 D, *Euthyphr.* 11 C); another whether this construction *grew out of* an ellipse. Riddell would apparently answer both questions in the negative. And it must be allowed that it is quite possible to frame a theory of the origin of ἀλλὰ γάρ in which no ellipse is implied. For γάρ (γε + ἄρα), like ἄρα, is originally emphatic or 'confirmative' (Kühner § 509. 8 a), as are also the inferential particles *igitur*, *enim*, *nam*, *namque* in Latin (Conington on Verg. *Aen.* x 614). How the causal use was developed from the confirmative Kühner explains § 544 a. It might therefore be held that the combination ἀλλὰ γάρ was formed while γάρ was still merely emphatic; and so it would not be necessary to suppose any ellipse.

The evidence however is very strong, I might say overwhelming, that γάρ was felt as causal at an early stage of the combination, that it was used to introduce a clause which gave

the reason of what *followed*, much as 'for' in Shakespeare's time was used for 'because' in such a sentence as :—

> 'it is as lawful,
> *For* we would give much, to use violent means
> And rob in the behalf of charity.

If ἀλλὰ γάρ developed while γάρ was still merely emphatic, we should expect to find the words in close juxtaposition from the first. As a matter of fact, however, ἀλλὰ γάρ never occurs in juxtaposition in Homer. Ebeling in his Homeric lexicon says 'ἀλλὰ . . γάρ, ita ut verbum aliquod semper interponatur ; de re certissima quae opponitur superioribus : *sed enim*.' The word interposed between ἀλλά and γάρ may be regarded as introducing the subordinate or parenthetic clause to which γάρ belongs, γάρ itself not being capable of beginning a clause. We have the full structure shown in such passages as—

Il. xv 739 ἀλλ'—ἐν γὰρ Τρώων πεδίῳ πύκα θωρηκτάων
πόντῳ κεκλιμένοι, ἐκὰς ἤμεθα πατρίδος αἴης—
τῷ ἐν χερσὶ φόως.

Il. xxiii 607 ἀλλὰ—σὺ γὰρ δὴ πόλλ' ἔπαθες εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο—
τῷ τοι λισσομένῳ ἐπιπείσομαι.

Od. xi 393 ἀλλ'—οὐ γάρ οἱ ἔτ' ἦν ἴς ἔμπεδος οὐδέ τι κῖκυς—
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδών.

Od. xiv 355 ἀλλ'—οὐ γάρ σφιν ἐφαίνετο κέρδιον εἶναι
μαίεσθαι προτέρω—τοὶ μὲν πάλιν αὖτις ἔβαινον.

In each of these cases we have an apodosis going with ἀλλά : in the following instances we have ἀλλά put after the γάρ-clause with the clause to which it properly belongs—

Od. x 174 ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ πω καταδυσόμεθ', ἀχνύμενοί περ
εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους, πρὶν μόρσιμον ἦμαρ ἐπέλθῃ,
ἀλλ' ἄγετ' κτέ.

ibid. 226 ὦ φίλοι, ἔνδον γάρ τις ἐποιχομένη μέγαν ἱστὸν
καλὸν ἀοιδάει, δάπεδον δ' ἅπαν ἀμφιμέμυκεν,
ἢ θεὸς ἠὲ γυνή· ἀλλὰ φθεγγώμεθα θᾶσσον.

But there are even in Homer many instances in which there is no separate clause to go with ἀλλά ; from which may be inferred that the separate force of ἀλλά and γάρ was already indistinctly felt ; examples are *Il.* vii 242—

ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ σ' ἐθέλω βαλέειν τοιοῦτον ἐόντα
λάθρῃ ὀπιπεύσας, ἀλλ' ἀμφαδόν, αἴ κε τύχωμι.

Cp. *Od.* x 202, 568, xix 591, and, for γάρ in protasis without ἀλλά, *Il.* vii 328 foll.

ἀλλὰ γάρ seems not to occur in Hesiod. But there are

instances in the elegiac poets like those in Homer, as Tyrt. 1 1 (Bergk[4])—

ἀλλ' Ἡρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικήτου γένος ἔστε,
θαρσεῖτ'.

A very important step was taken when γάρ was allowed to follow ἀλλά immediately. As γάρ cannot begin a clause it was now felt to lean upon ἀλλά, and its significance as introducing a separate clause was disguised. The following epitaph of Simonides (Bergk[4] 124 A = *Anth. Pal.* VII 607) is amongst the earliest recorded instances:

ἄνθρωπ' οὐ Κροίσου λεύσσεις τάφον, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς
χερνητέω μικρὸς τύμβος, ἐμοὶ δ' ἱκανός.

It must be confessed that it is difficult to discover any trace of ellipse in this.

In Pindar there are the following instances of ἀλλὰ γάρ in juxtaposition:—

Ol. 1 55=87 ἀλλὰ γὰρ καταπέψαι
μέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρῳ δ' ἔλεν
ἄταν ὑπέροπλον.

Pyth. IV 32=56
ἀλλὰ γὰρ νόστου πρόφασις γλυκεροῦ
κώλυεν μεῖναι.
Fennell 'But (we declined to stay) for.'

Nem. VII 52=77
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάπαυσις ἐν παντὶ γλυκεῖα ἔργῳ· κόρον δ' ἔχει
καὶ μέλι κτέ.

In the following places we have ἀλλὰ . . γάρ separated:

Ol. VI 54=90
ἀλλ' ἐν κέκρυπτο γὰρ σχοίνῳ βατίᾳ τ' ἐν ἀπειράτῳ
ἴων ξανθαῖσι καὶ παμπορφύροις ἀκτῖσι βεβρεγμένος ἁβρὸν
σῶμα· τὸ καὶ κατεφάμιξεν καλεῖσθαί μιν κτέ.

Here ἀλλά really goes with the clause beginning τὸ καί 'so too'; γάρ introduces the clause giving the *reason* of Iamus' name, from ἴον. At *Nem.* VII 30=44, *Isth.* III 34=IV 25, *Isth.* VI 16 there is no subsequent clause with which ἀλλά may be taken.

In Herodotus we have many examples of γάρ used with a protasis in the sense 'since.' See especially I 8 ἦν γάρ οἱ τῶν αἰχμοφόρων Γύγης . . τούτῳ καὶ τὰ σπουδαιέστερα τῶν πρηγμάτων ὑπερετίθετο. χρόνου δὲ οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος—χρῆν γὰρ Κανδαύλῃ· γενέσθαι κακῶς—ἔλεγε· Γύγη οὐ γάρ σε δοκέω πείθεσθαι (ὥτα γὰρ ἀπιστότερα . .) . . ποίεε ὅκως κτέ. Here the fourth γάρ *succeeds* the clause of which it gives the reason. Compare I 14 ἀλλ', οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα ἔργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐγένετο,

τοῦτον μὲν παρήσομεν : IV 83 ἀλλ', οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε συμβουλεύων οἱ χρηστά, ὁ μὲν ἐπέπαυτο : VIII 8, IX 27 end, IX 109 τῇ δὲ κακῶς γὰρ ἔδεε γενέσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε, and in the same chapter ἀλλ', οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε, διδοῖ τὸ φᾶρος.

Thus it still remained possible for ἀλλὰ γάρ, even when in immediate juxtaposition, to be succeeded by two clauses, the former of which might be taken with γάρ, the latter with ἀλλά. Jebb in his valuable note on Soph. *O.C.* 988 says that we must 'distinguish two cases of the formula ἀλλὰ γάρ : (1) with an ellipse as here : "but (your charges are untrue) for" ; in which cases γάρ may be represented by *in fact, indeed* : (2) where there is no ellipse.'

I give instances of both classes from the dramatists, calling 'elliptical' those instances where no separate clause that might go with ἀλλά is expressed ; though to what extent the Greeks were then *conscious* of an ellipse I do not undertake to say. It will be noted that in the majority of cases ἀλλά and γάρ are not in juxtaposition.

A *a*. Full construction (ἀλλὰ . . γάρ separate).

Aesch. *Prom.* 941 ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γὰρ τόνδε τὸν Διὸς τρόχιν,
τὸν τοῦ τυράννου τοῦ νέου διάκονον,
πάντως τι καινὸν ἀγγελῶν ἐλήλυθεν.

(The asyndeton in the last line makes it probable that it is to be connected with ἀλλά.)

Choëph. 375 ἀλλὰ διπλῆς γὰρ τῆσδε μαράγνης
δοῦπος ἱκνεῖται, τῶν μὲν ἀρωγοὶ
κατὰ γῆς ἤδη (scil. εἰσίν).

Soph. *Ant.* 392 ἀλλ' ἡ γὰρ ἐκτὸς καὶ παρ' ἐλπίδας χαρὰ
ἔοικεν ἄλλῃ μῆκος οὐδὲν ἡδονῇ,
ἥκω.

El. 256 ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν,
ξύγγνωτε.

Phil. 81 ἀλλ' ἡδὺ γάρ τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν,
τόλμα.

O.C. 755 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τἀμφανῆ κρύπτειν, σύ νιν
κρύψον.

ibid. 797 ἀλλ' οἶδα γάρ σε ταῦτα μὴ πείθων, ἴθι.

O.T. 1409 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ αὐδᾶν ἔσθ' ἃ μηδὲ δρᾶν καλόν,
ὅπως τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν ἔξω μέ που
καλύψατ'.

Eur. *Alc.* 422 ἀλλ' ἐκφορὰν γὰρ τοῦδε θήσομαι νεκροῦ,
πάρεστε.

Med. 1067 ἀλλ' εἶμι γὰρ δὴ τλημονεστάτην ὁδόν,
παῖδας προσειπεῖν βούλομαι.

Bacch. 1166 ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γὰρ ἐς δόμους ὁρμωμένην
Πενθέως Ἀγαύην μητέρ' . .,
δέχεσθε κῶμον εὐίου θεοῦ.

Ar. *Wasps* 320 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οἷός τ' ἔτ' εἶμ' ᾄδειν, τί ποιήσω;

A *b*. Full construction (ἀλλὰ γάρ juxtaposed).

Aesch. *Sept.* 861 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἥκουσ' αἵδ' ἐπὶ πρᾶγος
πικρὸν Ἀντιγόνη τ' ἠδ' Ἰσμήνη,
θρῆνον ἀδελφοῖν· οὐκ ἀμφιβόλως
οἶμαί σφ' ἐρατῶν ἐκ βαθυκόλπων
στηθέων ἧσειν ἄλγος ἐπάξιον.

Soph. *Ant.* 148 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀ μεγαλώνυμος ἦλθε Νίκα
ἐκ μὲν δὴ πολέμων
τῶν νῦν θέσθε λησμοσύναν.

Eur. *Phoen.* 1307
ἀλλὰ γὰρ Κρέοντα λεύσσω τόνδε δεῦρο συννεφῆ
πρὸς δόμους στείχοντα, παύσω τοὺς παρεστῶτας γόους.

B *α*. Elliptical construction (ἀλλὰ . . γάρ separate).

Aesch. *Eum.* 797
ἀλλ' ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτυρία παρῆν κτέ.

(On this place Whitelaw remarks in a review of Sidgwick's edition, *CR.* II 110 b, 'Why must ἀλλὰ γάρ with a single verb be regarded as elliptical? γάρ in the combination εἰ γάρ is not a conjunction, and the possibility of putting the γάρ next the ἀλλά seems to show that it was not so regarded. This combination is found, however, sometimes when ἀλλὰ γάρ= *sed quia*.' I am endeavouring to answer the points here raised.)

Soph. *Ajax* 167
ἀλλ' ὅτε γὰρ δὴ τὸ σὸν ὅμμ' ἀπέδραν
παταγοῦσιν κτέ.
Jebb 'No (we can do nothing) for.'

Antig. 155 ἀλλ' ὅδε γὰρ δὴ βασιλεὺς χώρας
χωρεῖ κτέ.
Jebb 'But (let us cease) for.'

El. 223 ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ δεινοῖς οὐ σχήσω
ταύτας ἄτας ὄφρα με βίος ἔχῃ.
Jebb 'But (ye speak in vain) for.'

ibid. 595 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ νουθετεῖν ἔξεστί σε.

O.C. 988 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖσδ' ἀκούσομαι κακός.

Eur. *Heracl.* 480
ἀλλ' εἰμὶ γάρ πως πρόσφορος, μέλει δέ μοι κτέ.

Ar. *Knights* 328 ἀλλ' ἐφάνη γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἕτερος πολὺ
σοῦ μιαρώτερος, ὥστε με χαίρειν
ὅς σε παύσει κτέ.

B *b*. Elliptical construction (ἀλλὰ γάρ juxtaposed).

Eur. *Phoen.* 1762
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί ταῦτα θρηνῶ καὶ μάτην ὀδύρομαι;
τὰς γὰρ ἐκ θεῶν ἀνάγκας θνητὸν ὄντα δεῖ φέρειν.

(I have left out of account Soph. *O.C.* 985 ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ οὖν ξύνοιδα, where γάρ belongs to the emphatic phrase γὰρ οὖν.)

When we pass from the dramatists to Plato we find an important further stage of development has taken place. Among the numberless instances of ἀλλὰ γάρ in Plato I can cite only two in which any word intervenes, namely *Prot.* 336 A and *Apol.* 20 C, in both which cases we have ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ. The words ἀλλὰ γάρ have almost coalesced, and we may be pretty sure that the Greeks were no longer conscious of any ellipse. The use of ἀλλὰ γάρ in Xenophon is generally similar to that in Plato: but we have γάρ with a parenthetic clause in *Anab.* III i 24 ἀλλ'—ἴσως γὰρ ἄλλοι ταῦτ' ἐνθυμοῦνται—μὴ ἀναμένωμεν ἄλλους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, and a word interposed at *Cyr.* II i 13 ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκω γάρ (Kühner § 509. 8 a).

It may perhaps be held that no discussion of ἀλλὰ γάρ is complete which does not take account of other combinations in which γάρ occurs. With regard to νῦν δὲ γάρ (which does not occur in the *Meno*), it seems parallel to ἀλλὰ γάρ, but we have little record of its earlier history, and it is possible that the analogy of ἀλλὰ γάρ has mainly operated in producing it, as also the phrase at *Parm.* 137 A ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτοί ἐσμεν. For καὶ γάρ Thuc. affords evidence of a parenthetic stage, as I 137. 2 καὶ (ἦν γὰρ ἀγνὼς τοῖς ἐν τῇ νηί) δείσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστί. Thuc. like Herodotus abounds in parenthetic clauses with γάρ. But I do not think it at all necessary to suppose that the history of all combinations of γάρ has been similar; in some it is probable that the original emphatic force of γάρ has been preserved throughout, as in γὰρ οὖν, in questions like πῶς γὰρ οὔ; and in answers like εἶπον γάρ **78 B** 3, οὐδὲν γάρ **97 B** 25, οὐ γὰρ εἰκός **73 D** 12.

EXCURSUS IV

Εἰ WITH THE FUTURE INDICATIVE (on **85 C** 15 and **86 A** 8).

For *εἰ* with the future indicative in *present* conditions, where 'it expresses merely a present intention or necessity that something shall be done hereafter,' see Goodwin *M. T.* 407. This (modal) use, as he observes (ibid. 408, 449) is equivalent to *μέλλω* with the infinitive: e.g. we might have had at **73 B** 42 (for *εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι*) *εἴπερ ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται*. *εἰ* with the future indicative in *real future* conditions is treated by Goodwin ibid. 447, 448. Much has been written as to the distinction in future conditions between *εἰ* with the fut. indic., *ἐάν* with the subj., and *εἰ* with the optative (see F. E. T. §§ 194, 206; Hadley § 899). It is clear that different writers have their idiosyncrasies as to the form they prefer for expressing future conditions; and that Plato *rarely* expresses a real future condition by *εἰ* with the future indicative (see Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 106 D).

The following list of places in Plato, where *εἰ* is followed by the future indicative, is by no means exhaustive, but may serve to illustrate the two classes, and to show the much greater frequency of the 'modal' class. (Instances where *εἰ* introduces an indirect question, as *Rep.* 387 D, *Phaedo* 77 B, are of course left out of account.) As real future conditions may be cited, besides **85 C** 15, *Apol.* 28 C *εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ*: probably also *Euthyph.* 3 E *εἰ μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδές, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτο ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον*: *Prot.* 338 B C *εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν . . εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται*: *Rep.* 361 C *εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί.*

The remaining instances seem to me to be all modal, though a doubt may arise in some cases:

Hipp. min. 375 D *δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη εἰ οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.*

Lysis 213 C *τί οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους ἔτι φήσομεν εἶναι φίλους;*

Prot. 330 E *σχολῇ μέντ' ἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται.*

Ibid. 351 C *καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἆρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, εἰ μή τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο;*

Gorg. 495 A *οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.*

Ibid. 505 E *εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν* (scil. engage in continuous discourse), *οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθές.*

Ibid. 520 E *καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται.*

Phaedr. 242 E *ἔτι δὲ ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτῶν πάνυ ἀστεία εἰ ἄρα ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς.*

Rep. 375 A *καὶ μὴν ἀνδρεῖον* (δεῖ εἶναι) *εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται.*

Phaedo 73 C *ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερον ἐπίστασθαι.*

Ibid. 106 D *σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται.*

Parm. 135 A B *ἔτι ἄλλα πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὖται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος . . ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γέ τις δὴ αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, μήδε τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει κτέ.*

Theaet. 161 D *εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάσῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι . . ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει . . τί δή ποτε Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ' ἐκεῖνον;*

Soph. 248 E *τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ ξυμβαίνει πάσχειν.*

Phil. 37 E *ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε* (καλὸν ὄνομα προστιθέναι) *εἴπερ ἀμαρτήσεταί γ' ἡδονή.*

Ibid. 62 C *ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἐμοίγε, εἴπερ γ' ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος.* [Cp. ibid. B, where instead of *εἰ* with *fut. indic.* we have *εἰ μέλλει ἐξευρήσειν.*]

Tim. 31 A (*ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν*) *εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται.*

Laws 822 B *ταῦτ' οὖν εἰ πέφυκε μὲν οὕτως, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ δόξομεν . . οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἂν τὰ ἐγκώμια προσάπτειν.*

Add *Apol.* 34 C quoted on **91 E** 17.

EXCURSUS V

On Eristic (75 C, 80 E)

The art of the Eristic is Contentious Dialectic: the Eristics 'can reduce any respondent to a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their questions—whether what he says be true or false' (Grote I 528, on the *Euthydemus*).

Eristic thus presents certain points of likeness to the Socratic elenchus. Both are opposed to the rhetorical method, and imply a process of question and answer between two persons face to face. At the same time the differences between the two things are very great. Grote, comparing the pair of Eristic Sophists with Socrates, says (I 531): 'The real contrast between the competitors consists, first in the pretensions, next in the method. The two Sophists are described as persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue[1] and claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Socrates disdains the fee, doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to encourage or help forward a willing pupil.' As to the differences in *method*, the main points are that in Eristic *verbal* consistency is all that is aimed at; the questions must be answered categorically, without qualifications; whereas the Platonic Socrates regards elasticity and variety of language as an essential of profitable discussion. Eristic takes no heed whether the answer represents the *bona fide* opinion of the answerer; to the Platonic Socrates this is all important (see on **83 D** 49). Lastly, the object of Eristic is victory, and 'the presence, as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd, are essential features in the drama.' The Platonic Socrates, on the other hand, gives his attention exclusively to the respondent, and is absolutely indifferent to outside opinion (cp. e.g. *Gorg.* 472 B C; 475 E). To the differences recognized by Grote, must however be added a further difference which he refuses to recognize. He says (I 530) 'the contrast does *not* consist in this—that Socrates so contrives his string of questions as to bring out some established and positive conclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in perplexity. Such is not the fact. Socrates ends without any result and with a confession of his inability to find any.' This surely is untrue of the Platonic Socrates, in whom the Elenchus has

[1] i.e. ἀρετή: see on **71 E** 2.

developed into a maieutic art (*Theaet.* 149 foll.) by which unsuspected treasures of knowledge are brought to light. Even in the *Euthydemus*, largely satirical as it is, the amount of positive result is considerable. No dialogue can show more clearly than does the *Meno*, that the "numbing shock" was only half the work of Socrates, the indispensable preliminary to something of a constructive process. Nor with regard to the historic Socrates do we gather from Xenophon that the conversations of Socrates were barren of positive result, that they always left the hearer just where they found him, only puzzled and humiliated; though this may have been the result in the case of pupils who left him prematurely. Grote himself goes far towards admitting some positive teaching from Socrates when he allows him to profess his willingness 'to help forward a willing pupil.'[1]

Other important differences arise out of the fact that the Socratic elenchus was systematized and unified by having a definite object, the framing or testing of definitions (chiefly in the department of Ethics). It was a thing that could be aped, no doubt; Socrates in the Platonic *Apology* 23 C, declares how readily his example was followed: *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστιν . . αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν.* Pupils of Socrates are sometimes represented as playing this part by Plato. At the beginning of the *Gorgias*, Chaerephon has a skirmish with Polus before the two principals engage. See, too, the conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles in Xen. *Mem.* I ii 40–46, about Law, where Alcibiades retails the art of his master Socrates, with some success. Pericles asserts (with what truth it is hard to say) that he could do that sort of thing when he was young; to which Alcibiades, somewhat sceptical, replies that he only wishes he had known him when he was at his best in that art: *Μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ἡμεῖς τηλικοῦτοι ὄντες δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἦμεν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ ἐσοφιζόμεθα οἷάπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς μελετᾶν. τὸν δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδην φάναι, Εἴθε σοι, ὦ Περίκλεις, τότε συνεγενόμην ὅτε δεινότατος σαυτοῦ ταῦτα ἦσθα.*

Again, in the *Euthydemus*, Ctesippus is the squire of Socrates and plays Iolaus to his Heracles (298 D). He engages with the Eristics, and soon learns to match them with their own weapons (see 303 E and cp. *Lysis* 211 B). This leads to a further consideration.

[1] 'The difference between him (the Eristic) and Socrates is that his effect is purely negative; he begins and ends with captious disputation, his skill is simply to bewilder and perplex: he is not, as Socrates, a midwife of true knowledge.' Sidgwick in *J.P.* IV 296.

The Elenchus was an art not to be mastered in a day: it could only be attained by an apprehension of the object to which it was directed, and in the apprehension of this lay its chief utility. On the other hand, Eristic was bound together by no common tie. It consisted of a number of isolated 'tips,' easily learnt. 'The different artifices which they (the Eristics) employed were collected from all sides, just as they presented themselves; and the attempt was never made to combine these various tactics into a theory, and to arrange them from fixed points of view. They therefore made their disciples learn quite mechanically the questions and fallacies which most commonly came before them.' Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 462. In his note Zeller quotes Aristotle *Soph. El.* 34, 183 b 36 '*καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν ᾠήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ' ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ' αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον*, as if a shoemaker (says Aristotle) were to give his pupil a number of ready-made shoes instead of instruction in his trade.' Cp. Campbell, General Introduction to the *Sophistes and Politicus*, p. xii.

We must remember however that in speaking of 'Eristic,' we are speaking of something which we hardly know except from caricatures, especially those by Plato. Who were the persons who really practised and disseminated the art thus caricatured? On this matter I must refer to two papers in the *Journal of Philology*, vols. IV pp. 288 foll. and V pp. 66 foll., by Dr. Henry Sidgwick, especially the former of them, where, at p. 298, he says 'I am disposed to think that the Art of Disputation which is ascribed to Sophists in the *Euthydemus* and the *Sophistes* (and exhaustively analyzed by Aristotle in the *περὶ Σοφιστικῶν Ἐλέγχων*) originated entirely with Socrates, and that he is altogether responsible *for the form at least* of this second species of Sophistic' (namely eristic, as distinguished from rhetorical, sophistry). Again, p. 302, 'I conceive, then, that Socrates was seed and source of a new kind of Sophistry, the post-Socratic Sophistry, as we may call it, which it was extremely difficult for the subtlest mind to distinguish from the profession of Socratic philosophy.'

I have italicized the words 'for the form at least' in the former extract, as the point is important, and is recurred to by Dr. Sidgwick in the following page: 'I do not see from whom else' (than Socrates) 'the method could have been derived—as far as the form is concerned: for no doubt its sceptical and

destructive aim, and the logical puzzles and paradoxes which it uses, may be traced to Protagoras and Zeno.'

Eristic was thus the progeny—the 'barren hybrid' to use Prof. Campbell's phrase—sprung on the one side from Socrates, on the other from a line as whose ancestor we must recognize Zeno of Elea.

In an important passage of the *Phaedrus* (261 B foll.), Plato distinguishes between two classes of men who are skilled in the warfare of words. The first class are the Rhetoricians, of whom Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus are taken as types. The others are described as the followers of 'the Eleatic Palamedes.' Under this soubriquet ancient and modern commentators have recognized Zeno of Elea. Dr. Thompson says in his notes 'That the father of the Eristic sects is here meant, the context proves to demonstration.' 'Zeno is well represented by Palamedes, the "sophist" of the heroic times, distinguished for his inventive genius.' (Doubtless the character of the hero was a deduction from his name, which whether connected with *παλάμη* or *μῆδος* lent itself to the same interpretation.) Aristotle spoke of Zeno as the 'inventor of dialectic' (Diog. L. IX 25, 29, cp. VIII 57), and we know that many of the Eristic puzzles were derived from problems that presented themselves to Zeno. (Grote I 97 ; Zeller *pre-Socratics* I 613, 4 ; R. & P. § 107.)

An important step in the development of Eristic took place when the problems—chiefly logical and metaphysical—dealt with by Zeno (and others) were taken up and *exploité* for their own purposes by professional teachers or 'sophists.' This was done by the man who is asserted to have been the earliest of the Sophists, Protagoras. We are told by Diogenes Laertius (IX 51) that Protagoras *πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἅπαντος πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις, οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας.* Further in §§ 52, 3, *καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφείς, πρὸς τοὔνομα διελέχθη, καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιπόλαιον γένος τῶν ἐριστικῶν ἐγέννησεν. ἵνα καὶ* Τίμων *φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ,*

Πρωταγόρης τ' ἐπίμικτος ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδώς.

οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε, καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένους λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος πρῶτος διείλεκται, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ (286 C).

The connexion of Protagoras with the subtleties of Zeno is sufficiently attested. As to the evidence of Plato, besides the place in the *Euthydemus*, there is the *Theaetetus*, where Protagoras is spoken of as a man of much dialectic subtlety. He has adopted the Heraclitean philosophy that there is naught but change,

and on it based a system that denies objective truth, and is summed up in the aphorism *πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*. It is not mere irony when Socrates (164 E), after refuting this view, says they would not have disposed of it so easily if its father (Protagoras) had been alive. Even in the dialogue called after him, in which his dialectical failure is most conspicuous, he is represented as acquainted with the common fallacy of Conversion (350 C). Aristotle also gives evidence to the same effect (R. & P. § 180), and an anecdote related by Simplicius connects Protagoras with Zeno in regard to one of the stock puzzles (R. & P. § 104).

The list of the works of Protagoras given by Diogenes (IX § 55) begins '*τέχνη ἐριστικῶν. περὶ πάλης.*' It seems probable (though a different view is taken by Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 432), that we have here one work under two titles, *περὶ πάλης* being a metaphorical, and *τέχνη ἐριστικῶν* an explanatory, title. This may be argued from Plato *Soph.* 232 D. The only 'practical men' (*δημιουργοί*) here under discussion are those concerned with *laws and politics*. The Stranger says *τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.* To which Theaetetus replies *τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνει περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι.* Here any allusion to an art of *wrestling* seems quite out of place. Cp. D. L. VI § 4 when Antisthenes says (surely metaphorically) that he is *παλαιστικός*.

But that Diogenes attributes too much to Protagoras in making Eristic spring from him *alone*, Dr. Sidgwick is able to show (loc. cit. p. 299). Diogenes leaves out of account the method of application, the weapon, which was supplied by Socrates. In the *Protagoras* the defeat of the sophist at the hands of Socrates is represented as due to the fact that he can only make long speeches and is incapable of dialectic. 'It seems to me quite incredible that if Protagoras had really not only practised, but actually invented, Eristic, as described in the Sophistes —methodical disputation by short questions and answers — he could ever have been represented as Plato represents him in the dialogue which bears his name' . . Again (p. 300) 'Protagoras, no doubt, was in a manner Eristic, just as Zeno was, but it was in a rhetorical manner: he very likely wrote a *τέχνη ἐριστικῶν*, as D. says: but if so we must suppose it merely to have contained instructions how to make speeches on both sides of a case, no doubt with the aid of logical fallacies.'[1]

[1] Prof. Campbell is, I think, using misleading expressions when he speaks of the 'negative *dialectic*' of Zeno, and the '*ἔλεγχος* of Zeno' (notes

To this view of Protagoras' function in substance I incline to subscribe. But there are one or two considerations that seem to me to indicate that Protagoras may have made *some* advance in the *method* of disputation. Thus the mistake of Diogenes will be both smaller and more venial than it would otherwise appear. In the first place it is to be noted that Protagoras *professes* to be able to speak at any length that may be required. This, says Dr. Sidgwick, is only 'a bit of his brag.' It may be noted however that the statement is put forward by Socrates as a matter of *common rumour* about Protagoras, though it is a reputation which Protagoras by no means disclaims: 329 B Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. In the latter portion of this passage a distinct claim is made to the art of Dialectic; it goes a good deal further than 334 E, where Socrates, again on common rumour, asserts that Protagoras can put a particular answer either in short or at length (cp. 335 B). This is merely a part of the art of Expression, and is a claim also made by Gorgias (*Gory.* 449 C). It seems to me a question whether Plato would have made Protagoras claim, or popular rumour ascribe to him, proficiency in this art, if it had been wholly alien from his practice. It is just because Protagoras does make the claim that he is so mortified at his failure. Gorgias—though he too was influenced by Zeno—makes no claim to any cross-questioning power, and he is little affected by Socrates' success against him. Theodorus expressly repudiates the art; he has never learnt it, and he is not going to begin at his time of life (*Theaet.* 146 B). Hippias pours scorn upon it (*Hipp. maj.* 301 B, cp. *Hipp. min.* 373 A).

It is true that Protagoras is hopelessly defeated by Socrates, and this is taken as showing that the method of question and answer, *in all its forms*, was unfamiliar to him. I will not insist on the point that Plato is playing both sides of the game; it may of course be answered that 'the coarsest satirist would not describe a man as quite unskilled in an art which he himself invented.' But the difference between the two things must be remembered. Not only were the topics of the Socratic elenchus generally different from those of Eristic, but the Elenchus was a Method: Eristic was not. The Eristic in the hands of Socrates was liable to find himself in the same pre-

on the *Sophistes*, p. 3). Not much stress can be laid on *Soph.* 217 C, attributing the method of questions to 'Parmenides,' as the reference is probably merely to Plato's dialogue of that name. See Art. 'Sophist' in *Encyc. Brit.* IX 270 a.

dicament as a man in a foreign land who has tried to get up the language from a conversation-book.

In the article 'Sophist' in the *Encyc. Brit.* the view is taken that there was a large element of Eristic, contemporary with, and independent of, Socrates. See p. 267 b 'Incidentally we gather two important facts, (1) that contemporary with the dialectic of Socrates there was an eristic, (2) that this eristic was mainly applied to ethical questions'; also the arguments adduced ibid. p. 270 a, and Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 90 c.

The difficulty, however, of identifying these Eristic Sophists is great, and on the whole I believe that wherever we find in Plato the word *ἐριστικός* (or its synonym *ἀντιλογικός*) certain persons are held in view who were in fact, either directly or indirectly, pupils of Socrates. These are first and foremost Euclides of Megara and his school, of whom Diogenes Laertius says (II 106) *οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, εἶτ' ἐριστικοί, ὕστερον δὲ διαλεκτικοί, οὓς οὕτως ὠνόμασε πρῶτος Διονύσιος ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν τοὺς λόγους διατίθεσθαι.* In the same author (II 30) we doubtless have a tradition of some rival Socratic school: (Socrates) *ὁρῶν Εὐκλείδην ἐσπουδακότα περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους, ὦ Εὐκλείδη, ἔφη, σοφίσταις μὲν δυνήσει χρῆσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ οὐδαμῶς.*

The other school glanced at by Plato, under this name, is that of Antisthenes. In *Soph.* 251 B the Eleatic stranger says that by attempting *predication* (by saying that *ἕν* is *πολλά*, or *πολλά, ἕν*) *τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν*: these *ὀψιμαθεῖς*, we read, *χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀνευρηκέναι.* It was this very quibble about predication, arising out of a misunderstanding of the nature of the copula, that was characteristic of Antisthenes. (Grote II 434, III 521; Zeller *Socrates* p. 297, *pre-Socr.* II 456 note.)

The word *ὀψιμαθής* seems to show that the actual persons indicated were rather pupils of Antisthenes, than A. himself, who was only some five years older than Plato (Dr. Thompson *Phaedrus* p. 175 note).[1] It was one point about Eristic that it took so short a time to learn that it was never too late to begin. The word *νέοις* also has its point: mere schoolboys were able to learn Eristic: see *Rep.* 498 A, 539 B. The last

[1] The date of his birth is uncertain (R. & P. 214; Zeller *Socr.* 285, 6). I do not know on what grounds Ueb.-Heinze (p. 129) place it at 'about 444 B.C.' Even so he would not be more than 45 at Socrates' death.

words of the extract contain a personal hit. Antisthenes was poor in worldly goods, and yet when asked (Xen. *Symp.* iii 8) on what he prides himself, he says *ἐπὶ πλούτῳ*. Subsequently (iv 31) he explains that the wealth of which he was speaking was wealth of *mind*. The anecdote may well have a historical basis, and thus give point to Plato's gibe in the *Theaetetus*, that Antisthenes was as poor in *φρόνησις* as in gold or lands.

The attack on Eristic in the *Euthydemus* is levelled mainly at him (Grote I 537 note; Zeller p. 119). The chief evidence for this is the mock eulogy on the Eristics pronounced by Socrates near the end of the dialogue (303 c foll.). Socrates praises them on three grounds. The first is that they only care for the approbation of people like themselves. The second is a 'really popular and kindly feature'; by forbidding us to speak of anything as 'fair,' or 'good,' or 'white,' and indeed *disallowing predication altogether*, they not only stop the mouths of others, but, what is more, their own; so no one can be offended: *τοῦτο πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρεῖται*. The reference to Antisthenes is here unmistakable. The third point is that any one can learn the art in a short time; he has noticed how soon Ctesippus was able to pick it up.

Antisthenes, the sincerity of whose purpose cannot be doubted, and whose whole interest lay with questions of Conduct, was glad of a short cut that abridged the field of philosophy which he regarded as superfluous and which he was indeed unable to appreciate (Zeller *Socrates* pp. 292 foll.). And though sincere himself he was the father of a sect who brought philosophy into contempt, much as the mendicant friars did religion at a later day.

Plato and Antisthenes were thoroughly antipathetic. Plato loved the pleasures of Reason, and probably was not indifferent to the pleasures of Sense; Antisthenes would rather be visited by Madness than Pleasure (Diog. L. VI 3). Indeed Plato's feud with him may well have been fiercer than against Euclides, if only because Antisthenes lived in Athens, while Euclides was at Megara.

It is important to remember that at the time when the *Meno* was written, the three men whom Plato had chiefly to regard as heads of rival schools were Isocrates the rhetor, Euclides, and Antisthenes. Each of these four men, as *κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ*, was engaged in continual wrangle with each of the others. The works of two of them are before us to speak for themselves; the titles of the works of the two others, preserved by Diogenes Laertius, are sufficient to show the part they played. But even in reading the works of the two surviving authors we

have to work to a great extent blindfold in making out the history of this 'literary feud'; as the etiquette of the time, borrowed perhaps from Comedy, which no longer lampooned individuals by name, discouraged the introduction of the names of living persons. The terms 'Sophist,' 'Rhetor,' 'Eristic' have all become mere polemic missiles; Isocrates includes Plato with Euclides and Antisthenes as Eristics; Plato calls Euclides and Antisthenes Eristics, and Isocrates a Rhetor or *δημήγορος*; while each of the four was to himself a 'philosopher,' and to his brother teacher a 'sophist' (see Dr. Thompson's *Gorgias*, App. II pp. 177 foll.; Zeller *pre-Socratics* II 432). There was perhaps no form of attack to which Plato was more sensitive than that which identified him with a class of teachers whom he hated as cheapening Philosophy and bringing it into contempt. Hence his continual endeavour to draw a broad line between Eristic and the Elenchus, of which latter he felt himself the lawful proprietor as the heir of Socrates.

For a list of passages in Plato bearing on *ἐριστική* or *ἀντιλογική* see Campbell, Introduction to the *Sophist* p. liv, note, and Sidgwick in *J.P.* IV 304 foll.

The earliest reference to Eristic in Plato appears to be in the *Lysis* 211 B (Socrates, about to converse with Menexenus, is addressing Lysis): *ἀλλὰ ὅρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, ἐάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρῇ ὁ Μενέξενος· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστιν;* *Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε· διὰ ταῦτά τοι καὶ βούλομαί σε αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι.* *Ἵνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταγέλαστος γένωμαι;* *Οὐ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἵνα αὐτὸν κολάσῃς.* *Πόθεν;* *ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ ῥᾴδιον· δεινὸς γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Κτησίππου μαθητής.* Later in the dialogue, after the paradox has been broached that everything loves its opposite (216 A), *εἶεν· ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον, ὦ Μενέξενε;* *καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἅσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί,* and will ask us if Love is not opposite to Hate, and whether Hate loves Love, and so forth.

Here it is extremely difficult to identify the *ἐριστικοί* or *ἀντιλογικοί*, though I think that a definite recognizable class is indicated.[1] We naturally look to find in them some contemporaries of Socrates, and indeed it must be allowed that if the Eristics of Plato are always post-Socratic, an anachronism is involved in making Socrates speak of them as he does. Further, if the Eristics of the *Euthydemus* really derived their art from Socrates, how extraordinary is the position that Socrates is there made to take up in regard to them! And yet such were the dramatic exigencies when Plato had once determined to make Socrates the mouthpiece of his own views. (See

[1] Sidgwick however (*J.P.* IV 305) thinks that the use of *ἐριστικός* in the *Lysis* is 'untechnical.'

Zeller p. 95.) And the anachronism is not greater than many others that we find in utterances put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato. The traditions of the drama demanded little of consistency or realism, nor was the philosophic dialogue much more rigorous. So I think it not impossible that in Menexenus, of whom Socrates is so afraid, we must find a pupil who has borrowed his arms (indirectly) from Socrates himself. But the complications extend farther. Ctesippus in the *Euthydemus*, and Menexenus in the dialogue named after him, appear as pupils of Socrates. Ctesippus, as genuine disciple of Socrates, at first vigorously takes up arms against the two Eristics, who are themselves (though Plato gives no hint of this) indirect and unrecognized disciples. Towards the end of the dialogue Ctesippus has mastered their art. The *Lysis*, though almost certainly earlier than the *Euthydemus*, may have a later dramatic date, and so regard Ctesippus as having already got up Eristic, and passed on his lightly-won acquisition to Menexenus. Thus it would seem that Ctesippus besides being son of Socrates is also his—shall we say?—great-grandson; while Menexenus, also his son, is, through Antisthenes, Euthydemus and Ctesippus, one generation yet farther removed.

A late date for the dialogue *Euthydemus* is claimed by Sidgwick (ut sup. p. 306), who would assign it to the same period as the *Sophist*. This is on the ground that it expressly identifies Eristic with Sophistic, speaking of Euthydemus and his mate as 'Sophists.' But were the successive uses of the word 'Sophist' so well defined that we can infer a late date for this dialogue from the fact that Plato therein applies the title to a class of teachers who were certainly in existence soon after the death of Socrates, and of whom Plato must always have disapproved, whether he happened to call them 'Sophists' or not? I cannot then see any necessity for placing the *Euthydemus* any later than the *Republic*, or for not placing it, as H. Jackson does, among the Educational dialogues leading up to that work.

But who were Euthydemus and Dionysodorus? Unless they, directly or indirectly, derived their art from Socrates, the whole theory of the Socratic origin of Eristic breaks down. That they were ever direct pupils of Socrates his attitude to them makes dramatically impossible. But that they may have been pupils of Euclides or Antisthenes is not at all impossible. Socrates could hardly be made to face his own spiritual children without recognizing them; the same obligation does not hold of spiritual grandchildren.

That Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real persons may, I think, be assumed. Grote indeed (I 536) says 'That they

correspond to any actual persons at Athens is neither proved nor provable.' Schleiermacher, on the other hand, 'cannot make out who the two Sophists were personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no notice' (ibid. p. 537 note). There is no other instance, apparently, in Plato, of imaginary persons introduced with names (Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 425 note 4). Euthydemus is mentioned in the *Cratylus* 386 D, where the phrase *οὐδὲ κατ' Εὐθύδημόν γε* is proverbial for *οὐδὲ κατ' ἐριστικήν*. Here it is of course not *impossible* that the proverb should have been drawn from a fictitious character, but surely unlikely (Zeller *pre-Socr.* II 457 note). Euthydemus is also mentioned as the author of sophisms by Aristotle *Soph. El.* ch. 20=177 b 12, and *Rhet.* II ch. 24=1401 a 26, and it happens that the particular sophisms that Aristotle quotes are not found in Plato's *Euthydemus*. Dionysodorus is probably the same person who is mentioned by Xen. (*Mem.* III i 1) as professing the art of strategy (cp. *Euthyd.* 271 D).

There is no explicit allusion to Eristic in the *Gorgias*. 'In the Meno, which I should place between the Gorgias and the Republic, we have Sophistic and Eristic side by side and unconnected. The Sophists are still our old friends: they are not exactly attacked: they are even half-defended against Anytus. But Eristic is noticed quite independently: it is contrasted with the method of Socrates as a perverse kind of Dialectic' (Sidgwick ut supra p. 305). At a later time not only is the Eristic included by Plato in the class 'Sophist,' but it is the type which the term Sophist pre-eminently suggests.

In the *Phaedrus* 261 B foll. we have the distinction, already mentioned, between the two kinds of 'adverse speakers' (*ἀντιλογικοί*), first the Rhetoricians, Gorgias, etc.; then the 'descendants of the Eleatic Palamedes.'

In the *Rep.* 453 E Socr. and Glaucon have acknowledged *ἄλλην φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύειν, γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄλλην εἶναι*. Yet they are proposing to give the same employment to men and women. How can they reconcile this? Socrates proceeds: *Ἡ γενναία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τί δή; Ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι*. Socrates in what follows applies this to their own case. They have accepted *πάνυ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς* the word *ἄλλην* as a verbal counter, without considering whether the Otherness of sex is relevant to the Otherness of employment. Here *ἀντιλογική* is represented as differing from Dialectic, not by any perverse intent, but by

imperfect training and limitation of view. Somewhat later in the dialogue (498 foll.) we find it strongly insisted upon that education in philosophy shall be thorough and shall not begin too early. Those short, cheap courses taken before the mind is mature for the subject, and in the intervals of practical business (cp. *Euthyd.* 304 C), are worse than useless. They leave no abiding impression, and stand in the way of anything better. In fact men have never had a chance of getting acquainted with real Philosophy, which aims at Truth and keeps at a distance *τὰ κομψά τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις* (499 A). Similar is the tendency of a later passage 539 B: philosophy must not be begun too young: *οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἕλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον ἀεί.* An older man approaches the thing in a more earnest spirit and is *μετριώτερος* (cp. the word at *Soph.* 216 B quoted below).

In *Phaedo* 89 D foll., on the *ἀντιλογικοί* is thrown the blame for the existence of certain *μισόλογοι*—haters of philosophy. (See Archer-Hind's note on *ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται* 90 C.) Cp. 101 E, where their defective dialectic is pointed out. In the *Theaetetus* at 154 D Socrates tells Theaetetus that if he answers contrary to his opinion *Εὐριπιδεῖόν τι ξυμβήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.* ΘΕΑΙ. *Ἀληθῆ.* ΣΩ. *Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν*—but as we are poor ordinary creatures in pursuit of Truth, we have no time for such frivolities (Sidgwick ut supra p. 306 notes that here Eristic is definitely identified with Sophistic). Then at 165 D E we have the picture of the Eristic free-lance, the *πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθόφορος ἐν λόγοις.* Lastly, at 197 A, how will Socrates (asks Theaetetus) carry on discourse if he is debarred from such words as *ἀγνοεῖν* and *συνιέναι*? Socrates does not know; *εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός*, he says, he would not only have professed to abstain from these phrases, but have come down sharply on any one who used them.

In the *Sophistes* we are introduced to a Stranger, *τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἐλέας, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα, μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον.* Can this be some Higher Power come to convict us of ignorance, *θεὸς ὥν τις ἐλεγκτικός*? asks Socrates. Theodorus replies *Οὐχ οὕτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου,*

ἀλλὰ μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων. He is no mere Eristic.

In what follows, the fourth[1] of the 'preliminary definitions' of the Sophist clearly corresponds to the Eristic: *τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ἐριστικῆς ὄν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, κτέ.* (226 A). Following this we have a definition which unmistakeably points to Socrates himself or his true followers. It is summed up at 231 B: *τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.*[2]

The final definition makes the sophist a conscious impostor, and that of two kinds (*Soph.* 268 B foll.): *τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλῆθος εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ κτέ.*

In this dialogue the Sophist, as Sidgwick (ut supra p. 296) points out, is 'expressly contrasted with both the Statesman and the Rhetor.' That is, he has ousted from the title the persons who in the earlier dialogues are chiefly before one's mind when 'sophists' are spoken of. He resembles the true Dialectician 'as a wolf does a dog.'

The last passage in Plato demanding notice is *Phil.* 17 A. Right Classification is the special faculty of the *διαλεκτικός* (cp. *Phaedr.* 266 B): *οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοί* (i.e. the half-educated 'imperfect' Socratics), instead of making sub-classes, go straight from the One to the infinity of particulars: *τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους* (See W. H. T. in *J.P.* VIII 301).

The chief references to Eristic in Isocrates are the following: (see Sidgwick ut supra pp. 292, 293; Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus* pp. 172 foll.; also note on **100 A 6**).

In the oration *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*, an early work, the word *ἐριστικός* does not occur; but near the beginning we read *τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μισήσειεν ἅμα καὶ καταφρονήσειε πρῶτον μὲν τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατριβόντων οἳ προσποιοῦνται μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν κτέ.*; § 20 the composers of the old *τέχναι* were worse *τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας καλινδουμένων.*

At the beginning of the *Helena* (10) after the references to Antisthenes and Plato, we have the followers of *Euclides* spoken

[1] Or, in the later summary, the *fifth* (231 E) *τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος.* On this definition the *Encyc. Brit.* Art. 'Sophist,' p. 267 a notes that it makes the *matter* of anti-logic 'Justice,' 'Injustice' and other abstractions (225 C): further, that 'it represents the earlier eristics, contemporaries of Socrates, whom it was necessary to distinguish from the teachers of forensic oratory.' (See p. 278.)

[2] Or at 231 E *δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτής.*

of thus: ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβουσι τὰς οὐδὲν μὲν ὠφελούσας κτέ.

In the tract *ad Nicoclem* (2) 51 we read: περὶ μὲν τῶν γυμνασίων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες, καί φασιν οἱ μὲν διὰ τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων, οἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἄλλων τινῶν φρονιμωτέρους ἔσεσθαι τοὺς αὑτοῖς πλησιάζοντας.

In the *Antidosis* (15) 45 we are told that some work at mythology, some on the poets, some on military history: ἄλλοι δέ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις γεγόνασιν, οὓς ἀντιλογικοὺς καλοῦσιν.

In § 258 of the same work we read τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας σπουδαζόντων ἔνιοί τινες ὁμοίως βλασφημοῦσι περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὥσπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. This is aimed at Plato (Sidgwick ut supra p. 293): § 261 ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς λόγοις δυναστεύοντας (again Plato and his school) καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν μαθημάτων διατρίβοντας οὐ βλάπτειν ἀλλ' ὠφελεῖν τοὺς συνόντας, ἐλάττω μὲν ὧν ὑπισχνοῦνται, πλείω δ' ὧν τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν.

In the *Panathenaicus*, his latest work, published in 339 B.C. after Plato's death, he adopts much the same tone as in the *Antidosis*: (I have much respect for the current education) λέγω δὲ τήν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους: but these things are only for boys; and so forth (Jebb *Attic Orators* II 131).

There are many allusions to Eristic in Aristotle. It may be assumed that these are in all cases aimed at rival post-Socratic schools, that is chiefly the 'imperfect' schools of the Megarians and Cynics (Sidgwick in *J.P.* v 70, 71). The 'Sophistici Elenchi'—an appendix to the *Topica*—is a series of solutions of eristic puzzles. At ii 2=165 b 7 he defines ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι as οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δέ, συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. The following places may also be referred to: *Topica* VIII xi 1 foll., especially δυσκολαίνοντες οὖν ἀγωνιστικὰς καὶ οὐ διαλεκτικὰς ποιοῦντες τὰς διατριβάς (see Grote *Aristotle* p. 366); *Rhet.* I xi 15=1371 a 7 (see Cope's note) and II xxiv=1402 a 5 and 14.

EXCURSUS VI

The Doctrine of Transmigration in Plato (on **81 A** 21 ff.)

The belief that the soul has some persistence after death, that the ghost of a man has power at least for some time after it has quitted the body, was shared by the early Greeks with many primitive races. This stage of belief we find in Homer (*Il.* XXIII 65 foll.; *Od.* XI). Already in Homer we also note the emergence of a belief in certain future rewards and punishments. But from this primitive belief to the doctrines of Immortality and Transmigration is a considerable step. Transmigration implies not merely a dream-like echo of life reverberating after death, but a series of lives each as real and vivid as the present, or even more so. How was this step taken by the Greeks?

To this question Zeller answers that in this matter the mysteries, especially the Orphic, do seem to have acted as the teachers of a higher truth. 'The doctrine of metempsychosis seems really to have passed from the theology of the mysteries into Philosophy.' 'In the Orphic theology transmigration is clearly to be found, and the probabilities are very strongly against its having come there through the medium of the philosophers' (Zeller *pre-Socratics*, I pp. 69, 71). Plato nowhere definitely connects the notion of transmigration with the Orphics. In the *Phaedo* 70 C, he speaks of transmigration simply as a παλαιὸς λόγος. But in the *Cratylus* 400 C οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα are credited with a doctrine which is at any rate closely connected with Transmigration, namely that the body is a prison in which the soul is pent in punishment for some ancient sin. With this we may connect *Phaedo* 62 B ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι κτέ., where 'the ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant.'

Cicero indeed (*Tusc. Disp.* I § 38) speaks of Pherecydes of Scyrus as the first who taught the doctrine of transmigration. The evidence is late and poor, and is rejected by Zeller. It is possible that its foundation is the statement of Theopompus (Diog. L. I § 116) τοῦτον (Pherecydes) πρῶτον περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεῶν Ἕλλησι γράψαι. But the doctrine of transmigration may have been taught long before it was committed to writing. The

mythical element is very large in the accounts of Pherecydes. Suidas says of him that no one trained him, ἀλλ' *αὐτὸν ἠσκηκέναι κτησάμενον τὰ Φοινίκων ἀπόκρυφα βιβλία*, that he divides with Cadmus of Miletus the reputation of being the first prose-writer, *καὶ πρῶτον τὸν περὶ τῆς μετεμψυχώσεως λόγον εἰσηγήσασθαι.*

The question whence the Orphics derived their doctrine is hard to answer. Herodotus (II 123) says it was derived from Egypt: *πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος εἰς ἄλλο ζῷον αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον ἐσδύεται· ἐπεὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύνειν· τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἵ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω.* (At ch. 81 he says that the Orphic or Bacchic rites are really Egyptian.) It is clear from this passage that some of those who taught the doctrine of transmigration in Greece, acknowledged no indebtedness to Egypt. It may be that Herodotus, finding similar doctrines in Egypt, supposed that the Greeks had borrowed them, a notion which his priestly informers naturally encouraged. Grote (II 202) speaks of the belief in metempsychosis as 'having its root in the Egyptian and Oriental religions.' But Zeller shows how easily such a doctrine may have grown up independently on Greek soil. 'If the soul is conceived as a breath-like essence which dwells in the body, and leaves it after death, . . the question inevitably arises whence this essence comes, and whither it goes. For answer to this question, a child-like imagination is most easily satisfied with the simple notion that there is a place, invisible to us, in which the departed souls remain, and from which the newly-born come forth. . . From this there is but a step to the theory that the same souls which previously inhabited a body should afterwards enter another body" (*pre-Socratics* I p. 73 note). We may point to the sixth century B.C. as an epoch to which important advances in Greek religious thought may be referred (Anrich, *das antike Mysterienwesen*).

The doctrine of Transmigration played an important part in the system of the Pythagoreans. It does not appear, however, that the school claimed to have originated the doctrine; and the probable conclusion is that they received it from the Orphics, with whom they were closely connected.

Plato unmistakeably copied his mythical descriptions of the soul after death from the Pythagoreans (Zeller *pre-Socr.* I 482). At *Gorg.* 492 E foll. we have the etymology *σῶμα* from *σῆμα* suggested, the body being the *tomb* of the soul. (Cp. *Phaedr.* 250 C *καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν σῶμα*

περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.) That the passage in the *Gorgias* is drawn from the Pythagorean Philolaus is made almost certain by Dr. Thompson in his note. In the words that follow, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, the reference is still to Philolaus, not to Empedocles, as some have thought. For as the proverbial expression was Σίκελος κομψὸς ἀνήρ, why should the amendment ἢ Ἰταλικός have been added, unless because the writer referred to was really an Italian, as Philolaus, rather than a Sicilian, as Empedocles? (Zeller *Plato* 126, note 81). In the *Cratylus* 400 B C (quoted above) there appears a slight divergence between the Orphics and the Pythagoreans. We are told that some (τινες) connect σῶμα with σῆμα; these we may conclude to be the Pythagoreans, as in the passages from the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* just referred to. Socrates prefers the etymology connecting σῶμα with σῴζεσθαι, which οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα support.

But however much of mythical material Plato may have borrowed from the Pythagoreans, his debt to them as regards any *philosophic* account of the soul is almost nothing. The Pythagoreans hardly attempted to connect their views of the future state, the product of moral instinct and poetic imagination, with the more scientific parts of their system (Zeller *pre-Socr.* I 485 7). It may be remarked that though Philolaus is once mentioned in the *Phaedo* as discountenancing suicide, yet Kebes has 'heard nothing clear from him'; and there is no hint of Pythagorean sources in any of the philosophic theorems on which the arguments for immortality in that dialogue are based.

In much the same position stand Heraclitus and Empedocles, who held similar views. Of Heraclitus, Zeller says: 'It is doubtless his opinion that souls enter the body from a higher existence, and after death, when they have proved themselves worthy of this privilege, they return as daemons into a purer life' (ut supra II 87). But this view is in no way co-ordinated with his general philosophy.

So with regard to Empedocles. In a well-known passage he introduces a fallen spirit explaining that any δαίμων who sins is doomed to wander for 30,000 ὧραι from the society of the Blessed,

> φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν,
> ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.
>
> ὧν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης.

But interesting as is this and his other utterances about the history of the soul, the whole topic is an excrescence on his

system. 'There remains only the supposition that he adopted the doctrine of Metempsychosis and all depending on it, from the Orphico-Pythagorean tradition, without combining it scientifically with his philosophic convictions advanced in another place and in another connexion' (Zeller ut supra II 177).

Thus for a long time the stream of myth and that of philosophy ran on side by side, touching, but hardly commingling. 'A scientific basis was first given to the belief in immortality by Plato' (Zeller ut supra I 74). This basis is found in the doctrine of Ideas.

To examine the progress of Plato's views as shown in his various myths of the soul's history is an interesting, but very difficult task. In the suggestions that we have as to the future state in *Apol.* 40 E foll., there is but little advance from the Homeric standpoint. In the myth that concludes the *Gorgias*, the material is again of the simplest kind. After death the good are sent to the Islands of the Blest, the bad to Tartarus, and the only refinement is the distinction between curable and incurable sinners (526 B). The case is very different when we come to the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. Whatever may have been the order in which these dialogues were written, they agree in this, that in each the mythical material is accompanied by an assertion of the soul's commerce with Ideas, and a demonstration of its immortality. Finally in the *Timaeus* we have myth and philosophy fused into one.

In the *Phaedrus* after the proof of immortality given in ch. XXIV (245 C–246 A) follows the myth of the soul's history —'a masterpiece of the author's myth-making genius: the exemplary specimen of an art of which he has left us many other instances, but none so brilliant and elaborate.' I quote from Dr. Thompson, Intr. p. XVIII, who proceeds: 'In one respect, indeed, this discourse may be said to differ from similar philosophical myths which are scattered in the Platonic writings; it is, in most of its parts, a deliberate allegory, in which the thing signified is designed to be intelligible to the instructed hearer or reader.' In his note on 246 D, however, he admits that 'the sign and the thing signified are intentionally fused.' And indeed a close examination reveals (as must be the case with almost any allegory) not merely certain gaps in the statement, but inconsistencies.

The soul is likened to a winged charioteer driving a winged pair of horses. By this we have figured the tripartite division of the soul, as explained in the *Republic*. The charioteer is Reason, the two steeds are Spirit and Appetite. All three elements are in the original state winged (251 B). With the gods both charioteer and horses are noble, but with other souls

the steed Appetite is of a baser strain. The 'wing' does not represent any *part* of the soul; but something material with which the soul is linked. Though the wing is of the nature of σῶμα, it is the finest and purest σῶμα: κεκοινώνηκε δέ πη μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου (246 D). It bears aloft that to which it is attached, and the Being thus upborne is an ἀθάνατον ζῷον. It is compounded of Soul and Matter; but the union of the two is indissoluble. But the soul that loses its wings is borne down to earth, receives an *earthy* body and becomes θνητὸν ζῷον. Earth, the grossest material element, cannot be *indissolubly* united with soul, and their union is liable to be broken by death.

The wing is thus an upward tendency acting on the soul, and counteracting a permanent downward tendency. How the loss of the wings takes place Plato proceeds to explain. There is no suggestion of any original *sin* to bring this about, as in the lines of Empedocles: the fall seems regarded *mainly* as a matter of fate (τινὶ συντυχίᾳ χρησάμενη 248 C), as in the *Timaeus*.

A vast procession of gods and daemons (unfallen spirits) ever follows the winged chariot of Zeus, as it moves on its providential course *within* the heavenly sphere. The daemons severally follow the train of their patron god, and are thus already differentiated. Within this sphere there is no lack of fair sights and journeys, and here the gods, as they fulfil their several courses, may be followed by any soul that wills.

But all souls, even those of the gods, require occasional refreshing with their proper sustenance, that is by commerce with the world of Reality, the world of Ideas. So 'there is a route which they tread only on their high feast days—a route up-hill from first to last, leading to the very apex of the arch which supports the vault of heaven, and there opening upon its outer circumference, whence they can feast their eyes on the glories of the supra-celestial region, which far exceed the θέαι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ in beauty, as the road which leads to them exceeds in difficulty the beaten highways on which the gods ordinarily go to and fro' (Dr. Thompson on 247 A). Only the chariots of the gods perform this journey with ease and certainty. With them also Reason, the charioteer, directs the two steeds, Spirit and Appetite; but in their case all the three elements are noble.

In this way the nutrition of the wing is accomplished; for the wing, as we read at 246 D, is nourished on the 'fair, wise and good'; in which words, as Dr. Thompson points out, the allegory is partially dropped. The same sense is given at 247 D where the allegory is for the time dropped altogether: the διάνοια of the gods, *and of all souls which are destined to receive their*

rightful inheritance, is fed on pure intelligence (*νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ*). (How it is that some souls fail to enter into 'their rightful inheritance' is explained in the sequel.)

These are borne round one 'revolution' (*περιφορά*) in contemplation of the Ideas. By the *περιφορά* here we must understand, not the Great Year of 10,000 years, but a lesser period. Every tenth millennium is spent by the souls in achieving, or attempting, the supra-celestial circuit. The remaining 9000 years consist of nine periods of 'life' followed by as many periods of 'death' (249 A B, 256 E). Certain expressions indeed, as 248 E *εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστη, οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων* suggest that there are '*ten* millennial probations' (Dr. Thompson ad loc.) the supra-celestial *περιφορά* being *exclusive* of these. Such apparent inconsistencies are quite unimportant; indeed it is hard to see how the supra-celestial state could be measured by time at all. (Cp. a parallel inconsistency between the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* pointed out in the note on **81 B** 33 *ἐνάτῳ ἔτει*.)

As to the word *διάνοια*, it is used here as a synonym for the whole *ψυχή*, where the distinction between the charioteer and the steeds is not insisted on, and the allegory is for the time abandoned. (So at 256 A we have *τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας*, and C *οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ*. Cp. also 251 B *πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ*) *τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή* with 249 C *μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια*.)

The souls run the circuit of the Ideas, Justice, Temperance, Knowledge, etc., until they come back to the point from which they have started. After its feast of truth the divine *διάνοια* returns within the sphere of heaven, and goes to its home. There (the allegory is suddenly resumed) the Charioteer satisfies the steeds, Spirit and Appetite, with 'nectar' and 'ambrosia.'

The above description applies to the gods alone. Other souls follow with different degrees of difficulty. The noblest souls, those most godlike, succeed in keeping the head of the Charioteer in the supra-celestial sphere, and thus remain in continuous communication with the Ideas. We may identify these with the *δαίμονες* mentioned at 247 A as forming the trains of the several gods. A second class only enjoy an interrupted vision; sometimes Reason triumphs over the baser elements, sometimes not. A third class are permanently over-weighted by the baser elements, and are carried round ever struggling to emerge but never succeeding. With the gods the baser element is non-existent; of other souls there are:—

(1) those in which the baser element is in permanent subordination;

(2) those in which there is a continual struggle, with varying result;

(3) those in which the nobler element is in permanent subordination.

(It is worth while to compare this with the more elaborate scale given by Aristotle *N.E.* VII i.)

In what follows it looks at first sight as if Plato had in mind the third of these three classes. It is however clear that he really means mainly the second. For the last class, having had *no* vision of the truth, cannot expect a human incarnation. The first class remain in the divine company, the second sink to human life, the third, we may assume, to the life of brutes. Of the unsuccessful classes, then, many souls are maimed by the fault of the charioteers. Bad training of the baser steed by the charioteer is also spoken of as a cause of mischief at 247 B *ὁ τῆς κακῆς ἵππος μετέχων . . . ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ἢ τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων*. Here we do seem to have the notion that a moral cause may be assigned for the fall. Reason is *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, *τὸ κυβερνητικόν*, and commands the rest of the soul, as the soul commands the body (see on **88 C** 3). Here we have a mythical statement of the doctrine Vice is Ignorance. In the struggle the wing suffers grievously. These souls after labour and sorrow go back to their place without attaining the vision of Truth, and feed henceforth on the 'chaff and husks of Opin'on' (*τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται*). This of course is the antithesis to *νοῦς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκήρατος*, the nutriment of the highest *διάνοιαι*. What, in the case of the less fortunate steeds, corresponds to the 'nectar and ambrosia' of the divine steeds, is not expressed.

The supra-celestial region is called at 248 B *ἀληθείας πεδίον*. The reason why there is such eagerness to attain to this is that there is found the pasturage for the best part of the soul, and that the nature of the wing is thus nourished. Here we have put before us mythically, the doctrine that all desire the Best (**78 B** 4). The *πτερόν* is, I think, not to be *identified* with *τὸ ἄριστον τῆς ψυχῆς*.

Any soul that in company with God sees anything—that is, as Dr. Thompson explains, 'some considerable measure'—of Truth, is to be untroubled till the next revolution, and if it can always attain this, it is to be always unharmed. The *περίοδος* here mentioned must be the Great Year, the period of 10,000 years from one supra-celestial journey to the next. (See Zeller p. 392, and for the Great Year his note 43 on p. 382, and note 64 on p. 412.) But any soul that, falling out of rank in the divine procession, loses the Vision, and by some evil chance founders, filled with forgetfulness and vice, and so loses

its wings and comes to earth—this soul, since it has had at some time commerce with the Ideas, must at its first incarnation be united with the body of a man (cp. *Tim.* 41 E foll.).

According to the degree of vision they have enjoyed, they become either—

1. *φιλόσοφος, ἢ φιλόκαλος, ἢ μουσικός τις καὶ ἐρωτικός,*
2. a King, either a Law-giver, or a Warrior and Ruler,
3. a Statesman, Social Reformer, or Financier,
4. a lover of Labour, a Trainer of the body, or a Surgeon,
5. a soothsayer, or a votary of the mysteries,
6. a poet, or some other 'imitator,'
7. an artisan or husbandman,
8. a sophist or demagogue,
9. a tyrant.

On this passage (248 C) Dr. Thompson remarks 'Those whose powers are unequal to the effort' (of keeping their place in the divine train) 'are in their first earthly genesis incarnated as man, never as beasts; this last degradation being apparently the result of a perverse choice deliberately made by the soul itself at a subsequent period. Human destiny would seem therefore to be partly the result of choice, partly of necessity—and we have here a metaphysical problem clothed in a mythical dress.' This is the doctrine of the *Timaeus* (l.c.); but the description in the *Phaedrus* would seem to suggest that souls of the lowest class, who perform the whole supra-celestial circuit *ὑποβρύχιαι*, without ever seeing the Realities, do enter into beasts even at their first incarnation (cp. 249 B and E). Stress is however laid in the *Phaedrus* on the superior excellence of the first life, as lying nearer to the world of Ideas, and preserving the memory of them still fresh: each soul (252 D) imitates his patron god to the best of his power *ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἀδιάφθορος καὶ τὴν τῇδε πριότην γένεσιν βιοτεύῃ* (cp. 250 E *ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελὴς ἢ διεφθαρμένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος*). On the other hand the Pindar fragment in the *Meno* suggests the view that the highest lives on earth are those nearest the other end of the course, on the eve of the soul's restoration—though of course in Pindar there is no thought of any world of Ideas.

As to the fate that follows the first life we read (248 E) *ἐν δὴ τούτοις ἅπασιν ὃς μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ ἀμείνονος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνει, ὃς δ' ἂν ἀδίκως, χείρονος.* 'The destiny of the soul after death is determined solely by the life it had led on earth, without reference to the ante-natal state. How a *σοφιστής* or a *τύραννος* can be said *δικαίως διάγειν* we are not informed, and the *τούτοις ἅπασιν* must therefore probably be taken with a grain of allowance. It is however noteworthy that, in its *first* genesis, the soul's condition is fixed according to an

intellectual standard (*τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν*) whereas its doom after leaving the body depends on moral considerations (*ὃς ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ*).' (Dr. Thompson's note.)

We must remember, however, that for Plato the antithesis between 'intellectual' and 'moral' is by no means so strong as it seems to us. We have seen that the fall is represented as due in part to the fault of the *ἡνίοχος*, a view which would reduce all vice and error, whether in this life or before it, to intellectual weakness. It is precisely the soul who has 'seen most of the Realities' in a former state, that will 'live most justly' in the present.

But the doctrine of the *Phaedrus* as to the causes of the fall is not clear, and the fatalist view, as seen above, predominates. Not merely as regards the previous state but in regard to *this* life, the *Phaedrus* seems to recognise an element of fate or chance. The soul's life here depends on reminiscence of the Realities ; (250 A) *ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκείνα οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἁπάσῃ, οὔτε ὅσαι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τἀκεῖ, οὔτε αἱ δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι ἐδυστύχησαν, ὥστε ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὧν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν.* 'This may be owing,' says Dr. Thompson, 'to their ill-luck either in the former or in the present state of existence. In the latter case evil associations may have turned them from the right path and clouded their memory.' With this may be contrasted the view in *Rep.* 617 E, which asserts free-will and the responsibility of the individual for all the conditions of this life : *αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος.*

After the first life, then, judgment follows. According to their deserts souls either are sent for the rest of the 1000 years *εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια* (purgatories), or are raised *εἰς οὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον.* (Cp. 256 D, where for the place of punishment occurs the phrase *ἡ ὑπὸ γῆς πορεία*, which also occurs *Rep.* 615 A.) Then comes the choice of a second life. Here a soul that has previously inhabited the body of a man may enter into a beast, and vice versa, always provided that no soul that has never beheld the Ideas can ever enter into the human form (249 B, see on **81 D** 12).

The great majority of souls have nine of these millennial periods to fulfil before they regain their wings, and restored to their original state again commence, or attempt, the supra-celestial circuit. But the soul that has *thrice* running chosen the lot of a guileless votary of philosophy, or of a lover in the highest sense, regains its wings at the end of the third millennial period, instead of the ninth ; and so departs, not yet, we may presume, to the supra-celestial sphere, but rather to the society of the gods *ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ* (249 A, cp. 256 B). Cp. Pindar *Ol.* 2. 68 foll.:

ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐς τρὶς
ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν
ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν· ἔνθα μακάρων
νᾶσον ὠκεανίδες αὖραι περιπνέοισιν· κτέ.

Apparently all souls, at least all that have ever inhabited a human form, are destined to restoration, and the recovery of their wings, after the elapse of the Great Period (248 E). In the light of this must be interpreted the words at 249 C διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια. They seem to refer to the *early* recovery of wings, just mentioned, accorded to the philosopher.

It is not necessary to follow in the same detail the remainder of the myth, in which its application to the doctrine of Ἔρως is explained. The sequel represents the recovery of the wings as a gradual process (251 B C), the chief agency in its accomplishment being Love and Philosophy. The souls of lovers who have enjoyed a pure and philosophic love even for one life only, become *ὑπόπτεροι* (256 B); their wings are sprouting, they have won one of their 'Olympian bouts,' but we must not suppose they are fully fledged till after the third. As it is, they have attained something οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία μανία δύναται πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. Here σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη is not the same as σωφροσύνη δημοτική. It is the human reflexion of divine σωφροσύνη; it is conditioned by human life, but otherwise the best of which man is capable. Next among lovers are those who have only lived up to the standard of popular repute (*φιλότιμοι*). These also are elevated by their love. They die at last *ἄπτεροι*, but their wings are *ready* to sprout. They must not be condemned to the 'subterranean journey,' for they have started on the course up through heaven which will lead them at last to the supra-celestial sphere (256 D). Last we have presented the vulgar connexion, from which Love is absent, where we have οἰκειότης σωφροσύνῃ θνήτῃ συγκεκραμένη. This is popular virtue in its lower aspect, the virtue of the *ὀλιγαρχικός* (see *Rep.* 554 C, and *Phaedo* 68 C with 82 A B); whereas the classes described before correspond respectively to the *ἄριστος* or *φιλόσοφος*, and the *φιλότιμος* of the *Republic*. To cast in your lot with this third grade will cause you to flit 'a senseless shade for nine millenniums over the surface of this earth and beneath it.'

If, unblinded by the magnificence of this allegory, we attempt to analyse it minutely, we cannot help noting a certain amount of vagueness and inconsistency. The question is whether this exists to a larger extent than the nature of allegory makes necessary. I am disposed to think that the myth does show traces of not being the result of a single

inspiration. I venture to offer a suggestion that we may find in the notion of the wing the original kernel of the myth, and that the image of the charioteer and steeds was a subsequent elaboration. But in any case the myth forms a chapter of the utmost importance and interest in the history of the Ideal theory. Plato found in the heaven of Pindar and the Orphics a suitable home in which to place his embodiments of intellectual concepts.

The myths in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* have much in common. Both of them cover a smaller field of speculation than the *Phaedrus* or the *Timaeus*. Each is associated with a proof of the soul's immortality. That in the *Republic* is found at 608 D–611 A, that in the *Phaedo* pervades the entire work. In neither dialogue does the doctrine meet with ready acceptance; in the *Republic* Adimantus receives it with surprise; in the *Phaedo*, Kebes is hard to persuade. In both myths there is a large amount of cosmological matter. But we have nothing about the supra-celestial course, nothing about the final restoration of the soul; these myths deal with the smaller *περίοδος*, a life followed by a death. The period of wandering for the soul after death is given in the *Republic* as 1000 years (615 A B) and the moment of rebirth is called *ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου* (617 D). The incentives to a righteous life are limited to its bearing on the subsequent period of death, and to the preparation of the soul for the ensuing choice of a life. This topic is elaborately handled in the *Republic*; the moment of choice is the grand crisis in which all the results of previous learning and conduct culminate: (618 B) *ἔνθα δή, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητὴς ἔσται, ἐάν ποθεν οἷός τ' ᾖ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα κτέ.* With this may be compared *Phaedo* 107 C D *εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. . . οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.* Cp. 81 E foll. Yet Plato believed—he could not help believing—in heredity (*Rep.* 424 A, 459; *Polit.* 310). Perhaps his teaching might not unfairly be summed up in the maxim, 'You cannot be too particular in the selection of your parents.'

The myth in the *Phaedo* is contained in chapters lvii to lxii, of which the first and last (107 C–108 C, and 113 D–114 C)

are the most important. No definite time is specified for the 'wandering': *τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἥγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις* (107 E). Indeed the time of wandering is not the same for all: *οἱ* (at the *λίμνη Ἀχερουσιάς*) *αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις.*

Lastly, the *Republic* and *Phaedo* agree with the *Gorgias* in recognizing a class of incurable sinners, of whom in the *Republic* (615 C foll.) Ardiaeus is the type. Compare with this *Phaedo* 113 E *οἵ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.* On this A.-H. observes: 'But in *Timaeus* 42 C it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity: nor is this possibility excluded in *Phaedrus* 248 C foll.'

The myth in the *Phaedrus* has most in common with the *Timaeus*, and the myth in the *Republic* with that in the *Phaedo*. As the *Timaeus* is undoubtedly the latest of these four dialogues, this might be taken as prima facie evidence that the *Phaedrus* is the latest of the remaining three. Such an inference would, however, I am persuaded, be mistaken. It must be remembered that the *Republic* and *Phaedo* differ from the *Phaedrus* chiefly in leaving a large part of the mythological material untouched.

The representation by Vergil in *Aen.* VI 735 foll. is very interesting. It is pretty clear that Vergil, starting with a mere imitation of the Homeric nether-world, such as he gives us in *Georg.* IV 467 foll., was superimposing on this a body of philosophic doctrine. But the result is unfinished and probably dislocated. (See Whitelaw in *CR.* V 186.) When we read at 745 foll.—

> donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
> concretam exemit labem, purumque relinquit
> aetherium sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem,

we think we are reading of the ultimate restoration of the soul in purity. Yet this turns out to be merely the prelude to another mortal existence:

> has omnis ubi mille rotam volvere per annos
> Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno.

This is based on *Rep.* 615 A, 621 A.

EXCURSUS VII

Δόξα AND ἐπιστήμη (97 B 17)

The antithesis of δόξα and ἐπιστήμη is prominent in Greek philosophy at least as early as Parmenides. Before him Xenophanes had already said of the speculator concerning the Gods and the Universe

> εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
> αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Parmenides' poem *Nature* 'is traditionally divided into three parts; the "Prooem," "Truth" (τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν), and "Opinion" (τὰ πρὸς δόξαν). In "Truth," starting from the formula "the Ent is, the Non-ent is not," Parmenides attempted to distinguish between the unity or universal element of nature, and its variety or particularity, insisting upon the reality of its unity, which is therefore the object of Knowledge, and upon the unreality of its variety, which is therefore the object, not of Knowledge, but of Opinion' (*Encyc. Brit.* art. 'Parmenides').

He passes from the section 'Truth' to the section 'Opinion' in the following lines:

> ἐν τῷ σοι παύσω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
> ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
> μάνθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων,

and then proceeds to propound a theory of the world of *seeming* and its development, pointing out, however, that, in accordance with the principles already laid down, these cosmological speculations do not pretend to anything more than probability; and ends his description with the words:

> οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε. (R. & P. § 102 c d.)

As to the precise import that Parmenides attached to his account of the World κατὰ δόξαν, there has been much dispute. (An important new work, *Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit* by Dr. A. Patin, is reviewed by Mr. John Burnet in *CR.* XIV 312.)

We may probably rest assured that the account was meant seriously, not ironically. Parmenides felt, as the article in the *Encyc. Brit.* puts it, that 'a natural history of illusion is a

necessary sequel to the account of Truth.' The section Δόξα springs in fact from the ineradicable desire to constitute some system for practical purposes, after it has become evident how little of our thought falls within the province of flawless certainty. Parmenides, Plato and other ancient philosophers taught that there were two paths for the mind, an upper and a lower; that the upper path was not only the nobler but the more important, and to this we ought to strive to attain. In modern times it has come to be seen more clearly that the lower path is really the only one, and that invulnerable 'necessary' Truth is from its nature sterile. At the same time the nature of the infirmities and limitations of the conclusions by which we practically guide our lives is better understood.

The scepticism of Socrates naturally led him to the view 'that while scientific truth is unattainable by man, right opinion is the only ground for right action' (*Encyc. Brit.* art. 'Sophist' 266 a, cp. art. 'Socrates' 237). This view strongly recalls the conclusion of the *Meno*, with the difference that Plato does not absolutely despair of the attainment of the higher level, Knowledge.

Among Socrates' followers, besides Plato, the subject received attention from Antisthenes, who, as we are told by Diogenes Laertius (VI 17), wrote four books Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης. R. & P. § 146 b suggest that the phrase ὀρθή or ἀληθὴς δόξα may have been derived from Antisthenes.

In tracing the contrast of ἐπιστήμη and δόξα in Plato's writings we must never forget that the contrast was familiar in Greek thought before Plato's time. Certain points, chiefly as to the nomenclature adopted by Plato, may be of sufficient interest to justify the inquiry.

In the earlier dialogues of Plato the word δόξα hardly occurs in a technical sense. Not much stress can be laid upon *Charm.* 168 A, where in the discussion of the question whether there can be an ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, a Knowledge that is Knowledge of itself simply without any external object, it is asked whether similarly there can be a δόξα δόξης; for similar questions have already been asked about Sensation and Emotion.

In the *Gorgias* we get a clear recognition of two different grades of apprehension, though this is expressed in other terms than δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. After Rhetoric has been defined (453 A) as πειθοῦς δημιουργός, the contrast between Rhetoric and Arithmetic brings out the point that there are two kinds of πειθώ, one accompanied by μάθησις, the other not. Πότερον οὖν, asks Socrates (454 D), ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσει δὲ

ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· ἆρ' ἔστι τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής; φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Here we have no mention of δόξα, πίστις being used instead. Again at 465 A we read τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν (τὴν ῥητορικὴν) οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει, ὁποῖ' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα. Cp. 501 A. Here the relation of ἐμπειρία to τέχνη is analogous to that of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη. As δόξα does not occur (in the technical sense) in the *Gorgias*, so πίστις does not occur in the *Meno*. In later dialogues, as in the *Philebus* 58 E foll., δόξα is expressly assigned as the sphere of Rhetoric. It seems probable that the *Gorgias* represents a stage before δόξα had come to fill so important a place in Plato's nomenclature as it afterwards did.

In the later rhetorical dialogue, the *Phaedrus*, we get some indications of δόξα as a technical term. We can hardly reckon as such the difficult passage 237 D foll. There are, we are told, two forces acting upon us, ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου. . . δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα· ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη. Here the definition of σωφροσύνη, as the product of δόξα λόγῳ ἄγουσα, recalls what we read elsewhere of the origin of popular Virtue. But here there is no contrast between δόξα and something *higher* (ἐπιστήμη): there is a contrast between δόξα and something *lower* (ἐπιθυμία). Nor is the phrase in the description of the nobler horse (252 E), ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος, to the point. The words are probably spurious, and in any case ἀληθίνη δόξα must mean something different from ἀληθὴς δόξα. (See Dr. Thompson's note.) But the antithesis ἐπιστήμη)(δόξα comes out quite clearly at 247 D, 248 B. The highest διάνοιαι are fed νῷ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ: those who fail of the heavenly vision τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται (see Exc. VI p. 292). Later in the dialogue comes the passage in which the verdict of the *Gorgias* on Rhetoric is revised. Phaedrus has heard that the Orator need not busy himself about τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντα τῷ πλήθει (260 A; cp. C δόξας πλήθους). Socrates shows that a knowledge of the Truth is a necessary condition of the power to persuade: λόγων ἄρα τέχνην (262 B), ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκὼς γελοίαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται. Further in 275 A Thamus says to Theuth about his invention of writing οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὗρες· σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν,

οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις. But in all this we do not get beyond the old antithesis current before Plato.

The special doctrine of Plato as to the relation of δόξα to ἐπιστήμη is to be looked for in the *Meno*, the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. Of these three expositions that in the *Meno* is probably the earliest. It should be noted that whereas Parmenides made Opinion correlative to μὴ ὄν, the non-existent, Plato in these dialogues makes it correlative to something *intermediate* between Being and Not-being. Later, in the *Sophist*, we have the term μὴ ὄν itself analyzed and its ambiguity explained. The problem presented at the end of the *Protagoras* is in the *Meno* carried a step towards solution by the doctrine of δόξα. On the other hand the doctrine of δόξα propounded in the *Meno*, etc., receives in the *Theaetetus* an important development.

In the passage of the *Rep.* (506 c), quoted in the note on **97 B** 17, the epithet *αἰσχραί* seems discordant with the view taken in the *Meno* of the value of ἀληθὴς δόξα. But the context shows it is ironical. It *would* be *αἰσχρόν* to content ourselves with *τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά* on the nature of the Good, *if* it were possible *παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά*. But Glaucon knows quite well that it is not, and is ready to acquiesce when Socrates proposes for the present to take the lower method. A similar ambiguous character attaches to the ethical counterpart of δόξα, Popular Virtue, which is honourable or dishonourable according as it is the highest standard attainable in mundane circumstances, or a lazy and specious substitute for something better. For the Good is the enemy of the Best. See on **100 A** 6.

The passage from the *Symposium* also quoted on **97 B** 17 is succeeded by some most important thoughts in which the view taken of δόξα and ἔρως is generalized. They fall within the function of *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, and that is to be intermediary between gods and men. *Ἢν τὸ δαιμόνιον* (202 e) *μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ καὶ θνητοῦ. Τίνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον; Ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παὰ θεῶν.* ἔρως, to which δόξα is correlated, is an intermediate link between Ignorance and Knowledge, between Earth and Heaven (see on **76 C** 16). So the stage of aspiration, of φιλοσοφία, belongs not to the highest existences, but to those conscious of an inferiority in themselves and of an ideal outside themselves: (203 e) *σοφίας δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν* ("Ερως)· *ἔχει γὰρ ὧδε. Θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι. ἔστι γάρ· οὐδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ.* Somewhat as for the production of mechanical energy a contact of bodies at different temperatures is necessary, so is a sense of deficiency a necessary

condition of spiritual energy or *φιλοσοφία*. Plato had already expressed a similar thought in *Lys.* 218 A: *διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαίμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἴτε θεοί εἴτε ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν οὗτοι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ἀγνοιαν ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι· κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν. λείπονται δὴ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἄγνοιαν, μήπω δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν.*

At *Symp.* 207 E we have an interesting passage illustrating the genesis of *ἐπιστήμη* from *δόξα* expounded in the *Meno*. Here we read no longer of an absolute changeless *ἐπιστήμη*; but are told how matters of human knowledge (*ἐπιστῆμαι*) share the characteristics of growth and decay that attach to everything human: *πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀποπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοί ἐσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταὐτὸν πάσχει. δ γὰρ καλεῖται μελετᾶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης σῴζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν.*

Certain places in the *Republic* bear upon the use of *πίστις* and *δόξα* in Plato's nomenclature. At 505 E *οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ, πίστει* is nearly equivalent to *δόξῃ*. At 511 E, 534 A we find *πίστις* made the superior division of *δόξα*, a sub-division which is abandoned at the latter of these passages (cp. on **98 B** 2). At 601 E *πίστις* and *δόξα* are used interchangeably: *οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν* (the flautist) *ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ* (the flute-maker) *πιστεύων ποιήσει;* Ναί. *Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἕξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην.* Πάνυ γε. *Ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἕξει ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν;* Οὐδέτερα. *Οὔτε ἄρα ἕξεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς κτέ.*

In the *Theaetetus* (201 A B) we have an advance upon the nomenclature of the *Gorgias* (454 D), where the result of oratory was expressed as *πίστις*. The term *δοξάζειν* is now correlated with *πίστις*: *οὗτοι γάρ που* (*οἱ ῥήτορες*) *τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν, οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται.* Orators are unable *διδάξαι ἱκανῶς*, but only *πεῖσαι.* ΣΩ. *Τὸ πεῖσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;* ΘΕΑΙ. *Τί μήν;* ΣΩ. *Οὐκοῦν ὅταν ὀρθῶς πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἐστὶν εἰδέναι,*

ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν ;

In the *Parmenides* δόξα simply appears in a list with ἐπιστήμη, αἴσθησις and other faculties (142 A, 155 D, 164 A).

In the *Timaeus* 29 C, ὅ τί περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια, πίστις is equivalent to δόξα. On 37 B δόξαι καὶ πίστεις βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς A.-H. says 'there is a slight chiasmus; βέβαιοι is appropriate to πίστεις and ἀληθεῖς to δόξαι.' But πίστις and δόξα are practically synonyms.

The sequel shows a strong contrast between πίστεις and δόξαι on the one hand, which are formed when the soul is busy in the domain of the Sensible, and νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε which are perfected when the soul is occupied with the Rational.

The difference between the two planes of thought is nowhere more constantly and strongly affirmed than in the *Timaeus*; and the note is made prominent early in the dialogue. ἔστιν οὖν δὴ (says Socrates 27 D) κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἄλογον δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.

Further may be quoted 51 D ὧδε δ' οὖν τήν γ' ἐμὴν αὐτὸς τίθεμαι ψῆφον· εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθὴς ἑστον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὑτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἴδη, νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ', ὡς τισι φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθὴς νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ' ὁπόσ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, θετέον βεβαιότατα. δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον κτέ. 'Summing up all previous discussions, the *Timaeus* declares that Knowledge (νοῦς) is implanted in us by instruction, Right Opinion by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason (λόγος), the other is without reason; the one is not to be moved by persuasion, the other may be moved; and lastly every man may be said to participate in Right Opinion, but in νοῦς only the gods and very few men' (Zeller p. 174).

The phrase ὀρθὴ δόξα occurs several times in the *Philebus*. In the contest between Pleasure and Reason, it is ranked as allied with the latter (11 B); Right Opinion is a concomitant of Right Pleasures 37 D, 38 A. In the *Laws* 632 A, 653 A, ἀληθὴς δόξα is mentioned side by side with φρόνησις, distinguished from it though not contrasted.

The distinction of ἐπιστήμη from δόξα ἀληθής was preserved by Aristotle; see *Anal. post.* I 33 = 88 b 30 quoted by R. & P. 311 B b: τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων κτέ. See too *NE.* VII iii 3, 4, with Grant's note.

It hardly belongs to the present place to consider at any length the development of the doctrine of δόξα in the *Theaetetus*. A general reference may be given to H. Jackson's paper in *JP.* XIII pp. 242 foll.

The three sections into which that dialogue is divided correspond respectively to the definitions of ἐπιστήμη as (1) αἴσθησις, (2) δόξα ἀληθής, (3) δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου. The first section does not now concern us; in the second certain important points are cleared up that might suggest themselves to a reader of the *Meno*. How is False Opinion possible? (180 A) οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἐσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. But it is just the omission of these things from consideration that is one main cause of our trouble: 'in other words, so long as we ignore the states of learning and forgetting, which are intermediate between absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance, no place can be found for False Opinion' (*JP.* XIII p. 258, cp. Zeller p. 171). The Eristic quibble about False Opinion meets us already in *Euthyd.* 286 C ἄλλο τι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν; (τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἢ γάρ;) ἀλλ' ἢ λέγοντ' ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ λέγειν; (The sophist agrees). Πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μέντοι ἔστιν; Οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα ψευδής, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν· Οὐκ ἔφη. It here appears that another source of confusion is the ambiguity of the phrase τὰ μὴ ὄντα, which may mean either 'what is non-existent,' or 'what is other than the fact.'

But though the possibility of False Opinion, and consequently the legitimacy of the phrase 'True Opinion,' is thus demonstrated, yet the gulf that yawns between True Opinion and Knowledge still remains (201 B). This forms the transition to the third section. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιόντος του ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά. The view here put forward strikingly recalls that of the *Meno*. But οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων must refer to the strange word ἐπιστητά—a word which does not occur in the *Meno*, nor indeed in any place in Plato except this in the *Theaetetus*. This makes it probable that the passage in the *Theaetetus* is *not* a criticism on the *Meno*. Another difference between the phraseology of the *Meno* and that of the *Theaetetus* strengthens this view. The distinctive phrase μετὰ λόγου does not occur in the *Meno* **98 A**. On the other hand we have in the *Meno* the hint that ἐπιστήμη differs from ὀρθὴ δόξα, αἰτίας λογισμῷ. This hint, it is true, is only put forward

tentatively ; Socrates utters it *ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων*. That there is a difference between *ὀρθὴ δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη* he holds as firm ground ; but the problem of the nature of the difference Plato had not fully solved when he wrote the *Meno*. It is remarkable that the speculation suggested in the words *αἰτίας λογισμῷ*, though indicated in the *Gorg.* 465 A (see p. 300), is in the *Theaetetus*, so far as I can see, neither criticized nor developed.

Two other passages must be cited as recalling the phraseology of the *Meno*. In the *Phaedo* 96 B, Socrates, running through his former speculations, says he inquired whether it is through the brain that we get sensations, *ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην*. The other is *Polit.* 309 C : *τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὁπόταν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνηται, θείαν φημὶ ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει*.

A few words may be added on the subject of the relation of *δόξα* to Discourse. It appears in the *Meno* (**85 C**) that *δόξαι* arise in the individual soul, and that it is by dialectic, by friction with *other* minds, that these become converted into matters of Knowledge. We find passages in which it is noted as a mark of *δόξα* that it belongs to the *separate* workings of the mind ; e.g. in *Theaet.* 187 A Socrates speaks of a certain faculty of the soul *ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα*. ΘΕΑΙ. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, δοξάζειν*. ΣΩ. *Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ φίλε*. The same view is carried on at 189 E ΣΩ. *Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἆρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς ;* ΘΕΑΙ. *Τί καλῶν ;* ΣΩ. *Λόγον δν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἐνδάλλεται διανοουμένῃ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρήμενον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οἰδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν*. This makes it the easier to understand why when later the phrase *δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου* is analyzed, it is thought necessary to suggest as one possible meaning of *λόγος* 'vocal expression' (206 D). Of course it at once appears that *λόγος* understood in this sense is a quite inadequate expression of the difference between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*. (Note that while in the *Republic* (511 D) *διάνοια* is made the inferior division of *τὸ νοητόν* and to lie *μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ*, in the *Theaetetus* *διάνοια* is represented as preparatory to *δόξα*.)

Very much the same view of *δόξα* occurs *Soph.* 263 E ΞΕ.

Οὐκοῦν διάνοια καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. To λόγος, continues the Stranger, belong assertion and negation; ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅ τι προσείπῃς αὐτό; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; Cp. with this the view of δόξα in *Philebus* 38 C. You see an object indistinctly in the distance. Then follows the internal colloquy (διάνοια): What is that yonder? Is it a man? Or is it perchance an image set up by the shepherds? Κἂν μέν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἂν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

But this distinction between δόξα and Discourse does not in the least overlie or obliterate the grand distinction between δόξα and Knowledge; indeed not long after the passage just quoted from the *Sophist* we have the old distinction reappearing (268 A) οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει.

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)(= distinguished from.

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